THE

THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC.

A SERIES OF THEOLOGICAL PAPERS CHIEFLY SELECTED FROM THE PERIODICAL AND OTHER LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND HOLLAND.

EDITED BY

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THE

THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC.

THE SKEPTICISM OF THE PRESENT DAY.*

There is a kind of doubt, at once modest and bold, by which the wisest of the Greeks, Socrates, counselled his disciples to free themselves from the prejudices of education and of the schools. Freedom such as this was the prelude to a serious search after truth, and was intended to point the way from the confused domain of opinion to the clear light of knowledge. Again: one of the greatest of modern philosophers, Descartes, places himself, by an act of his own will, in a state of doubt, and that the most complete. The general unsettlement of all his beliefs is the means which he chooses, in order to discover a firm basis on which, as on a solid rock, he may rest his views. Doubt such as this, springs from the belief in the existence of truth, and under one form or another, has a well-defined place in the regular development of the human mind.

Skepticism, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, is doubt of a totally different nature—since it consists in asserting the impossibility of knowing what is truth. This kind of doubt does not proceed from faith; it is the offspring of despondency. Far from being the starting-point of a serious search after truth, it must conclude, if it be consistent with itself, that all such research is vain, and must remain in the silence of despair. The poet exclaims, "Insensate the mortal who

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* Read before the Geneva Conference of the Evangelical Alliance, September, 1861, by Professor Ernest Naville, of Genève.

thinks! All thought is an error!" He thus appropriately concludes, "Let us live and die in silence." Indeed, as has often been remarked, why should the skeptics speak? They contradict themselves by even laying down their thesis, since they thus attempt to mark with the seal of truth, the very affirmation which declares the knowledge of the truth to be impossible. What motive induces them to disseminate the doubts which have destroyed their own convictions? I do not contemplate here those writers who make traffic of their ideas, or regard them simply as a means of acquiring fame. I speak rather of men whose high character raises them even above the suspicion of such motives. Why should they speak of their views? Can it be that they are such bitter enemies of the human race, whose belief seems to insult the poverty of their thoughts, that they wish to make their fellows sharers in their own misfortune? Are they like those unfortunate people, who, having themselves been driven from their homes by the flames, rush blindly to and fro, carrying a blazing firebrand to spread all around the destruction which has made them desolate? No, it is not thus. Skeptics speak, study and teach, because a vague image of the truth floats ever before their eyes in spite of their system. Their studies, their speeches, their books contradict their doctrine, and if consistent and absolute skepticism escape every other refutation, it sufficiently refutes itself every time it speaks.

But universal skepticism has few representatives in our day, and we are not called upon to take it into serious consideration. Ancient legends relate that the celebrated Pyrrho was the object of constant care and watchfulness to his disciples; for as he doubted everything, he would not have even thought it necessary to use a stick to drive away a dog, or to turn aside to avoid a precipice, for nothing proved to him the existence of precipices, or the reality of dogs. We are not in the same predicament. We believe enough—we believe only too much, in physical realities, in the material world, in the science which explains it, and in that practical industry, the daughter of science which every day gains new victories over nature. No one disputes the harmony that exists between the thoughts of our minds and the phenomena of matter. But do we wish to go upward to the source of this harmony, to

apprehend from it the existence of a God, the Creator both of mind and matter? Do we wish to assert an existence in the future beyond the bounds of immediate observation? Here we are arrested. Skepticism rises before us in all its magnitude, like one of those gigantic clouds, which enveloping the traveler on the top of a mountain, and concealing from him all the horizon, permits him to see only the barren rock on which his feet rest, and the nearest fir-trees of the neighboring forest.

The most serious and the only dangerous form of skepticism is that which allows to man the experimental knowledge of nature and of society, and at the same time forbids to him every affirmative proposition beyond the horizon of this present life. Skepticism such as this will be the special object of our consideration in this discourse.

I propose first to consider the symptoms of the skeptical spirit of our time as it appears in the most general and ordinary occupations and interests of men; then to fix our attention upon the special domain of science; and lastly, to draw from this subject the conclusions to which it conducts.

I. With respect to subjects of general interest, we shall successively direct our attention to politics, religion, and literature.

The domain of politics has never been possessed of much stability, but the degree in which it has been shaken has varied. In modern times there have been few convulsions to compare with the French Revolution, that great shock, the reaction of which is still so strongly felt. History has rarely exhibited scenes like that of the great soldier of fortune, crowned by victory amid the anarchy of his country, and leading his armies through Europe like a rushing whirlwind, tearing off kingly crowns, and sweeping away the boundaries of empires. These great events have imparted a keen interest to politics; and the providential elevation of the poorer classes to the ranks of the educated has rendered this interest general throughout the whole frame-work of society. Objects of interest formerly reserved for men of rank, or diplomatists, now become the subject of conversation in the coffee-houses or club-rooms of the cities, and in the village taverns. Now, what is it that is daily going on in this domain thus more and

more opened to all? The great object of the politician is success, and too often state policy is only the collossal application of a maxim which has been justly condemned, but much less condemned than practiced—"*The end justifies the means.*" If falsehood and treachery, and the flagrant violation of right, are openly employed in support of a cause reputed good, some timid protests are indeed heard, but these are speedily stifled by the voice of success. The wise and the learned come forward and tell us that such has always been the case in political matters, and that it is necessary to submit, and the consciences of men are silent, and become habitually silent, with respect to things which most keenly interest and excite men in general. This is an injury to society, and it is, above all, an injury to the consciences of men. For what, in truth, is the state of the question? The great laws of moral order—those eternal laws which injustice violates, but can never affect—in presence of which a reverse is never a condemnation, and a triumph never an apology—which proclaim that there are honorable misfortunes, and victories more shameful than defeats—these laws are forced to be silent in the presence of success (*du fait accompli*). Morality is proscribed in the domain of politics, and as each individual has his special political views, he has only to take one step further in order to banish it altogether from his daily life, leaving it as a favor a place in philosophical treatises, in sermons, and in catechisms.

Think you that the conscience can be thus assailed without the greatest danger to the stability of religious convictions? Alas! political leaders do not know the evil that they do to the human race when they thus crush under foot the most fundamental principles, in those acts which form the universal subject of interest to men. But it is not our mission here to give a lesson to kings and their ministers. Let us confine ourselves to proving that the skepticism of our day receives considerable support from politics.

Religion presents itself as a haven of rest for the soul, wearied with the vacillation of earthly things. Therefore, if the development of political interests favors doubt, the development of religious interests ought to withstand this fatal tendency. This is doubtless the case, and each of the

triumphs of the Gospel is another stay and support on which the thoughts of men may rest. But this light is not without shade, and it is the darker aspect of the religious manifestations of our time that our subject now calls upon us to consider.

We bear the penalty of the faults of our forefathers. The Gospel has made, and continues to make, the conquest of the world, according to the prophecy of the Son of God. The symbol of the Crucified has taken its place above kingly crowns, and the word of Christ has changed the manners and institutions of nations. But religion has been compromised by its very triumphs. Too often has it become one of the things of this world—a means of acquiring riches, an instrument of attaining power—and the more its representatives have been guilty of these crimes, the more the spirit of skepticism has increased. The scandals of the eighteenth century are not yet so distant from our time, that their sad traces have entirely disappeared. Who can calculate the strength given to skepticism by a clergy scoffing in the drawing-room at the God whom they preached in the church; and seeing in the Gospel of Salvation only the means of a shameful traffic? But without pausing to consider such lamentable examples, is it not manifest that the more religion takes the character of a worldly institution, of a means used for the pursuit of purely terrestrial interests, the more is true faith withdrawn from the souls of men? When the salt has lost its savor, men tread it under foot.

Doubtless, gentlemen, we live in a time when, thanks to God, the salt is beginning to recover its savor. When we have confessed our weakness, reckoned up our miseries, and acknowledged all the impurities which have mingled with the religious manifestations of our time, it is still not the less true, that in every part of Christendom, for a period of fifty years, there has been an awakening in the consciences of men, and a serious return to the truths of the Gospel.

But along with an interest in religious things, there has been awakened at the same time a spirit of controversy and dispute; and as, like an irresistible instinct, our reason teaches us that truth is one, therefore religious controversies are the means of sowing the seeds of doubt in many minds. We can

not here even approach this subject in its formidable depths; but it is important to remark that the more the spirit of doubt is diffused in the world, the more ought Christians to manifest and bring prominently forward the common basis of their faith, and give a subordinate place to the slight diversities of their beliefs. The meetings of your society, gentlemen, and the object at which you aim, testify, I am aware, to a desire for union which, perhaps, only requires to attain the fullness of its manifestation, in order to become in spiritual things one of the most important agents of our time. But you represent only one of the three great divisions of Christendom. Permit me to tell you—my subject authorizes me, and my convictions oblige me to do so—when you enter into a controversy with the other members of Christendom, do so only when feeling it a positive duty, and realizing that you are under the eye of God. Do not forget that there is no more active cause of unsettling religious belief, no more fruitful source of skepticism, than the spectacle of disputes, and more especially angry disputes, between men professing a common faith in the salvation which has been purchased for them by the life, the death, and the resurrection of the God-man.

Let us pause a moment to consider one particular aspect of this vast question. In the controversies of our time there appears a struggle always existing in the world of thought, the struggle between *the principle of authority and the principle of liberty*. Faith in its fullness is the reconciliation of these two principles. Faith, in truth, is not slavery, it is obedience. Obedience presupposes legitimate authority; and, on the other hand, as Vinet remarks, "without liberty obedience can not exist, and there is not even any use for the word." But this faith which reconciles principles apparently so opposite, has been injured by our controversies. The partisans of the abstract principle of authority construct a Catholicism which is disowned by their own church. The defenders of the abstract principles of liberty found a Protestantism which is disowned by all conscientious Christians; and skepticism appears equally at the extreme boundary of these two lines of thought.

One party wish to establish authority on the ruins of reason,

instead of acknowledging the wants of the understanding, giving them vitality, and pointing them to the truths of the Gospel as to what can alone truly satisfy them. These apologists, inadequate to the task they have undertaken, have created skepticism while trying to promote the faith. They collect all the reasons for doubt to be found in the annals of philosophy, they amplify them, they exaggerate them, they treat human reason with proud disdain. What is the consequence? If the souls of men escape from the yoke of unreflecting belief, which they endeavor to impose upon them, they stumble into despondency and uncertainty, because the rays of light have been extinguished which were intended to lead them to the source of light. The Abbé de Lamennais presents us with a notable example of such a shipwreck of the faith. This eloquent writer wished to establish the authority of his church on the ruins of reason. An incident occurred in which the court of Rome did not agree with him, and the whole of Christian truth was vailed from his eyes because he had himself sapped the foundations upon which it rests.

The principle of liberty separated from faith furnishes to the spirit of doubt a still more dangerous support in the present state of public feeling. Liberty is the necessary means of attaining truth, because it is the essential condition of a real conviction. If liberty manifests the division and the opposition of the opinions of men, it manifests it as an evil, but a passing evil, in the point of view of the ideal; for free and living union, union in the same light and the same love, is the only legitimate object of our efforts. These fundamental principles are too often forgotten. In opposition to the Catholicism of Mons. de Lamennais, there has arisen a Protestantism affirming diversity to be an absolute good, and glorying in its very divisions. We see a Protestantism arise which renounces the pursuit of the unity of the faith, proclaiming that all thoughts are of equal value, that there is a truth for each individual, that is to say, that there is no truth at all, and imprudently holding out before our eyes the hand of fellowship to philosophy the most skeptical.

"There is more happiness in knowing than in searching after knowledge," said Aristotle, the philosopher, because he thought that truth is the first good of the soul, and its

possession the source of the highest satisfaction. But truth requires obedience; the man who has found it feels that he must submit to it; while in simply seeking after it, in the mere exercise of thought, he seems to enjoy a sort of absolute independence. A false spirit of liberty, which is, in truth, only a rebellion against our position as creatures, may make men fear to yield to the dominion of acknowledged truth, and prefer the pleasure of thought, amusing itself by a search without end, if that can be called a search when one is resolved not to find. Pascal, the great explorer of the human heart, remarks this fact, and stigmatizes it as one of our miseries. The German, Lessing, glories in this misery. He thus writes—"If God were to offer me truth in His right hand, and the search after truth in His left, and were to command me to choose, I would throw myself eagerly to the left, saying, 'Father, grant me this! keep the truth for Thyself alone!'" This strange, I had almost said blasphemous, speech, does not want admirers in the France of our day. Men wish to be free, and truth would retain them. They, therefore, renounce truth, in order to preserve the pleasure of independence. It is sufficiently difficult to understand how philosophers can speak thus, but it is still more surprising to see such tendencies intrude themselves even into the things of religion, and spring from a theological education. Such, notwithstanding, is the case.

Since abundant sources of skepticism are thus found even in the domain of religion, not less than in the field of politics, you can not be astonished to see analogous tendencies manifest themselves in the literature of the day, this general expression of human thought.

One remarkable fact here claims our attention, and will singly suffice for this brief sketch. Journalism in all its forms, from its lightest leaves appearing in the morning of each day, to those more serious collections which count their dates by weeks or months—journalism occupies a constantly-increasing space in the domain of public attention. There are some journals devoted to the defense of fixed principles, but their readers are comparatively few in number. To which, then, belongs the widest circulation? To those periodicals which, faithful, perhaps, if not to political principles,

at least to the interests and passions of one class of society, yet present, in other respects, the most complete mixture of opinions the most contradictory. As to their morality, an article of a pure tendency may stand side by side with a most pernicious novel.

A mother will forbid such reading to her daughter. As to religion, an apology for Catholicism, a defense of Protestant principles, a eulogy on Deism, may be found under the same cover which equally shelters the theses of atheism and the doctrines of nihilism. Literary criticism is distinguished by a disposition to comprise all, in order to justify all, by this refinement of tolerance which tolerates everything, evil as well as good. Doubtless, in these facts we see primarily a manifestation of the general state of public opinion; for journalists seek for readers, and study the taste of their subscribers. But this manifestation itself becomes a cause. These journals and reviews are read; but how are they read? Is it in a serious and active frame, judging gravely of the thoughts which pass before the eye of the mind? Do we enter into these bazaars of the intellect with the firm purpose to prove all things, and hold fast only that which is good? Such, indeed, is the disposition of some, at least, at certain times. But, in general, periodicals are not reckoned among our serious studies, but are read as a pleasant recreation. We open the newspaper at the breakfast-table, we cast our eyes over it hastily before going out to the business or amusement of the day. The review is taken up at our leisure moments, is opened, thrown aside and opened again, without any efforts of thought or steady exercise of judgment. This is all very well as regards the passing politics of the day, the local news, or the harmless effusions of the imagination. But moral and religious questions occupy a daily increasing place in these fugitive publications. On the great subjects of God himself, of the soul, and of its destiny, we find, in the same journal, the most contradictory opinions under the deceptive unity of the same sheet or of the same cover. When I close the volumes of Pascal or Bossuet to open those of Voltaire, I am well aware that I am passing from one region of the intellectual world into a region wholly different. If I read the newspaper of one party after the newspaper of the party

opposed to it, I am not ignorant that I have listened to the advocates of opposite principles. But in the present state of the periodical press, ideas the most contradictory pass before the minds of careless readers, who find nothing to arouse them from this carelessness, and who are not warned by any exterior circumstances that they are passing from the writings of a Christian to those of a deist, or from the writings of a deist to those of an atheist. The result of this, be assured, is a great unsettling of all belief. Formed in a school like this, the young contract the habit of hearing with indifference the holiest truths affirmed and denied by turns. Before they have any fixed opinions, they learn to listen to those who tell them that firm belief is a mark of ignorance and folly, and that the proof of superiority of mind and elevation of thought is to wander freely in the world of intellect without ever being steady to anything. This is one of the serious dangers of our time, and points out to us a great duty. I propose to you, gentlemen, a work which I know to be difficult; but when was it ever easy to accomplish anything great? We must labor to annihilate this corrupt and mercenary press, which seeks success alone, careless of the true interests of souls, and which has directly inherited the sophisms of ancient Athens. It is necessary that a stable opinion should be formed and prominently brought forward, so as to carry with it the writers who occupy the place of organs and directors of public thought. Without any proper call or authority, the door must no longer be carelessly opened to articles which one day glorify God and the next day deny Him, which one morning praise the holiness of Christian morality and the following morning labor to sap it in its most sacred precepts. In ancient times, the Greek Carneades secured the applause of the Roman youth by pronouncing an eloquent speech in praise of justice, and afterward demonstrating with similar eloquence that justice is nothing. Cato the Elder demanded that this dangerous man should be immediately expelled from the city. Many of our journals are like Carneades, but the Catos among their subscribers are few.

II. If the ordinary occupations of our day thus produce incorrectness of thought, shall we find *in the calm regions of science* a shelter ever open, where our unsettled convictions

may again become fixed? This is the question which now presents itself for our examination.

Modern science has two titles to glory—its discoveries in the study of nature, and its investigations in the domain of history. Nothing at first sight can seem more fitted to establish our faith in the invisible world.

Does not nature reveal to the least attentive eye the perfections of its Author? If the stars revolving through space obey a great command that they have never heard, if the insect floating through the air, if the blade of grass springing from the soil, proclaim unconsciously the wonders of Divine wisdom, shall man not feel it incumbent on him to give a voice to nature, to translate into distinct accents the confused murmur of the creation, celebrating the praises of its Author? And does not the obligation to do so increase in proportion as science initiates him more deeply into the secrets of the universe?

Nature has its utterances of faith. What shall we say of history? Is Divine wisdom not still more admirable in the world of liberty than in the world of nature? Its material elements in their varied combinations, the plant in the mysteries of its vegetation, the animal in the wonders of its life and of its instincts, manifest without thwarting the power which governs them. Man alone revolts against his Creator; and yet, notwithstanding his revolt, nay, even by his very revolt, he accomplishes the decrees of a superior Power which bends all to His own will. At first sight, the progress of society may appear to be only a confused concourse of events without order, and of passions conflicting in darkness. But seen from a higher stand-point, it reveals a fixed plan. Humanity has its destinies toward which it moves onward, the Divine scheme everywhere breaks through from beneath the fantastic or shameful tissue of human liberty, and the only conclusion worthy of history must always be that of Bossuet: "Let us not speak of chance or fortune, or let us speak of it only as a name with which we cover our ignorance. For that which is chance with respect to our uncertain plans, is a well-concerted design in higher counsels, and in that eternal counsel which includes all causes and all effects in one great system."

History and nature have thus alike their utterances for faith, and this faith ought to give vitality and enhancement to all the conquests of science. Our age, so proud of its discoveries, ought, if possible, to adore with still more fervor than Newton, the Creator of the stars, and to find for human history words still more noble than those of Bossuet. Too often the opposite is the result. But the matter in hand is not now to disparage our age, for we are not called upon to judge it. Yet we can not mistake the fact. For many minds, the science of history and the science of nature are pierced at the root by a destructive insect, and present to our generation only foliage blighted by doubt, and the bitter fruits of skepticism. "How is the fine gold changed into vile lead!"

The study of the laws of the universe, and of the destinies of humanity, nourishes faith; but before being nourished, it is necessary that faith should exist. The oil poured into the lamp feeds the flame, but can never create it. An erring science too often hinders the mind from ever going upward to the great First Cause, as if, in order the better to see the earth, it were necessary to extinguish the celestial ray which alone warms and enlightens it. Hence doubt as to spiritual truth flows in large measure from the exclusive study of facts which are submitted to present observation.

The duty of the historian is to avoid hasty views and arbitrary generalizations, and to study facts in their details and in their different lights. If, in order to this, he leaves God out of view, and thus shuts himself out from the source of elevated thought, he soon contracts a sort of disdain for all affirmations which transcend the immediate object of his study. Thus deprived of a loftier view, his eye rests on the diversities and variations of things here below. By continually fixing his regards on the current which is flowing past, these regards begin to waver; the stable shore and the changeless bed of the river seem to him to participate in the movement of the waters. In vain do religious beliefs shew themselves everywhere as one of the prominent characteristics of the human race. Instead of seizing the meaning of this manifestation of the conscience in all its extent, he forces himself to study religions only in their diversities, in their relations to times, to places, and to circumstances.

Faith in the soul is to him only one of the passing phenomena of this earth, and he believes himself wiser in proportion as he shuts his ear to the great voice which speaks to man of eternity, and impels him to seek after the invisible. Thus is formed this spirit of criticism, as it is called, which in our day is most frequently only the burlesque of the true spirit of history—the disguise of complete skepticism. The same tendencies follow from the culture of the natural sciences.

The science of natural history, as it is understood in our day, knows nothing and seeks for nothing beyond facts which may be perceived by the senses, and are susceptible of direct observation. It starts from the phenomena of matter and returns again to the phenomena of matter, thus describing a circle which reaches to no heaven beyond the starry one which is visible to the bodily eye. The divine world escapes its methods, for spiritual facts can neither be seen nor weighed, and spiritual beliefs can not be subject to the laws of calculation and be proved by visible observation. Yet humanity continually aspires to a higher world, and the legitimate consequence of this fact is, that there is a class of truths requiring a different method of study, and different processes of reasoning, from those of the naturalist. But the human mind always has a tendency toward unity. This is at once its strength and its weakness, the secret of its discoveries, and the explanation of its errors. The naturalist is therefore easily led to believe that his method is the only method, and that all which escapes his observation is beyond the legitimate exercise of thought. If he is not restrained by firm convictions, if the man in all the integrity of his nature does not subordinate in himself the mere *savant*, he soon speaks of the invisible world with a smile, which is the transparent vail of disbelief. The study of nature has now realized the magnificent prophecies of Lord Bacon. It goes onward from conquest to conquest, and industry, the daughter of science, glorifies it in the eyes of the men of our day. Its methods of attaining truth have therefore acquired a great ascendency over the minds of men, and hence there is a very general disposition to consider physical and mathematical facts as the only truths which are solid and well proved, and to banish the wants of the heart

and of the conscience, and the more elevated requirements of reason, to the land of chimeras and vain imaginations.

The progress of science, a legimate object of pride in our time, conceals, therefore, a dangerous rock. Minds fixed upon natural facts, as well as those shallow minds from whom the changeable surface of history hides its solid foundation, both arrive at one common result. The phenomena of time hide from them eternity. The two greatest edifices erected by modern genius project the shadows of doubt over our generation. It seems as if every stone added to the building vailed from us a new portion of the eternal azure.

The skeptical spirit which thus proceeds from the study of facts finds a powerful auxiliary *in an infidel philosophy* at its command, surrendering its power to the very tendencies which it is its mission to withstand.

Philosophy is distinguished from the experimental sciences of which it is at once the basis and the crown, as the guardian of the noble gift of reason. It belongs to philosophy to proclaim unity in the presence of manifold phenomena, eternity in opposition to time, and to rise to the consideration of the first cause and the ultimate end of things. The philosophy which in our day stands highest, falls far short of these requirements. Our age produces few systems worthy of this name, and even when the systems of the past are adopted, they are generally stripped of their metaphysical character, and reduced to the proportions of a literary exposition. But ideas gain in general influence what they thus lose in depth, and we may perceive a philosophic current passing equally over France, Germany, England, and Italy, whose characteristics it is easy to determine. It teaches that there exists no other unity than a collection of the facts of nature and of history. It gives us, for the *cause* of these phenomena, the *law* which is only their expression. It asserts that there is nothing stable and eternal beyond the revolutions of this world, and that everything is subject to continuous change, without cessation and without repose, in which is found the secret of the universe. If we must here employ the terms of the schools, "becoming" supplants "being." These thoughts are not of modern date. "All is in a state of flux," said Heraclitus, more than twenty centuries ago. A legend,

ingenious in its depths, shows us Heraclitus weeping, and mingling his tears with the torrent which he sees sweeping away all things around him, and himself among the rest. Our modern Heraclituses, on the contrary, grieve us by their satisfaction, and rejoice with a laughter more sad than tears. Look at what is really their idea. They believe in the senses, in experience, in facts, in all that time carries away, but beyond this they admit nothing—nothing but formulas, empty, if we separate them from the material objects of which they are the expression. Our most lofty philosophy is the product of a reason which abdicates its function. At the root of these ambitious and abstract formulas, we discover only weakness of thought. This philosophy follows blindly the material sciences whose progress it ought to enlighten. It is like those popular chiefs who yield to all the impulses and caprices of the crowd which they vainly pretend to guide.

But let us admire here the native power of the human mind, and the resources at its command. These very men who have excluded God from their thoughts, have overthrown the altar of the Universal Father, to leave in its place only a nature without a cause, and a humanity without a Providence. Well! in this destitution of all faith, the necessity of believing reappears in them, and lords it over them. This very nature and this humanity separated from God, they are, as it were, constrained to deify, and a strange and monstrous alliance is thus formed in their minds. In contempt of reason, they accord to the passing realities of this life the characters of the Infinite Being. This world is without God, but they declare it to be itself divine, divine in its totality, with all its miseries and pollutions. And they adore, after their fashion, the eternal wave which sweeps away all existence—the power which is manifested in all that is, without being itself anything. Do we call them atheists? They protest against it, they are indignant. Is this merely solicitude for their interests, dissimulation unworthy of a philosopher? No, gentlemen, not always. These men deny God, the only true and living God, but they do not wish to be atheists; they do not wish it in the depths of their own being, in the secrecy of their own conscience. Their indignation is not feigned. It

is the cry of their souls, protesting against the mistaken conclusion of their thought. It is a last homage that even amid their errors they still yield to the truth.

They adore, then, this variable and changing world, of which they make their God. They adore it more especially in the human mind, the highest manifestation of reality, the consciousness, as they call it, which the Infinite Being has of Himself. We are here enabled to penetrate the ultimate secret of this doctrine, so proud in its poverty, and to discover the reason of a singular contrast which it presents.

The spirit of man is carried away by the universal movement. His thoughts, his opinions, his beliefs vary with times, places, and individuals. All truth is relative, that is to say, there is no truth at all: this is doubt the most complete. But all the thoughts of man are divine; all his thoughts are true; all are destined to appear in the eternal evolution of things, for the human mind is itself God; this is dogmatism the most arrogant.

The doctrine is thus presented to us under a double aspect, which explains the singular mixture of doubt and arrogance that sometimes characterizes the thinking of its disciples. "Nothing is true"—such is the first assertion; that of the sophist Gorgias. "All is true"—such is the second formula, that of the sophist Protagoras. These two manifestations of the skepticism of Greece meet and blend in the deification of man. If laughter could be permitted on a subject so sad, it would be an amusing spectacle to see the writers of our day offering us gravely, as the last products of modern thought, the very errors against which the good sense of Socrates protested four centuries before the advent of Jesus Christ.

III. We have just seen united at the heart of the same system, the denial of God and the denial of truth. Here is the ray which must light us to our conclusion.

God and the truth are in intimate, in indissoluble union. In order that reason may find a basis which shall allow it to rise above the phenomena of experience, in order that the spiritual world may become visible to us, an act of faith is necessary which shall be the product of the entire soul, and not of the mere processes of the intellect—an act of faith which directly apprehends God. Human reason is made for

truth; but until God arises on the horizon of the mind, it is enveloped on all sides by the cold darkness of skepticism.

This is the truth which Descartes saw with the eye of genius. Descending into the depths of the human mind, Descartes discovered there the reflection of a divine brightness, and rising upward to the source of this light, he proclaimed God the first, the most certain, and the best of all truths. He reflects still further; he comprehends that if God is not, the most regular exercise of thought may deceive us, and that our reason offers us no guaranty. He confesses that all the force of his proofs depends on a belief which precedes them; that without this belief, man is condemned to irremediable doubt. This powerful mind pauses to weigh his work. He owns that reason proves God, only on the condition that God exists and is the guaranty of reason. He adores, and by a sublime contradiction, by a circle of thought, the object of criticism to historians, but one of his noblest titles to glory, this powerful promotor of the purely rational method recognizes an act of faith as lying at the basis of all the processes of the intellect.

What, then, is the barrier to be opposed to the encroachments of skepticism? Let us boldly answer, Faith in God. This is the remedy, and I know none other. Study, reflection, science, have a great part to perform in present circumstances; but reflection, science and study, the most learned considerations upon method, the most ingenious efforts of philosophy, all will continue utterly fruitless, if God be not the starting-point and the end of the activity of intelligent beings.

But this affirmation of the existence of God, the foundation of all spiritual truths, is it, then, an arbitrary assertion? Shall we let it be said that we offer no other refuge against doubt than a caprice of thought, or a fit of despair on the part of the reason? By no means. In the first place, I can not consider as a caprice of thought the act of grasping that faith which alone can justify and establish it. Then the isolated intelligence is not the entire man. If God is the only satisfactory response to the will seeking for His law, to the heart longing for an object which may satisfy its affections, to the conscience requiring the reason of its commands and the sanction of its decrees, shall we call arbitrary the

movement of the soul when it rises in all the harmony of its faculties toward the light which alone can explain to it its own nature? By what right can the most vital powers of our being be excluded from the search after truth? Are physical phenomena the only facts submitted to our observation? Does logic, applied to experience from without, exhaust the procedures of our thought? In vain does the skeptic object that beyond positive facts we enter into the region of chimeras. We have a right to ask him, What do you make then of the will, of the heart, of the conscience? Is moral order a chimera? Does it not offer us facts, incapable doubtless of being submitted to the balance and to the microscope, yet resplendent with their own light? Does not conscience loudly tell you that there is a good and an evil which is within each one of us, a real and living struggle between opposite principles, also living and real? What do you make of these facts? You deny them—you who proclaim so loudly that observation is your only method; you sacrifice them to the logical exigences of your skepticism. After having declared that there is no truth, the current of your thoughts hurries you on and forces you to say there is no morality. Upon the tragic struggle of which the conciousness of man is the theater, you found an indifferent history of the manners of humanity. But the voice of humanity, which speaks even within you, in spite of your doctrine—the voice of humanity answers you as it answered the sophists of Athens by the mouth of Socrates, as it answered modern skeptics by the weighty words of Kant—"there is duty, there is therefore truth." And as truth exists only in its eternal center, man is an enigma of which God alone is the solution.

But this solution does not force itself upon us like physical truth or mathematical evidence. Spiritual truth is presented to the free will, and requires a resolution of the soul to grasp it. The God of man is, before all, the God of the conscience. It is when He has taken position in the conscience that the universe proclaims His wisdom, that the history of humanity relates His justice and His mercy, that He appears as the only legitimate end of the efforts of reason.

I am aware that this faith, which is not the mere evidence of the understanding, that this movement of the soul by

which it grasps the truth without the intervention of the senses or of geometrical demonstrations, is stigmatized by certain minds as superstitious credulity. Credulity is doubtless a weakness. Intelligent and free, man ought to explore with intelligence and freedom the mysteries of his origin and of his destiny. But we must venture to say, notwithstanding the too easy abuse of this thought—and the Christian who feels that everything good in him is from the grace of God, will unite with us in saying—that the ultimate sources of our belief lie in the state of our soul. The understanding alone does not possess the secret of solving the problems of life. Faith is a virtue, and doubt is a temptation. Each of us may experience this in himself. We believe in the divine world just in the proportion in which it is realized in us. And precisely as we become earthly in our affections, in the same measure do we become skeptical of spiritual truth, whatever may be our words and our outward profession.

Do we wish, then, to combat skepticism? Let us proclaim God, the living and true God, the God of the Gospel. But let us not proclaim Him only in words and in public assemblies. Let us proclaim Him by our lives. Let us cultivate in the inner sanctuary of the soul the sources of this living faith, without which our religion would dissolve into vain thoughts, and into words still more vain. Let us show what faith in the Invisible can do, and that it becomes visible to the eye of all in the works that it produces.

Finally, be not disquieted. If the whirlwind of doubt sweeps over our time, even if it become more violent, let us continue calm. God sustains the human mind in its faintness. To the errors of thought, as well as to the waves of the ocean, He has said, "Hitherto shall ye come, but no further."

The struggle between darkness and light will doubtless last as long as this world of trial. But skepticism shall never extend its icy shades, or rather its sullen fogs, over all the face of the intellectual world; and the future will always prove those to be right who confidently affirm that the worst of all errors is to cease to believe in the truth.

AN INTERVIEW WITH SCHELLING IN BERLIN IN 1851.*

The last thought of a great man is always worthy of our most serious attention. We feel it to be proper that as he approaches the closing hour, the man of genius, in view of his eternal future and of the generations which rise before him, should, in the plenitude of his experience, and often of his faculties, sum up his thoughts, express them more clearly, and present us with the fruits of his toils and long meditations, in all their maturity and savor. The greater the influence such a man exerts upon his age, the more precious does this legacy of his mind or heart become. His last thought is henceforth to be regarded as an inviolable testament. It is this which still constitutes, to a great degree, the charm and value of the conversation of Socrates, discoursing with his friends at the moment of death, on the immortality of the soul; or, to refer to a more recent instance, of Napoleon, retracing with the hand of a master the great conceptions of his life, and nobly abasing himself in presence of the infinite grandeur of the Redeemer of men. The last thought of the sage explains his entirely spiritualistic philosophy; that of the conqueror and legislator gives the solution of an enigmatical and providential career, and unites the extremities of his life.

From this point of view it is that the last utterances of Schelling deserve to be carefully recorded. His philosophical system has for half a century engaged the attention of thinking minds in Germany, and still interests all who are fond of philosophical studies. He has given a new impulse to intellectual progress, and made a deep impression upon the history of modern thought. Even in France, whose genius, though so different from that of Germany, is prompt to elaborate and reduce to practical syllogisms the boldest speculations of the philosophers beyond the Rhine, his influence is now making itself felt in every department of literature. The earlier period of his philosophical career may be sketched in a word. The distinguished disciple of Fichte, the friend and then the

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* Translated from the *Revue Chrétienne*, October, 1862.

rival of Hegel, he taught during many years, in the lecture-room of the University, and though numerous works abounding in learning and poetry, a system of pantheism, which confounding with Bruno, Spinosa. etc., the ideal and the real worlds assumed, by turns, two distinct forms; the one more idealistic, the other more realistic. These have been styled, in language used to describe the great painters—Schelling is beyond dispute one of the greatest painters of nature—his two *manners*.

He was born in Suabia (Wirtemberg), a region fertile in thinkers and poets, in the year 1775, and died at Ragatz, in Switzerland, in 1854. At the age of twenty years he began to publish his writings; at forty he laid down his pen, and from 1815 to 1834 wrote only occasionally for the public, devoting himself meanwhile to the duties of his professorship. In 1834 he announced, in a German translation of the "Fragments" of Cousin, his intention to exhibit the principles of a new philosophy called *positive*, designed to reconcile the interests of philosophy and revealed religion. From the year 1841 he taught this system in lectures at Berlin. They were published without his knowledge, from notes taken during the course, and before the author had given the final revision to his work. Schelling was deeply hurt by this indiscretion. He retired from public life, and was generally supposed to be engaged in the preparation of a new system, which might justly be styled the key of philosophy.

It was at this period that I had the honor of an interview with him. On Saturday, the 12th of July, 1851, provided with a note of introduction from Dr. Nitzsch, Professor in in the University of Berlin, and justly regarded as one of the most pious and learned theologians of Germany, I called at his study. The patriarch of the German philosophy received me with affability and charming simplicity. He was then seventy-six years of age, but the weight of years sat lightly upon him.

His appearance was very striking. Never shall I forget the beautiful and tranquil expression of his countenance, or the clearness of his deep blue eyes, under a massive forehead crowned with white. He seated me at his side and immediately commenced conversation in his native tongue. After

the usual complimentary expressions, and a few inquiries on the state of learning in France, he stopped as if to give me the opportunity of introducing any subject which might interest me. The close of the familiar conversation which followed will always be engraven on my memory. The idea to which he gave utterance on the great subject so worthy of the attention of philosophers, and which then, and down to the end of his life, occupied his thoughts, was one which he frequently expressed to his familiar friends. To state it is, in my judgment, to pay homage to his memory.

In reply to my inquiry in respect to his labors, he replied with much kindness and animation, that he had been engaged for many years on a work designed to exhibit the harmony of revelation with philosophy and thereby to give the key of the latter. Desirous of further information, I ventured to inquire of the venerable old man, "What the principle and, so to speak, the key-note of this harmony would be?" He rose from his seat, went to his library, and taking down an old copy of the Greek New Testament, opened to Rom. 2: 36, "*For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things; to whom be glory forever, Amen,*" and placed the sacred volume in my hands.

"There," said he with simplicity and the emphasis of connection, "is the foundation and the last word of philosophy. It is the Holy Scriptures which gives them to us."

Would that this conclusion, I said to myself, as I took my leave, were that at which all our philosophers were happy enough to arrive. Certain it is that Schelling's experience is worthy of their best consideration. His ultimate thought is the testimony of a man whose genius, learning, and philosophical ability none can question. After having, by his writings, gained a world-wide celebrity, Schelling abandoned the vain conceptions of pantheism for a philosophical system intimately allied to revelation. He understood and adopted the celebrated saying attributed to one of the princes of science (Pico de la Mirandola): "Philosophy seeks, Christianity possesses, the truth." May our modern thinkers ponder it!

There is no question that in our day pantheism has everywhere made rapid progress. In France, especially, it pervades the whole of our fashionable literature. It peeps out under

a thousand different forms, leveling and aristocratic, poetical and scientific, esthetic and vulgar, speculative and practical, critical and dogmatic, in multitudes of works read and reread, and is gradually penetrating to the lowest strata of society. Always and everywhere its cry is, "*Ye shall be as gods.*" The consequence is that conscience is obliterated, the spring of morality bent or broken, the taste perverted; and yet, after all this, men are astonished at the contradictions, the monstrous errors, everywhere appearing in its train! But how can it be otherwise? Man loses the knowledge of himself whenever he loses the knowledge of God, in whose image he was made. The moment he denies the personality of God, he inflicts a mortal blow upon his own being, because he subverts the foundation of his moral responsibility. These two errors are closely related and grow up together. Now to every man who will give himself the trouble to think, it is evident that no one can raise us up to God except God himself. A saying of Voltaire, the *doubtor*, by way of eminence, written in one of his best moments, has become famous, "if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him." Nothing is more true or just than this avowal of its own weakness, extorted from reason. But of what consequence to man, confined within the narrow limits of his reason, is the existence of a God, if this God does not reveal himself? A God lost in the solitary infinite, or too vague to be seized by the heart of man, can he satisfy us? Can he, if he does not speak, give us the solution of all the enigmas, of all the problems which so legitimately occupy our attention, such as our existence, its origin, its rule and final end, the true foundation of strength, consolation, and hope in conflict, sorrow and faintness? We need a God who is near and not one who is afar off. We need a God who will speak to our consciences and our hearts, who will illumine, direct, and draw to himself our restless souls, subdue and tame our rebellious wills, and take entire possession of our being; who, in a word, will respect our true liberty in making us voluntarily submissive to his law. We need, by whatever name we may call it, a *Revelation*, not only in nature, whether internal by conscience, or external by creation, but beyond this, a revelation, direct, spoken, clear and decisive; without it, we are

like the blind, groping in the dark, notwithstanding the flood of light around them. We need a voice from God himself, which shall rouse and enlighten our consciences, too often made sluggish and dark by the sway of passion and the habit of sinning; which, in short, shall give to all nature its divine language so frequently unknown or wrongly interpreted. Yes, *if a Revelation did not exist, it would be necessary to invent one.* This is the indispensable corollary of the fine thought of Voltaire. The invention of a revelation is just what all the founders of new religions, from Buddha to Mohammed, and even down to Joseph and Hiram Smith and Brigham Young, on the banks of the great Salt Lake, have been obliged to undertake to carry out their schemes of falsehood. All these audacious pretenders spoke in the name of God. They instinctively saw that they could not found an empire, more or less permanent, except by the written word. The result has verified their anticipations; their followers have been made the slaves of fanaticism in the name of a Deity miserably reduced to human proportions. Now God himself, the living and true God has spoken. He has given his oracles by his Spirit, and the Spirit from age to age proclaims them in and through the Christian church. Why should we Christians—there are none of our modern philosophers who would not claim this name, the fairest of all—why should we doubt the revelation of the God whom we adore, of a God made flesh, the Word, uncreated and creator, who "dwelt among us full of grace and truth?" Is it simply because it transcends the human inventions of which we refuse to admit that God was the author? Would man ever have conceived it? Rosseau has well said that "the inventor of the Gospel would be more wonderful than his hero."

In this revelation, accepted by the heart, man finds here below, in this earthly state, the nourishment of his noblest faculties, the satisfaction of his most legitimate wants, and the foretaste of eternal fullness. There is not a truth proclaimed or even hinted at by the greatest sages and the profoundest philosophers of antiquity, Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, which the Gospel does not proclaim, and render more luminous and resplendent to the eyes of even the humblest. There are many truths,

also, which man never discovered, and which the Gospel alone discloses; things which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man." A distinguished writer (De Sacy), who speaks with authority on such questions, has recently said: "Christianity is not only a worship (the only worship in spirit and in truth); it is also a philosophy, the highest philosophy; a system of ethics, the purest, the sublimest ethics." Always indispensable, always old and always new, this Truth is perfect like God who gave it. Neither profound knowledge, nor severe attention is required to see that it has inspired and guided the highest genius, the loftiest courage, and that humble self-devotion of our own day, which is as truly resplendent in its humility, as was that of the guiding lights of Christian civilization. The Word of God, the Bible, in short, responds to all the questions which truly interest, in his immortality, the intellectual, moral, and religious man—questions which at the present time especially—and it is an encouraging sign—are raised and earnestly discussed in journals, reviews, and extended treatises. Problems, the most intensely practical—slavery for example on which depends the fate of a great people—there find a solution, rational, sure, complete, and persuasive; for the Gospel made for man is a law of enfranchisement, of true liberty for all men without distinction.

It is not, then, simply astonishing that men, otherwise intelligent and enlightened, have so little learned to draw from this fountain which is always open and always flowing? Is it surprising, on the other hand, that a mine so rich, should not have yet yielded all its treasures; that prayerful and thoughtful attention may daily discover new veins; that the mysteries of the future should be contained in the Gospel, like germs yet to be developed and to come to maturity in the midst of a world subdued, step by step, to the empire of Christianity?

They who seek from a distance a reply to their doubts and investigations, how would they be astonished to find it where, hitherto perhaps, they have not even thought of looking! For them the novelty, the discovery of which they dream, is there. Their convictions would be deeper and more sincere, because spontaneous, and, so to speak, unexpected. They would be like Schelling, after all his labors, his prodigious

learning, and his boundless thinking, dazzled, in a manner, by the splendors of revelation. They would become new Sauls, converted and illumined by the light from heaven, and zealous propagators of the Truth too long neglected in the bosom of French society, which, Christian in name and by tradition, and perishing from the want of religion, too often contents itself with vague aspirations, uncertain hopes, and empty, delusive, and dangerous theories.

A. ESCHENAUER.

BLEEK, EXPOSITION OF MATT. VIII: 22.*

"*But Jesus said unto him, follow me; and let the dead bury their dead.*" Some expositors, as Grotius, Kypke, Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius and others, would explain the reply of our Lord to the request of the disciple who asked permission to go and bury his father, by the supposition that the latter was still living, and that the request was to be allowed to devote himself to the care of his father until his death. But this is certainly erroneous. Such a request would have been very differently worded, and there is no reason for supposing this to be the meaning. We must assume, as indisputable, that the father had just died, and that the son wished to go home in order to make arrangements for his funeral. This alone would have required no protracted absence, since among the Jews the interment of the dead ordinarily took place without much delay. But according to the Mosaic law, any one who had come into contact with a corpse was thereby rendered unclean for seven days, and was obliged to pass through a special ceremony of purification, Num. 19: 11–22. Hence the High Priest was utterly forbidden to approach the corpse of any person, even of his own father or mother; he might not even exhibit the usual external signs of mourning at their death, Lev. 21: 10–11. So, too, it was forbidden to the Nazarite, during the time of his vow, to make himself unclean by contact with a dead body, even though parent, brother, or sister had died, Num. 6: 7. From this it is clear that according to

* Translated from *Synoptische Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien von Friederich Bleek. 2 vols. Leipzig*, 1862.

the Jewish laws and customs, not only not the care of the funeral rites of the deceased regarded to the same degree as among ourselves, as universally the pious duty of the nearest relatives, but was even strictly inderticted to those who were consecrated by their office or by voluntary vow, to the service of God. Hence the reply of our Lord, which might easily appear harsh if viewed only in the light of modern customs, assumes a different aspect.

In respect to the meaning to the passage, it is certain that the word *dead* in the first part of the sentence is not to be taken literally as in the latter part (the rendering given by Fritzsche and Weisse, "let the dead bury each other," would, as De Wette rightly observes, give not merely a paradoxical, but a senseless direction), but figuratively, as describing those who are spiritually dead, and who have no life or thought for the kingdom of God and the things pertaining to it. Comp. Rev. 3: 1; Eph. 2: 1, 5. What the Savior, therefore, directs is, that this disciple should leave the care of these external arrangements to others, especially to those of his brothers or other relatives who at the time knew of no higher duties, but that he himself should no more allow himself to be drawn away by such cares from the service of what he recognized as the kingdom of God, than those who under the old dispensation were specially devoted to the service of religion. The main thought in the narrative is in any case this, that the Lord demands of his followers an unconditional and undivided obedience, whenever he calls.

THE TRUTHFUL USE OF CHRISTIAN LANGUAGE.

There is a striking difference between a people just entered upon a career of Christian civilization, and one whose Christianity is reckoned by centuries. The new forms of thought and feeling in the case of the former are indeed imperfectly expressed, but they are fresh and direct. The Christian culture of our day, on the other hand, transmitted as it has been from past ages, is encumbered, to a great degree, with formal and mechanical phraseology. It has been objected against the French language, that it contains so many expressions all

prepared for the use required, that a simpleton, with their help, can appear for a considerable time quite profound. This, however, is not peculiar to the French; in that language, the degrading process has only been more rapid than in others. The same complaint now comes from England, and among ourselves in Germany the symptoms of similar confusion and corruption of language, springing from excessive refinement and the lack of naturalness, are evident to every serious observer.

Even in the literature and religious language of the church, this mechanical phraseology extensively prevails. The rich treasure of pious discourse in which the deep emotions of our ancestors once found utterance, is appropriated by the merely worldly preacher, and used without any true thought of what it expresses. In the beginning he is conscious that the words and thoughts he uses are exhortations to himself not to cease to strive after the divine life which they express. But the mind, by abuse, becomes more and more insensible to the difference between the use of words with a full recognition of their meaning, and a careless employment of them as mere phraseology, and thus the man finally falls into a mechanical and merely habitual repetition of the noblest terms. His use of religious language is accompanied with no corresponding thoughts. His real life runs in another channel. How great the danger that the progressive estrangement between his life and his words will issue in the transition from an unconscious divergence to *conscious hypocrisy.*

We would not be understood as maintaining that one may not use a term, the full meaning of which is not at the moment present to his mind. On the contrary, it is characteristic of the deepest thoughts, that they are always accompanied by a certain striving of the soul to reach the fullness of the terms in which it has chosen to clothe them. But then this conscious striving is never to be neglected. It is only when it really exists, and the imperfection is not only felt, but true efforts made to diminish it, that the difference between a ripe word and an unripe life is tolerable. It is only then that the words, especially the sacred words, which we take upon our lips, elevate the soul in its weakness, and bear it into a higher atmosphere.—*Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft*, Nov., 1861.

THE ALLEGED GEOLOGICAL EVIDENCES OF THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.*

Not unfrequently we see advertisments inserted in the public prints offering rewards to those who will point out where an individual was born and in what parish his register is to be found. For some time past there seems to have been a demand for a geological certificate of the antiquity of the human race. Exceptions have been taken to the historical record, and the pages of the Stone-book have been more carefully scanned with a view to discover some entry of man's appearance on the globe at an earlier era than the fortieth century before Christ. Sir Charles Lyell's treatise might have been written in reply to such an advertisement. His inquiries, indeed, have not enabled him to furnish us with the precise date required; for fossil hand-writing is often difficult to decipher, and the leaves of the great underground volume are naturally blurred and defaced by long lapse of time; but he supplies us with a number of fragmentary extracts which would seem to intimate that the lord of creation belongs to a much more ancient house than is generally supposed.

Hitherto it has been popularly assumed that man was installed in his magnificent property about six thousand years ago. But if the discoveries recently made and inferences now suggested are correct, this period must be indefinitely expanded. And as the doctrine now advanced is tendered upon palpable physical grounds, and not upon mere crotchety assumptions, we are found to grapple with the facts fairly, and to face the consequences to which they may logically lead. There is an immense difference between flimsy cavils which are bred in the skeptic's brain, and the fossil truths which the philosopher digs out of the earth and lays before us in all their undeniable reality. We can laugh at the criticisms of the Bishop of Natal when he reproduces objections which have been answered a hundred times; but it would be idle, or worse

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* From the *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1863; A Review of *The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man.* By Sir Charles Lyell, F. R. S. London, 1863.

than idle, for it would be mischievous, to refuse a respectful hearing to a geologist who comes bending under the weight of skulls, and cavern bones, and curious relics which bear marks of indisputable antiquity, and—*it may be*—of pre-Adamite age.

Certainly if any man has a right to speak on such a subject, it is Sir Charles Lyell. He has contributed largely to the literature of the rocks. He has devoted himself to the practical part of the science as earnestly as he has done to the exposition of its principles. One series of strata—the Tertiary—he has made peculiarly his own. And in order to qualify himself for the discussion of the great question now brought into open court, he has visited various continental localities, and carried on a correspondence with every eminent geologist who had facts to communicate or a single gleam of light to afford.

Doubtless we might expect from his theory of uniform agencies, that Sir Charles would entertain a decided bias in favor of a doctrine which brings the human race under a law of leisurely development. He is what we may call a long-age philosopher. He requires enormous periods for almost every terrestrial change. Nature, in his opinion, was scarcely a whit more lively or impetuous in her juvenile proceedings than she is in her maturer transactions. Time itself has grown old since the foundations of the round earth were laid; but whether buoyant with youth or burdened with years, the Man of the scythe has marched with the same slow, secular step, and has done his work with the same tranquil, imperturbable hand.

Hostile, therefore, as our author is to the philosophy of paroxysms and catastrophies, to the principle of revolutionary epochs, in which so many of his brethren delight, we might expect that, to him, any enlargement of the human period would be decidedly acceptable. But it is right to say, that he has withstood the temptation until fast multiplying facts seemed to justify the assumption that our species might not be of such mush-room growth as was commonly imagined. And now that he appears in public to explain the grounds upon which the theory rests, we find that he does not present himself as its sworn and unhesitating advocate. He puts the case interrogatively rather than dogmatically. There is an

inquiring air about the book which seems to say either that the writer is not profoundly satisfied with his premises, or—and this is the more complimentary inference—that he deems it unphilosophical to draw peremptory conclusions until the question has been more extensively debated. The work, indeed, is preëminently characterized by caution and candor; the former of these properties being evidenced by the fairness with which objections are introduced; the latter by the very uncertainty in which he leaves the reader as to his personal views, and the want of definite declarations where these are most eagerly desired. Indeed, we fancy that few readers will close the volume without regretting that the writer has not ventured upon some more explicit avowal of his creed. Without doubt Sir Charles's previous publications, containing as they do opinions either directly adverse to, or at any rate scarcely in keeping with, those now discussed, may have imposed a certain amount of reticence upon his pen; but it would be unjust to refrain from expressing our admiration of the calm and passionless spirit in which the book has been composed. There is no anxiety evinced to make the most of a startling doctrine. There is none of the fiery zeal of a new convert. But looking at the question as simply one of facts, he deems it his duty to examine these with a judicial eye, and to admit or reject them purely according to their scientific desert. The book is a perfect model in this respect.

Let us now glance at some of the leading discoveries which have induced many persons to conclude that there is an older register of human births than that contained in the Mosaic record.

First, there are the *Flints*. It is clear that wherever beings like ourselves have existed on this earth, they must have had implements of some description, for man has been defined as an animal that uses tools; they must have had instruments to enable them to capture prey, or to protect themselves from the wild beasts, to whom human flesh would doubtless be as acceptable as it is to their modern representatives; but above all, they must have had arms or missiles, however imperfect; for who can believe that a people such as we are could possibly subsist in a weaponless world? Now, about the year 1840, M. Boucher de Perthes, discovered in some ancient allu-

vium at Abbeville, in Picardy, a number of flints which appeared to have been shaped by art, inasmuch as they bore a strong resemblance to the knives and arrow-heads known to be employed among savages of modern growth. They were found in company with the bones of many extinct species of quadrupeds, at depths often amounting to twenty or thirty feet below the surface, and in beds which seemed to have been undisturbed for ages. Their position compelled him to conclude that they must have been the property of some tribe which flourished long before history was invented. Hearing of this discovery, Dr. Rigollot, a physician of Amiens, who was quite incredulous upon the point, resolved to ransack the gravel-pits in his own neighborhood, and there, to his great astonishment, he succeeded in exhuming a quantity of flints which might have come from the same manufactory as those of Abbeville, and which were treasured up in beds of precisely the same geological constitution. In the course of four years, the Doctor collected some hundreds of these curiosities. Since then, the valley of the Somme has been visited by Mr. Prestwich, Mr. Evans, Sir Charles Lyell, and other inquirers, all of whom have been more or less successful in their exciting hunt. Our author procured about seventy specimens, one of these being extracted while he was present; and the result was so satisfactory to himself that he openly declared his belief in their genuineness and patriarchal character at the next meeting of the British Association at Aberdeen.

Similar flints have been found in England as well. In 1858, the mouth of a cavern was discovered, at Brixham, near Torquay, in consequence of the falling-in of the soil. Here was a prize for geologists, who had now become fully alive to the importance of exploring a new repository of bones with special reference to the subject of man's antiquity. The utmost precautions were taken to prevent deceptions and to give the question fair play. The Royal Society granted money to defray the expenses; a committee of philosophers was formed to direct the investigations; the operations were conducted under the superintendence of two experts, Mr. Bristow and Mr. Pengelly; Dr. Falconer was retained as a sort of standing counsel to the undertaking; and a journal was kept in which the details of the exploration were as minutely noted

as if the lives of thousands depended upon the result. The cavern, in itself, was not a place of any great magnitude or importance. Its entrance was sixty feet above the level of the adjoining valley. Five galleries were cleared out, but none of these exceeded eight feet in breadth. In some parts they were filled with mud and other materials to the very roof, but in others a considerable space was left. The deposits, through which the explorers dug, were arranged as follows: first, there was a surface layer of stalagmite (in which the antler of a reindeer and the humerus of a cave-bear were preserved) ranging in thickness from one inch to fifteen; next, a bed of reddish loam varying in depth from one to fifteen feet, and lowest of all a stratum of gravel containing many pebbles, but destitute of everything like fossil remains.

"The mammalia obtained from the bone-earth consisted of *Elephas primigenius*, or mammoth; *Rhinoceros tichorhinus; Ursus spelæus; Hyæna spelæa; Felis spelæa*, or cave-lion; *Cervus tarandus*, or the reindeer; a species of horse, ox, and several rodents, and others not yet determined. No human bones were obtained anywhere during these excavations, but many flint knives, chiefly from the lowest part of the bone-earth, and one of the most perfect lay at the depth of thirteen feet from the surface, and covered with bone-earth of that thickness. From a similar position was taken one of those siliceous nuclei, or cores, from which flint flakes had been struck off on every side. Neglecting the less perfect specimens, some of which were met with even in the lowest gravel, about fifteen knives recognized as artificially formed by the most experienced antiquaries were taken from the bone-earth, and usually from near the bottom. Such knives, considered apart from the associated mammalia, afford in themselves no safe criterion of antiquity, as they might belong to any part of the "age of stone," similar stones being sometimes met with in tumuli posterior in date to the era of the introduction of bronze. But the anteriority of those at Brixham to the extinct animals is demonstrated not only by the occurrence at one point in overlying stalagmite of the bone of the cave-bear, but, also, by the discovery, at the same level in the bone-earth, and in close proximity to a very perfect flint tool, of the entire left hind leg of a cave-bear. This specimen, which was shown me by Dr. Falconer and Mr. Pengelly, was exhumed from the earthy deposits in the reindeer gallery, near its junction with the flint-knife gallery, at a distance of about sixty-five feet from the main entrance. The mass of earth containing it was removed entire, and the matrix cleared away carefully by Dr. Falconer

in the presence of Mr. Pengelly. Every bone was in its natural place, the femur, tibia, fibula, ankle-bone, or astragalus, all in juxtaposition. Even the patella, or detached bone of the knee-pan was searched for, and not in vain. Here, therefore, we have evidence of an entire limb not having been washed in a fossil state out of an older alluvium, and then swept afterward into a cave, so as to mingle with flint implements, but having been introduced when clothed with its flesh, or at least when it had the separate bones bound together by their natural ligaments, and in that state buried in the mud. If they were not all of cotemporary date, it is clear from this case, and from the humerus of the *Ursus spelæus* before cited, as found in the floor of stalagmite, that the bear lived after the flint tools were manufactured, or in other words, that man in this district preceded the cave-bear."

Flint implements have also been detected in the caves of Gower, in Glamorganshire, in a cavern near Wells in Somersetshire, at Icklingham in Suffolk, in the Valley of the Ouse near Bedford, and at various other places in England. At one spot, indeed—at Hoxne, near Diss, in Suffolk—Mr. John Frere had the good fortune to fall in with such an enormous quantity of these articles, that five or six turned up in every square yard, and the person who first tapped the treasure, emptied basketsful into the ruts of the adjoining road before he learned that they would be considered precious objects in the antiquarian's eyes. In fact, Mr. Frere, who published his account so far back as the commencement of the present century, inferred from the position and abundance of these relics, that he had pounced upon the site of an ancient manufactory of weapons of war, and that Hoxne had once been a sort of Woolwich, in its way, when England was peopled by tribes who had the honor of living before the era of the "present world."

But wherever found, these stone implements manifest some sort of agreement in character and appearance. Mr. Evans has divided them into three classes: first, there are the pointed instruments, measuring from four to nine inches in length, which are supposed to have been used as spear-heads; secondly, the oval or almond-shaped tools, two to nine inches long, which, from their having a sharp cutting edge all around in most instance, are presumed to have served as axes or hatchets; and thirdly, flakes of flint, which may possibly have been designed for knives or arrow-heads. Further, numerous

chips of the same material, as well as other intermediate shapes, have been discovered; so that if we admit the articles to be of human fabrication, we should be justified in concluding that the aborigines experienced sore difficulty in executing their task, and had left us many specimens of their raw and rejected productions.

Now, the most important question which arises in regard to these flints is palpably the question of their human workmanship. The writer of this paper will not readily forget the disappointment he felt when he first made the acquaintance of the "oldest memorials of mankind." For uncouth and inelaborate productions he was fully prepared, but the amorphous objects before him seemed to afford such scanty evidences of design that for a moment he believed the affair was a hoax. Certainly, had a heap of such flints appeared at the roadside, a traveler would no more have fancied he was gazing upon the contents of an ancient arsenal, than he would have regarded a collection of milestones as statues chiselled by a Canova or Thorwaldsen. It must be admitted, however, that coarseness of contour is no fatal objection, if the material could not have been brought into its present condition by any recognized natural means. Still less should that objection be allowed to prevail if the surface affords proof that it must have been artificially chipped. Now, that such a number of articles could all have been fractured by accident, it might be presumptuous to affirm; and that the snippings on their surface could in any case have been produced without human agency, has been stoutly denied by men who are practically conversant with the temper and qualities of flint. "For more than twenty years," says Professor Ramsay, "like others of my craft, I have daily handled stones whether fashioned by nature or art, and the flint hatchets of Amiens and Abbeville seem to me as clearly works of art as any Sheffield whittle."

There are, however, some very difficult nuts to crack before we can comfortably subscribe to the theory that makers of axes and knives existed in the world long before the historical pair appeared. Why, for example, are not these flint implements accompanied by some relics of the men by whom they were manufactured? The osseous parts of the human body

are quite as capable of preservation in the rocks as those of the animals by which they were preceded in the great geological drama, thousands, or, it may be, millions of years ago. Sir Charles candidly admits, that neither in the valley of the Somme, where such hundreds of weapons have been exhumed, nor yet in any other part of Europe, where deposits similarly charged have been explored, has a single fragment of a human skeleton been discovered "in the tool-bearing drift of the post-pliocene period."* What renders the case the more surprising (and, as the reader may possibly deem it, the more suspicious) is, that the bones of many of the quadrupeds with which these spear and hatchet individuals are presumed to have been contemporaneous, have been extensively embalmed in the very alluvium which has hitherto refused to give up its human dead. Of course it is easy to say, "You must wait. Rest assured that these things will turn up some fine day or other. The time will undoubtedly come when the men of flint, duly fossilized, will be found in splendid profusion." And this, indeed, is what Sir Charles apparently expects: it is what M. Boucher de Perthes positively predicts; for, according to the latter gentleman, nothing but the retirement of the waters in some lake, or the upheaving of some mountain mass, is needed in order to disclose thousands of skeletons to our wondering eyes. In fact some geologists now attach so little value to "negative evidence," that Mr. Jukes declares, "I hold myself perfectly prepared, if I live long enough, to hear of the discovery of the Silurian mammals, and, of course, of all those of the more recent periods."†

Unfortunately, however, these drafts on the Future can scarcely be permitted to satisfy the demands of the Present. For if the flint implements are found in such abundance (as we have seen to be the fact), the bones of their makers should be discovered in some sort of proportion. If England was so highly peopled at that distant period, that whole bushels of spear-heads and hatchets could be kept in store at Hoxne, surely some of the wielders of those weapons ought to have

* Page 144. In the Belgian caves, however, some flints, presumed to be artificial, have been found in the neighborhood of some bones, presumed to be human.

† Jukes's *Popular Physical Geology*, p. 205. London, 1853.

left us an arm or a leg to appease our lawful curiosity. Besides, how shall we explain the absence of all other tokens of art and human industry? In the tumuli of Denmark you meet with relics in horn and bone, with fishhooks, chisels, vessels, and other utensils—productions, in fact, which leave no doubt that they were of intelligent origination. These Scandinavian savages, though undoubtedly people of considerable antiquity, have done *their* work in a business-like fashion, and we can unhesitatingly acknowledge them as men and brothers. But it is otherwise with the flint-manufacturers of Amiens and Abbeville. Are we to suppose that the knives, lance-heads, and hatchets constituted the whole of the goods and chattels capable of preservation which belonged to this pre-Adamite race? The condition of the question is, that certain articles which are vague in form and dubious in purpose should present themselves in astonishing abundance—the ground being saturated with them, so to speak, in sundry quarters—and yet that no other article, certain in form and indubitable in purpose, should also appear in their company. This, to say the least, is scarcely logical. At the same time we cheerfully admit, that whatever difficulties may be on the surface of the case, the production of any instrument or utensil which was clearly of human fabrication would counterbalance a whole library of argument. Were a tombstone to turn up in some Tertiary deposit with the name of "John Smith" inscribed upon it, we should be constrained to admit that members of that popular house existed even in pre-historic days. But we are now dealing with instruments which are so deficient in distinctness, and which exhibit at least such meager traces of human workmanship, that if examined singly there is scarcely one man in a million who would not cast them away as unmeaning fragments.

Under any circumstances, however, we are bound to inquire, How were these implements fabricated? Where are the tools by which the process was accomplished? Flint is notoriously one of the most obdurate and unmanageable of materials. That there were no metal instruments in those benighted times is obvious from the facts, that if such had existed they would have superseded the wretched articles in question. The only resource is to assume, as has been done, that the

ancient artificers employed a flint as a chisel and a stone as a hammer (or perhaps combined the two objects in one implement), and then struck off flakes in various directions from another lump, until he "smiled his handiwork to see," and called upon his companions to wonder with himself at the perfection to which human arts had attained. Professor Ansted states that in aftertimes—

"The edges were rubbed down on another stone as hard, or harder than the implement to be constructed; and at a later period still, a rough polishing process was introduced. These latter steps were, however, in all probability, undue innovations; and involved efforts far beyond the powers of the older tribes. Not only are the implements and weapons found in various stages of completeness, but very rough beginnings are sometimes seen, and whole basketsful of chips have been described as occurring in some localities."

Sir C. Lyell, however, asserts that the sharp edge of the ancient tools in the valley of the Somme was always produced by fracture and not by friction. Under either view of the matter, the reader may possibly be tempted to inquire whether the shadow of a shape which these articles exhibit may not have been acquired by natural violence, or by the agency of water. Many of them, it is admitted, have been "worn," or "snipped," or "much triturated," by river action. Mr. Wright has stated that, in his opinion, the simple flakes at least might be produced without art by a forcible and "continued gyrating motion, perhaps in water, in which they are liable to be struck by other bodies in the same moment." This may seem a very speculative explanation, it is true; but then the supposition that they owe their origin to artizans who flourished some tens of thousands of years ago will appear to many to be more speculative still.

Upon the whole, we feel bound to say of these flints that, until more conclusive discoveries are made, they afford but a flimsy basis on which to rest the startling theory that the world was extensively peopled before Adam rose from the dust of the earth, or Eve sprang in full-grown loveliness from her Maker's hands. They are something to swear by: their numbers and extensive distribution give them a certain logical value; but it must be admitted that a single drinking-

cup, or even a well-shaped hammer or chisel, placed in the balances of testimony, would go far to outweigh them all.

Secondly, the principle of law which requires that the best evidence should always be produced, is just as applicable in a court of science as it is in a court of justice. The public have, therefore, a perfect right to call upon the advocates of man's immense antiquity to bring forward some genuine human remains: and if we should ask them to put a few *skulls* or even *entire skeletons*, into the witness-box to speak for themselves, there would be nothing unreasonable in the demand. Accordingly, as if in compliance with this requisition, we find that certain crania and other fragments, supposed to belong to pre-Adamite men, have actually been subpenaed, and their testimony is now tendered as tolerably conclusive on the point. Several years ago, M. Tournal discovered in a cavern at Bize, in Languedoc, a quantity of teeth which had once been set in human jaws, where they had probably ached like modern molars. Mixed with these were a few bones, also of human origin, and some scraps of pottery, which, however, were of so rude a character that it might be fairly assumed there were no Wedgewoods or Mintons in the post-tertiary world. Now, judging from the remains of the animals and land-shells with which the relics in question were associated, it was contended by M. Tournal, that the originals must have been contemporaneous, and that, therefore, the men who wielded those jaws must have been people of more than historic antiquity. About the same time, M. Christol, detected some human bones in a cavern, at Pondres, near Wismes, where they repose in peaceful proximity to the remains of hyenas, rhinoceroses, and other brutes now happily unknown in our mildly tempered climes.

From the circumstances, however, that these antiques were found imbedded in alluvial mud, it is certainly a very reasonable supposition that they might have been blended by the agency of water; for present fellowship does not imply original association, any more than the coexistence of thousands of bones in a church-yard implies that they all belonged to the same generation or even to the same parish. Sir Charles himself tells us that M. Trissier, when exploring a grotto in the department of Gard, discovered the osseous

remains of bears and men intimately mixed, as if Bruin had been on the most friendly terms with his superior; and yet the same receptacle, so far from claiming the honors of incalculable age, proved itself to be comparatively modern, by producing bracelets of bronze, and, worst of all, a Roman arm. In his "Principles of Geology," he remarks, that as—

"Many of these caverns, therefore, may have served in succession as temples and habitation, as places of sepulture, concealment, or defense; it is easy to conceive that human bones, and those of animals in osseous breccias of much older date, may have been swept away together by inundations, and then buried together in one promiscuous heap. It is not on the evidence of such intermixtures that we ought readily to admit either the high antiquity of the human race or the recent date of certain lost species of quadrupeds." *

In fact, the author frankly allows, in his new production, that after visiting various places in Germany on a tour of inquiry, he *then* came to the conclusion that the human remains found in caverns were "probably *not* coeval" with the remains of the extinct animals with which they were locally allied.

Further consideration of the question, however, has induced him to modify his views. There are richer caverns than those of Languedoc, and more expressive memorials than fossil teeth and bits of barbaric pottery. In the province of Liege, numerous caves exist on the banks of the Meuse and its tributaries, and from these Dr. Schmerling not only dug out several bones belonging to "human" hands and feet, but at Engis, about eight miles to the south-west of Liege, he effected a notable discovery. Day after day this philosopher was lowered by means of a rope fastened to a tree; and having reached an opening in the bank, he crept on all-fours through a narrow passage, until he arrived in some chambers, where the workmen were occupied for weeks and months in breaking through a crust of hard stalagmitic matter, and delving into the breccia beneath. Perhaps no gold-digger ever manifested more anxiety to secure the treasure of which he was in search, than the good doctor did to pounce upon every scrap

* *Principles of Geology*, p. 716. 1850.

of bone, or fragment of art, which might reveal the secrets of an unchronicled age. At last his perseverance was rewarded. He succeeded in disinterring the remains of at least three "human" individuals.

"The skull of one of these, that of a young person, was imbedded by the side of a mammoth's tooth. It was entire, but so fragile that nearly all of it fell in pieces during its extraction. Another skull, that of an adult individual, and the only one preserved by Dr. Schmerling in a sufficient state of integrity to enable the anatomist to speculate on the race to which it belonged, was buried five feet deep in breccia, in which the tooth of a rhinoceros, several bones of a horse, together with some ruminants, occurred. This skull is now in the Museum of the University of Liege."

In some *other* cavernous repositories, numerous flint implements of excessively rude construction—if such a word as construction can be applied to such amorphous instruments—turned up under the spade and pick-axe; and from their presence, even independently of the fossil tid-bits already mentioned, Dr. Schmerling considered himself entitled to conclude that man had walked the world contemporaneously with the cave-bear and certain other species of mammals now extinct.

Again, in the Neanderthal, near Düsseldorf, there is a grotto which was explored by Dr. Fuhlrott, of Elberfield, in the year 1857. It is an excavation in a limestone rock, and is approached by an opening about sixty feet above the level of the river Düssel. Here, in the mud which covered the floor of the cave, a skull was found, and then sundry other bones of a human body. Little suspecting the importance of the discovery, the workmen treated these relics as they would have done those of any anonymous corpse of the last century, and dispersed or destroyed (as was supposed) all but the larger portions. Fortunately, however, the cranium was preserved, and like that of the adult extracted from the Engis cavern, has been carefully criticised by osteologists of renown. "Upon the whole," says Sir Charles Lyell, in his own frank and impartial way, "I think it probable that the fossil may be of about the same age as those found by Dr. Schmerling in the Liege cavern; but, as no other animal remains were found

with it, there is no proof that it may not be newer. Its position lends no countenance whatever to the supposition of its being more ancient."

Now, if the reader should be satisfied to waive any question as to the possible introduction of the skeleton into the cave by aqueous agencies, and this at a comparatively recent period—for there is a passage leading to the surface through which it might confessedly have been washed—and if, furthermore, he can overlook the fact that the loam in which the fossil was interred was only five feet thick, and was not covered by any crust of stalagmite, still a very plausible suspicion may naturally be started. Was the proprietor of this skull really a creature of the same order as ourselves? We are not entitled, perhaps, to require that he should display as highly civilized a head-piece as Sir Charles Lyell himself. But is the cranium, thus happily rescued from oblivion, so decidedly human in its character that every anatomist without exception would sign a certificate to that effect without a moment's demur? Now, the author tells us that when he exhibited a cast of the curiosity to Professor Huxley, the first remark of that eminent individual was that he had never seen such an "ape-like skull before." Several of the anatomists who sat like scientific coroners on the skeleton at Bonn, expressed their doubts as to its genuine humanity. Nor were good reasons wanting. The forehead is disgracefully low and retreating; the superciliary ridges are extravagantly developed, and protrude in a very undignified fashion; the brain-case is of remarkable thickness, and indicates (if that be any test) no ordinary amount of stupidity; besides which, the owner appears to have been as irregular in his occipital as he was in his frontal regions, and at first Mr. Huxley found some difficulty in believing that the posterior lobes of a human brain could be flattened and diminished to the extent observed in this Neanderthal gentleman. From the stoutness also of the limb-bones, and the size of the ridges to which the muscles were attached, it appeared obvious that sinews were of more importance in his economy than intellect, and that he was much better fitted for the woods than for the drawing-room. In fact, there are many features in the osteology of this individual which seem to intimate that he bore a very brotherly,

or at least a very cousinly resemblance to the ape. And though Professor Huxley affirms that there can be no substantial ground for "ascribing this cranium to anything but a man," and though he thinks that its peculiar configuration simply denotes the extreme state of degradation in which the proprietor lived, yet he agrees with Professor Schaffhausen and Mr. Busk in asserting that it is "the most brutal" of all known skulls, having the slightest pretensions to humanity; while Sir Charles Lyell himself remarks that it exhibits a nearer approximation in outline to that of the chimpanzee than has ever been observed before.

Respecting the Engis skull, Mr. Huxley reports in more complimentary terms. He compares it with that of the uncivilized Australian, and even assigns it a more distinguished place in the scale of creation; but it is worthy of notice that its discoverer, Dr. Schmerling, inferred from the narrowness of the forehead, that the owner of the cranium must have been a personage of scanty intellectual development. In neither case, however, does there seem any good reason for doubting the geological antiquity of the neighboring ground.

Besides these, sundry other human bones have been discovered, in sites which seemed to indicate a pre-Adamite date. Some years ago a deep incision was made in the soil near New Orleans, for the purpose of the gas-works. Beds almost wholly composed of vegetable matter, such as are now forming in the cypress swamps of the neighborhood, were cut through until, at the depth of sixteen feet from the surface, and reposing beneath four separate forests, arranged in stories, as it were, a skeleton with some charcoal was exposed to view. From the configuration of the skull it was concluded that this individual belonged to the Red Indian type; and from calculations made with regard to the rate at which the Delta of the Mississippi has been produced, Dr. Dowler assigned him a modest antiquity of fifty thousand years.

At Natchez, in another part of the basin of the Mississippi, a fossil human bone was also discovered. It had evidently belonged to some gentleman's pelvis, being the portion known as *os innominatum*. It was supposed to have come from a deposit of clay underlying some ancient loam; and the

specialty of the case was, that bones of the mastodon and megalonyx, to say nothing of other extinct animals, had been dug out of the same formation. It followed that if the alluvium of that great river had required so many years for its deposition as Sir C. Lyell computed, the personage in question must have represented the Confederate interests upward of one hundred thousand years ago!

One thing, however, was necessary to establish the geological antiquity of the Natchez gentleman, namely, that the fragment he had kindly bequeathed to the world, should really have been extracted from the ancient bed to which the other relics were referred. If a stream ran at the foot of a lofty bank, at the top of which there happened to be a churchyard, we might some day find that the water undermining the cliff not only brought down fossils of indubitable age, but also fragments of our forefathers, who, comparatively speaking, had lived but yesterday. And so Sir Charles interpreted the Natchez phenomenon when he visited the place in 1846. He thought it quite possible—and, indeed, until better evidence were offered, perfectly presumable—that this *os innominatum* might have fallen from the vegetable soil at the upper part of the cliff, which is two hundred feet in height, while the genuine antiquities had been dislodged from the lower deposits. Now, indeed, he admits that he then discussed the question with a "stronger bias" against the probable contemporaneousness of men and mastodons "than any geologist would now be justified in entertaining;" but he still thinks that, in the absence of more positive testimony as to the original position of the bone, it is quite "allowable to suspend our judgment" respecting the epoch to which this elderly individual really belonged.

The "fossil man of Denise" is another celebrated geological character. Pity he could not anticipate the debates to which he has given rise, and enjoy some little foretaste of the consequence which would one day attach to his bones! How many curious eyes have gazed upon his relics, under the impression that if the skull of Methusalah could be unearthed it would be a thing of yesterday as compared with these antique remains; and how many others, alas? have departed from his presence with pretty much the same feelings as they

would retire from a show where the body of a mermaid, or a two headed monster, was exhibited.

At Montagne de Denise, near the town of Le Puy-en-Velay, in Central France, a peasant, while digging in his vineyard, fell in with a number of human bones. They were imbedded in light porous tuff, which seemed to have been ejected from the neighboring volcano. Among them appeared portions of a skull, a radius, some lumbar vertebræ, and several metatarsal bones. Part of these belonged to an adult individual, and part to some juvenile of olden times. Now, as the crate of the Denise has long withdrawn into private life, and as the remains of the *Hyæna spelæa* and *Hippopotamus major* have been discovered in tufaceous beds of precisely the same description, and therefore presumptively of the same date, it was inferred that these human relics belonged to a dispensation of high antiquity—when people had the opportunity of riding mammoths, if they only knew how to train and mount them.

Unfortunately, however, for the man of Denise, his credit has been partially impaired. Not that he could help it, poor fellow! but mortals (at least modern ones) are sometimes mercenary; and it is suspected that the demand for human fossils had led to a factitious supply. Some specimens, at any rate, appear to have been put together by art, and bones are supposed to have been wedded to each other illegally by means of plaster of Paris. The skull, too, of the hero in question is decidedly of a Caucasian cast, and this fact seems to betray a more recent origin than befits a person who, if he really belonged to a remote period, ought to have been more like a Hottentot or a Samoiede in his cranial regions. Let us add, however, that the locality has been repeatedly visited in honor of the man of Denise, and that able naturalists and osteologists have enthusiastically recorded their opinions in his favor.

Perhaps, however, one of the most interesting cases in support of the theory is that of the sepulchral grotto at Aurignac, not far from the foot of the Pyrenees. In a small cavern on a limestone rock two entire skulls, and fragments of not less than seventeen men and women, were discovered in 1852. Outside, and directly in front of the grotto, which was closed by a vertical slab, the remains of various animals, scores of

flint implements, articles made of reindeer horn, a bodkin also of horn, and some other curious objects, were extracted from a thin earthy deposit which covered a small patch of charcoal. The osseous relics included those of the cave-bear, cave-lion, tichorhine rhinoceros, mammoth, and several other exterminated quadrupeds. From the fact that the bones in question had been spilt open to extract the marrow, it was concluded that they had been used at feasts in honor of the dead who lay in that rocky sepulchre. There was nothing in the geological position of the grotto alone to entitle it to ancient honors; for the mouth was simply and slightly masqued by a talus of rubbish from the side of the hill; but here the evidence in favor of the existence of human beings and extinct mammals appears to be peculiarly strong. The former seem to have eaten the latter. To many, indeed, this fact will present itself as perfectly conclusive; for the principle of contemporaneousness has been regarded as one of the pivots on which the whole doctrine turns. Still, if it could be ascertained that individuals belonging to species which have been summarily cashiered survived till a comparatively recent period, the argument would lose much of its chronological worth. Take, then, the case of the *Elephas primigenius*. Siberia is a vast country of mammoths. The bones of these brutes are strewn over the country in such profusion that if all the elephants in the world had the misfortune to be Russian subjects, and were consequently banished to that penal region, they would not equal their dead brethren in number. Now, it is well-known that the entire carcass of one of these animals imbedded in ice, was discovered on the banks of the Lena at the commencement of the present century. The quadruped measured upward of sixteen feet in length, and nine and a quarter in height. The flesh was in such admirable preservation that dogs, wolves, and bears dined off it with evident relish; and had mammoth meat been a recognized dainty among the Siberians, they might have held a banquet upon its body without the slightest sympton of disgust. In other instances, too, in the same region, the skin and various portions of an extinct species of rhinoceros have been found. Can we suppose that creatures which have thus left their most perishable parts for our inspection belonged to any very ancient era? or if such a

supposition must be entertained, are we not entitled to expect that some definite evidences of pre-Adamite existence should also appear, seeing that the fragile remains of animals have been so readily preserved?

Not a little, too, might be said with regard to the association of bones belonging to such a variety of animals, some of which were arctic in their constitution, whilst others are, now at least, exclusively tropical in their character.

Remains of the hippopotamus have been found in situations where, to all appearance, it would have little opportunity of earning its classical designation. These are perplexing facts if we assume that the creatures all lived at the same time, in the same localities, and in immediate intimacy with man. But the difficulty would disappear if we were at liberty to suppose that the bones were collected by posterior mortals, (just as we stock our museums) either to extract their marrow, or, as Mr. John Taylor ingeniously argues in regard to the contents of the Kirkdale cavern, for the purpose of employing them, as the Druids did in medical and magical rites.*

Thirdly, the *mud of the Nile* is also supposed to furnish another clue to the antiquity of the race. Annually, as we know, this famous river overflows its banks, and covers the adjoining lands with a coating of slime, which quickly hardens under the sun, and furnishes a new matrix for the husbandman's seed. If, therefore, the rate of precipitation could be settled, would it not be possible, by sinking pits in the soil, to ascertain the time which has been consumed in forming the vast bed of alluvium whereon some of the oldest and most cultivated tribes of men have flourished? Accordingly, at the suggestion of Mr. Leonard Horner, the Royal Society directed a series of investigations to be instituted, two successive Pashas of Egypt lending their patronage, and even contributing munificently to the expenses of the undertaking. Twenty-seven pits, each five feet square at the upper part, were opened on a line stretching across the valley of the Nile, from the foot of the Lybian hills on the west to the skirt of the

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* *The Hand of Man in the Kirkdale Cavern.* By John Taylor. *McMillan's Magazine*, September, 1862.

Arabian hills on the east. This line was five miles in length. Similarly fifty-one shafts were sunk on another line, extending sixteen miles, in the latitude of old Heliopolis, and at a distance of about twenty miles from the first-named excavations. In the whole, ninety-five openings were made, and of these, one or two penetrated to the depth of sixty feet below the surface. In no case, however, did the boring instruments reach the rocky flooring of the valley, their route lying wholly through the alluvium which appeared to have been deposited by the river, and the sandy matter which had been swept in from the desert through the gorges in the Lybian hills. Mr. Horner reports that in one shaft, which was sunk near the statue of Rameses II. (the Sesostris of the Greeks), a small vase of coarse unglazed pottery, a saucer of similar material, and the hinder part of a small lion in baked clay, were found at a depth of ten feet, a bit of colored mosaic at twelve feet, the blade of a copper knife at thirteen, a small white vase at fourteen, a vessel of brown unglazed pottery at fifteen; and then, when the influx of water rendered it impracticable to continue the excavations on a large scale, and the boring instruments which were substituted could fetch up small objects only, still minute fragments of burnt brick and crockery were dragged to day from all depths, even ranging as far as thirty-eight feet. Indeed, in a perforation at the village of Besousse, where the workmen attained a depth of fifty-nine feet, it is stated that "rubbish"—meaning by this term "particles and very frequently morsels of baked clay"—persisted in appearing. Occasionally, too, the bones of the ox, dog, ass, and other domestic animals, were encountered. There were shells belonging to the land, but none of a marine description; and throughout the whole of these investigations, not a single organic relic of any *extinct* species was discovered.

Now, in estimating the rate at which the river deposits its mud, M. Girard, one of *savans* who accompanied the French invading expedition, availed himself of a ruined Nilometer at Elephantina near Assonan, and of another still carrying on business at Rhoda near Cairo. He compared the height attained by the present inundations with that of the ancient overflows as indicated by the instruments in question. Judging

from the inscription on the first, he concluded that the bed of the river had risen at the rate of 0.132 of a metre, or 5.192 inches, in a century; and judging from the second, he calculated that the increase must be about 0.126 of a metre, or 4.960 inches, within the same period. For various reasons, however, Mr. Horner dissents from this estimate, and maintains that three and one-half inches would represent the amount of sediment deposited in each hundred years much more appropriately. If this standard of computation were admitted, it would follow that the shred of earthenware drawn up from the depth of thirty-nine feet must indicate the presence of rational beings (people who were, at any rate, competent to act as potters), not less than thirteen thousand three hundred and eighty years ago! Girard's more modest computation would also imply an antiquity of between nine and ten thousand years; while, if we are to take six inches in the century as the rate of precipitation, the bit of baked brick found at a distance of sixty feet below the surface would intimate that twelve thousand years ago there were brick-makers established in the land. Were we, however, meekly to accept M. Rosiere's estimate of two and one-fourth inches per century, we should have to believe that the hands which shaped the oldest scrap of burnt clay brought up during these borings had done their work not less than twenty-five thousand years before Adam is supposed to have appeared.

Undoubtedly these researches were conducted with every precaution, and the fullest determination to guard against all impositions. It is well known that relic-hunters can generally procure whatever they wish, provided they are in possession of a competent purse. Every article, like every individual, has its price. It may be rare, but you have only to pay a given sum, and it is yours. It may be almost exhausted, but if so, pay twice as much, and your longings will be assuredly appeased. Perhaps it has wholly disappeared, and not a specimen, as you are told, can be had for love or money. Don't be discouraged. All you have to do is to double your last proposal, and the object on which you set your affections is sure to turn up in the most accommodating way. The Arabs are notorious sinners in this respect; and if you offered an adequate reward for the skull of Sesostris, or for a wheel from Pharoah's

chariot, they would pretend to find the former in some mummy pit, or to fish up the latter from the Red Sea. It is due, however, to the investigators to say, that great care was taken to insure perfect integrity in the operations, and, therefore, the fragments recovered must be accepted as genuine antiquities.

But antiquities to what extent? Before we can conclude that they are of pre-Adamite origin it would be necessary to assume that the deposition of the Nile mud has always proceeded at the same pace, and it would be equally necessary to know the nature of the bed of the valley, so as to satisfy ourselves that there was nothing peculiar in its conformation, and that the ground had undergone no change. Few presumptions can be more precarious than those which are founded upon the action of water. When the little river Dranse was dammed up for a few months, and then broke through its barrier, it carried down such a quantity of matter into the plain, that at Martigny some of the houses were filled with mud up to the second story in the course of a few minutes. So, if from the elevation of the soil in one place, or its depression in another, hollows should be formed, these will naturally fill up more rapidly than they could if scoured by the stream. Where great ponds have been produced by rivers, in consequence of the formation of some obstruction, beds of prodigious thickness have been deposited within very moderate periods. So if the branch of a stream should be silted up, the quantity of sediment precipitated may easily mislead the observer who guages it without reference to, or knowledge of, its history. Had the mud of the Pharaohs been laminated, or had the annual inundations left lines of distinction, we might to some extent have used the series as a chronometer, just as the botanist calculates the age of an exogenous tree by the rings in its substance; but Mr. Horner informs us that there was an utter absence of lamination in the soils which were perforated, and no trace whatever can be found of "quietly deposited successive layers." Nor does the position of the various relics intombed in any given sediment always justify a conclusion as to their relative antiquity.

"A canoe," says Mr. Geikie (quoted by Sir Charles), "might be capsized and sent to the bottom, just beneath low-water mark; another

might experience a similar fate on the following day, but in the middle of the channel. Both would become silted up on the floor of the estuary, but as that floor would be perhaps twenty feet deeper in the center than toward the margin of the river, the one canoe might actually be twenty feet deeper in alluvium than the other; and on the upheaval of the alluvial deposits, if we were to argue merely from the depth at which the remains were imbedded, we should pronounce the canoe found at the one locality to be immensely older than the other, seeing that the fine mud of the estuary is deposited very slowly, and that it must, therefore, have taken a long period to form so great a thickness as twenty feet."

Dreadful mistakes, too, may be made as to the age of buried earthenware; for Mr. Carruthers has recently shown that the pottery discovered under the town of Leith, and which was supposed to be charmingly antique, had not the smallest pretensions to antediluvian fame. Certainly the extensive areas over which the Egyptian pits were sunk may afford some guaranty that the results were not due to mere local peculiarities; but the reader will find that Sir C. Lyell has his reason for suspecting the sufficiency of the conclusions deduced from these alluvial borings.

"The experiments instituted by Mr. Horner, in hope of obtaining an accurate chronometric scale for testing the age of a given thickness of Nile sediment, are not considered by experienced Egyptologists to have been satisfactory. The point sought to be determined was, the exact amount of Nile mud which had accumulated in three thousand or more years, since the time when certain ancient monuments, such as the obelisk at Heliopolis, or the statue of King Rameses at Memphis, are supposed by some antiquaries to have been erected. Could we have obtained possession of such a measure, the rate of deposition might be judged of, approximately at least, wherever similar mud was observed in other places, or below the foundations of those same monuments. But the ancient Egyptians are known to have been in the habit of inclosing with embankments the areas in which they erected temples, statues, and obelisks, so as to exclude the waters of the Nile; and the point of time to be ascertained, in every case where we find a monument buried to a certain depth in mud—as at Memphis and Heliopolis—is the era when the city fell into such decay that the ancient embankments were neglected, and the river allowed to inundate the site of the temple, obelisk, or statue. Even if we knew the date of the abandonment of such embankments, the inclosed areas would not afford a favorable

opportunity for ascertaining the average rate of deposit in the alluvial plain; for Herodotus tells us that in his time those spots from which the Nile waters had been shut out for centuries appeared sunk, and could be looked down into from the surrounding grounds, which had been raised by the gradual accumulation over them of sediment annually thrown down. If the waters at length should break into such depressions, they must at first carry with them into the inclosure much mud washed from the steep surrounding banks, so that a greater quantity would be deposited in a few years than perhaps in as many centuries on the great plain outside the depressed area, where no such disturbing causes intervened."

Fourthly, the *Danish peat* and *Danish shell-mounds* have been pressed into service as human chronometers. The Scandinavian Archaeologists, it is well known, have marked out three successive periods, namely, those of stone, bronze, and iron. Unlike old Hesiod, who had nothing to show for his five primitive ages but pure fancy, these gentlemen drew their conclusions from facts; for the old tumuli, explored by them frequently, exhibited weapons and other articles constructed of one or other of the materials just mentioned, precisely as the strata of the earth exhibit an advance from one class of animals to another. The tombs, for example, which yielded nothing but hammers, chisels, arrow-heads, and other instruments of stone, were presumed to be more primitive than those which contained more diversified and elaborate specimens in bronze or iron. Now, from investigations into the Danish peat, which varies in depth from ten to thirty feet, it appears that the Scotch fir (*Pinus sylvestris*) was once naturalized in the country, though for some reason or other it seems to have deserted it, never having been heard of in the land within the historic period. The old forests in which it grew now lie buried deep in the bogs. Above it comes the oak, which is supposed to have succeeded to the fir; but this monarch of the woods has in turn been supplanted by the common beech, and the latter now reigns supreme on the soil. We have thus three vegetable eras established. But since Steenstrup, *propriâ manu*, drew out a flint instrument from beneath a Scotch fir embalmed in one of these bogs, it has been inferred that Scandinavians of vast antiquity must have existed, because turf is a substance of slow formation; and

upon further comparison of the "peaty record" with the testimony of the tombs, M. Marlot decided that the ages of stone, bronze, and iron correspond pretty closely with those of the fir, the oak, and the beech.

Then, too, the shell-mounds of the same region are quoted in corroboration of the conclusions deduced from the bogs. These heaps are known as Kjökken-mödding, or kitchen-middens. They are chiefly composed of cast-away shells of oysters, cockles, and other eatable molluscs. You might, indeed, suppose that all the oyster-shops of London had carted off the rejected parts of their "natives" to some of these localities; for the mounds are occasionally one thousand feet long, two hundred wide, and from three to ten in height. They are not inland phenomena, being almost limited to the coast, where, however, they rarely appear at a greater elevation than ten feet above the level of the ocean. It is particularly deserving of notice that they are wholly wanting in quarters where the waves are manifestly eating into the land, the inference being that at some remote period they existed there too, but have been swept away by the slow advance of the waters, just as the royal Dane who has served to point so many a moral would have been had he persisted in keeping his chair on the sands in spite of the uncourtly tide. That these masses of refuse were of human accumulation is indisputable; for similar collections of shells have been observed near the sea-shore in various parts of the United States, at spots where the Indians were accustomed to pitch their wigwams, long before the pale faces troubled them with their sordid ways and their seducing brandy.

Now, the common oyster, which is so conspicuous in these heaps, can not flourish in the Baltic of the present day, because the quantity of fresh water poured in that land-locked basin is by no means congenial to its temper. A more saline medium is required. Hence *Ostrea edulis* refuses to honor that ocean with its presence, except near the entrance, where a salt current seasons the fluid to its taste. It is pretty much the same with *Cardium edule* (the common cockle), as well as with the mussel and periwinkle, which we shall not presume to disguise under their more learned appellations. The extant

species are puny and degenerate things when compared with their savory predecessors. Great, therefore, must have been the interval of time which would cover all the revolutions here implied; for extensive physical changes must have occurred in the Baltic to account, not only for the extinction of some of these molluscs, but for the deterioration of others which originally attained a size which must have been highly gratifying to their devourers.

Further, the kitchen-middens contain the bones of certain birds, fishes, and quadrupeds. All the specimens of the latter belong to species which either continue to inhabit Europe or are known to have done so within historic times. Some of these, like the beaver, have died out in Denmark within comparatively recent periods. No domesticated animals like the sheep, horse, or ox have been detected in these mounds, and therefore the natives can neither have been a pastoral nor an agricultural race. But dogs are abundant, though it is remarkable that they were brutes of a much smaller breed than those of the bronze era, while dogs of the latter dispensation were by no means equal in caliber to their brethren of the iron age. From the relics of herring, cod, flounder, and other denizens of the deep seas, it is presumed that the aborigines possessed boats and ventured to put out from the shores upon fishing expeditions. No human bones, however, make their appearance in these curious piles; for it has never been the practice even of the lowest savages to banish their dead to the dung-hills. But the skulls which have been obtained from the peat as well as from the tumuli, supposed to have been coeval with the shell-mounds, indicate that the inhabitants of the locality were men of puny stature, with bulletheads and projecting eye-brows, bearing, in fact, no slight resemblance to the modern Lapps.

Lastly on this subject, from the masses to which we now refer the antiquarian has extracted a number of knives, hatchets, and other instruments made of stone, wood, horn, and bone; he has drawn out fragments of rude pottery, together with cinders and charcoal; but no implements of bronze or iron have been detected. It is therefore assumed, that the elegant heaps in question were piled up exclusively

by men of stone, and that consequently a race of low intellect and no refinement had run its course long before the men of bronze, and still longer before the men of iron appeared.

Collating, therefore, the testimony of bog and midden, Sir C. Lyell propounds the following conclusions:

"What may be the antiquity of the earliest human remains preserved in the Danish peat, can not be estimated in centuries with any approach to accuracy. In the first place, in going back to the bronze age, we already find ourselves beyond the reach of (recorded) history or even of tradition. In the time of the Romans, the Danish isles were covered, as now, with magnificent beech forests. Nowhere in the world does this tree flourish more luxuriantly than in Denmark, and eighteen centuries seem to have done little or nothing in modifying the character of the forest vegetation. Yet in the antecedent bronze period there were no beech trees, or at most but a few stragglers, the country being then covered with oak. In the age of stone, again, the Scotch fir prevailed, and already there were human inhabitants in those old pine forests. How many generations of each species of tree flourished in succession before the pine was supplanted by the oak, and the oak by the beech, can be but vaguely conjectured; but the minimum of time required for the formation of so much peat must, according to the estimate of Steenstrup and other authorities, have amounted to at least four thousand years; and there is nothing in the observed rate of the growth of peat opposed to the conclusion, that the number of centuries may not have been four times as great, even though the signs of man's existence have not been traced down to the lowest or amorphous stratum. As to the shell-mounds, they correspond in date to the older portion of the peat record, or to the earliest part of the age of stone known in Denmark."

In this estimate it will be seen, there is nothing positively hostile to the notion that the men of flint—the makers of the kitchen-middens—may have vegetated (we can scarcely say flourished) within the limits of the ordinary chronologies. Elsewhere, indeed, Sir C. Lyell refers to calculations made by M. Boucher de Perthes respecting the time required for the growth of turf in the valley of the Somme, that lively and enthusiastic gentleman fixing its rate of progress at three centimetres in a century. But this computation, he observes, "would demand so many tens of thousands of years for the formation of the entire thickness of thirty feet, that we must hesitate before adopting it as a chronometric scale." That

peat does not always require such immense periods for its production may be gathered from the fact that in Hatfield Moss, as well as in other places both in England and Scotland, it has accumulated to the depth of eight feet over the roads cut by the conquering Romans. Indeed, Sir Charles himself asserts, in his "Principles of Geology," that a "considerable portion of the European peat bogs are evidently not more ancient than the age of Julius Cæsar." Roman relics, too, have sometimes turned up in these morasses under circumstances which should render us extremely cautious in accepting evidences of antiquity from such a quarter. Besides the growth of turf may have been much more rapid in ancient times, when the vegetation was unchecked, when land was comparatively undrained, and when other conditions combined to favor the increase of these uncivilized swamps.

Again: far more interesting, however, than these Danish heaps and Danish bogs are the *dwellings* which have been mapped out and imaginatively reproduced on the *Swiss lakes*. Near the shores of some of these beautiful sheets, and projecting through the mud at the bottom, the heads of numerous piles were frequently observed; but it was not until the droughty winter of 1853–4, when the water in the Lake of Zurich sank lower than it had been known to do for centuries, that these mysterious posts were brought under philosophical consideration. The inhabitants of Meilen, wishing to rescue some of the ground which was thus laid bare, ran up an embankment, and scraped together as much material as they required to fill up the intervening space from the bed of the lake. It was then perceived, not only from the arrangement of the stakes, but also from hammers, axes, pieces of pottery, and other relics of art which appeared, that this spot must have been the site of some human settlement. No sooner was attention drawn to the subject by Dr. F. Keller than mere after mere was scrutinized, and as it never rains but it pours (a proverb as true in archæology as it is in regard to misfortunes or in matters of meteorology) similar remains began to present themselves in almost every part of the Swiss waters. Upward of twenty of these villages have been traced out on the classic expanse before Geneva, while Neufchatel has yielded a still richer harvest for the antiquarian. That the piles in

question really served for the foundation of extensive platforms covered with huts, admits of small dispute. The practice of building towns upon the water was by no means uncommon in ancient times; for Herodotus describes a tribe of Pæonians (many-wived scamps, as appears), who lived on scaffolds erected in the middle of Lake Prasias in Thrace, who kept up their connection with the main land by a single narrow bridge. The same practice still obtains among various modern savages. According to Dumont d' Urville the Papuans of New Guinea quarter themselves upon similar structures in their bays and rivers. Dr. Baikie reports that the natives on the Tchadda are equally partial to lacustrine life; while the Indians of Lake Maracaybo take refuge on wooden stages attached to trees, in order to escape the attention of that blood-thirsty little insect the musquito. Indeed, Dr. Keller states that within the compass of the last century several fishing-huts are known to have been constructed upon the pile principle on the river Limmat, near Zurich. Very extensive, too, some of these Swiss settlements must have been, for at Wangen not less than forty thousand posts were traced, and in certain instances it was supposed by M. Troyon (a great authority on the *Pfahlbauten*) that as many as three hundred huts, containing a population of one thousand souls, may have been clustered upon a single platform. And a very curious spectacle they would doubtless present, if the sketch prefixed to Sir Charles Lyell's book, with its bridges, its basket-like huts, its fishing-nets, its trough of a boat, really affords, as it probably may, a tolerable approximation to the truth. Doubtless the object of the natives in establishing themselves upon the lakes was to secure some sort of protection from the attacks of enemies far more ferocious than the musquito; for the narrow pathway which connected the platform with the shores might be easily broken down when requisite, and if the wooden edifices should happen to be set on fire, still the inhabitants might escape by means of their canoes. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact that burnt timber is found in great abundance on the site of most of these settlements; and from this circumstance it is reasonably inferred that many of the villages fell a prey to the flames. Kindled those flames might be in some cases by accident, but in the

majority of cases it may be fairly presumed that the conflagrations were due to hostile hands or hostile arrows.

The relics obtained from these localities are so numerous and so unequivocal that the antiquarian now talks of the lake-dwellers as confidently as he would of the ancient Gauls or Britons. Axes, hatchets, knives, lance-heads, swords, hammers, and other useful or mischievous implements, vessels of various kinds, buttons, chains, and other articles of personal adornment—for there were fops even in those unpolished times—fishing-tackle, shreds of flaxen cloth, lumps of carbonized wheat, and flat round cakes of bread, together with many other productions of human skill, have been dug out of this archæological mine. But on collating the treasures obtained from various settlements, three periods of progress or intelligence appear to be distinctly indicated. The villages discovered on the lakes of Constance, Zurich, and the eastern parts of Switzerland, afford no samples of metallic articles, their artificers having confined themselves exclusively to stone, and bone, and horn, as if no Tubal Cain had yet arisen among them. The inhabitants must, therefore, have belonged to the age of stone. But in other places we find that the predominant material was bronze, forty hatchets formed of this compound having been dredged up near Morges alone. And as this circumstance is characteristic of the stations on the lakes of Central and Western Switzerland, it may be assumed that a race of somewhat superior cultivation flowed in from the setting sun, and either subdued or ejected the children of stone. Nay, as tin, one of the constituents of bronze, was anciently the procured from Cassiterides, or British Isles, chiefly if not exclusively, it is possible that the men who made this unhandsome inroad might be our own predecessors, or at least some continental people who carried on a species of commerce with our country. Surely the world ought to have been roomy enough in those days of undeveloped population; and one would have thought that a people whose lust of land was so small that they were content to live on the water, might have escaped the attentions of the most covetous marauders. But the men of bronze were in turn compelled to succumb to the men of iron. For it seems that a more martial race, brandishing swords and lances of this latter material, forced their

way into the region, and made sad havoc with the dwellers on the western lakes. The tin-and-copper tribes, in fact, appear to have perished completely.

The animal remains discovered in connection with these villages belong, with a single exception (the wild bull), to existing species. The natives could not have been particularly nice in their tastes, for among the fifty-four kinds enumerated by Professor Rütimeyer—and most of them were employed for food, as is obvious from the split bones from which the marrow has been extracted—we find the badger, polecat, weasel, otter, wild cat, hedgehog, and other excommunicated brutes. Domesticated animals—the ox, sheep, goat—run through the whole series of settlements; and dogs of a medium size appear to have abounded during the period of stone; but during the bronze epoch a large hound came upon the scene, and doubtless assisted its masters in the chase.

From relics, therefore, which have been detected on the sites of the Swiss lacustrine villages, it is assumed that these three successive human dynasties corresponded with the three ages which he fossilized (so to speak) in the Scandinavian tombs. They show that each of these races might probably have a long spell of life; for it is contended that the improvements in their implements, the changes in their animal accompaniments, the revolutions in their history, the alterations in their habits, could scarcely have been accomplished without the consumption of many centuries. But even the Swiss geologists, in their largest drafts upon the exchequer of time, scarcely venture to carry back their lake-dwellers to a period anterior to the starting-point in the Mosaic calendar. M. Marlot's estimate, founded upon the growth of the delta of the Tinière, a stream which flows into the lake of Geneva, assigns a date of between three and four thousand years to the bronze age, and between five and seven thousand years to the commencement of the stone epoch. M. Gilliéron's computation, based upon the growth of a morass on the margin of the lake of Bienne, brings out a period of six thousand seven hundred and fifty years as the interval which has elapsed since the aquatic dwelling at the Pont de Thièle was erected; but his conclusions do not appear to have been con-

firmed or disproved by borings and other practical tests. Conjectures, indeed, like that may prove utterly fallacious; and in some cases we fancy they are pretty much the same as if a man, finding that an individual nearly six feet in height had grown only half an inch last year, were to conclude that he must be hundred and forty years old.

Besides these, there are several other subjects discussed in Sir Charles Lyell's book; but some of them, like the chapters on the Glacial Period and the Transmutation of Species, throw little light upon the chronological position of man. To enter upon these within our contracted limits would be impossible. To one point, however, we must venture to advert, because it involves a question which will scarcely fail to present itself to the mind of the acute reader. The advocates of antiquity sometimes suggest whether the six thousand years we have really enjoyed would afford sufficient room for the improvement and expansion of the human race. Can the various arts and languages we possess have been the growth of sixty centuries alone? Now, if we are not very much mistaken, the reader will be disposed to turn the tables upon these gentlemen, and to reject the theory simply because the progress of the presumed primevals was so frightfully slow. Ages of opportunity are asked, and yet nothing but minutes of performance are rendered in return. It might be too much to expect, with a deceased geologist, Mr. Richardson, that we ought to have found majestic monuments of man's former existence; his cities and his structures; his pyramids and his mountain temples; his palaces of limestone and of marble; the tombs which he reared over the objects of his affection; the shrines which he erected in honor of his God. But, surely, we ought to have discovered something superior to coarse potsherds and stone hatchets, which can only be regarded as works of skill by a considerable exercise of faith and charity. Paltrier products of intelligence could scarcely have been imagined. A child's humming-top or tin-whistle exhibits more genius than the entire stock of articles to which a pre-Adamite date has been colorably assigned. We can not, of course, dispose of flints and fossils by mere syllogisms; but in dealing with an undemonstrated theory we are bound to take every logical difficulty into account. And here the

great flaw in the case is, that while it asks a multitude of years for primitive man, it crowds all the real work of the world into historic times: it accepts of no responsibility in regard to these hypothetical aborigenes, but is of opinion that they might reasonably spend a millennium in advancing from flint knives formed by chipping to flint knives smoothed by friction. If, to take Bunsen's estimate, the human race has been in existence for at least two hundred centuries, what was it doing during the fourteen thousand years which preceded the advent of Adam? Since every relic we possess which can possibly be referred to those unregistered races exhibits nothing but unmitigated barbarism, we have a right to say that they have treated their species shabbily, and that they ought to have done something more brilliant for their posterity, even if they were utterly indifferent to themselves. *Mutum et turpe pecus*, indeed, theirs must have been. In one sense, therefore, the theory overshoots the mark, and asks more time than it knows how to manage.

The position, then, of the question appears to be this: A number of relics—some implements, fragments of pottery, bits of burnt brick, and even human bones—have been discovered in places and under circumstances which seem to denote considerable antiquity. These relics derive additional value from the fact that they have been found in different localities; sometimes in different tiers or stories in the same locality, as if to indicate an advance from one form of art or mode of life to another; and sometimes, again, in intimate association with bones of creatures which, though now extinct, are presumed to have been similar in point of date. On the other hand it must be confessed, that there is an indistinctness and uncertainty about these memorials of a primitive race precisely in the very particulars where distinctness and certainty are most to be desired. To some extent this must undoubtedly be expected; for the further we recede from the Present the dimmer our vision must necessarily become. But since a work of art may as well exhibit a human impress when it comes from an inferior as from a superior workman—since the pipkin manufactured by Robinson Crusoe would tell its tale almost as unequivocally as the Portland vase—it *does* seem a remarkable circumstance that

all the remains of the pre-Adamite host should be so obscure in form, and so conjectural in purpose, that a man might, without the slightest stigma upon his sagacity, use them for materials for macadamizing a turnpike road.

The problem is something like that of ghosts. When a person sits down to investigate a particular case, he discovers many elements of doubt, either in the possibilities of deception, or the vagaries of vision, or the incoherencies of the narrative, or the uncertainties of the testimony, or all combined, that he feels disposed to treat it as a contribution to the "cock and bull" department of literature. It is only when he collates a number of spectral transactions, and finds that they exhibit a sort of family likeness (or has the mournful honor of seeing an apparition for himself), that he begins to talk more respectfully of Lord Lyttleton's visitant or of the sprite which plagued the Wesleys at Epworth. No reasonable geologist will expect the public to alter the current chronology until the grounds for such a change are perfectly clear and conclusive. Till then it is not only proper but imperative to suspend the judgment.

If, however, the reader should be of opinion that the advocates of antiquity have raised a fair presumption in favor of their views, it becomes necessary to inquire how far this doctrine bears upon the statements contained in the Bible. Should the theory be established by further researches, ought we to conclude that the story of Adam's creation, as chronicled by Moses, is false?

Certainly not. The discovery of a whole cemetery of skulls like those of Engis or Neanderthal, or of a collection of microscopes and other philosophical instruments, in some pre-glacial formation, would not shake our faith in the veracity of Scripture for a moment. It would indeed be necessary to revise our construction of the opening chapters of Genesis. But since it is nowhere expressly asserted that Adam was the first intelligent creature whom God produced upon the earth, we should surely have no right to charge the book with untruthfulness because it contains no allusion to the owners of those "ape-like" crania, or to the manufacturers of those miserable flints. To do so would be as unfair as it would be to assert that it spoke "the thing which was not," because it

records the appearance of the rainbow after the Deluge, though the sun, and clouds, and raindrops—all the factors of the phenomenon, indeed—were in existence long before the flood. Geology has already constrained us to interpret the Mosaic narrative as our forefathers did not. Fifty years ago there was scarcely a divine who would not have been shocked had he been requested to believe that the creation of the world occupied more than six literal days: now there is hardly a lettered man to be found in the three kingdoms who would not consider the proposition just as hopeless as if he were to maintain that Rome Imperial was built in four-and-twenty hours.

If, therefore, any of our readers should feel reluctant to relinquish the ordinary chronology, there is one supposition, already half suggested, which it appears to us perfectly lawful to advance. Few can fail to have been struck by the fact that man is the sole acknowledged species in the *genus homo.* Mr. Lawrance and others go further, and "put him into a separate order by himself." But of what other creature can we say the same? Looking at him zoologically—simply as the chief mammal—we might expect to find that the law which has regulated the appearance of other animals would have applied in some measure to him. Whatever may be said with regard to the doctrine of progressive development, the successive geological platforms which have been reared have obviously been employed as exercising-grounds, new species having been introduced from time to time, while others have been permitted to expire. Each particular order has broken up into various genera, as if to give it a fair trial under the most favorable circumstances. But man, as historically known, has always been specifically one and indivisible. Varieties exist, but these are all of the same flesh and blood. Is it not permissible, therefore, to suppose, if the case should ultimately require some revision of our views, that other *species* of this proud genus may have preceded us on the earth? And as we may safely assume that they would be inferior to ourselves in mental organization, would there be any impropriety in fastening the low-class skulls to which we have so frequently referred upon their shoulders, and placing the clumsy flint about which so much has been said in their unskillful hands?

But however this may be, all that Scripture requires us to believe in reference to Adam is, that he was the progenitor of the existing race. It does not assert that no other species ever belonged to his genus, nor does it even affirm that the extant tribes of human beings are the only tribes of human beings which have ever appeared. It is silent on such subjects; but its silence may be simply of the same kind as that which omits all mention of the sun until the fourth "day," and all reference to death until after the Fall. That such previously-created races may have wholly disappeared before Adam was introduced, may be no unreasonable presumption: on the contrary, it is suggested by the argument on which, as we have seen, the case of the antiquarians chiefly turns, namely, that these primitive men were coeval with the mastodon, cave-bear, and other *extinct* quadrupeds. The bipeds may have succumbed to the same adverse influences under which their four-footed cotemporaries perished. Not only from the state of the climate which then appears to have prevailed, but also from the barbaric conditions under which they lived, we are entitled to assume that they must have had great difficulty in making head against the miseries of their position. Until, therefore, it can be shown that the flint men of Somme have left issue which now forms part of the human family, or until the heirs of the Natchez veteran can be traced into the Adamic line, we do not see that the existence of savages twenty or a hundred thousand years ago, even if fully established, could in the slightest degree impair the credit of the sacred book. But for the present we do not feel that we are compelled to surrender the received ideas on this question. When adequate proof on the side of concession shall be before us, the concession shall be made. We reverence the past or conform to the present on all such questions according to the law of evidence and on no other ground.

HOW MY CONGREGATION TAUGHT ME TO PREACH.*

Come, my brethren, who have like me for many years, and for the most part longer than I, trodden this way, do for once what I am doing this moment. On some quiet evening bring once more to the light of day those first essays of yours which were long ago put away into some dark corner of your bookcase, or your desk, and lay them on the table alongside of your present compositions. It is a melancholy pleasure for me then to tread my footprints over again, and to meet once more the *I* of my early days, which otherwise I should hardly recognize any more than the butterfly the sheath of the *pupa* from which he came forth.

When I first came to my present situation I brought with me a precious treasure, twenty sermons, partly the fruits of my time at the University, partly of my probation-days—sermons that might be delivered at any time and in any place, composed for the most part without any urgency, and all without having a definite congregation in my mind—mere words in the air, speeches without hearers. Above all, my probation-speeches at the University pleased my fancy; they were worked, and worked over again, and worked thoroughly. They were all preached at Mastland, and have the date of their public delivery on their title-page. Were they understood? I can not venture to think it. On the words of our Savior: *I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world*, I had given a handsome sketch of the history of the Church; and on these of St. Peter: *I will endeavor that ye may be able after my decease to have these things always in remembrance*, I had given a very good account of the origin and the canon of the books of the New Testament; but—

Beside this precious collection of sermons, I possessed a *ditto* of outlines, on which I set even a higher value—the hard-won fruits of the composition-course. That composition-course; oh! when I think of it even now, what labor

* From *De Pastorij te Mastland*, translated by Thomas Keightley, and published under the title: *The Manse of Mastland; Sketches from the Life of a Village Pastor in the Netherlands.* London, 1860.

did it not cost me! How neat were the outlines! All the divisions and sub-divisions could be taken asunder and put together again like a child's plaything; the whole closed in like the border in the draught of a skillful architect. And whenever the good professor made his appearance, though we had been toiling at it with excited powers for whole winter evenings, the plane must be once more set to work and the brush passed over it; but then we took them so cheerfully, and wrote a fair copy out so neatly, and put them away as diamonds of the first water!

It is strange how our judgment alters imperceptibly from day to day, so that we can hardly comprehend how it is that, after a few years and without any sudden bound, we are placed on a totally different point of view. Whenever I take in hand these precious, high-polished outlines, they seem to me mere shadows without substance, mathematical figures without body, skeletons that never had life; and I see no chance, even with the best will in the world, of being able to put breath into them or to drive the blood through the veins. And when I set before me our little party of students, so joyous and so lively, so unfit to instruct and to govern others, when we could hardly govern ourselves, sitting round the table with essays—it seems to me pretty much as if we had learned from a medical professor to feel the pulse on a figure of straw and to examine the tongue of a wooden gaper.

And yet this was not the fault of the worthy and learned professor, but of youth and of the University. Our colleges are well adapted for making divines, but they do not make ministers. These make themselves, or their congregation makes them—by degrees. Our Church wants that regular transition from theory to practice, which can not be got at the University. The circumstances of the time have produced that legion of probationers, among whom the intermediate state between student and preacher is passed. I believe, and I even see, that this state is of advantage to many; but it is too uncertain, too irregular, too vacant and dispiriting; it is no ante-room into which people are admitted, and where in some sort one instructs the other; it is the street, where people crowd and jostle one another, not knowing whether they will ever be so lucky as to get in.

But I am to speak of my first sermon. I do not count as such the discourses I brought with me; these served for those weeks in which I was wholly occupied with necessary business and with visiting. I speak of the discourses composed at Mastland, and for Mastland. How I did labor the whole of Monday and Tuesday to find a *good* text! for a good text must be one from which a theme, a subject rounded on all sides, may be deduced. In this everything must, or at least, may be contained that can be said on the text, and then the subject must be one that I can manage with ease, or at any rate with satisfaction. But this was the least of my work; the outline, the odious tormenting outline! it must be so nicely arranged, no part must be too large or too small, and there was no professor in Mastland to look over it! First an introduction, whether I had anything to say or not; and then—this however ran then most easily—in the first part the text duly explained, in the second the truth contained therein proved from reason, Scripture, and experience, and in the third concluded with some appropriate observations. In truth I must not be ungrateful; without this method I know not how I should ever have got through it. And now when the outline was ready, what else was to be done? Write—nothing more. The ideas were at hand, and the words came of themselves. Now, then, the committing to memory, that most unpleasant effort, in which, by the way, some periods were made more harmonious, fuller, or better-rounded, and—I was ready. Well, then, the delivery? Why, as to this I was sufficiently prepared; I had always learned to move my eyes and hands skillfully, and should have learned to do the same with my feet, if it were not that the pulpit was closed in at the bottom; and I had always been an active member of a debating-society, in which Tollens was spoiled *secundum artem* and Bilderdijk parodied through ignorance.*

Thus prepared I appeared before the Mastland congregation, and I looked on myself as being pretty far on the way to be, before long, one of the first preachers in the Netherlands, and consequently to have formed my whole congregation into a noble band of Christians, in which all the infidels

* Two distinguished Dutch writers of the present century.

would have been convinced, all the sinners converted; and, as I confess this ingenuously, I can add with confidence that I had the last infinitely more at heart than the first.

There, then, I stood in the presence of a congregation of my own. This reflection, even while I was on the pulpit-stairs, drove all my gesticulation out of my head. I further felt myself with a certain anxiety bound to what I had written, and not a bit too much at home there, just at the moment that I was delivering it. Thus one thing and another made my delivery stiff and confused; and some rather too officious friends were so kind as to inform me of the severe judgments that were passed upon it. That was the first hard pill; I have since had to swallow whole boxes of them.

These unfavorable judgments grieved me not only on my own account, but on that of the good cause. It was plain that the truth which I presented must have very little affected the hearers, who had had time to make such bitter criticisms. What could be the cause of this? Not a single proof was omitted; I knew not any fault in the outline, and could discover no topic changed in the sermon. After some reflection I resolved to give closer attention to the looks and the behavior of my hearers, in order to follow, if possible, my sermon into their souls. At my introduction—as soon as they were aware that I always had one—they seemed to listen only to the first words. They were then at ease, as I was under weigh, and many of them had some trifle or another to speak of or to do, before the prayer began. At the explanation of the text many were tolerably attentive, some even (at a later period I remarked that these were known and honored as being well versed in Scripture) pricked up their ears at once. But at the second part, the demonstrative, the state of things was melancholy. The Burgomaster and the oldest Elder then gave the signal by settling themselves in their nook, and many followed their example. Alas! before the last proof had been developed, there sometimes remained but a small body of *hearers*, with Master Balyon forever at their head, whom a deep sense of his duty always kept from going to sleep. The good man, beside this, did also all he could, and supplied all the Ruling Elders, as well as the front row of women, with—snuff.

But the word *Application* acted like an electric-shock on the dozing congregation. They then stood up, saluted one another, after an odd country-fashion, and looked steadily at me in order to lose nothing of this application of mine. I will candidly own that, as their dullness had annoyed me, so their attention disconcerted me. How, thought I, can people apply to themselves what merely passed over their drowsy ears? and beside this, to omit no part of the proofs, the second part had occupied so much of the sermon that only a few pages had remained for the Application, which, so thought I, follows of itself with every rational being as soon as he is penetrated by a truth. And this got for me from the same sleeping listeners the remark that my explanation was very good, but that my application was not powerful.

How I did struggle throughout the first year, when the first Christmas required nine services instead of four—when I could think no longer on the logical arrangement of my outline, and felt glad, when, by working night and day, I had composed for every service some tolerably intelligible and feeling address; which after all was listened to with not less attention than my highly labored sermons. And when in the beginning of the following year I was to return to my usual labor—I have a vivid recollection of it—then I sat with my hand under my head, and was afraid the Bible would be too small for me. I should henceforth have no assertion to prove, no vice to correct, no virtue to inculcate, which had not been already proved, corrected, and inculcated. And the number of *good* texts—texts such as I have just described—was scanty indeed.

Meanwhile I learned to know my people more individually, and to attach myself to them; and whenever then, as need drove, I had to make a sermon, one thing or another constantly floated before my mind that I had brought home with me from the houses of my parishioners. One time it was some prevalent erroneous mode of thinking, then vices or disasters, which I had witnessed, then again their comprehension, or the influence on them, of my preaching. I am convinced that in this way I am indebted to my people for forming me to be their pastor and instructor. Many of these circumstances are at this moment present to my mind; but

they would probably appear as insignificant to the reader as they are of importance to myself. I will therefore pass over that period, and only tell how I now try to judge between my first sermons and my present ones.

Whenever I look back now on the tedious throes through which, out of a theologian and rhetorician, I was born a village-pastor, I never repent of my studies or feel ashamed of my first feeble efforts. Theology, though there is much in it that deters many a one, is a useful and a necessary science; and without having studied it with zeal and judgment, no one can become a distinguished preacher. But we are not on that account to compose theological sermons. It is just as with the foundations of a house—they must be solid, but they must be covered in. A congregation is no more a literary audience, than the Bible is a "Kritik" of Kant's. People also are no more convinced by the mere regular enumeration of numbered proofs, than they are converted by the pressing of incitements to virtue. It is also quite certain, that if we must first make our hearers good theologians in order to make them good Christians, our blessed heaven will be wonderfully empty.

This was beyond question the main defect of my first sermons. They were too much of the nature of theological disquisitions, and the church of Mastland was not built for a lecture-room. Besides, they were delivered in too stiff a manner, but this I look upon less as a fault than an unavoidable peculiarity of a youthful speaker. I was at that time (in the good sense) an *actor*, as I afterward became a *speaker*, that is to say I *performed* my pieces; but still they were my own pieces—I *represented* there, in a faulty manner, what I had thought and felt in my study; but it was *I* who had thought and felt, and therefore I never repent it. Nay, I am of opinion that no one who is penetrated with the importance of the subject can on such an occasion feel himself quite at ease in the pulpit, and that the young man who really has the self-possession to be a *speaker* will probably soon have the impudence to be a *babbler*.

But when one feels himself more at home in the pulpit and with his own people, how is he then to speak most usefully? This question too I will endeavor to answer from my own

experience, although perhaps some people may think it presumptuous and others confused; but as I was at liberty to write of all or nothing, so every one is at liberty to read all or nothing.

What are our sermons? Not theological disquisitions, nor even merely or properly instruction in religion and morality; they are also no first proclamation of the Gospel, such as is the task of missionaries; they are simply addresses to a congregation, and that rather to our own congregation at their public worship of God and the Savior, addresses in which a portion of God's word is the foundation, after the pattern of the old Jewish synagogue. This is what the people expect from us: and as I went more among them, I heard them speak only of the *explanation* and of the *application*, and not of the artificial dry second part, at which so many of my auditors had abandoned me.

We are then to *speak* on and according to the Bible to human beings as they are, and as we know them to be, with their mortality and their eternal destination, with their follies and their sins. He, then, who speaks must have something to say; something that he knows, or believes, or feels, or wishes; something that burns on his lips, with which he is deeply penetrated. There, then, is the true principle of our work—anything else is mere bungling.

It is also not enough that he who speaks thus should be full of the subject *on which* he speaks; he must also be attached to those *to whom* he speaks. In what state are men? Why do they come? How do they hear us? In general they feel, though it be but feebly, their need of religion; but this feeling is asleep in many, in few so strong as to make them listen attentively, as it costs them trouble; it must be awakened; nature must be well shaken up in them. We want to convince them of truths, do we? Very good, but we must first try to induce them to listen to these truths. And when they *do* listen, we must not expect them to receive what has been clearly proved; for most have either no definite ideas on the subject of religious and moral truths, and then they adopt them with the greater difficulty as they are more advanced in years; or they have a narrow range of thought and certain fixed opinions, friends of their youth, from which they will

not be separated; whatever agrees with these they will receive—whatever is at variance with them they reject as false *per se;* and perhaps they reject, at the same time and forever, you that have enounced it.

Does it appear, then, that the road to the mind of the majority of our hearers is closed against us? Not quite so; it is merely barricaded. There are still two ways open to us, from which several by-paths lead to the brain—the way to the *conscience*, and the way to the *heart*.

Conscience is in every man an irrefragable witness, which slumbers at times, but rarely falls fast asleep. Even when the understanding hesitates to receive the truth, the conscience is frequently affected by it. Where, then, should we find the way to it more open than in the house of prayer, where the sinner presents himself before the sight of God? He who hardens himself there is certainly most difficult to move anywhere else.

The *heart*, also, is in no man entirely closed against noble affections. It may appear as if wild passions had got the complete mastery of him; but as these subside, he becomes capable of gentler emotions. The greatest reprobate lets fall some warm tears at the thought of his mother or his children.

These, then, are the ways by which our hearers are accessible to us; not exactly to cure them in an instant of inveterate prejudices, or convert them from deep-rooted faults, but to exercise a salutary influence over them, though it may be tedious and imperceptible. But, to do this, we require an ardent and indefatigable zeal in the good cause, and a thorough love of our species, more especially of those who are committed to our charge. Oh! a hearer observes so quickly if you speak to him because you feel an interest in him; just as the child reads in your eyes whether you are fond of children or not. The instruction, the encouragement, and the admonition which you give him as a friend he takes willingly from *you*, while he would reject it from another. I, therefore, no longer find fault with logic and dogmatic and homiletic science for not having taught me to preach.

And now for the *subject*. What a fool I was to be so long looking for a *good* text, and being afraid of the Bible not

being big enough for me! So often as I enter the church, the place where the Infinite, the Invisible is worshiped, is there not an infinite deal to be said in the glorifying of the incomprehensibly great Being? When I set before me my people and myself with them, sinners as we are—perhaps to-morrow a corpse—men with their infinitely varied character and destiny, and I open the consecrated pages, is there not an endless variety of things to be learnt out of them, and to be employed for encouragement and for reproof? And though it is not all new or unknown, and though I have myself already spoken on it, has it yet been sufficiently thought on or believed? Certainly not; my life is not long enough for me to say all that I have to say out of my Bible, and in addition to it.

But *how* shall I speak? For when I set zeal and love in the foreground, I do not mean that mild zeal and that soft gentle love which expects to make up for the neglect of an entire week by the earnestness and tender-heartedness of a few minutes. Oh! it is a dangerous crossway for us when once we have uttered an unreflected yet ardent word, and the worthy people are interested by it. All exertion costs labor, and how convenient does it appear to be able to edify without study! "But do we not frequently see that a vigorous word hastily written or thought of off-hand has more effect than a carefully composed speech?" I have myself thought I had experienced this, but on further experience I have discovered that the want of effect did not proceed from my discourse being *carefully* composed, but in reality from its not being so. Then for the *sudden word*, can that be the right zeal in us which cools down in our study? and is that a permanent impression on the congregation which is so rapidly excited? And when we let ourselves be misled by the approbation of some over-friendly friends, or by the tears of some weak pious souls, so as to avail ourselves again and again of the *sudden word*, should we lay our hand on our heart and answer for the purity of our principle? Should we have advanced the Christian knowledge of our people, their respect for ourselves, our own improvement? Or—

But what, then, are we to aim at, what are we to effect in our sermons? As it seems to me, before all things, *truth*,

order, and *simplicity*. The *truth* of what we say must be the fruit of our own indefatigable inquiry. It is the Bible and human nature on which chiefly we should have clear, definite ideas; for I can testify from my own experience that, if we do not awaken clear conceptions, the cause in most cases is that our own ideas are deficient in the requisite lucidity. The only text that I now regard as not *good*, at least not good for me, is the text that I do not perfectly understand.

Now for the *order*. Here my composition-course comes into play, but it is far more in the background than it was four years ago. I will never more declare in favor of any mode of preaching, and I believe that every kind is good provided it is natural and to the purpose. For example, it is natural, if I have anything to say on the subject, that I should make an introduction; but why should I torment myself about it otherwise? The congregation know perfectly well already that they are in the church, and that they are to join in prayer, and hear the Gospel preached. It would even be a hindrance to me to have to deliver an introduction, my mind being full of thanksgiving and prayer. Why, then, on such an occasion should not the introduction or exordium, if people will have it, come after the prayer?

And now for the sermon itself. The text is to be explained. Very well, if it requires it. The words of Scripture are sometimes quite simple and are well known. This, then, gives room for an affectionate and useful word to the people. Sometimes it is our express design to make an obscure text, or one that is often wrong-applied, be better understood; then the whole discourse is commentary. I believe, then, that the *object*, far more than the *subject*, of our preaching determines the natural order of our discourse. If our object is to convince, we must naturally seek the most regular order of advancing proofs; if to impress, we must follow the course of human feelings. Should we wish to make comparisons, we must enumerate all the points of agreement. Would we narrate, our clue, then, is the succession of events. Thus, then, as it appears to me, each has its peculiarity, and the only *art* is to get at the true *nature* of the matter in hand.

But, then, there is the application? Yes, my good reader, I was for some time rather at variance with my people on this

subject. *They* would have an elaborate separate application, and *I* gave nothing but either an affectionate address at the conclusion, or between whiles I spoke a suitable word, when I thought it was the right place. However, when I saw that the very same thing made far more impression if spoken at the end and in the middle, where I could do it I gave in more to the taste of my people; although I could never quite approve of this taste, or rather this habit of letting themselves be edified in this way and in no other. It is certainly natural that the impression made by a serious discourse should be stronger toward the end; that it should then come with more force to its object, and reach it if possible; but when a separate application is required, to say "This concerns *you*," it is my opinion that the congregation is either too cold under our sermon, or our sermon is too cold for the congregation.

And now at last, beside *truth* and *order*, the golden *simplicity*, which, beyond all, knows how to find the shortest, the purest, the clearest expression, which can smooth down the sharp lines of art and discovers beauty of language in the nature of the subject—simplicity which speaks the very language of the hearers, but that language purified—gives their own ideas, but these ideas dignified. No, the labor we have bestowed on it shall make our *elaborate* discourses no less useful than the others; nay, on the contrary, more useful, as this labor brings us nearer to our people, instead of setting us at a greater distance.

But I must not digress any longer. I have let myself be carried further away by a favorite subject than may prove agreeable to some of my readers. I will, then, only add, that I have merely been desirous to give the result of my own reflection and experience, and not to impose my ideas as a law on others. They have for me this advantage, that subjects, ideas, words, grow up now on all sides about me like bright poppies in the wilderness; that art no longer puts zeal into armor, but offers it a friendly hand; that I need not pass by any flower or fruit which grows on the way of my discourse; and that my Mastland congregation is in some degree more awake than it was three years ago.

I am sometimes, I own, a little out of spirits as to the fruits of my preaching, when I find the people on Monday just the

same as they were on Saturday; but I have learned to see that there lies a little youthful presumption in our first expectation of the fruit of our preaching. Is it not as if we were to do all at once what another could not do in several long years? And when we look into ourselves, have *we* got rid of our follies and our sins in so very short a time? Moreover, may not the best fruits ripen in secret? Oh! if each time we could remove but *one* bad thought, change *one* evil act, wipe away *one* sad tear, awaken reflection for *one* moment, either excite or compose *one* pang of remorse—how abundant, and great, and noble, would our harvest then be at the coming of Christ!

THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION CONTRASTED WITH THE HEATHEN MYTHOLOGIES AND PHILOSOPHIES.*

BY PROFESSOR BLACKIE.

The first Christians had unquestionably this grand advantage over us, which arose out of their great disadvantage: they saw the gospel directly confronted with idolatry; the God-man Christ Jesus against a sensual Bacchus and a carnal Venus; light in miraculous radiance made more manifest by the pitchy darkness through which it shot. It is difficult for some of us in these latter days to get a glimpse of Christianity as the grandest phenomenon in the history of the moral world; we take out our sectarian spectacles and microscopes, and we scan our special form of Christianity—our Episcopacy, our Presbyterianism, our Independency, our Popery, most minutely; but we find the utmost difficulty in getting out of this habit of over-nice inspection, in adapting our eye to a larger range of vision. We become, so to speak, short-sighted in spiritual matters, and we only see the fingers and the nails of the great statue of divine Truth, not the whole figure. Nay, worse: there are some of us who have got into an evil habit of looking only at the small spots and scratches which our microscopic habits have taught us to discover on the fair nails of the statue; and we seem vastly conceited with this discovery. There is nothing which seems to delight a certain class of minds so much as finding faults in beautiful things; as Coleridge tells a story of a smart cockney who could see nothing in Dännecke's beautiful statue of Ariadne at Frankfort, but a few blue spots in the marble, "very like Stilton cheese!" Comments not very different in spirit, I fear, are often made on the Divine image of moral beauty presented to us in the gospel, and on some of the more prominent passages of the Bible. Among others, the first chapter of Genesis, which has always appeared to me a perfect model of sublime and simple wisdom, has come in for its fair share of microscopic inspection, and of short-sighted misconception. It has

*From *Good Words*, October, 1861, abridged.

been curiously dissected in parts, but not looked at as a whole, or comprehended in its grand drift and universal significance; it has been tortured all shapes by all sorts of impertinent scientific appliances, instead of being looked at as a revelation of the great lines of theological and philosophical truth; it has been confronted with Playfair and Hutton, and the minute shell-fish of Murchison's Silurian rocks, not, as it ought to have been, with Homer, and Hesiod, and Thales, and Heraclitus, or the portentous cosmogonies of the Indian Puranas. It is my intention, in the present paper, to present the Mosaic account of the creation in its natural grand points of contrast with the heathen mythologies and philosophies which it supplanted; to show by what profound, though plain, statements of eternal wisdom, it has declared for all times and all places, a philosophy of the divine architecture of the world, beyond which the human mind can never reach; and to accustom the thoughtful reader to look seriously upon this most venerable of all documents, in its own natural aspect and attitude, placed where it properly stands in the moral and intellectual history of the world, not, as it may appear, after having been forced into all sorts of unnatural positions, by curious distinctions of merely physical science, which do not in the slightest degree affect its theological import.

What, then, I ask, are the grand truths, philosophical or theological (for philosophy and theology at the fountain-head are one), which this document reveals? It appears to me that they naturally arrange themselves under the following heads:

I. In the first place we have the philosophy of CREATION. Creation is the production of order. What a simple, but at the same time comprehensive, and pregnant principle is here! Plato could tell his disciples no ultimate truth of more pervading significance. Order is the law of all intelligible existence. Everything that exists in the world, everything that has either been made by God, or has been produced by man, of any permanent value, is only some manifestation of order in its thousandfold possibilities. Everything that has a shape is a manifestation of order; shape is only a consistent arrangement of parts; shapelessness is only found in the whirling columns that sweep across African Saharas; but even these columns have their curious balance, which calculators

of forces might foretell, and the individual grains of sand of which they are composed reveal mathematical miracles to the microscope. Every blade of grass in the field is measured; the green cups and the colored crowns of every flower are curiously counted; the stars of the firmament wheel in cunningly calculated orbits; even the storms have their laws. In human doings and human productions, we see everywhere the same manifestation. Well-ordered stones make architecture; well-ordered social regulations make a constitution and a police; well-ordered ideas make good logic; well-ordered words make good writing; well-ordered imaginations and emotions make good poetry; well-ordered facts make science. Disorder, on the other hand, makes nothing at all, but unmakes everything. Stones in disorder produce ruins; an ill-ordered social condition is decline, revolution, or anarchy; ill-ordered ideas are absurdity; ill-ordered words are neither sense nor grammar; ill-ordered imaginations and emotions are madness; ill-ordered facts are chaos. What, then, is this wonderful enchanter called ORDER? What exactly do we mean by it? If we look into it more narrowly we shall find that it implies the separation, division, and distribution of things according to their qualities, in certain definite well-calculated times and spaces. Number and measure are of the essence of it. The sands of the desert can not be numbered; at least not by us; relatively to our faculties they are mere chaos; but the soldiers of a well-ordered army, arranged in rank and file, can be numbered, and their thousands told, with as much ease as the units of a small sum, if only the arrangement be completed. So, then, order consists in driving a confused multitude of individual elements into groups that bear a natural resemblance to one another in kind, in number, and in measure. A squad of full-grown soldiers, five in front, and three in depth, like the band of the old Greek chorus, is perfect order; each unit being like the other, and the whole being composed of parts that bear a definite relation of equality or proportion to the whole; the many under the controlling power of order have become one; and with that unity have acquired a distinct character, and are capable of answering a definite purpose. This and this only is the difference between an avalanche of shattered rocks on the storm-battered sides

of Mont Blanc or Ben Mac-Dhui, and the stable piles of the Memphian pyramids, or the chaste columns of the Parthenon; between what the great Scotch poet paints as—

> "Crags, knolls, and mounds, confusedly hurled,
> The fragments of an earlier world,"

and the beautiful procession of things which Moses describes as marching forth into existence at the fiat of the Omnipotent. So it is with forms. Forces also are subject to the same law. Take a bottle of boiling water. Look at the steam coming out of its neck; how it bubbles and blows, and puffs and whiffs and wheezes, and makes all sorts of irregular inorganic movements and noises. The atoms of which that vapor is composed, are, as the chemist well knows, composed of elements that come not together at random, but are subject to a calculation as nice and exact as those which measure the orbits of the stars, and the flux and reflux of the tides; but the vapory mass itself, as it issues from the kettle, is a blind force, not produced with any object other than that of disengaging itself, and not productive of any result such as well-ordered forces are daily seen to produce. Well! take that same hot vapor, spitting and spurting in its wild unlicensed way, and confine it in a cylinder; then by the calculated injection of cold water, cause it to contract and expand at certain intervals; and the originally blind force, made subject now to calculation, and order, and law, becomes a serviceable power, which acting on a series of pistons, beams, and wheels, becomes a steam-engine!—a machine which, like a Briareus with a hundred arms, can achieve all sorts of weighty work, with a touch as light as the hand of a little child playing with a hoop. And thus an idle puff of evanescent vapor becomes the great wonder and wonder-worker of the age; the greatest mechanical wonder, perhaps, of all ages that have been since the world began. Such are the triumphs of order.

II. In the second place, we have the Cause of Creation. If all things, knowable and cognizable, are only different forms of order, the question arises, *How is order produced?* Now, in order to look with proper reverence at the profound simplicity with which Moses has answered this question, the best thing

we can do is to inquire, first, how the great popular oracles of ancient times answered it. What does Homer say?—

"Ocean the prime generator of gods, and Tethys the mother." *

What does Hesiod say, who was a greater authority in these matters with the Greeks, and wrote, about eight hundred years before Christ, a genealogy of the gods, meant to instruct the Greeks in those very matters in which we are now instructed by the first chapter of Genesis.

"In the beginning was CHAOS: and after Chaos primeval
EARTH broad-breasted, the firm foundation of all that existeth;
Murky TARTARUS then in the broad-wayed Earth's abysmal
Deep recesses; then LOVE, the fairest of all the Immortals,
LOVE, that loosens the firm-knit limb, and sweetly subdueth
Wisest of men to her will, and gods that rule in Olympus.
Then from Chaos was EREBUS born and the sable-vested
NIGHT; from NIGHT came ETHER, and glorious DAY into being,
Born from Night, when Erebus knew her with kindly embracement.
Earth, then, like to herself in breadth produced the expanded
Starry HEAVEN, to curtain the Earth, and provide for Immortals
Lucid seats on the brazen floors of unshaken Olympus;
Also from Earth the MOUNTAINS came forth, the lofty, the rugged,
Dear to OREAD NYMPHS who haunt the rocky retirement.
Then the billowy SEA, the bare, the briny, the barren,
Fatherless, born of herself; but after, in kindly embracement
She to HEAVEN brought forth the vast deep-eddying OCEAN;
Likewise CŒUS, and CRIUS, and IAPETUS, and HYPERION,
THEIA, RHEA, and THEMIS, and MEMORY, mother of MUSES,
PHŒBE, with golden diadem bound, and beautiful TETHYS."

Now, these are curious, and in some views beautiful passages; but when we reflect seriously, and begin to ask what wisdom they contain, we feel a terrible void—a void as terrible as the chaos, which is the first link in this strange genealogy; our pious desire to know what may be known of things supersensible is rudely baffled; and we see plainly that we have been fooled in expecting wisdom from this quarter; certainly they from whom we asked bread have given us a stone. In fact, it becomes plain, on a nearer consideration, that this old doctor of Bœotian theology does not touch the important question at all which we have now raised—what is the *cause* of

* *Iliad*, xiv. 101.

order? He only tells you, that before order was chaos, and that light was evolved out of darkness. This is all very true as a historical sequence; just as true as that a chicken comes out of an egg, or a child out of the womb; but the point of cause is not touched on at all; for the egg is certainly not the cause of the chicken, as we all know that it required a hen previously to produce the egg; as little, when I take a phosphorus match, and by rubbing it on the hearth-stone, produce light, can it be said that this darkness, out of which the light came, caused the light; it only preceded it. Hesiod and Homer, it will be observed, do not at all agree in the first link that they set forth in the great chain of existing things. The secular poet says that all the gods are produced from Ocean and Tethys—the male and female powers of water; the theological doctor, that Chaos and Earth were first; that Chaos had no productive power; but that from earth were produced Tartarus, Night, Day, Heaven, Ocean, etc., and by descent from them, as the sequel of the poem teaches, Jove, Apollo, Juno, Venus, and all the heavenly Powers. But in one thing they both agree: they speak of an evolution and a development by the ordinary method of generation; which, as we all know, is not a cause but a process. When grain is put into the hopper of a mill, it will certainly be drawn in, and by a constant action of wisely-arranged machinery, come out changed into well-ground meal; but the clear perception of this process does not help me a single step to the comprehension of that other question—how came the mill to be so curiously contrived, and whence came the grain that was put into the hopper? Or, again: if in a large manufactory you see a little wheel which takes its motion from the teeth of a big wheel, and that big wheel takes its motion from a yet bigger wheel, and that wheel again from a rolling cylinder, and that cylinder from a perpendicular shaft, and that shaft from a horizontal beam; in such a case you would never dream for a moment of confounding the different steps by which the motion is conveyed with the source of the motion; you must go on till you come to the steam and the water, and the boiler and the fire, and beyond that also you must go till you come to James Watt. The cause of the motion of the little wheel, with which you commenced, is the mind of James Watt,

directing for a certain purpose, the elastic force of the aëriform water, which we call steam. So we say to wise old Homer, whose writings the Greeks fondly conceited themselves to contain all wisdom, what do you mean when you say that Ocean is the prime generator of gods? Do you only mean that, according to the old adage, "WATER IS BEST," not because the inventors of that proverb were total abstainers, but because that without water no living organism can exist (turn water into a solid—as at the poles—and all vegetation ceases); and, therefore, that the existence of water is the first condition of all existence on this earth? This we willingly believe; but it is only one important fact connected with a great process; for when you are singing the praises of water, Heraclitus, who philosophized at Ephesus about four hundred years after Homer, bethinks himself, that as all water becomes solid by the abstraction of heat, so the existence of water is possible only under the supposition that fire previously exists. Fire, therefore, or heat, or, if you prefer a learned Latin word, caloric, is first principle or cause of all things. Well, this seems to go a little bit farther than either Homer or Hesiod; but, after all, our thinking appetite has got nothing that it can feed on; for what is fire? And whatever it be, what virtue has it to produce order? Does it not rather, in our experience, tend as much to produce disorder? Is it not one of the great agents of dissolution, destruction, and death? Strange! nevertheless the chemist comes in and tells me very dogmatically, that whatever heat may be, it acts, in his department at least, in a very orderly way; for the elements, to whose material action it is necessary, will not unite except in certain fixed and definite proportions, the recognition of which is now necessary to the most rudimentary knowledge of chemistry. Water, to whose atomical composition we previously alluded, is made up of two gases or airs—oxygen and hydrogen—which, in forming that compound, will unite only in the proportion of two bulks of the latter to one of the former. And in the same way of all other bodies. The elements of which they are composed are combined, under the expansive action of heat, in certain curiously calculated proportions. And in this way, we seem plainly to arrive at the old doctrine of Pythagoras, promulgated about 550 before Christ, that NUM-

BER OF MEASURE is the first principle of things. But this also is only a fact, not a cause. For the cause of NUMBER, which indeed is only another name for order, and for that cunning proportion among the atoms of compound bodies which the great Dalton, discovered, we must go a step beyond Dalton, a step beyond Pythagoras, a step beyond Heraclitus, a step beyond Homer. Nor is it a difficult step that we have to take. We have constantly in every action of life, to do with order and disorder; we are constantly employed in creating either the one or the other; so we can not be at a loss to discover their cause. A father makes a present of a curious toy to his little boy. He amuses himself with it for a day or two, or it may be a week or more, but in due season tires of it, and longs for something new; and to make public proclamation that the old toy has served its purpose, he takes it all to pieces some morning, and strews the fragmentary pegs, and wheels, and springs, and various-colored beads, upon the parlor floor in motley confusion. Here we have an example of the creation of disorder. How? In the simplest way possible! By utter thoughtlessness, and a restless, impatient activity on the part of a witless child. The boy needed no wisdom to achieve this deed. He did not purposely wish to do anything; he he only wished to undo a thing that another had done. What was necessary for the accomplishment of such a purely negative result? Nothing but blind force. A monkey in sport, as readily as a man, with a reasoning purpose, could do a business of this kind; a maundering idiot, an unreasoning madman, as easily as an Aristotle, a Newton, or a Gioberti. Blind force, therefore, unreasoning, uncalculating impulse, is the author of disorder. But with the making even of the simplest toy it is quite a different affair. We know that no most assiduous action of blind puffs and strokes will make a toy. Toys are made by ingenious, thinking minds, and by a series of processes, of which ingenious, thinking minds are the authors. We find, therefore, that mind, and mind only, disposes a few pieces of painted wood, flexible steel, and shining studs, into that finely calculated trifle which we call a toy. So we find in all other cases. A wild, raging, passion-stung rabble can pull down a palace in a few hours, which it required years of profound thought in the architect to scheme,

and in the builder to erect. A sudden fit of what we call fever, which is a violent irregular action of the blood and venous system, will turn into a chaotic babblement the utterance of a mind, whose words, before this intrusion of a disorderly force, might have hymned the poetry of the universe in a lofty epos, or directed the fate of kingdoms by a salutary ordinance. All that exists without and beyond chaos, exists only by virtue of indwelling or controlling mind—mind not cognitive merely and contemplative, but active; that is to say, intelligent force, as contrasted with blind force. Here, therefore, we have, within the space of our own direct knowledge and experience, the must indubitable proof of the real cause of order. In no branch of the many-armed activity of human life do we see any other principle than this at work—mind constantly the cause of order; disorder as constantly proceeding from the absence of mind. Nor is there the slightest room to suppose that, while we make this conclusion safely with regard to what falls within our human sphere of action, we are making a rash leap into the dark when we say that the presence of a like mind always and everywhere is the cause, and the only cause of all orderly operations and results in the external universe. For the order, which we perceive in the external universe, is exactly similar to that which we create by our own activity; and to suppose different or contrary causes for effects altogether similar and identical, is unphilosophical. Nay more: the most curious machines which we can make, with the highest power of our most highly cultivated reason, have already been made, and are already constructed in the world over which we exercise no control, exactly on the same principles as those which are the product of our thought-directed finger. The eye, as everybody knows, is a telescope. The man who doubts that the power which made the human eye is, in its manner of working, not only similar to, but absolutely identical with, the mind which invented the telescope, may as well doubt whether the little paper-boat, which a boy launches upon the pond, floats there upon the same principle by which the mighty ocean bears the armadas of England, and France, and America upon its bosom. Doubters of this description labor under a disease for which argument certainly is not the proper cure.

We have thus arrived at the cause of order, in a very sim-

ple way, by actual experience of the fact, than which nothing, no, not even the boasted necessity of mathematics, is more certain. It is not more certain that two and two make four, or that the angle at the center of a circle is double the angle at the circumference, than it is that a grand exhibition of curiously-calculated reasonable results could not have proceeded from the action of a blind, unreasoning force, or the combination of a host of such forces. Yet must we not be surprised, if the world and the wise men of the world did not at once arrive at this natural, necessary, and inevitable conclusion. In the secret consciousness of the healthy human intellect, the thought of the eternal, universal cause, no doubt, ever resides not only as the greatest truth, but as the root of all possible truth. The wide-spread existence of Polytheistic forms of faith, forms no exception to this rule. Every form of Polytheism, either acknowledges one Supreme God, as the preserver of order in the universe—as Jove among the Greeks; or at least conceives the existence of certain superhuman powers, which if they do not act always on the noblest principles, nevertheless are there, and do act in some way to preserve the recognized order of the universe, so far as human minds, in a very low state of culture, are capable of recognizing that order. For, it must be observed, that the order of the physical universe, however cunning and certain, is on so great a scale, and involves so many complex relations, that unthinking and uncalculating minds may often fail to have any very clear perception of it. The cleverest monkey, with all the action of its most clever conceits, will remain at an infinite distance from the possibility of comprehending a steam-engine; and men born without the organ of tune shall have their ears besieged by all the sweet, subtle forces of a Mozart and a Beethoven in vain. As there are individual men deficient in certain faculties and sensibilities, so there may be whole races of men, whose faculty of thinking is so little cultivated, that they have very little idea of what thought means in their own narrow, meager life; much less are they able to rise to a clear perception of that thoughtful order of things in the great whole, which made the Greeks designate the visible universe so significantly a κόσμος, or *garniture*. Besides, many things are constantly taking place in the physical and moral world, which, to a superficial view, seem actually the result not of

reasonable calculation, but of blind force. Storms, hurricanes, blights, burnings, volcanic explosions, subterranean quaking of the earth, civil wars, murders, rapines, and the triumphal march of prosperous injustice, as it appears, are phenomena, which, even to thoughtful minds, have often suggested horrible shadows of atheism and blind necessity. Deeper thought, no doubt, always teaches the absurdity of fixing our eyes on these irregular, and, to us incalculable, exhibitions of force, as any foundation for systematic atheism. The connection and ultimate purpose of all the violent and most sweeping movements of the world, can no more be comprehended by us than a fish can comprehend the currents of the ocean in which it swims, or a fly the revolutions of the wheel on which it has fixed itself. But the existence of these irregular, and, so far as their immediate and most obvious operation goes, destructive phenomena, may, along with a low state of culture, easily explain the existence of a sort of atheism among various races of men. I do not see, however, any proof that absolute atheism, or the belief in an absolute unreasoning something, without a name, as the cause of the definite reasonable something, which we call the world, has ever prevailed extensively among the human race. The Buddhists, it has been said, are atheists. But the atheism which they profess, according to the account of it which well-informed parties give, is not a formal denial of intellectual causality in the universe, but only a fixture of the feeling of reverence upon a great human preacher of righteousness, to the neglect of the great fountain of all righteousness. This is a very different thing from the perverse skepticism of certain irreverent individuals of highly cultivated intellects, who can bring themselves to believe in no intelligent author of the universe, because, with all their cleverness, they are so shallow as not to know the difference between a cause and an occasion, or because they are so despotic in a certain intellectual selfishness, as not to be willing to allow any intellect in the universe superior to their own. Such men require a moral conversion, not a logical refutation. Professed and vainglorious atheists must be allowed to pass as ghosts which haunt the day, with which a sound living eye can hold no converse.

THE PREACHING NEEDED IN OUR TIMES.*

Perhaps, of all classes of the community, the literary class is that naturally the least disposed to listen to the voice of the Christian preacher with respect. To listen with respect to your teacher, you must look up to your teacher; and the literary man, from the very circumstances of his position, is little inclined to look up. He is, or imagines himself to be in intellectual stature and mental culture, the equal, or more than the equal, of his instructor. He listens, therefore, with candor, perhaps, and attention, but with a certain judicial attitude and temper which puts the preacher's powers to a very severe test. He sits, not on the same level with the rest of the flock, but in a lofty region of his own, unfavorable alike to docile inquiry and deep impression. How should he, who is accustomed weekly or daily, from his lofty intellectual throne, to speak aloud his imperial decisions on all manner of men and things in the ear of the whole nation, sit meekly down every seventh day at the feet of the man who utters plain homely words to plain homely folk in his parish church? Besides, the speculative and the critical region in which he habitually moves, is necessarily unfavorable to the influence of an instrument whose power lies mainly in the moral and spiritual sphere. We should never forget that, as religion, to use the words of Schleiermacher, is not a thing of knowing only, or a thing of doing, but of feeling and of affection, it is with that inmost sanctuary of the soul, also, that the Christian preacher has mainly to do. His main business is not to extend theological science, to sound the foundation of speculative truth, but to feed the springs of Christian life. He is there not to philosophize or theorize, but to plead and persuade—to waken consciences, to kindle hearts, to nourish moral feeling, to stimulate and sustain holy action. His message, therefore, is not alone or mainly to the reason, or the judgment, or the æsthetic tastes, but to the soul—to those spiritual instincts and infinite wants and longings lying deep

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* From the article on *Modern Preaching*, in the North British Review, May, 1863.

down at the center of our being, which it is the business of religion at once to evoke and to satisfy. He is, in short, not a professor of theology, but a minister of religion, a preacher of faith. Now, with all this the distinctively literary habit has little in common. It moves in a wholly different orbit Its home is the cavern of the brain, rather than the consecrated chamber of the heart, where religion and her ministers chiefly dwell. No wonder, then, if the *litterateur* is apt to underrate the preacher. He comes to church expecting, or at least seeking, profound thought, ingenious speculation, powerful demonstration; and he finds only solemn unvailings of the world unseen, and earnest calls to repentance, to faith, to newness of life. What is the cure for this state of things? How shall the church meet half-way, or is it her duty to meet half-way, this large and influential class? Shall she try to make her ministrations philosophical—teach her pastors to preach a religion of reason, instead of the old religion of revealed truths and living faith? Shall she aim to move more in the intellectual sphere, and less in the spiritual and experimental? We do not think so. If the pulpit is to hold her own against the various and formidable agencies which in these days dispute with her the empire of the human soul, it must, we are persuaded, be by keeping to her own ground, and not by exchanging it for theirs. It is in his hold on the inward and spiritual, through the living enunciation of revealed truths, that the preacher's great strength lies; let him surrender this for a mere intellectual or speculative interest, and he becomes weak as another man. He may be intellectually brilliant, or he may not; he may be acute, original, profound, full of fresh thought, speculative insight, or bright poetic fancy, or he may not, just as any other man may. Such power as those attributes impart, he shares in common with all other teachers who possess them, whatever their special theme or distinctive aim may be. But his peculiar power as a preacher comes from an inspiration higher than they. That reason and intellectual gifts generally have an important function in the work of the pulpit, is, of course, beyond question. That function is at once negative and positive. They contribute, on the one hand, to preserve the substance of the divine message pure by rejecting

all admixture of crude opinion and morbid feeling; and on the other, to illuminate it, and set it forth with original force, freshness, and beauty. The intellectual charm which choice words, fine thoughts, vivid illustrations, keen glances into the hearts of men and things, and those deep, pregnant utterances of wisdom which reveal the fruit though not the processes of philosophy, impart to any discourse, whether religious or otherwise, is assuredly not to be made light of as an ally, if not the principal agent, in the work of the pulpit. If rare powers of thought and genius can contribute nothing to the substance of the preacher's message, and may take nothing from it, they may at least do much to win attention to it, and bring it into living contact with the minds of men, and especially of cultured and thoughtful men. Still intellectual power is one thing, and spiritual power is another; and the latter, not the former, is the peculiar power of the pulpit. Let them by all means, and as far as possible, be combined, but let not the one be substituted for the other.

Nor are we disposed to assent to the demand now often made on the Christian preacher in these days, to eschew all doctrinal statements, and confine himself to the practical concernments of human duty and common life, or at least to aim rather at the embodiment of a certain Christianized tone of thought and feeling, than the inculcation of any definite Christian system. If, indeed, by doctrinal preaching is meant the mere mechanical reproduction of other men's definitions and forms of thought—raw and wretched morsels of unmasticated, undigested catechism or creed—the dead tradition of a controversial and dogmatic orthodoxy, rather than the living faith of the heart—we can scarcely have too little of it, and the best friends of the pulpit will mournfully confess that we have by far too much. But if doctrinal preaching in the true sense be, as surely it is, the clear and earnest declaration of God's message to sinful men, or, in the words of a pre-eminently doctrinal book of "what we are to believe concerning God, and *what duty God requires of man*"—the declaration of this by men who believe it, and because they believe it, "therefore speak"—it is difficult to see how we can have too much of it; we can scarcely, indeed, conceive

of a proper Christian discourse without it. Surely, if the preacher is to do God's work in the souls of men, he must declare to them God's truth; and that truth, whatever special cast and shaping it may receive from the circumstances and characteristic thinking of the age, must, when declared, assume more or less the form of doctrinal statement. There must still be "Thus saith the Lord" clearly and distinctly heard above the din of human speculation and philosophy, or the pulpit will lose the spell which it wielded of old over the souls of men. If you are, indeed, to move the world from its foundations, it can only be by the means of a fulcrum beyond the world: and where is that fulcrum to be found, if not in that old doctrine of sin and grace, of man's ruin and God's redemption, which, from the Pentecostal day till now, has been the source of whatever has been strong, whatever has been holy in the faith and life of the Church? Let that doctrine indeed be declared not in man's way, but in God's; let it be uttered, not as a dry dogma, but as a living faith; let it not be a mere theological tradition, but the ever new conviction and belief of the heart, the personal message and "burden" of the man himself, and not of any other man or other age—still, and in any case, it must be a message, and a message from God. What men call doctrine may be dead doctrine or living doctrine; it may be abstract scholastic doctrine, or concrete Bible doctrine; it may be doctrine that bristles in definitions, or that gushes from the heart, but—there must be doctrine.

Even in an apologetic point of view, and in the face of all the skeptical philosophies of the day, we are persuaded this is the best and safest course. We should never forget—in these times of speculative doubt and misgiving, it is more than ever important to remember—that the Gospel itself is emphatically its own witness. It shines, whenever faithfully and livingly preached, in the light of its own evidence. By its very proclamation it accredits and authenticates itself. There is a depth, a power, a majesty, a self-evidencing light, a soul-searching and soul-quickening energy about the message itself, apart even from those external "signs of the kingdom of heaven" by which it is accredited, which seems to stamp it as divine, and to claim as by an inherent and inde-

feasible title the homage of those who hear it. The manifestation of the truth is the most irresistible demonstration of the truth. If it needs any other vouchers than itself, those vouchers are to be found in the human conscience and the human heart—the heart whose infinite longings it satisfies, and the conscience whose piercing cries it at once interprets and stills. The echo of the human soul from the inmost recesses of its being answers to the voice of God speaking in the Scriptures as it does to none other. Let the preacher awake this echo, and he will have therein a mightier witness to the truth of his message, as well as a mightier persuasive to compliance with it, than the most profound philosophy or cogent argument can ever supply. We do not, of course, depreciate the external and secondary evidences of the truth of the Scriptures. Those evidences, whether drawn from miracle or prophesy, or the analogies of nature and providence, or the victorious progress of the faith, and its beneficent and regenerative influence on society and the world, are most powerful corroborative proofs of the divinity of the Gospel—most precious aids to faith. But still we believe the main and central basis of our belief must be sought elsewhere. These are rather but the buttresses and outer bulwarks of the temple of truth, than its proper foundations. The religion of God does not so much fight its way into human souls by argument, as reveal itself through its own inherent divinity to those whose eyes are opened to see its glory. For high or low, for learned or unlearned, for the philosopher and the peasant alike, the most convincing evidence of Christianity is the manifestation of Christ.

Do we mean, then, to maintain, on the whole—and especially as regards the matter of doctrinal preaching now last referred to—that all is right? Are we perfectly content with things as they are? Have we no desiderata? We are far from thinking thus; and perhaps the effort we have made in the foregoing pages to do full justice to the merits of the existing ministry, may be accepted as establishing for us a sort of title to speak the more freely in indicating what we deem the real defects and vulnerable points of modern preachers and preaching, even of the better sort. To sum up the whole, then, in a single sentence, we think there is among

us a very large amount of that dry, formal, doctrine-preaching we have alluded to above. We gladly admit there is less of this than formerly—that in the high places of the Church it is rapidly passing away, and giving place to the freshness either of intellectual life on the one hand, or spiritual earnestness on the other; but on the lower flats of intellectual and spiritual mediocrity, it still obstinately holds its ground. Men go on perseveringly plowing the old ruts, mistaking dead dogmas for living truths, human artificial forms for the divine substance. We do not object, as we have already fully shown, to doctrinal preaching, but only to the kind of doctrinal preaching which is still too largely prevalent. It is not doctrine, but *mere* doctrine, hard and stiff doctrine, narrow, one-sided doctrine—doctrine divorced from Scripture exegesis, divorced from experience, divorced from human life—doctrine that may be carried about in a formula, and passed, without thought, or feeling, or heart conviction, from hand to hand. We want water, drawn not from mere human tanks—whether of Oxford, or Geneva, or Westminster—but from the divine living springs.

To come more to detail, we think, first of all, that the pulpit would greatly gain in vitality and power by becoming more *biblical*. Nothing, we are persuaded, has of late contributed more to redeem the preaching of the age both from intellectual and spiritual commonplace, than the great development in our day of a healthy exegetical spirit. The study of divine truth has been resolving itself more and more into the study of the divine word. Men have been seeking to make their escape from the narrowness and poverty of man's thoughts and words, to the largeness and fullness of the thoughts and words of God. This is unquestionably a movement in the right direction. As the reformation of philosophy was based on the interpretation of nature, so, surely, must the reformation and revivification of theology and preaching be based on the interpretation of Scripture. If system and theory be valuable in their own place, that place is assuredly one subordinate to, and dependent on, interpretation. System must grow out of interpretation, not interpretion out of system. Divine words must be questioned, even as natural facts must be questioned—not merely summoned

as "proof-texts" to establish a conclusion already foregone. Let us not be misunderstood. We are not speaking in any measure in disparagement of the systematic and scientific development of Christian doctrine as one of the essential disciplines of theology; we are only claiming for exegesis, or the free, unbiassed reverential interpretation of the divine word, its distinct and independent sphere. Let dogmatics no more dominate exegetics, than exegetics shall supplant dogmatics. The course, too, which the revived exegesis has taken is eminently a healthy one. While not abjuring philosophy, or such subsidiary lights as history and archæology supply, in the interpretation of the sacred text, its great business has been the close, searching, reverential examination of the inspired words themselves. It has sought carefully to weigh and measure the utterances of the Spirit, giving to them precisely the sense they bear, neither more nor less; not daring either to add to or take from it, even in the interest of the truth itself. Its motto, in short, has been, "Hear the Word," not "Hear the Church;" and if the result, notwithstanding, has been a signal corroboration of the cardinal tenets of the Church's faith and traditional scheme of orthodox belief, it has not been because divine texts have been pressed into the service, but because they have freely and spontaneously hastened to bear their uncorrupted witness. And if this characteristically biblical movement has been for the advantage of sound theology, it has perhaps been even more so to a sound and healthful homiletics. All true and living preaching of the Word must be drawn fresh from the springs of the Word. The faithful messenger must take his message direct from his Master; and his declaration of the message must be, as far as possible, the very echo of his Master's voice. We shall learn to preach like Christ, only by pondering and deeply studying the words of Christ. We need scarcely say how many of the choicest products of the pulpit in our day derive their main excellence from this source. It may be enough to refer to the sermons of Trench, of Alford, of Ellicott, and, perhaps, chief of all, of Dr. Vaughan, whose recent volume of expository discourses on the Epistle to the Philippians seems to us very much the model of what scriptural exegesis ought to be, as well as, at the same time, an example of what such an

exegesis may do to vivify, to freshen, and enrich the ministrations of the sanctuary.

Then, again, we think the preaching of the age might, with great advantage, be more *Christian*. We use this expression here in a somewhat unusual sense, because we can not find any other to express our meaning. What we intend by it is, that we should desire to see a greater prominence given in the ordinary teaching of the Church to the Divine Person and life of Christ Himself, as distinguished from mere doctrinal propositions concerning His offices and work. As we once heard a devout Christian layman express it, there is in the sermons of many preachers too much of "it," and too little of "Him." Undoubtedly that which most vitally concerns us all, is to know Christ—to know not some doctrines about Him merely, or even all doctrines about Him, but to know Himself, the real personal Jesus, as well as the official Christ—not the justifying life and atoning death only, but Him who "for us men and for our salvation," lived and died. This is the true vivifying element in Christian preaching—the divine kernel, without which all else is but barren husk and chaff. Let us have doctrine by all means—doctrine in all its fullness and explicitness, but doctrine vivified and glorified by the person. It is in this way alone that theoretic doctrines, and especially the distinctive doctrines of grace, can be made, we do not say quickening and salutary, but even safe. Thus alone shall we at once feel their power and avoid their pernicious abuse. We think, then, that the current preaching of our time would gain greatly in depth and vitality by having more of this element, and with this view, while not less diligent in the study of the Epistles, moving more than heretofore in the sphere, and breathing the holy air, of the Gospels. Here also we gladly own that a great improvement has of late taken place in the preaching of this country, at least of the better sort. It is much less common now than in the last age, for good men to talk in a stiff and formal way of justification and sanctification merely, and to lose sight of Him who is Himself the Lord our righteousness and our strength. There are many now who know full well to pluck the leaves of healing from the tree of life itself, instead of bringing them forth dry and withered from the *hortus siccus* of a traditional faith.

We pass on, then, to another of our desiderata: We should like to see the preaching of the day more *ethical*. We do not mean, of course, the mere morality of the past age—a morality that held of Socrates rather than of Christ, and which showed the earthliness of its origin by its utter impotence, and barrenness of all divine, recreative power. What we do mean, is the life of Christ, as distinguished from, but still in indissoluble connection with, the grace of Christ—the life of a Christian man on earth, or of Christ in him, in its manifold ramifications and manifestations. This surely is just as legitimate and necessary a subject of Christian preaching as the highest doctrines. The conscience needs not only to be awakened, but educated. It wants not stimulus only, but direction. The life of a Christian man, like the life of any other man, is a life of details; and the light of divine truth must be shed on those details, and the inspiration of holy motives breathed into them, as well as those great acts and moments of existence which seem the turning-points of destiny. The hands of the diligent make rich, by the care of little things as well as of great: the perfect likeness of Christ depends on the more delicate lines and shades as well as on the general outlines of His image. We need, in short, to learn how to walk, and to please God, not in the chief things, but in all things; not on high and solemn occasions only, but amid all the common scenes and ways of life. Should not the instructions and exhortations of the Christian pulpit, then, cover all this ground? The Bible covers it. The preaching of the apostles covers it. The inspired instructions to bishops and evangelists as to the proper sphere and range of their commission cover it. Can the Christian preacher, then, now be considered as faithfully discharging his trust, and declaring the whole counsel of God, if he do not strive habitually to cover it too—if he do not assiduously labor throughout the whole tenor of his ministry to acquit himself before God and man as the preacher of righteousness, as the preacher of grace? Has it been so in the evangelical pulpits of this country hitherto? We can not say so. In a great majority of the sermons denominated evangelical, preached every Sunday in England, and still more perhaps in Scotland, this element is in a great measure wanting. You may lay your account, as

a general thing, with the exhibition, more or less effective, of some part or aspect of Christian doctrine, with more or less of application to the heart and conscience—but scarcely ever the inculcation and enforcement of any specific duty or Christian virtue *per se*. Still, a great improvement has of late taken place, in many quarters, in this respect also; though much remains to be done. We would refer especially to such works as those of Dr. Goulburn on "Personal Religion," Dr. Vaughan's "Lesson's on Life and Godliness," and Mr. Arnot's "Laws from Heaven for Life on Earth," as specimens of the kind of teaching which, in this view, we should like to see more extensively prevalent in the Church.

We should have liked to dwell a little on yet a fourth desideratum—that of a more intimate relation in the teaching of the pulpit with *the actual facts and realities of human life*. Our preaching, we think, while not less divine than heretofore, but in truth more divine, should be *more human* also—more directly bearing on the actual battles the men before us are fighting—the actual sins, sorrows, temptations, misgivings, fears, amid which they are struggling. But our space forbids illustration, and it is enough to have pointed to a path in which Chalmers, more than forty years ago, led the way, and in which he has since had many a worthy follower. Preachers are learning, slowly perhaps, yet still surely, to speak not to men's hearts and consciences only, but to "their business and bosoms" too.

But what now shall we say of the common people? What shall we say of the great breach, already so wide, and in the view of many becoming still wider, between a large section of them and all the ministries and agencies of the Christian Church? What is the cause of that breach, and how best may it be bridged over or closed? This is the most serious aspect of the whole subject. It is surely passing sad to think that the Christian ministry in our land should to so large an extent have failed just precisely where it has failed. Of all classes in the Jewish community of old, the common people heard our Master gladly. Why is it that, to so large an extent, they refuse to hear his servants? Why is it that those scattered multitudes no longer recognize in their preaching the voice of their true Shepherd, but only that of a stranger?

Why do they not own and welcome them as friends—the friends of the poor and suffering and toiling multitudes, even as they owned and welcomed Him? We fear no satisfactory answer can be given to these questions as regards the Christian ministry and the Christian Church, not indeed of this generation especially, but rather of bygone generations, from whose slumbers we are just awakening, and the bitter fruits of whose neglect have descended as a sad legacy to our times. But then or now—the fathers or the children—we are verily guilty concerning our brethren. They would not have ceased to hear us, unless we had ceased to speak as our Master spake to them. We would not indeed throw the whole blame of this matter on the clergy. On the contrary, we are persuaded the special evil now in question is in one view only a part of a still wider evil, in which clergy and laity are alike involved, the laity perhaps even more than the clergy. The separation of the people from the Church is, in great measure, but one aspect of the separation of the people from the upper and dominant classes of the community generally, with which they have come more or less to identify the Church. They suspect and turn away from the clergy not so much on their own account, as on account of those with whom they are, in their view, associated and mixed up. They look upon them as men of a class, and that not *their* class. They regard them as belonging to the ranks of the educated, cultivated, prosperous few, as distinguished from the rude and struggling many to which they and theirs belong. They seem to them to walk on the sunny side of the world, while their home is on the dark side. It is probable that, in these days at least, the clergy share to a less degree than any other section of the upper classes in those feelings of alienation and suspicion, but still they share in them. The Church is deserted and forsaken, where it is deserted and forsaken, less as a divine institution than as an upper and middle class institution; and the Christian ministry suffer not for their own sins only, but for the sins of the whole body of the influential classes, and, among others, of those who most sharply reprove them in this matter. Of all men, in short, the clergy have done most to bridge over the great gulf which all alike deplore. But still the gulf remains.

In regard to the remedy for this state of things, we deeply feel that it becomes us to speak with deference. What we would urge is only in the way of respectful suggestion, and not of admonition or counsel. But a very humble person may often clearly enough see the thing that is wanted, without imagining himself in any respect qualified to supply it. He may give utterance to the *desiderium* deeply and generally felt, though it be with him nothing more than a *desiderium*. What, then, is that *desiderium?* How would it express itself if called to speak in the presence of a body of the younger clergy, summoned together to consider this very question of the alienated and revolted masses, and what is to be done for them? Somewhat, we think, as follows: Supposing all other more fundamental requisites, spiritual and intellectual, present, then, first of all, speak to the people in a *manly way*. Speak to them as a man to men. Let your thinking be clear, and your words wise and strong. Let there be in your discourses the genuine ring of sound sense and healthy manly sentiment. Let their frame be muscular, not soft and flabby. Don't speak down to the people. For one thing, many of them are not below you; and if they were, it is no compliment to them to tell them so. Avoid feeble and mawkish sentiment. The feminine style of thought and feeling, or even the infant-school style, may have its admirers in Belgravian or May Fair circles, but assuredly it is no favorite with the brawny sons of care and toil. Then speak in a *brotherly manner*. Make them feel, in every word you speak, and in your whole intercourse with them, that you are not only a man, but a brother. Show that you understand them, that you feel not for them only, but with them. Identify yourself as a true priest of God with the people of your charge, sharing their griefs, bearing their sorrows, fighting, if you can, their battles. They think that you are men of a class, and therefore suspect you, and keep aloof from you; make them feel that they are wrong in this—that you are men not of any class, but of every class—that you are men, and deem every man your brother. Learn what they are thinking about, what they are most deeply interested in, what they are aiming at and struggling for; and when they come to the house of God, let them feel that they are hearing the

voice of a friend and not of a stranger—one who understands them, and is at least trying to help them, in bearing their life-burden and fighting their life-battle. Thus shall you indeed drink into the spirit and follow the footsteps of Him who was not only a man, but pre-eminently *the* Man—who therefore deemed everything human His own—who was our brother born, and born most of all for adversity. Last of all, speak to them *earnestly*. The "common people," of all classes, like earnest speech. In their whole life they have to do with earnest work and with earnest things, and they have little sympathy with anything else. Their life is necessarily, at least as regards this world, a life in earnest—earnest wants, earnest toils, earnest cares, earnest sorrows—nothing of mere finesse, and form, and conventional ceremony. They combat with life in its sober, stern reality; there are few flowers, few sunny bowers on their path; mostly plain, rough, dusty highway. Therefore whoever would speak suitably to them, must speak in earnest. He must speak in plain, honest, downright fashion; the more plain, honest, and downright the better. He must be a real man speaking to real men, or he is nothing. Other desirable qualities may be dispensed with, but this is essential. He may or may not be a man of taste; he may or may not be a man of learning; he may or may not be a man of eloquence; but he must be a man in earnest, and speak *like* a man in earnest, or he never can be the friend of the poor—a shepherd of the people. How pre-eminently was this the case with our divine Master! If ever man on earth was in real right earnest, it was Christ. If ever man looked on life, and on the world, and on the sins and sorrows of men in their reality, and spoke as one that did, He did so. No one that heard Him could ever feel that He was trifling with him, that He was mocking his misery, that He was playing with his disease. He spoke as one who felt himself in the presence of awful powers of death and woe, who knew all, and in the depths of His soul felt all. This the common people loved; this they welcomed as the thing they needed, the only thing that met their case. Therefore they heard Him gladly. Let His servants go and do likewise, and they will hear them gladly too.

PROVIDENCE, NOT NECESSITY, THE LAW OF THE UNIVERSE.*

I CONTEMPLATE with joy the idea of a universe without limits, unfolding itself through space and time, and expressing, by an inexhaustible multitude of created beings, the omnipotence of the immense and eternal Creator. Spinoza and Bruno have each of them a most profound sentiment of the infinity of worlds, and yet their universe can not be mine, because their God is not my God. They only see in nature and man various forms with which an impersonal activity successively clothes himself beneath the law of a blind destiny. To my eyes, on the contrary, according to the idea that I have formed of the All-perfect Being, this world, which is His image, must everywhere show traces of an intelligent will, on the side of the good and the beautiful, who has freely chosen, formed, and disposed all things for the best end. It must be referred to the universe itself, and to man's observation, whether my idea of it or the Pantheist's is the most right and true.

But the problem which overwhelms and makes me feel most strongly the extent of my ignorance is this: One must be a Humboldt to embrace the Cosmos; nor is this enough; for not only must one know the heaven and the earth, the world of gravity, and the world of life, but also that invisible world, more changeable and unapproachable than the two others—the world of humanity. Thus we must question these three universes, and ask of each if its last word be necessity, or Providence.

When I begin to contemplate nature in simplicity and truth, I find her beautiful, and full of harmonies. The sight of the starry heavens throws me into a sort of ecstacy. These stars, these worlds without number, the splendor of their fires, the prodigy of their greatness and of their distances, that infinite multitude of luminous globes, in their constant and varied groups, ordered in space to accomplish with the same motion their majestic revolution, like an immense concert,

* From *Modern Pantheism: Essay on Religious Philosophy.* By M. EMILE SAISSET, Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Faculty of Letters of Paris. Edinburgh, 1863. 2 vols. 12mo.

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where one feels that a superior harmony runs through the different notes of the instruments and the voices—in presence of these beautiful objects, beneath the charm of their grand impressions, I feel my whole mind penetrated and subdued by the idea of an ordaining thought.

And when my thought leaves the vault of heaven to enter into itself, if it find within a soul at peace with itself and with its equals, whose every feeling, insensibly softened by contemplation, has borrowed from the beautiful night something of its serenity, I begin to understand that harmony of visible nature and of internal consciousness which made a philosopher, Kant, say, "Two objects fill my soul with an ever-increasing admiration and respect—above us the starry heaven, within us the moral law." At such moments I believe in God, King of Heaven and Ruler of man. I believe in Him with a faith without reserve, with that spontaneous faith, which is prompter and sweeter than the faith which reflects. But soon reflection has its way, and I ask myself if I am not the dupe of an illusion.

I have just admired the vault of heaven, and I have seen in it worlds without number gravitating through space under the same law of equilibrium and of harmony.

Am I sure that my eyes have seen it, or was it perchance my reason, delivered from its native ignorance, that guessed by a miracle of intuition, the order and the structure of the Heavens? It was modern science that fed me with such thoughts as immense globes, infinite worlds, gravitation, eternal equilibrium. If I had been born among the aborigines of Australia, or if I had lived three thousand years ago, I should have seen in the starry Heaven, only a dark vault, sprinkled with some brilliant vapors. Do what I can, I can not seize again the first simple impressions of nature. On all sides acquired prejudices enwrap me; and the echoes, more or less distant, of modern science, resound in my spirit in spite of myself.

What is to be done in this impossibility of hearing clearly the voice of nature? Let us try to find out exactly what science says or thinks. In the first place let us refer to those extraordinary men, who are considered to have discovered the laws of creation—Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton. One, say

the learned, has marked the true place of our earth and our sky in the vast economy of the celestial globes. The other has defined the precise curve that the earth and the other planets describe around their luminous center. And the last, drawing from the laws of Kepler the consequences that they contain, has succeeded, by the matchless power of his calculation, in determining the certain number which subjects all the stars of our world, and moreover all stars and all bodies, in all spaces, and in all time, to one and the same law.

There is a marvelous succession in this series of discoveries, but it is hard to be understood. I am incapable of reading the book of Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium cœlestium*, or the *Harmoniæ mundi* of Kepler. The calculations, the numbers, the figures, the algebra are all beyond me and perplex me. But after all, what I want is to know what these great observers have thought of the plan of the universe, and having reduced it to this single point, I think I may find an end to my labors. If it were true that an eternal and blind necessity presides over the movements of the universe, surely the inventors of astronomy must have known it better than any one. But, on the contrary, I find that the more these great minds succeeded in laying bare the general economy of the world, they recognized in more glowing characters the free and wise hand of the Creator. Copernicus had deeply studied, not only the systems of Ptolemy, but those of Philolaus, of Ecphante, of Hicetas, of Heraclides. The first doubts that came into his mind as to the truth of the old systems, arose from his observing one common fault in all, that of imposing on the universe a plan destitute of simplicity and of symmetry: and he was led to the first idea of his own system, by seeking out the simplest and the most beautiful plan, that which is most conformable to the idea of a wise and foreseeing Ordainer. It was not necessary in itself that the earth should turn round the sun, but reason told Copernicus that this arrangement was the best, because it was the most simple, and experience and calculation confirmed the inspiration of his reason. Let us hear his own words. "By no other combination," he exclaims, "have I been able to find so admirable a symmetry in the diverse parts of this great whole, as by placing the torch of the world, the sun which governs the

whole family of stars, upon a royal throne, in the center of Nature's temple."

This earth forms a part of a collection of planets which revolve round the sun. Each of these has its own proper orbit, one a circle, another an ellipsis, a third a different curve, or rather we may presume that they describe similar curves ruled by the same laws.

Kepler employed more than twenty years in observations, in calculations, in unwearied researches, to verify this sublime presentiment. He reached the goal, at last; he discovered the three laws which immortalize his name, and he exclained: "Now what is it to me that my book be read by the present age, or by a future age! my book can wait for readers. Has not God waited six thousand years contemplating His work?" I can not exactly tell by what means Kepler reached these three laws. I know not how much we are to attribute to experiment, how much to calculation, how much again to all sorts of strange mystical, symbolical, Pythagorean ideas; but that which is the dominant idea of all his calculations, all his observations, all his hypotheses, all his reveries, is his profound conviction that the world is beautiful, that it has been made on an ideal model by an Artist of infinite skill and knowledge.

But there is one who has penetrated further than Copernicus and Kepler; further than any man before him, into the secrets of celestial things; one who bringing back the laws of Kepler to their generative principle, has demonstrated mathematically the system that Copernicus had merely discovered, and made likely: and has fixed finally the sole and supreme condition, whence results the eternal equilibrium of worlds. What would Newton have said if he had been told that the law of universal gravitation, and the magnificent system that it governs, are but a necessary consequence of the nature of bodies, that they contain neither order, nor wisdom, nor suitableness, nor beauty, nor harmony, but pure and simple necessity? He would surely have answered, "I know not how you have made yourselves acquainted with the essence of matter and the movements and laws which necessarily result from it. I do not pretend to be so skillful, I profess my ignorance of the essence of bodies. I only know matter by its sensible

properties. I have made some experiments, and some new calculations, which have taught me that all the motions of the universe may be referred to a single law, which I have called, for want of a better name, the law of attraction. Now as a fact and a law I can take hold of this attraction and demonstrate it; as a cause I know nothing about it; I can not even tell its mode of action, whether it acts from a distance, or by the intermediary of an invisible fluid called ether, or otherwise. Upon this point I dare not pronounce, for want of observations, and sufficient proofs; but what I do know is, that all these regular movements suppose a first cause which is not a mechanical cause; that this admirable arrangement of the sun, the planets, and the comets can not be explained but by the design and government of an intelligent and powerful Cause; that a blind necessity does not explain anything, for that necessity being the same at all times and in all places, a variety of things can not proceed from it. And consequently, the universe, with the order of its parts appropriated to a variety of times and places, can only have originated from a Primitive Being, having ideas and a will.

"God must neither be represented as a soul of the world, dispersed in the variety of things, nor as a Being, dead and abstract. He is the Creator, distinct from the world and acting upon it. It is not enough to contemplate Him as an eternal, infinite, absolute Being, not even enough to admire Him as the infinitely wise Architect of the universe. He must be venerated as our Lord and Sovereign. We do not say, my Eternal, my Infinite; we say, my God, that is my Master. God is no longer God, He is but nature and fate, without a Providence. The true God is then an intelligent living God, who moves, orders, and governs the universe. Thus natural philosophy teaches us the origin of things, for it belongs to that science, supported by the observation of phenomena, to raise us up to God."

We can not fail to be touched with a faith so strong, exhaling from the lips of Newton in such grand and simple words. I know it will be said that Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton speak like Christians rather than philosophers, that having breathed from infancy the air of Christianity, and fed upon her

milk, they beheld the universe with prejudiced eyes. It will be remarked how much astronomers must have changed their point of sight, when an age of doubt and negation has succeeded to an age of faith. Nature, in the days of Copernicus, apparently was just the same as in the days of d'Alembert. The laws of Kepler, and the attraction of Newton, far from having received the slightest refutation from the progress of observation and calculation, on the contrary, have shone out with an ever-increasing splendor. Yet in the eighteenth century, new astronomers, new geometricians, those even who have verified, extended, and completed the Newtonian system—a Lagrange, the inventor of the calculus of variations, a Laplace, author of the "Celestial Mechanism," have not found in the heavens a trace of God. The only divinity before which astronomy will henceforth bow, is mathematical science; the ideas of propriety, of beauty, of free choice, and arrangement have neither sense nor meaning since numbers must govern the universe; for in geometry and mechanics everything must be demonstrated rigorously, everything is in a chain, and must be deduced by immutable relations, everything is what in needs must be—it is the empire of necessity.

I confess these arguments make no impression upon me; I can see without difficulty that the essential character of mathematical truths is to be absolutely necessary; but this necessity, be it understood, is purely ideal, for this simple reason—that the object of mathematics is also ideal. Numbers, circles, and curves are not real and effective things; by no means, they only express abstract possibilities which may have an eternally real basis in the intellect of the eternal geometrician; but which, taken in themselves, have no force and no virtue, and can not explain the existence of a grain of sand.

You say that it is absolutely necessary that the radii of a circle should be equal; that may be, but it is not necessary that there should be a certain circular body, say the sun. Granted a universe with stars and worlds, governed by the mathematical law of attraction, undoubtedly several things must necessarily follow: for instance, it will be necessary that planets should describe elliptic curves round the sun; but it

is evident that of itself there is nothing necessary in this motion. If the ellipsis were the curve necessary for stars which have a translative motion, other stars would not describe different curves. If you tell me that all celestial motions are the necessary consequences of the law of attraction, which is necessary in itself, I ask how you prove it? Is the necessity of this law evident? Then it would not have needed the labor of ages and the genius of a Newton to discover it. Do you call it a consequence of the essence of bodies? then you must have the kindness to explain what the essence of bodies is, and what attraction is in itself, and what is its mode of action; and, further, you will have to prove that bodies themselves exist necessarily. Away with these childish speculations! Let us only reason on what modern science has established—with the help of observation, analogy, and calculation. One thing only is established, that there is a grand, universal, sole, sovereign law, which gives an incomparable beauty, solidity, and harmony to the universe. Everywhere in the heavens there is order, simplicity, and arrangement; therefore everywhere intelligence and choice; therefore nowhere blind necessity.

Leaving those immense worlds which human science only perceives afar, and in the aggregate of their masses and their movements, I turn to the things of earth, which can be taken up and handled. Here the absolute empire of mathematics ceases. There succeeds to the inflexible regularity of the heavenly bodies a harmony more varied, more delicate, more simple. I see around me life. Here I find a flower hidden in the grass; it rears bravely its frail and flexible stem to seek the sunbeam which helps it to expand, to tint its leaves with thin, delicate hues, to exhale its sweet perfume. Close beside it I see a little insect, which spreads its wings, flutters from flower to flower, sucks out their odorous sweets, and, laden with its spoils, bears it to the hive, where tribes of winged reapers follow. If some one should come and tell me that that flower and that bee are the work of an absolute necessity, without any thought of suitableness, or free and harmonious arrangement, I should find it difficult to understand him, and unpleasant to listen to him. I understand and appreciate much more that observer (Leibnitz, I think) who,

having one day taken a grub from a bush to admire it more closely, was suddenly seized with an involuntary emotion, and hastened to replace the insect on its leaf with a sort of respect, fearing to profane or tarnish one of those living mirrors where the wisdom of the Creator is reflected.

Before allowing myself to mistrust the inspirations of nature, or those acquired prejudices which may unconsciously influence me, I will consult again those naturalists, those learned men of genius, Harvey, Linnæus, or better still, those last great creators, Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and those whom they have initiated into their researches. I am told, indeed, that these eminent men could not agree—that if the ideas of Cuvier are conformable to a Providential system, those of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire favor that of necessity. I am not prepared to enter into the infinite complications of this illustrious controversy, but I may succeed in seizing its great features and their most certain results.

Cuvier was convinced that the innumerable multitude of individuals which compose the organized world, may be referred to a certain number of essentially different plans and types. In the animal kingdom especially, whatever may be the analogies which are found between different groups, anatomy lays down four plans of organization which it is impossible to confound, and which divide animals for ever into four orders. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire only beheld a factitious work in this great classification, which has overthrown that of Linnæus, and which has been succeeded by no other. According to him nature works on a single type. The differences which seem to divide living beings, are purely exterior; and the philosophical observer finds everywhere the same essential organs.

A learner, like myself, can not decide between Cuvier and his antagonist; but I ask both, and Cuvier first, what the principles are that have presided over their respective labors. Cuvier answers thus:

"Every organized being forms a whole; a single united system, the parts of which mutually correspond, and concur to the same definitive action, by a reciprocal reaction. None of these parts can change, without the others changing also; and consequently each of them taken separately indicates and

gives all the others. If the intestines of an animal are so organized that they will only digest flesh, and that newly killed; it follows that his jaws will be constructed to devour his prey, his claws to lay hold of and tear it, his teeth to cut and divide it, the whole system of his organs of motion to follow and to seize it, his organs of sense to perceive it afar; nature even must have placed in his brain the necessary instinct to know how to hide himself and lay snares for his victims. Such are the general conditions of the carnivorous species. An animal intended to be of this species must infallibly unite them all, for his race could not exist without them."

Had Cuvier been told that there has been found, on some old Egyptian monument, the figure of an animal, whose strange organization would confute the principle of the correlation of organs, how boldly his reserved and positive spirit would have repulsed *à priori* the authenticity of such a testimony. He would say, you have mistaken the pictures of fantastic animals for descriptions of real animals. "In some such design on one of these monuments, Agatharchides must have seen his carnivorous bull, whose jaws reaching from ear to ear spared no other animal, but which assuredly would be disowned by naturalists, since nature never combines cloven feet and horns with sharp teeth." And mixing gracefully the serious playfulness of the man of wit with the higher views of the philosopher, Cuvier thus goes on: "Now-a-days any one who only sees the trace of a cloven foot may conclude that the animal who made it was a ruminating animal; and this conclusion is as certain as any other in physics or in moral science. This single track, then, gives to him who observes it, both the form of the teeth, and the form of the jaws, and the form of the vertebra, and the form of all the bones of the leg, of the thighs, of the shoulders, and of the stomach of the animal that has just passed by. It is a surer mark than all those of Zadig."

These great principles of the subordination and correlation of organs, in the hands of Cuvier, have reconstituted, with the help of a few fossil bones, whole races of extinct animals, and have recalled to existence worlds that seemed lost for ever in oblivion. And any one may see that all these labors,

all these discoveries, all these miraculous resurrections, are inspired by the thought that nature, in her operations, obeys, not blind mathematics, but laws of convenience, harmony, and proportion.

I next inquire of the disciples of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire if they have a principle. They have one, and they call it analogy. To distinguish and to classify animals, to divide them again into species, genera, orders, classes, ramifications; all this is but the beginning of their science. They must still analyze each of these groups, and grasp analogy under difference, and unity under variety. From one species to another species, from one kind to another kind, philosophical anatomy discovers or fancies the same elements of organization. One species, the fish for example, has a skull composed of twenty-six bones; another, such as the bird, has but eight or ten. Here, then, is a marked difference, a line of demarkation. So you think, because you have only examined the bird in its adult state. Examine it in its fetal state, and you will find in it all the primitive bones, which, later, will melt together and deceive the artificial observers. At other times you let yourself be deceived by the numerous metamorphoses that an organ is subject to, when you observe it in the whole course of the animal series. Its visible forms vary, its dimensions change, its structure becomes complicated or simplified, its functions, even may differ; for different organs serve sometimes for the same function, as the lungs and the branchiæ, and it happens, too, that the same organ sometimes fulfills different functions, as the organ of locomotion, and the organ of respiration; but the relative position and the mutual dependence of organs never vary. Hence that principle which is the torch of anatomical philosophy; an organ may be maimed or destroyed, it can never be transposed.

Nor is it only in one of the ramifications of the animal kingdom that this law is verified. Vertebrated or unvertebrated, whatever artificial barriers are raised between animal and animal, still the unity of their organic composition prevails; and thus science verifies every day, that sublime conception of the Timeus which Buffon has expressed in language worthy of Plato: "It seems as if the Supreme Being would make use but of one idea, and at the same time

vary it in every possible manner, in order that man might equally admire the magnificence of the execution and the simplicity of the design."

But we have still to explain an immense series of phenomena which have remained till the present time an enigma and a scandal; I allude to the existence of monsters. But that which is called by this name is not a denial given to the general laws of nature. It may all be explained by an arrest of development, ruled by two very simple laws, that of the balance of organs, and that of the attraction of similar parts. Every time that you meet with an organ developed in an exorbitant fashion, instead of believing it a miracle, try if you can not find in a corresponding organ a defect of its normal development. If on the one side there is hypertrophy, there is atrophy on the other side. As Goethe has ingeniously remarked, Nature has a fixed budget, and too great an expenditure in one department exacts economy in another.

Thus the law of the balance of organs accounts for simple monstrosities; those which are called double are explained by the attraction of similar parts, which so act that if two germs, if two fœtuses, should happen to join, it is always the heart which will be joined to the heart, the brain to the brain, and so on. We must not then speak of the freaks of nature, of disorder, or of chance. Monsters are not a disorder, but an accident subject to laws—a transient deflection, always contained, corrected, and ruled by the superior laws of order, which are above all.

These are the great discoveries which give to Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire an immortal place beside Cuvier. Where is now the necessary contradiction between these two men of genius? From the point of sight of religious philosophy, it does not exist at all. To Geoffroy, as to Cuvier, the world has a plan, it is governed by laws—not laws of necessity, but laws of convenience and harmony. One, led by the stern genius of analysis, sees best the differences of beings; the other, carried away by the audacious inspirations of synthesis, can only see their analogies. Both make me understand that faith in Providence is independent of the diversity and the contradiction of systems. Systems change and clash, because

they represent the unequal efforts of man to grasp the often mysterious economy of the divine plan; but in proportion as some of the great lines of this plan are more clearly discovered, the world appears to us more harmonious, vaster, more simple, and more beautiful, and the eye of man beholds in more visible characters the free and intelligent Principle which it reflects.

The Central Committee for the Home Mission of the German Evangelical Church, Drs. Wichern, Bethman-Hollweg, Dorner, and others, offer a prize of four hundred German dollars for the best Essay on *the Bible and Nature, in the harmony of their revelations.* They say that while it is desirable to set the results of modern scientific investigation which harmonize with the contents of the Scriptures, in their true light, the attempt so frequently made in other countries, simply to show the agreement of the two, does not meet the present exigency. What is needed is a critical exhibition of the points at which they at present differ, and wherever the difference has been exaggerated the error must be rectified by an exact statement of the counter testimonies of natural science itself as opposed to any of its immature results. The prominent object, however, should be to show the fundamental distinction between theology and natural science according to the laws of each. On the ground that the Bible is the record of a divine revelation, a full exhibition must be made of the rich thoughts which lie concealed in the Scriptures respecting creation and the natural world, in order that the treasures of undeniable truths which are far above all the phases of scientific investigation, may be brought to view and unfolded. The result and aim of the whole must be the restoration of nature, so often abused in being made to conceal God and to become a stumbling block to faith, to her rights, as a revelation, though not complete, of the living God, and standing with the whole of God's revelations in the most intimate friendship and willing affinity; and the evidence that both by the results, and in spite of the results, of the investigation of nature the Holy Scriptures are manifestly an infallible record of revelation, and that the Christian faith is neither suspended nor shaken.

GOLDWIN SMITH AND THE NEW THINKING AT OXFORD.*

Mr. Goldwin Smith tells us that he was struck, nay, startled, by the appearance of Oliver Cromwell in the historic line of Oxford Chancellors. "I almost shrink," he writes, "from mentioning the name which intrudes so grimly into the long list of the Tory and High Church Chancellors of Oxford." A similar effect is produced upon our intellectual and nervous systems by the spectacle of Goldwin Smith among Oxford Professors. How, we ask, has this ruddy athlete, florid with intellectual health, full of the hope, the aspiration, the audacity of the present, found his way into halls dedicated to the worship of the past? What has this vivacious stranger, in tight-buttoned coat and wide-awake, to do in the throng of big-wigs, whose faces are as long as those of the seven sleepers, whose robes fall in severe academic curves, and who seem to turn on him glassy eyes of upbraiding inquiry why he has intruded into these haunts of ghostly learning and hoary tradition? Goldwin Smith is simply the most modern man we know. His whole being vibrates in sympathy with this rapid and changeful time. He smiles at the idea that the vigor of humanity is exhausted, and rejoices in the faith that we are in the morning of the world. In Oxford he seems an incarnated rebellion against the *genius loci*. Well, we like to come upon a fountain in a waste of sand; we are glad when a railway startles a dosing old town out of its slumbers; and in Oxford, of all places, we are happy to meet with Professor Goldwin Smith.

We have said that he is intensely modern, and we know not that we shall have anything more to do on the present occasion than to amplify, qualify, and illustrate this proposition. Mr. Smith's modernism is of a peculiarly excellent kind. It is not the flippancy of ignorance and conceit, which "in the flying of a wheel cries down the past;" it is the frank acceptance of his own time as great and advancing, by one whom culture has familiarized with the greatness of other times. The favorite task of criticism, it has been somewhat

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* From the *Christian Spectator*, January, 1863. The Lectures referred to in the article, are on Modern History, Irish History, and Rational Religion.

bitterly said, is to expose the faults of the living and to trumpet the merits of the dead. He is but one man in a thousand, who, having attained a real knowledge of the ancient world, having understood its ways of thought and feeling, having breathed the spirit of classic literature and felt the beauty of classic art, has capacity, courage and honesty enough to assign their due place to the master-pieces of modern times. Mr. Matthew Arnold, for example, an admirable judge of poetry, himself a poet, and subject to as little affectation as most men, can not rid himself of the belief that some mystic grandeur necessarily resides in the verses of Homer as distinguished from those of Walter Scott, and that the picture of a battle, in which gleamed the crests of gods and the white arms of goddesses, on the banks of Scamander, must be better than that of a battle in which feudal standards—the Howard lion, the Marmion falcon—rose and sank in the swells of conflict on the grey slopes of Flodden field. It is to the credit of Jeffrey, by the way, that he dared to acknowledge the transcendent merit of that wonderful passage, and declared that, in his opinion, Scott's Flodden was superior in interest and animation, in breadth of drawing and magnificence of effect, to any poetical battle-piece from the days of Homer downward. Mr. Goldwin Smith does justice to the ancients, but he looks upon them with no such admiring despair as would unfit him for holding the balance equal between them and the moderns. His remarks upon the style of the ancient historians, excellent from every point of view, illustrate these observations, and shew how freely he can let his critical genius act in provinces where criticism has too frequently lost itself in feeble raptures. "The language of the ancients," he says, "is of the time when a writer sought nothing but simply to express his thought, and when thought was fresh and young. The composition of the ancient historians is a model of simple narrative for the imitation of all time. But if they told their tale so simply, it was partly because they had a simple tale to tell. Such themes as Latin Christianity, European Civilization, the History of the Reformation, the History of Europe during the French Revolution, are not so easily reduced to the proportions of artistic beauty, nor are the passions they excite so easily calmed to the serenity of

Sophoclean art. Not all ancients are classics. The clumsiest and most prolix of modern writers need not fear comparison with Dionysius Halicarnassus, nor the dryest and most lifeless with the Hellenics. Nor are all moderns devoid of classical beauty. No narrative so complicated was ever conducted with so much skill and unity as that of Lord Macaulay. No historical painting was ever so vivid as that which lures the reader through all that is extravagant in Carlyle. Gibbon's shallow and satirical view of the Church and churchmen, has made him miss the grand action and the grand actors on the stage. But turn to the style and structure of his great work; its condensed thought, its lofty and sustained diction, its luminous grandeur and august proportions, reared as it is out of a heap of materials the most confused and mean; and ask of what Greek or Roman edifice, however classical, it is not the peer?" This is manly writing, and it is thus that Mr. Smith always bears himself toward other generations. He does not despise their achievements, but neither does he let his common sense be carried off in floods of vapid ecstacy. He can count the rings in the tree of humanity; but he believes that its leaves are yet green, and that buds are yet opening on its branches. His culture saves him from vulgarity and sciolism; but he reverences the spirit of his own time, and the might of modern tendency influences him more powerfully than any precedents gathered from past ages. We find, therefore, that those remarks of ours upon Oxford may have been too severe, and that Goldwin Smith owes something to his University training. He is, in the best sense of both terms, an Oxonian and a Liberal—his modernism sound, frank and ardent, but enriched by a delicate aroma from his classical attainments.

We have struck, it must be allowed, into a line of high commendation. If we have not said that Mr. Goldwin Smith is a great man, we have said, or implied, that he is a power in his country and his time. Greatness is often solitary; power is generally sympathetic. Mr. Smith is not a man seeing far over the heads of his contemporaries, alone in his intellectual elevation, originating ideas which will shape the character of nations when he is in the tomb; but his sympathetic nature, like a well-strung harp, is resonant to all the

finer influences of his time, its manliest thought, its purest aspiration. We think of him, therefore, as a representative man, as a leader among the high-minded youth of England; one who is especially fitted to guide in the path of progress, whose ardor of moral impulse, boldness of thought and speech, manly religion, and English sense, it will be well for young men to admire and emulate. In his works there is hopefulness, and sunny vigor, and trust in the destinies of England and mankind; there is resolute clearness in the enunciation of all that is believed to be true, honorable, and of good report, with bold assault upon speciosities and abuses; there is no affectation of mystery or profundity, or of emotions too refined for general sympathy; no oracular utterance of truisms, no attempt to dazzle with tricks of rhetoric. If we do not meet original thoughts, we are yet greeted at every turn with pertinent remarks, striking home to the matter in hand, sending the arrow into the white. If we are not startled by impassioned eloquence, we are constantly charmed with picturesque and felicitous expression. Mr. Smith's style has nearly as much vigor as Arnold's, with more freedom, grace, and vivacity.

His views on the Irish Church, and his emphatic announcement of them, are characteristic of the man. The Established Church of Ireland may be pronounced an infallible touchstone of sincerity, conscientiousness, and moral courage, by which to try the members of the Established Church of England. It is possible to be an honest and clear-seeing man, and yet to believe that the Church of England is just and beneficent; but charity can require no man to say that an Anglican supporter of the Irish establishment is at once capable and conscientious. Such a one may believe himself conscientious, but the fact must be, that he has administered an opiate to his conscience. Conscience would really deserve no credit at all, if, in an unsophisticated state, and fairly interrogated, it gave its voice for the Irish Church. It is unjust, for justice can never sanction the saddling, upon a nation of poor men, of a Church which ministers to a wealthy minority. Being an injustice, it has of course barred the advance of truth, endearing to Irishmen the tattered, poverty-stricken, Popish priests who administered consolation in their cabins, and

exciting their bitterest animosity against the lazy and lordly Protestant clergymen, who lived on the fat of the land. The Irish Church has done more than any other agency to paralyze Protestantism in Ireland, and it is in a high degree probable that, if it had been abolished a century ago, the island would at this day have been Protestant. Still, though, as Macaulay said, no man ever attempted to defend the Irish Church on its merits, there are plausibilities in abundance by which Anglicans dull their consciences into tolerating it. They may dilate on the personal respectability of the Irish clergy. They may speak of their augmented zeal in establishing schools, and of their liberality to the poor. They may enlarge on the danger of overthrowing a Church so closely connected with the home establishment, and urge that wrong must be inflicted on Ireland, in order that good may come upon England. It is, perhaps, not astonishing to one who has some notion of human nature, that arguments like these should satisfy the conscience of Mr. Newdegate, or even of Lord Shaftesbury. Conscience lies very quiet when lapped in the soft music of Evangelical expediency. But it is surprising that a whole political party which, in the days of its youth, felt the power of high moral impulse, and was vehement in its attacks on the Irish Church, should have sunk into indolent acquiescence in its perpetuation. The decadence, the moral apathy and atrophy, of the Liberal party, are in no respect so manifest as in their attitude toward the Church of Ireland. But Mr. Goldwin Smith, Oxford Professor as he is, has not only penetrated these fallacies, but, by an unsparing assault on the Irish establishment, has set the example to Liberals of a political virtue to which they have too long been strangers. Once more he sets the institution before the world as what it is, a blunder, a crime, an offense to moral civilization, a standing satire on English justice, a theoretical anomaly, a practical evil, a thing that would not paint if you had all the brushes and all the pigments in Europe. A voice from Oxford, clear, loud, thrilling, proclaims to High Churchmen and Evangelicals, that an injustice can not be right, and that a lie can not be beneficent. A Churchman reminds the Nonconformists of England, who have been so vivacious in attacking Church rates, and any other grievance which they may *themselves*

endure, that it is their duty, as well as their policy, to assail the incalculably greater wrong inflicted upon their neighbors. In renewing the attack upon the Irish Church, Goldwin Smith is, we trust, representative of a new Liberal party, which will take the place of the somnolent Whigs, do what they have left undone, assail abuses which they have winked at, and put an end, once for all, to this Conservative reaction of which we have heard so much. In his opinions on Italian and American questions, as well as those on the Irish Church, Mr. Smith recalls the earlier and better days of the Liberal party.

One of the most valuable of Mr. Smith's literary performances is that lecture in which he has discussed the compatibility of belief in the doctrine of historical progress with faith in Christianity. It is not an exhaustive treatment of that momentous question, nor is its conclusion based upon grounds so broad as were legitimately available for the purpose of the lecturer. But it is fair to recollect that a lecture is a lecture, not to be tried by the tests which apply to a treatise. It is absurd to expect in a sketch what is indispensable in a picture. The sketch of a master, however, is distinguished from that of a tyro by giving as much of truth and of beauty as was possible with the means used; and we demand of a lecturer that he shall penetrate to the heart of his subject, and set before us, with force and felicity, what is conclusive concerning it; what, practically, is enough to satisfy the mind. This Mr. Smith has done in the lecture before us. He proves his point. He adduces enough to convince any open-minded, truth-loving young man, that the human race has not outstripped Christianity, and that it is in the nature of things impossible that Christianity should ever be outstripped. Let us glance at his argument.

He sets out with a fair statement of the proposition which it is his object to contest: "If we accept historical progress, it is said, we must give up Christianity. Christianity, we are told, like other phases of the great onward movement of humanity, has had its place, and that a great place, in history. In its allotted epoch it was progressive in the highest degree, and immense veneration and gratitude are due to it on that account; but, like other phases of the same movement, it has had its appointed term. That term it has already exceeded.

It has already become stationary, and even retrograde; it has begun, instead of being the beneficent instrument, to be the arch-enemy of human progress. It cumbers the earth, and the effort of all honest, scientific, free-thinking men, who are lovers of their kind, should quicken the death-pangs into which it has manifestly fallen, and remove once for all this obstruction to the onward movement of the race. Confusion and distress will probably attend the final abandonment of "the popular religion:" but it is better at once to encounter them, than to keep up any longer an imposture which is disorganizing and demoralizing to society, as well as degrading to the mind of man."

In the first place, answers Mr. Smith, what has been the fact in respect of historical progress? It is assumed by those against whom he argues, that sustained historical progress has been universal. But this is a mistake. Various races and nations have advanced to a certain point and have there paused. To the Chinese, to the Indians, to the Mohammedan nations, some force, whether of circumstances, as may have been the case with the Mongol populations of Central Asia, or of moral influence incarnated in some strongly religious nature like Mohammed's, has communicated an impulse of progress. For a time, the advance has continued. Indian civilization, Chinese civilization, Mohammedan civilization, have reached a certain point of perfection. But when the force was spent, the civilization drooped. There was no internal energy, no unconquerable instinct of progress, no self-originating power, such as the atheistic apostles of progress imagine, to take the place of the waning flame of the old enthusiasm. There is no historical evidence that a nation, having exhausted the force, generally a religious force, which originally bore it on, can supply itself with another. Christianity, it is allowed, has carried nations farther on than any other moral force known to history; but there is no proof, no presumption, that, if Christianity were discarded, the Christian nations could extemporize a force adequate to maintain the advance.

At this point, however, a critical point in the conduct of Mr. Smith's argument, the opposite party adduce what they maintain to be a conclusive historical instance on their side.

"It is confidently said," we quote from Mr. Smith, "that the historical progress of the most advanced nations of Europe during recent times has been beyond the pale of Christendom, and that it forms a conclusive proof of the exhaustion and decline of Christianity. The intellect of Protestant Germany, which has played so momentous a part in the historical progress of the last century is triumphantly cited as a palpable instance of this fact."

Mr. Smith's reply is that Christianity is to be viewed not only as a theological but as a moral system, and that "much which to the eye of the theologian, looking to religious professions, is without the pale of Christendom," is still "to the historical eye, looking to moral connections, within it." For sundry causes—the divisions of the Churches, their impotent controversies on points of dogma, their sinister alliances with political obstructiveness and injustice, their false ground in relation to science, and so on—"great masses of intelligence and eminent leaders of thought in all departments have been nominally and outwardly estranged from Christendom." But this estrangement is more apparent than real. In their view of the Divine Being; of human character and destiny; of duty; of social relations; they continue Christian. "Many a great writer who is brought forward as a proof that the intellect of the age is Christian no longer, will be found, on examination, to have nothing in his writings which is not derived from a Christian source. Schleiermacher received the Eucharist on his death-bed, and died declaring that he had adhered to the living spirit of Christianity rather than to the dead letter. He may have been illogical; but he can not be said, historically, not to have been a Christian."

This argument is, we believe, conclusive in proving what it is Mr. Smith's object to establish. The moral and intellectual atmosphere of Europe is still saturated with Christianity. No great writers have so completely emancipated themselves from its influence, as to furnish evidence that progress could continue if it were extinct. Mr. Smith refers to Schleiermacher, a man touching whose Christianity, defective as it may have been, we knew not that a doubt had ever been suggested. But he might have referred to Fichte, to Goethe, to Carlyle. As moralists, these men have been to a large

extent Christian; and precisely where they have not been Christian, have their systems been erroneous and temporary. Fichte maintained that his distinctive ethics were but an interpretation of the Christianity of the apostle John and his Master. In proclaiming the unselfishness of duty, in declaring that the fear of hell or the hope of heaven will never make a man virtuous, Fichte merely reminded Christians of the morality of the New Testament. That morality is a life, a new life in Christ, a life unchanging and immortal, independent of circumstance in all its range, from hell-flames to heavenly glory. When he deviated from Christianity, when he enunciated a system of his own, Fichte passed into the vague infinitudes of Pantheism, and found himself, as every Pantheist must, dumb before the essential but elementary question, Why is right better than wrong? In that passage in "Wilhelm Meister," where Goethe most elaborately moralizes, where we are introduced to the three reverences in which perfect moral culture consists, where we are informed of the all-importance of self-abnegation and the "divine depth of sorrow," he says nothing which might not be diffused through sound Christian sermons, and headed with texts from the gospels and epistles. But when Goethe turned from the Christian beacon-lights, and gave us hints of that perfect morality with which the advocates of atheistic progress will enlighten a race emerging from the twilight of Christianity, we have nothing better than insinuations of the occasional propriety of incest, and seeming indications that the philosophy of the future will readjust the relations of man and woman on the model of the animal creation. Mr. Carlyle owes all his best power as a moralist to his profound appreciation of certain parts of the Christian system. He deserves that high and beautiful, yet touching, compliment paid him by Chalmers, that, in relation to Christianity he is as a man on the wall of a city, who, though not within, sees more of it than those who are walking in its streets. But where Carlyle has spoken on his own account, where his moral system is distinctive, what has been its advance beyond the Christian code? To omit consideration of that underlying Pantheism by which his teaching is vitiated and confused, what has he been doing of late but trying to induce us to prefer a rod of

iron to Christ's golden scepter? And the further he has departed from the Christianity of his youth, the more questionable have his estimates of historical characters become, until the panegyrist of Martin Luther has become the panegyrist of Frederick the Great.

We think that Mr. Smith might have strengthened his position by a bold statement of facts like these. The conclusion to which they conduct is inevitable, namely, that, since the human mind has not yet established in morals any principle which *is* good and which is *not* Christian, and since, where tentative efforts to frame an extra-Christian scheme of morals and of manners have been made, they have led to debasement not to improvement, the abandonment of Christianity by civilized nations would arrest their progress, and be the signal for their decay. It was virtually an admission of this which Goethe made, when he declared that the human race, having once attained to Christianity, could not recede from it. Goethe saw that the basis of Christianity was broad enough to bear the pyramid of human advancement, however high it might ascend. Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the same admission in another way. He declares in his work on "Liberty" that there is no truth in ethical or political science with which Christianity can not be reconciled. He would probably allege, that much which passes for Christian morality has been discovered by modern thinkers and appropriated by the Christian Church. So be it. If Christianity contained, not only in germ but in development, all that the human mind can attain to, it would have consummated progress, but at the same time paralyzed the faculties of the race. The religion which can assimilate all that is good—which is interpreted more correctly, which is better understood, with every advance made by man—must be immortal. Of what other system, religious or philosophical, could this be said? Surely it is too soon to discard Christianity, when even those who do not accept it can not pretend that it is in the way.

There is one nation in which Christianity has really, to a large extent, lost its hold upon the public mind, and the account which Mr. Smith gives of it is particularly good. "In France, perhaps, alone," he says, "owing to peculiar disasters, not the least of which was the hypocritical re-establish-

ment of Roman Catholicism by the statecraft of Napoleon, a really great estrangement of the people from Christianity has taken place. And what are the consequences of the estrangement to the progress of this great nation, which not a century ago was intellectually at the head of Europe, which seemed by her efforts to have opened a new era of social justice for mankind, and which the atheistical school desire now, in virtue of her partial atheism, to erect into the president and arbitress of the civilized world? The consequences are a form of government, not created by a supreme effort of modern intellect, but borrowed from that of declining Rome, which, bereft of Christian hope, immolates the future to the present: a despairing abandonment of personal liberty and freedom of opinion; a popular literature of heathen depravity; and a loss of moral objects of interest, while military glory and material aggrandizement are worshiped in their place. If this state of things is progressive, what is retrograde?" The social morality which in France has superseded that of Christianity, the morality of the French conjugal life, the morality which pervades the works of Balzac and Sand, the morality which, diffused through French literature, has corrupted the youth of Europe and of South America, might have furnished Mr. Smith with a pertinent illustration of that "progress" to which men may hope to attain when they have left Christianity behind.

Having treated his subject in this admirably practical, but somewhat general manner, Mr. Smith grapples with it more closely by inquiring what is the root and essence of moral character, and asking whether Christian morality is sound and universal, and the Christian type of character perfect and final. He determines that "the root and essence of moral character" in man is benevolence; and concludes than Christianity, resting on the principle of love to our neighbor, can not be outstripped by the advancing race. "The type of character," he says, in a passage of some length, but which we make no apology for quoting, "set forth in the gospel history is an absolute embodiment of love, both in the way of action and affection, crowned by the highest possible exhibition of it in an act of the most transcendent self-devotion to the interest of the human race. This being the case, it is

difficult to see how the Christian morality can ever be brought into antagonism with the moral progress of mankind; or how the Christian type of character can ever be left behind by the course of human development, lose the allegiance of the moral world, or give place to a newly emerging and higher ideal. This type, it would appear, being perfect, will be final. It will be final, not as precluding future history, but as comprehending it. The moral efforts of all ages, to the consummation of the world, will be efforts to realize this character, and to make it actually, as it is potentially, universal. While these efforts are being carried on under all the various circumstances of life and society, and under all the various moral and intellectual conditions attaching to particular men, an infinite variety of characters, personal and national, will be produced: a variety ranging from the highest human grandeur down to the very verge of the grotesque. But these characters, with all their variations, will go beyond their source and their ideal only as the rays of light go beyond the sun. Humanity, as it passes through phase after phase of the historical movement, may advance indefinitely in excellence; but its advance will be an indefinite approximation to the Christian type. A divergence from that type, to whatever extent it may take place, will not be progress, but divergence and corruption. In a moral point of view, in short, the world may abandon Christianity, but it can never advance beyond it. This is not a matter of authority or even of revelation. If it is true, it is a matter of reason as much as anything in the world."

We can not follow Mr. Smith into his brief but masterly exhibition of our Saviour's character, as the Christian type, or show with what easy triumph he refutes the exceptions taken by Mr. Newman to the perfection of Jesus of Nazareth. Every word of this part of the lecture is worthy of diligent study, and we earnestly recommend it to young men. Mr. Smith, with the ardor and hopefulness characteristic of his nature, believes that Christianity, instead of leaving the world, is about to beam forth with an effulgence which it has never yet displayed. He looks for a reunion among the Christian Churches, and deems the circumstances of the time favorable to that consummation. He does not believe that one Church will convert all others to its peculiar tenets, but that

Churches will universally lift up their eyes and find that they are, in essentials, one. The Papacy, "the grand cause of division in Christendom," he believes to be nearing the end of its death-agony of three centuries, and with it will, he thinks, pass away the obstacles to reconciliation and reunion throughout Christendom. Then will be seen a Christianity "as united, grand, and powerful, as capable of pervading with its spirit the whole frame of society, as fruitful of religious art and all other manifestations of religious life, as Christendom was before the great schism." This is a cheering, as well as a devout imagination, but we are not so sanguine as Mr. Smith that it will soon be realized. We could wish also that Mr. Smith had been somewhat more explicit in discriminating between that which is "essential to religion in the eyes of polemical theologians" and ought to pass away, and that which is of the perennial nature of Christianity, and, therefore, indestructible. He has constructed an admirable vindication of Christianity as an ethical system; we presume him to have equal confidence in its historical verity.

Mr. Smith is known to the public as the philosophical antagonist of Professor Mansel, and as the advocate, politically, of the opinion that Great Britain ought to cut her Colonies adrift. In both these capacities we partially agree with him, partially dissent from his conclusions. He has spoken a great deal of sense on the subject of our Colonies, pointing out the irrationality of a relationship which is all expenditure on our side and all profit on theirs; and setting in a clearer light than had ever been shed upon it before the fact which most clear-sighted men recognize, that Colonies, though gorgeous ornaments on the robe of empire, do not augment the real force of States. We have no hesitation in saying that, when Colonies are able to maintain themselves, and desire to be independent of the mother state, they ought to be permitted to go free. But we would not drive Colonies off so long as they remained loyal; and we do not think that it would be consistent with the honor, the dignity, or even the safety, of England, to incur the risk of beholding, in case of a European war, settlements formed by her children falling under the dominion of Russia or of France. In his controversy with Mansel, Mr. Smith does not appear to the highest

advantage. We agree with him, indeed, that Professor Mansel's doctrine of moral miracle is untenable, and that no protection is afforded to the Christian mysteries by commanding reason to approach them blindfold. The Most High assuredly does *not* suspend the moral laws of the universe as He suspends the physical; if He did, the grand cause of physical miracle would be removed. "God can not lie;" though he changes at will the physical causes of physical effects. Nor is reason to be debarred from her noblest exercise in "justifying the ways of God to man" by any *a priori* demonstration that the morality of the atonement is inscrutable. But when Mr. Goldwin Smith passes from Professor Mansel's *application* of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the Conditioned to that doctrine itself, he gets beyond his depth. Man is God's image; divine and human morality are essentially the same; but man is finite, and, being finite, he can not comprehend, he can not conceive, an Infinite Being. To draw the line between finitude and infinitude, which was done, with magnificent comprehensiveness and marvelous perspicuity, by the great Scottish metaphysician, was a splendid service both to philosophy and theology. But Mansel has, we humbly think, misapprehended the nature of that service, and his work on the limits of religious thought, exquisitely ingenious as is its reasoning, and masculine as is its style, is not, in the main, conclusive. Mr. Goldwin Smith, however, is not versed in metaphysical speculation, and in that province he is not able to measure swords with his learned adversary. His strenth is in the practical; and long and widely may his influence prevail to kindle the high aspirations in the breasts of England's youth, and to turn them from those reactionists of a Sadducean age whose cynicism would congeal every noble impulse into a sneer.

RELIGION, THE MOVING AND DISPOSING POWER IN HUMAN HISTORY.*

Among the different problems in relation to the future history of the world, the most important is this: When and how will Christian Europe, which is giving forth and effecting so much in so many directions, carry back to Asia, and especially to Western and Central Asia, what it has thence derived? The Jews we still everywhere meet. Having never been a nation except through religion, now, after a thousand years' separation from their Asiatic home, they are in consequence of religion and prophecy a nation still; they silently repeat to us the same question. The crusades, the expulsion of the Oriental races from Southern Europe, the Turkish wars, the new Greek kingdom, the battle of Navarino, the stop put by Europe to the conquests and plans of Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim, have all failed to answer, have only started anew this inquiry. The prophecies of the Old and New Testaments furnish no solution in the manner of *a chronicle of the world:* they designate points to be reached, they give glimpses, outlines—nothing more. In the mean time faith in these prophecies, which is the same as faith in the kingdom of God and its certain triumph, is strengthened by looking back to the past history of the world. Says the Psalmist, "I remember thy judgments of old, O Lord, and have comforted myself."

The powers of Europe are standing again before the doors of Asia.† The churches they represent are still mutually hostile and contradictory. Even the contentions with regard to rights and privileges in the holy places at Jerusalem, have certainly a bearing far wider than their immediate objects. The inquiry is still excited, When will Asia, Christian and Mohammedan, experience, socially and morally, a change, a renovation; now that the vital powers of Islamism are

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* A Discourse delivered at Berlin, March 5, 1855, before the Evangelical Union for Church Interests, by Dr. K. I. Nitzsch, Professor in the University of Berlin; translated from the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft* by Rev. Elisha Ballantine, District Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Cincinnati, Ohio.

† The reference is to the Crimean War.

exhausted, and the Son of God has long since caused its followers to understand that it is no longer capable of serving as a whetstone to a fanatical monotheism for its carnal weapons of conquest?

Such and similar reflections have moved me to choose to-day's theme, one certainly much too rich and extensive for this occasion. I shall be able to present nothing new—only that which is well known, from a special point of view.

The introductory clause of one of Paul's sentences (Gal. 4: 4), "*But when the fullness of time was come*," has an immense significance historically even. In our day philosophy, too, has said, history goes on to that point (the birth of Christ), and thence starts anew. There can be no other division of history than that commonly made, viz.: history before and history after Christ; even aside from the fact that its absolute beginning lies beyond our reckoning. The Bible is the only one of the sacred books of the world which knows, sketches out and reveals a plan of general history with and as a part of that of religion.* It not only rests the earliest Hebrew history, that from Abraham to Moses, together with the law itself, on a *primitive human history* well ordered and divided, and traces the history of the peculiar people from the point of view of a Divine history of the world; but also the Old Testament prophecy, the gospels, and apostolical predictions point out consciously lines and relations of general history. Especially does the apostle Paul show himself a world-historian, by the grand perspective which he gives of the past and future. The early Bible history recognizes it as an act of God, that the human race divided itself *into nations and languages*, which thence followed their diverse destinies. It points out, in Japhet, the principle, historically important, of *spreading abroad;* in Shem that of *imparting*, which implies valuable possession; and it presents a regular table of the nations of men. It knows and notes the movements of nations; enumerates the great empires of civilization, which follow successively till the coming of Christ's kingdom; distinguishes between the opposition to the *progress* of this kingdom and submission to it, between the forces of super-

* That which late Greek historians did of this kind, from the general point of view of *civilization* or *culture*, can not here come into account.

stition and of infidelity; and finally, expects, after the kingdoms of this world shall have become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, a last effort of violence, in which opposition to the Christ of God shall once more repeat, and by so doing destroy itself. But as there is great diversity in the understanding, the reference, and the exposition of details, we can have no scientific history of the future of the kingdom of God. Faith and actual experience are to remain free. We say only this: The Scriptures not only speak of a general history of the world, but also of the source and aim of its movements, of its beginning, middle and end, and *of the great law* that in all the delay or haste of preparation, or of development, and in the sundering or the reuniting of nations, *the prevalence of true religion is the main end and design.*

But it may be asked, whether history as we understand and learn it scientifically, and so far as we are able to survey it, bears testimony itself to this watching, guiding, regulating, principle; whether, in fact, peoples and events have become important in history in proportion as they have been important positively or negatively for the Church of Christ? or may not one more correctly say, that the only proper point of view from which to study and exhibit history is that of culture and civilization, understanding by these the universal and harmonious development of genuine humanity, of which, then, religion is a part? or still better, the progressive organization of the community of nations throughout the world, for the great end of increasing, giving, receiving, and enjoying universal culture?

We venture, however, to present a view of history different from all these. It is true, the passive and passionate religion of nature-worship in highly endowed nations, so excites and encourages the study of science and morals that the latter overtop religion and make it a mere instrument; but, with the true religion, religion active and regenerated, it is far otherwise. For this wakes up the powers and capabilities of men even when they are asleep, or re-arouses them when they have died out; this alone furnishes to culture, science and art, their most inexhaustible materials, and gives strength and security to social intercourse and morals when grown

distrustful of themselves; this is that which over all the forces of war, trade, conquest, and the mighty spirit of emigration, drives on, and the longer the more, the progress of the organization of the universal federation of nations and countries; and which in its highest import and truth, all movements of nations, yea, all hindrances to movement, and also all stillstands, must consciously or unconsciously serve. It is in this sense we speak of *the religious character of history*, of its religious motives and ends, of religion as the moving, guiding, and ordering power in the general history of the world.

I. The history *of the first great period* had for its field the coasts of the Mediterranean. It reared and bound together, in the first place, those civilized peoples of the three parts of the so-called old world, which, because of their location on the coast, could directly reach each other by trade, colonization, war, and conquest. Africa, although still condemned in a great degree to dependence and to be a blank in history, we can not yet see how long, entered by means of Egypt and Carthage into the circle of historical relations. Both these were indeed not really African, but considered in reference to government, power and culture, were only Asiatic plants; Egypt was a derivative from India, Carthage a descendant of Phenicia. Carthage had so short a life that she seems only to have been designated by her fall to stir up the Romans *to round off* the last great power of the ancient world on the south-west *with a large part of Africa*, which afterward became the arena and the means of later relations between the East and the West. Egypt retained its importance more and more distinctly, only as a place for the meeting and mingling of the Oriental and the classic cultures. This was true especially of Alexandria. The only *native* product which Egypt sent beyond its borders, was the contemplative, world-renouncing convent-life. There remain then the classic lands, and that result of universal ancient history which was exhibited in the unity of the empire of all nations, fully brought about under Augustus. The Asiatic empires successively destroyed each other; the last one sinks into the Macedonian, and that into the Roman. In that Pantheon all the gods sought refuge; into that sea emptied all nations, with

the exception of those impracticable and unconquerable peoples North and East, which, like many great nations now, though having much history within themselves, contributed nothing important to the general history of the world. Though now the relation into which the Gospel came to the Emperor through the birth of Christ—for Christ, as a Jew, was reckoned a Roman subject—pointed to a time when he should take possession of the empire, and religion, therefore, should assume her rightful supremacy; yet it seems as if the course of history up to that time bore no relation to our theme. In fact, up to that time, the Grecian and Roman spirit seemed to have the ascendancy over the Asiatic, and the interest and appreciation of culture to have the start of religion. The course of things was plainly this: the original independent Asiatic world had by means of Phenician navigation and settlements, or through Egypt, imported the first mechanical means of physical and mental culture, viz., writing, the reckoning of time, and mythico-religious elements. But the Greeks taking all this material, renewed and remodeled it. The standard of all things to them, according to their own proverb, was *man*, and not as to the Asiatic, the *nature of the universe* continually reproducing itself and returning back into the abyss of the Divinity. The Greek represented in his gods the human form and beauty; human thought was to him truth, and civil freedom and obligation was to him the source and the end of morality. Religion, from which his inward life was broken loose, remained to him a compound of earth and fate, serving to keep the common people dependent, being to the educated aristocracy merely a symbol, and to the state a convenient instrument. Least of all was religion the soul and source of the Grecian emigration and colonization. What led the Greeks abroad, here to Sicily and Italy, and there to Thrace and Pontus, was their superiority in the fine arts, and in the application of political and worldly wisdom. "We have," said the Greeks (and the Romans repeated it after them), "our being from the gods, but our true well-being from philosophy." And though the Roman state was more devoted to religion, at least to its rites and ceremonies, yet it is equally clear that its feeling of a call to universal dominion, had *no religious* foundation, but one entirely civil and political.

The Romans were so far from imposing their own gods upon the nations, that they rather took pains, by certain rites and miracles, to allure the local deities from all other places to Rome. "Eternal Rome" was a poetical conception, perhaps also a political one, of the time of Augustus, not a native religious one. It developed also no heroism from the time it was uttered, as such a prophecy, fixing itself deep in the heart of a nation, would have done elsewhere. And how could a prophecy develop itself out of a natural religion which had to submit to the fate of being overstepped by philosophy? The reformers of the Grecian common mind were not prophets but philosophers; and the Roman nobles, when the philosophers, whom they kept in their houses as a kind of priests, did not suffice for all wants, fell into the hands of the so-called Mathematicians or Chaldeans, or perhaps a prey to the jugglery of the priests of Isis. The influence of this class of men at Rome and elsewhere during these transition times might seem to show a power and tendency of the old religions to spread and renew themselves. But, in fact, the migration from their native places of the Attic Ceres, of the Egyptian Isis, of the Phrygian Cybele, or of the Persian Mithras, their coming to Rome, and their making proselytes among the educated classes, testify to something entirely different, to this, namely, that neither the public religions of the different cities nor the worldly wisdom which ignored all religion, could permanently satisfy the deeper wants of the Romans and the Greeks. Far into the Christian period successive efforts were made to revive the worship of the gods. Something of natural philosophy was grafted upon the old mysteries. But though assisted by bloody persecutions, they could not maintain the contest with the mysteries and the revelations of Christ. *These latter had indeed migrated from the midst of a cultivated people;* but they had a future how different, and how different an origin and foundation in the past! For the nation of Israel was all that it was in history, not by means of science, or art, or trade, or successful war and conquest, *but only by its religion.* Not only was its own history begun, carried on, and entirely controlled by this power, but it came into existence for the sake of religion, by religion reached a heroic age, and in time a political greatness; and

its whole system of state was a means of which religion was the end; while to the Greeks and the Romans religion was simply an instrument of state policy. After it had been for long periods more or less tributary, or entirely subject to foreigners, and robbed of its religion, and outraged with Grecian idolatrous rites, by a half-crazy Syrian king, the Jewish people rose, contrary to all example, by means of religious enthusiasm in the Maccabean family, to political independence, and, under John Hyrcanus, to a greatness which drew many embassadors of foreign powers to Jerusalem. Judaism became then first known to the world as the religion of a God superior to nature, holy, and worshiped without images; and the great favors which the Jews enjoyed in their dispersions, are for the most part due to this fact. The antithesis of "Jews and Heathen" had a historical significance, and though at length done away by Christianity, had a far longer duration than that of "Greek and Scythian." The Jew could also show in contrast with the Roman law, a nucleus of far more enduring rights, and in contrast with the Grecian Philosophy, a prophecy, which he held *as trustee of the world.* The Jew knew that the religion of his God, *who, as yet, suffered all nations to walk in their own ways*, would at length bring them all into subjection to His kingdom. But before this began actually to take place through the mission of Paul, *preparation had been made for it in history* by the fact that the outposts of revelation had been advanced to Corinth and Rome, to Ephesus, and beyond, and thence spread their light in all directions throughout the heathen world. (Moses hath in every city them that preach him, being read in their synagogues every Sabbath day.) *The missions of Christianity traveled these highways.* The Jews erred indeed in thinking that all the world would become disciples of Moses, and draw life and salvation from his books; but the hope which they had could be translated into the truth. How important, historically, the fact that the Greek language, predominating as it did throughout the civilized world, received an oriental coloring from the Greek translation of the Old Testament. How is it that in the very passage in which the great Roman historian condemns the Jews for their hatred of the human race, for their unseemly customs and melancholy worship, he

yet speaks in admiration of the sublimity of their religion? How is it to be explained that the Roman satirists are always ridiculing the fashion prevailing among their people of keeping the Sabbath and attending the synagogues of the Jews; and so add testimony to the undeniable fact, that very many, both Romans and Greeks, of both sexes, even in the yet flourishing period of their own religions, were conscious of a deep spiritual want, if not self-loathing. They are called in the Acts the "devout," or those "that fear God;" and they furnished the first nuclei of the Pauline Christian synagogues. "Salvation is of the Jews."

The result, then, as to the time of ancient history, is this: the ancient classical culture had great and positive importance historically. It presented for the spread and the conquest of Christianity not only a united aggregate of nations possessed of mental susceptibility and maintaining a basis of civil order and intercourse regulated by law, but what is much more, it had elaborated forms of thought and language, into which could be taken up a new and far greater fund of knowledge and experience; and what is just as important, it contained as the fruit of speculation and thought, a mass of questions upon the most important subjects, to which that religion which is the ideal of religion realized, furnished the ready answers. This state of the case is apparent especially in those individual men, who sought after truth beyond the systems of the schools, as Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, and many others.

Culture and religion mutually seek and avoid each other. The ancient culture in her worldly character and pretended self-sufficiency was fated to grow, break, and decay. Only so far as she was the handmaid of the church, could her language, her system of unity, yea, an epitome of herself, her net result, be preserved and handed down to future ages.

II. History has traveled *westward.* The smallest quarter of the world, which indeed embraced the center of the ancient universal empire, is now the richest source of human development; so that after the lapse of a thousand years, and after its nations have withstood the inrushing of Asiatics, and regained the rule of the Mediterranean, it is beginning to send out the results of its culture to all the Indies. *But how*

did Europe become what it is? That here we can find much material for the answer to our inquiry after the *religious causes* of history, will be conceded. For who does not think at once of the mutual relations of the Papacy and the Empire, of the Mohammedan conquests and the Crusades. But first let us refer to the spread of Christianity among the Germans, Celts, and Sclaves, and to the predominancy of church history in the political history of the middle ages.

We turn first to the great *migrations* from the East and North to the West and South, both of the less rude and better regulated tribes, which, not till after seasons of quiet, broke up their huts and went further; and also of the wilder and devastating races. Not till these migrations had ceased, having pervaded the countries of the Western Empire, did the nations become settled, and begin a successful career destined to end in historical unity. The spirit of migration, wherever it was strong and enduring, had partly well-known causes, viz., poverty and greed, and partly secret ones, revealed afterward by Providence. Alaric the Goth confessed before the gates of Rome, that he was urged on by One whom he knew not. The Latin Christian writers of the fifth century speak of judgments of God drawn down upon themselves by the degenerated Romans; and there is a long series of historical proofs that God made the rage for devastation and the hatred of civilization his instruments for rebuking and punishing his Church. Huns, Avars, Mongols were to Christendom what the conquerors of Western Asia had been before to Judea. Attila recognized and called himself the scourge of God. But how do the fore-mentioned writers explain more particularly those Divine judgments? They not only eulogize the piety and magnanimity manifested by the Goths, but they add "ye Christians of Marseilles, Aquitania and Carthage, *ought to have learned from the barbarians, what virtue, modesty and charity are.* So Salvian in his book on God's government of the world. The Goths pressed generally in a southward direction, and brought with them the noblest that they had, great susceptibility for everything. They sought homes, being generally pressed behind by others. They traded readily, and demeaned themselves in general correctly; only when they met with faithlessness did

they make their strength and love of war felt. They had belonged to a sect of Christians, from the time of their apostle and bishop Ulphilas, and still showed all honor to the orthodoxy of Italy. They became generally better promoters of peace and protectors of the arts of civilization, than the Roman emperors had been. But in regard to the Gothic and German susceptibility spoken of, the strongest point is, that among all the religions of savage peoples, theirs cherished the deepest longing for an actual redemption, renewal and resurrection. The history of their gods tells of a contest between the good and evil, which has in it more moral truth than is contained in the Persian system. Baldur among the Asens, is righteousness and piety; and though he is overcome by the plots of the evil one, yet by the help of the mediating principle he attains to the life of the resurrection, and with his return, there takes place an entire renewal of the world. This is heathenism indeed, but of a very select kind. May not the strong inclination of the Germans for the sacraments of salvation from sin and death dispensed from Rome, have originated in this religious element of the wild olive tree?

If we should ask further, how the different parts of Europe became mutually acquainted, and were brought into settled relations, and how Europe gradually established an eastern border, we might certainly have much to say of wars, conquests, sea-voyages, and colonies of the Normans, and finally of great commercial treaties between the cities; and yet all these movements and changes coincided on the whole with the spread of Christianity. The opening of the east and of the North, especially of the latter, advanced step by step with the Christian missions, and from one episcopal station to another. The greatest length and breadth of the modern Roman Empire, under the Frank and Saxon emperors, was about the same as the extent of Christianity. Otto the First carried Christianity eastward among the Sclaves, just as far as he did the German power and rule. The Roman patriarch and the emperor needed and sought each other's aid, just as appears in their mutual relations in the next century, when the European unity was mainly effected. The Pope, forsaken by the Greek church, robbed of his influence in Illyria and

Dalmatia, and made insecure of his dignity by the factions of Rome itself, looked so much the more to the North and West. But neither the new Frank dynasty nor its northern conquests could have been maintained by the sword alone: the former owed much to its papal consecration and the connection of the Franks with the Roman orthodoxy, and the latter to the fact that it was preceded or followed by the Anglo-Saxon missionaries of Christianity.

If now, under this united case, the German or Germanized peoples gained an advancing civilization, the question arises, of *what sort* it was, from what origin and impulse, and assisted by what organizations and helps. It was certainly of no little importance that some learned men and bishops in Italy and Spain united extracts from classic literature with the productions of Augustine, Jerome and Gregory; and that in general Italy was open to Germany. But whoever reads the history of the schools in that age, and notes all the testimonies to the striking efforts to learn, which spread abroad from the court of Charles or from the cloisters, must soon become convinced that this powerful impulse which drove persons of both sexes and of every age to reading, writing, and the study of Latin, sprung from the desire after the sources of the knowledge of salvation. They learned Latin, because the Bible and the sacrament of redemption spoke in Latin.

The cloister took the lead in the tilling of the earth and the clearing of forests, just as it did in the cultivation of knowledge and the enlightening of souls; and that for centuries. During the first half of the middle ages, to live "according to the Rule," or, "under the Abbot," meant the same as to live religiously. Outside of the cloister was *the world:* not in Germany as in the South, the degenerated and secularized church, but rather the world yet to be trained up, whether baptized or yet to be brought to baptism. Religion, as being above the world, had to show itself externally by renunciation of the world. According to the original rule of St. Benedict, a part of the monks employed themselves with books, and a part with mechanical arts and horticulture. The good results of this extended beyond the walls. Out of monachism, that dangerous and pretentious form of an ideal piety, proceeded the two older and genuine forms, the

Missionary and the Martyr, the former ever ready to become the latter. But the missionary sowed the seeds both of religion and the arts of civilization in the rich and prepared soil. The strongest and deepest impulse, viz., religion, produced in connection with the increase of wants, and stronger than all earthly wants, an activity and a culture without which those times of peace necessary to the observance of stated public religious services, could not have been enjoyed.

The culture which in ancient times had grown up on the soil of natural religion, but had outgrown it, had, as we have seen, sought after the true religion. Christianity could not take root in Germany without producing new germs of science, art, and moral culture.

Permit me to dwell a moment on the different branches of culture.

Let us reflect first how much religion had to do in the establishment of a state of peace and the rule of law, without which the various branches of culture could not prosper. For instance, that stern power of the head of the family among the old Germans, could not so easily have conformed itself to the demands of a more extended community, nor sacrificed itself as it did to the military power of the sovereign, if it had not been before softened and modified by faith in the kingdom and grace of God. The protection and consolation which the spiritual power afforded to the masses bound down by secular chains, became itself again the source both of a willing subjection on the one hand, and of a more natural and proper authority on the other. Except where the German purity of family and social life had suffered too much from the admixture of the southern element, Christianity had not to look for any contest with refined lewdness or villainy; but always found a susceptibility to its moral rules. But so much the more did it have to sustain a fearful contest with a wild, fierce, and cruel sensuousness on the part of the great; and had not the sacrament of penance developed itself with the greatest energy, and at last, under the protection of the kingly power, the disorders and disturbances which followed the Carlovingian period would scarcely have left a remnant of that culture remaining.

In regard now to the *science* of the West, not even the cen-

turies which may be called the darker, were entirely unfruitful, and that by means of religion.

The ancient philosophy had the universe as its object of study, and for practical problems those of the State. The monk, who was employed in all kinds and grades of schools, had before him his liturgy, his homilies, and his creed. Thus Latin he had both to learn and to teach. First he had to do with the sense of the words, a labor assisted by indifferent helps. This labor, however, was inspired and sustained by the desire to understand the great subject, the foundation of all the sacraments. The mind of one was excited by the desire to leave no point of his faith not understood and proved. Another left the mystery inviolate, and held his thoughts and imagination in check, in order finally to master the truth and by step after step of self-denial to give more room to the light from God. These two lines of effort might partially coincide. Christian tradition had indeed itself brought in apparent contradictions; but as special distinctions coming down also by tradition, had solved such as the trinity and unity, the duality of natures in the one person, etc., the *a priori* faith insured to all new started questions a similar solution. Such solutions were now sought and found with high intellectual zest, until at last the great system of doctrine rose cathedral-like out of the mass of these solved questions. New sources of the knowledge of antiquity were gradually opened, making necessary the correction of many of the older views and decisions. The classic philosophy was but little esteemed, and yet was honored as house-keeper for the sake of the mistress, Theology.

The effort was even made to organize all human and divine knowledge into one whole. The soul, banished from paradise, since salvation is possible, strove to make its way back to its native home, according to the divine order of knowledge, by the tracks and the lines of the various sciences. Such were the beginnings of a science, of a scholasticism, and of a mysticism, which, in all their origin and their aims, were religious.

Just so it was with Art. The so-called Romanic Art (that of Italy and Southern Europe, in the middle ages,) did not originate independently of ancient art, and yet both in matter

and form it was a regeneration of it. All the branches of the Fine Arts started again, as in ancient times, from the public services of religion. But the effort was not now, as with the Greeks, to embody the highest conceptions of nature in the noblest human form, in which case religion is made only a *means;* but the glory and holiness of a God above all nature, a God laying hold of ruined man, and by expiating and blotting out his sins, glorifying and blessing him, furnished an inexhaustible fullness of new motives and new materials to the arts of design and representation. There is a difference between the Noble and the Holy. The former consists in self-moving and self-controlling man rising above that which is mean and low in himself. Beauty and symmetry overcome the monstrous by the aid of the reason. But this is merely an apparent and temporary victory, as it only conceals from view, does not remove, the abyss of corruption. This ideal, therefore, of ancient Art—the noble, not rising above humanity, and having no firm foundation even there—had to yield and give way before that of Christian art, which starts from the blessedness of release from sin and death through recovered holiness. This process of the history of art rests on the principle, "Thou shalt not make to thee *any image*." In the very thing which apparently closes the way to all art, lies the deep, rich and moving cause of art creations of all kinds. The tenderest, sweetest lyric hymns made the beginning of the art of the middle ages. Christianity, it is true, adds new authority to the old prohibition of images. The historical reality of Jesus Christ deprived the old fables of their power; the view of the crucified one hindered the sensuous repose of delight in works of art; and Christianity had to overcome the world by testifying in blood to its mission, before the celebration of its salvation by art could really begin. By means, also, of the reviving or unconquered worldliness of the church in Southern Europe, there came in a restoration of heathen art, and this the easier as the mythology of the worship of the saints and champions of Christianity, and the extravagances of the mass offered points of connection therewith. Images of the gods were transferred to saints, etc. But, at the same time, the way was gradually opened from the weakest beginnings to a perfection which, at length complete in itself, left nothing

to future times but to learn and emulate. The beginning of painting and sculpture, or of poetry, in the simple *matin* or vesper hymn, were like the first strokes to a complete work of art. The object which a single cross presents to the mind of the beholder, is in itself so great and so strongly realized, that nothing more was needed for edification. How far beyond this did art advance when tenderness, inspired by the spirituality of the object, was impelled to represent the crucified to itself and the people, in his truth and holiness; when there sounded forth those sublime Latin hymns of the passion services and of the mass, all designed to glorify *the doctrine* and truths therewith connected; hymns which, in their signication, were the source of the classic forms of the national poetry of the Western nations. Architecture, too, that queen of church art, with a similar history and success, sketched her plans and devoted herself to their execution.

III. If, now, the church, in its Romish portions, forgot more and more her proper office, viz., to foster Christian culture, because she made submission to her God-derived sovereignty her great object and her only condition of toleration for Europe, she certainly had to endure the reaction against this claim. From the fourteenth century on, the scales fell more and more from the eyes of the governments of the nations, the schools, the church corporations, etc., so that they saw and understood clearly their own divine rights. And yet religion was far from losing her power as an element of history on that account. Not only has the Papacy remained for ages since its immediate ecclesiastical power was confined to Southern Europe, or even to Italy, as a monument of the connection between the nations of Europe, as a reminder and a symbol of the Catholic Unity of Christianity; but faith, religion, the Gospel itself, was the very rock on which her overstrained church-power was wrecked. The first efforts at church-revolution were indeed successfully repressed. But after the religious spirit, especially of the German mystics, had learned, instead of violently opposing the regulations of the church, to estimate them simply as means of spiritual edification on the foundation of Christ, and after the weapons directed against a series of great witnesses to the truth had been blunted, then, in the heart of Europe, commenced a Reforma-

tion, which, originating entirely in individual religious experience, was the beginning of a new era to the age and the world. The movement which went forth from Wittenberg, and the great testimonies given at Augsburg and at Worms, pervaded Europe, spreading even into the Romanic and Sclavonic nations. The state of nations and kingdoms was changed and took new shapes according as counter-revolutions took place, or as the Romish or the Protestant party conquered, or as both gained and secured, by treaty, public rights. What a scope of history is supplied by the religious wars of France, Germany and England! Even where the Reformation was entirely crushed, the bloodiest revolutions yet broke forth. These damages are yet far from being healed. The rise of a great naval power in the seventeenth century was owing to the violently opposed religious freedom of a German people. The national and civil independence of the States of Europe has, with few exceptions, been maintained; and each State has at some time had an influence upon the whole. Monarchies which made conquest their policy have had a short career. The projects of Charles the Fifth utterly failed. The ecclesiastico-cosmopolite plan of the Society of Jesus had, on the contrary, great success. In connection with this, Ferdinand and Louis the Fourteenth were able, seriously, to menace German and European freedom. But the men and the nations which made the most effective stand against them were those to whom *the energy of the evangelical faith lent its aid*—Gustavus Adolphus, the Great Elector, Holland and England. There has been, throughout the course of late European history, a certain Christian unity, in connection, however, with many separations and specialities, which then exhibited and perpetuated themselves in Germany, as in a microcosm. But however much the Southern element may have mingled with the German and the Sclavic on the borders, the deepest division was and remained that by which, in these three elements, three different churches were represented. Thus, in all the great affairs of Europe, religion has to this day been the element, both suffering most, and at the same time the most active and effective.

Time does not allow me to pursue further these observations. But I may, before closing, ask attention to two points—the

relations of Europe to the other parts of the world since the Reformation, and the peculiar development of culture since that time. The *religious* causes of the results in both these respects is plain enough, but has not been sufficiently appreciated. Christians do not doubt that the great consummation of the history of the world is the bringing the different parts of the inhabited earth, and the peoples of each, into more and more intimate connection with each other; and by the spreading abroad of that "Name which is above every name," the bringing all that was "made of one blood" to a family unity in the mutual exchange of earthly and heavenly blessings. Since the ways to all the Indies have been opened and traveled, the carrying out of this problem has fallen especially to the Europeans. The Pope at once divided out the newly discovered world: the sun did not set on the dominions of Charles the Fifth, when Erasmus (in his *Ecclesiastes*) exhorted the clergy to forget their trivial contentions, and to go forth in crowds of evangelists for the enlightenment of heathen darkness. Fifty years later, this spirit was excited still more, as the Romish church hoped to compensate for her losses in Europe by extending herself on fresh soil by means of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements. These enterprises were opened by St. Xavier. The thirst for gold had already pretty well stripped the West Indies; the Aztecs and the Caribs had been nearly exterminated by severity of treatment, when a few monks began in the spirit of Christian benevolence, and not without success, to labor there too for the same objects. By degrees the southern European powers were deprived of the rule of the seas; German and Protestant countries took, for the most part, their Indian possessions, or, at least, greatly enlarged the European settlements. The trading companies of Holland, England and Denmark, established in these possessions and settlements, to some extent, their own state religions, and from these some missionary efforts were made among the surrounding heathens. In the eighteenth century took place the scientific voyages around the world, adding new discoveries in the different oceans. But how have these discoveries been gradually extended? Whence did we obtain our thorough knowledge of the ethnography of Southern India? Whence

is it that European civilization can talk with the heathen of all parts of the world in their own language? By what kind of dealings has Europe carried to them not only what is better than gun-powder, brandy, vices, pestilence or trinkets, but also the best possible means of deliverance from those fatal importations? Who has taught the Esquimaux to sing hymns, put an end to war and murder among the New Zealanders, imparted the spirit of civilization to the most degraded races, covered the Antilles with negro congregations, and given the manners, the purity, the marriage covenant, the schools, churches and civil institutions of Europe to so many ocean islands? These things were not carried out by the hands of trading companies; their introduction was most violently opposed by these companies until these, too, discovered the blessing that was in them. Nor did the Cooks, the Bougainvilles and the Lapeyrouses leave them when they landed. But every one knows how first the United Brethren, and, at the time of the French Revolution, the English Dissenters, were excited by a missionary spirit which then produced such results as these. And so, if we search for the beginning of this spirit, we are brought back to the awakening, in the invisible Church, to the earnest question of hearts touched by Jesus Christ, "what am I doing for thee who hast done so much for me;" to a church spirit which is not satisfied with members, which feels it a great reward to save an immortal soul; to faith in the miracles of Jesus Christ, and to the history of primitive Christianity repeated. In these events, and similar events in China and West Africa, it is palpable to all that history recognizes the *religious* power and ends of her movements.

And in regard, particularly, to North America, where the nations of Europe are finding a second home, it has already had a rich history, and gives prospect of one much richer. The first emigrations thither were prompted less by mercantile than by politico-religious interests. Tired of the oppression of the Stuarts, increasing crowds of pilgrims, mainly Independents, sought a place there for the free practise of their religion. That which the late well-known theologian, Vinet, desired, that Protestantism, driven out into the wilder-

ness, and free from all state entanglements, might bethink herself and refresh and renew herself, began then and from that time to take place.

But how could religion assert its *power* and develope itself wider as a blessing to the world, when the *Church* more and more lost her *authority*, when the Reformation had freed individual piety from dependence on the priesthood, taught the state, the family, science and labor to know their own God-given rights, and to free themselves from the claims and prejudices of monkery, and led men to seek for and find the center of gravity and of unity, not in Rome, but everywhere in the Gospel?

I answer, authority *subjects*; a power *frees*. A power does not become less because it works in the way of freeing, but greater. Otherwise the Gospel would not stand higher than the law. Civil government would have been nothing at all if it had not had to deal with beings possessed of knowledge and will. Truth does not conquer through itself. Grace and truth must conquer united, or there will be no final, complete victory. It is not to be thought that religion will have to be ashamed or afraid of any branch of human culture, the germs of which she herself planted and fostered. Every such branch of culture is, or from the law of its origin may be, either an ornament to religion, or a weapon for its defense. By means of the Reformation, the individual and the community, the state and the church, science and faith, art and worship, have become so separated, that each has become conscious of its independent individuality, and so natural excitements and hostilities are inevitable. But such separations are, in reality, only means of advancing the kingdom of God. The opposing parties and interests stand in need of each other. If the church will make the permanence of her inherited external form, the great rule and *end* of her policy, if she will not open herself and her history to the eye searching after her origin and original form, she must not wonder if men will judge her by her fruits, and she must regard it as a blessing that she is called to test her power upon the moral forces of the State; for only thus can she preserve herself from prejudice and the fanaticism of superstition, and maintain the character of a divine influence upon society. But science, which examines

into the causes of phenomena and their intrinsic relations, has itself a religious character, both because it does not *go before* the designing and creating Spirit in its inquiries, but endeavors to follow it, and also because it finds religion existing as a fact, which, therefore, is beyond the province of science either to make or do away. If science sacrifices faith to reason, it is then ready to sacrifice reason to the understanding, and ends by sacrificing itself to materialism. Science needs both nutriment for its own life, and a motive to exertion. Both these Christianity alone inexhaustibly furnishes. The last few years have clearly shown that with these it should be contented.

There is one question still: How can a kingdom in itself discordant stand? When churches and sects have become so numerous, and each of them contests the divine warrant and authority of the rest, how can there be a harmonious working and ruling of religion in history? We must remember, too, that religious discords and wars have always been, and will be the most distressing and threatening; and that because religion is felt to be the most controlling principle of human life and activity. And so we come back to the starting-point of our discussion, viz., the future of Christianity in the future of history, and especially the condition of Western Asia, not to mention central Asia and Africa; the loud call now made on Europe to open that region to its own Christian influence; and the thousand years' sleep of the Oriental Church, which, yet, can not be an eternal one. Who is now, at length, uniting the nations of the west, at least to a preliminary act, preparatory to the peaceful and bloodless work which is to be done there? The power of Christ to unite the severed, is not yet exhausted any more than his undying and separating agency. Only the legal and external part of Christianity is manifold. The Gospel, though containing principles variously applicated, is itself simple and inviting.

The crusade which is to be finally victorious will begin without the sword, through the preaching of the Gospel. But before this can take place the nations of Europe must awake to some degree of Christian sympathy. "All things are yours; whether Paul or Apollos, or Cephas or the world, or life or death, or things present or things to come, all are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's."

CHRISTMAS EVANS AND WELSH PREACHING.*

Welsh preaching is as great a mystery to an Englishman as the Welsh language. He has heard of it as something little short of the miraculous; but as he is ignorant of the language, he is not able to analyze it nor to put himself in the place of the hearer, and to judge for himself of its power. Yet he is assured on good authority, that it is immeasurably superior to the best English preaching; and, remembering that the English pulpit can boast of a Hall, a Chalmers and a Melville, he begins to suppose that Welsh preaching must be superhuman—something to which the angels would like to listen if Welsh were but the language of Paradise. It can not be translated, it can not be reproduced in an English form: the beauty, the inexplicable charm, vanishes if you attempt to convey it through any other medium.

One of the men to whom the Welsh pulpit owes some of its principal glory, is Christmas Evans. He was born on Christmas Day, 1766, at a village called Llandyssul, prettily situated among the Cardiganshire hills. His father was a shoemaker, and does not seem to have been distinguished among men of his class; nor does it appear that his mother had any extraordinary endowment that will account for the remarkable ability of her distingushed son. The father dying when Christmas was only nine years old, he had no education, but was obliged to leave home immediately, and get his living as a herd's boy. Amid much hardship, he grew up a large boned, muscular and somewhat passionate young man. In other respects, he gave no signs of the great powers that lay slumbering within him. At seventeen or eighteen years of age, during a time of great religious excitement, "the day of grace dawned upon his spirit," to use his own words, and he became a member of the Christian church. With the help of some of his companions, it was then that he first learned to read the Welsh Bible. Under the friendly patronage of a tailor in the village, he began to make his first efforts at "exhortation;"

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*Somewhat abridged from the (London) *Christian Spectator* for September, 1863.

and soon he seems to have been inspired with the fixed purpose of entering the ministry.

Christmas Evans first settled as a pastor, in a place called Lleyn, in Carnarvonshire. It seems to have been a poor place, and yet it was about this time that he ventured upon matrimony, and espoused a good sensible wife, in the person of one Catharine Jones. Mr. Evans* gives us a graphic picture of him and his scanty literature, consisting of his Bible, his borrowed Welsh and English dictionary, and Burkitt on the New Testament, "which it is said he would often study in bed, with the said dictionary at hand, to look up all the hard words he encountered." Here it was, that his preaching took shape.

Up to this time, he seems to have been struggling to get his ideas and oratory into the form that should be most satisfying to his aspirations, and had not succeeded. But now God had sent him a teacher. One Robert Roberts, a Calvinistic Methodist preacher, of Carnarvonshire, a deformed, weakly-looking man, but an inspired preacher, did for Christmas Evans, that which Socrates prided himself in doing for the ideas of others—helping them to the birth. Christmas Evans, when asked if he could give an account of what led him into his peculiar way of preaching, replied: "Yes, I can, partly at least; I had the ideas before, but somehow could'nt get at them. When I was in Lleyn, the Methodists had a man of the name of Robert Roberts, of Llanllyfui, who was very popular, and there was a great deal of talk about him. Well, I went on one Sunday afternoon to hear him. He was one of the most insignificant persons I ever saw—a little hunch-backed man; but he neither thought nor said any thing like other people; there was something wonderful and uncommon about him. This Robert Roberts gave me the key."

At the end of two years we find him leaving Lleyn, and settling in Anglesea as a sort of evangelist to ten preaching stations, at a salary of seventeen pounds a year. Not pausing to ask how this great-boned man, six feet high, and his wife, could manage to live upon seven shillings a week, we go on to say, that it was here he spent the greater part of his life as a minister—that is not less than thirty-four years. This was

* *Christmas Evans; a Memoir* by Rev. D. M. Evans. London.

the period of his great glory as a preacher. It was now that he began to make those frequent preaching tours into South Wales, which were made ever-memorable by his wonderful sermons at the great associations. Mr. Evans has given so graphic a picture of his great namesake preaching at one of these gatherings, that, though it has been quoted before, we can not help extracting it:—"Meanwhile, in the midst of a too general hum and restlessness, the preacher had read for his text: 'And you that were some time alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath He reconciled in the body of His flesh through death, to present you holy and unblamable, and unreproachable in his sight.' His first movements were stiff, awkward, and wrestling, while his observations were, perhaps, crude and common-place, rather than striking or novel; but he had not proceeded far, before, having thus prepared himself, he took one of his wildest flights, bursting forth at the same time into those unmelodious, but all-piercing shrieks, under which his hearers often confessed his resistless power. Closer and closer draw in the scattered groups, the weary loungers, and the hitherto listless among the motley multitude. The crowd becomes dense with eager listeners as they press on insensibly toward the preacher. He gradually gets into the thickening plot of his homely but dramatic representation, while, all forgetful of the spot on which they stood, old men and women, accustomed to prosy thoughts and ways, look up with open mouth, through smiles and tears. Big, burly country folk, in whom it might have been thought that the faculty of imagination had long since been extinguished, became engrossed with ideal scenes. Men 'whose talk is of bullocks,' are allured into converse with the most spiritual realities. The preachers present, become dazzled with the brilliance of this new star on the horizon; they start on their feet round the strange young man, look hard at him in perfect amazement; loud and rapturous confirmations break forth from their lips: "Amen," "Ben digedig," "Diolch byth," fall tumultuously on the ear; the charm swells onwards from the platform to the extreme margin of the wondering crowd, and to the occasional loud laugh, there has now succeeded the baptism of tears. The excitement is at its highest; the preacher

concludes, but the weeping and rejoicing continue till worn out nature brings the scene to an end."

A brief summary of his chief qualities as a preacher must include passion, or ardent excited feeling, a dramatic imagination, and grotesque humor. The published scraps of sermons which remain, and have been translated into English, illustrate these qualities, and almost only these. He does not reason, he does not argue, he does not think, he does not betray anywhere any capacity for speculation. The light he casts upon religious truth is not of the intellectual sort; it is the light that flames out from the heart—the light of the imagination, which enabled him to see truth in its concrete forms, and to dramatize abstract principles. He imparted no novelty to the forms of religious thought, but he could light up as with a flash of lightning the whole horizon of acknowledged fact and doctrine. And in this he proved himself to be the great preacher, and not the great theologian or essayist.

Perhaps our readers would like to see our great preacher in his study, "preparing his sermon." "Two young ministers one day called at his cottage, and after Catharine had admitted them with a very few quiet words, there is sitting at a little round table set out for tea, an evidently abstracted man, withdrawn from every object around him, Bible in hand, and in agonizing thought. He takes no more notice of the strangers than if they had been familiar pieces of household furniture. He moves to and fro in his chair, performing the "pumping" process, of which John Foster has told us, but with little result; still he *can not* abandon the endeavor. He closes and opens his eyes, but upon other scenes, and his face looks dark and clouded. His first cup has been drank long ago, and his wife nudges him, and asks him to forward the cup to be replenished; all unconscious of her meaning, he hands her the little Bible which he holds in his hand. Still the vision does not brighten. He becomes restless, gets up from his seat, and turns over page after page of Dr. Owen's volumes; tries another Puritan divine, and another, but in vain. What can he do? The result does not come, still he can not let go the process. One resource remains—he, there and then, undistracted by earthly presence, bends his knee in fervent prayer, and pours forth the most ardent supplications to Him who can

'open the eyes of the understanding.' Again he resumes his work, and his face grows calmer and brighter, his expression of agony wears away, and in a short time he has succeeded. He now emerges from the struggle, cordially addresses his visitors, and becomes playful and genial as a child."

One of the most interesting chapters in Mr. Evans' book to an Englishman and a preacher, is that in which he explains and accounts for the popularity of the Welsh pulpit. We will sum up the causes in a few words. When the great preacher of a past day (for Welsh oratory now is losing its national character) stood in the pulpit, he was sole monarch of the interest of his congregation; that interest was not distracted or divided, either by literature, politics, or science. "The sermon became almost the sole means of intellectual, moral, and even recreational excitement." In England, at least now, novels, reviews, commerce, politics, and popular science, all have, more or less, a place in the thoughts of those whom the preacher has to interest, and divide the empire of the people's mind, making the work of the preacher an infinitely more difficult task. Then there was the hearty, unrestrained *responses of the congregation*, helping to kindle the fire of the preacher, and replenishing it with fresh fuel as he proceeded, till it attained its greatest heat and splendor; and the *preacher's training* did not carry him beyond the perfect sympathies of his hearers. His training was preëminently in the one book—the Bible—and here he and his people met on common ground. They studied the Bible, and the Bible alone, and only in the light of the Puritan theology. This perfect sympathy was the more firmly established by the adoption of an almost exclusively scriptural phraseology in the sermon, which gave the highest advantage with an audience whose whole literature was the Bible. In addition to this, it is to be admitted, notwithstanding all the extravagant claims that have been made for the Welsh language, that it is a language admirably adapted to the wants of the orator, "not easily surpassed for bold, vigorous and resounding expressions." And then the language is not grammatically taught or spoken by any class of the people, so that a preacher using the broad provincialisms of the people, would speak home to the mass without offending the tastes of any class in his congregation. This could not be

done in England. Robert Hall and Billy Dawson could not have preached with success to the same congregation. We shall try to make the reader understand what is meant by the Welsh *hwyl*, and the part it plays in the Welsh preaching, by quoting a sentence or two from Mr. Evans' account of it:—"The *hwyl* actually sang. It was distinguished from the natural melody of all truly eloquent speaking in which the emotions are deeply excited, by the fact that the cadences were so varied and prolonged, that at last the preacher addressed himself, as in mere music, to the imagination, through the medium of sound. The afflatus common to all great excitement passed into recitative and song. The *hwyl* (full sail) would not possibly explain nor argue; it came on at the height of the excitement, to work in the impressions of truth that had been stated, argued and illustrated, and its effect was overwhelming. * * * * * * When, rising higher and higher in excitement, the preacher had reached the height of ordinary inspiration, he would break forth in wild, irregular chant of jubilant tones or wailing cadences." The *hwyl* can not be imported, if it were desirable; and if it could, the entire body of circumstance necessary to its success, can not be transferred. But we feel perfectly assured that the voice has played a far more important part in the history of the Welsh pulpit than in that of any other, and that the *hwyl*, with its peculiar form of inspiration, *has been one of the main elements in the universal popularity of Welsh preaching.*

Christmas Evans, and his great cotemporaries, John Elias and Williams of Wern, have passed away, and with them has passed away also the grandeur of Welsh preaching. Let it be admitted that the spirit and method of their preaching were adapted to a period of great spiritual outburst and renewal of the national life. We will call it revival preaching, little fitted to instruct and educate and edify, but almost exclusively adapted to rouse men just awaking from a long spiritual slumber. *Now*, even in Wales, the people are more educated, and are accustomed to and require a more thoughtful style of preaching; and, no doubt, if Christmas Evans awoke from the dead, and had to preach to this generation, he would preach so as to meet the new circumstances in which his countrymen were placed. But we must believe that he would

retain his accustomed fire; if he argued more, he would argue in burning syllogisms; if he encountered prevailing errors and prejudices, he would launch thunderbolts at them, or flash upon them the killing light of truth. He would never give in to the doctrine, that to be intelligent you must be tame; that to instruct, you must be cold, and that fire and passion and fancy, must all be abandoned to untrained, headlong fanatics.

We confess to a purpose to get a moral out of this great Welshman, for the preaching of the present day. We should like his life by Mr. Evans, together with that by Rev. D. R. Stephen, (a memoir with many characteristic beauties) to lie upon the study table of every minister in the three kingdoms. They would be especially valuable if they only inspired every minister with *the determination to succeed* in his preaching. We see in this man how he cast about for a long time trying to catch the right method, till at last he got the "key;" and how persistently he wrestled with God for his sermons. To produce a sermon, was with him an agony—a conflict not only of the intellect, but of the heart and the imagination. It was not merely the getting of a "division" and the skilful mapping out of a subject, with its first, second, and third heads, but he strove well and long to get at the flaming heart of the subject in hand, and to kindle his whole soul with it, before he was satisfied to appear before the congregation. The success we here plead for is of only the preliminary kind—not the higher success of converting men and building them up, for the latter can not be attained without the former. The first, the indispensible thing for the minister of the gospel, is to be able to compel the attention of his hearers—to win for his sermon a thorough interest in the minds of his audience; and if Christmas Evans, with a simple, and for the most part, rustic audience, had to work hard to succeed in this, much more must the peacher *now* work hard to captivate the mind of a congregation pre-occupied with the thousand questions and interests of modern civilization. The great body of the people still believe in the Bible; we have few unbelieving philosophers to encounter; but we have an almost infinite amount of unbelief which takes the shape of profound apathy—an intense absorption in material and present things, or a vague,

half-formed conviction, that some important religious questions can not be certainly and satisfactorily solved and answered, and that much of the dogmatic teaching of the pulpit, may only be partly true. How much of all this may be due to the pulpit itself, we do not presume to say; but we do say, that if it is to be overcome and cast out, the preacher must first know that it exists, and then how to dislodge it.

We say, then, that there must be what we will call the *preaching temperament;* the power of not only seeing but of feeling with intense excitement, the truth which the preacher seeks to urge on his audience. This was one great part of Christmas Evans' power. From this came the *hwyl.* Cold phlegmatic men, who are not able to tremble themselves at the message they have to deliver, will never be able to make others tremble. We know very well that the *vis vivida* does not depend on a man's will, but we say that where it is absent it is a great disqualification of the Christian preacher. Then this vital quality of the preacher's mind must be heated and inflamed by prolonged study of the sermon, and by grappling with the truth to be preached, with the intellect, the conscience, the passions, and the imagination. Didactic teaching and exhortation, are of infinitely less consequence than the being able to stimulate men to think and to feel. This is what the great preachers have done; with impetuous force they have broken in upon the ordinary currents of men's thinking and feeling, and compelled them, for the time at least, to gaze with transports of wonder and joy, upon glorious pictures of the unseen and impalpable. Preachers who would do this again, must be men not only of blameless lives, but mighty in their wrestlings with God and with truth—who make the study an oratory, and who carry from the study to the pulpit, sermons that have been inspired at God's altar.

A GALLICAN VIEW OF THE MEANING OF MATTHEW XVI: 18, "THOU ART PETER," ETC.*

BY THE ABBE GUETTÉE.

The Abbe Constant, in his work on the History and Infallibility of the Popes, finds, as he supposes, an argument for the *promised* primacy in the famous passage, *Thou art Peter.* This he cites as if it was decisive. He does not appear to suspect that the fathers of the Church have given a different interpretation. Now we ask the author: Do you admit that the Scriptures ought to be interpreted according to the Catholic tradition? Do you admit that the authorized organs of this tradition are the œcumenical councils and the fathers of the Church? To these two questions he will certainly reply in the affirmative. We will now present to him another: How have the councils and the fathers interpreted the passage, *Thou art Peter?* The true œcumenical councils, namely, those of the first centuries after Christ, have said nothing directly upon the passage, but their acts are diametrically opposed to your interpretation of it. This we have abundantly proved in the *Observateur Catholique*, and the author has only to read the articles published in this repertory to be convinced of the truth of our assertion. Of the fathers of the Church, the immense majority interpret the passage as follows: it is not the *person* of Peter but *the truth he had uttered;* viz., the divinity of Jesus Christ, which is the foundation of the Church, against which the gates of hell shall not be able to prevail.

Of the small number of the fathers who understand by the word *rock* the person of Peter, THERE IS NOT A SINGLE ONE who draws from it, as the Abbe Constant does, the ultramontane system.

Having proved these two incontestible points in the *Observateur Catholique*, we have the right to say to the author that his interpretation of the passage, *Thou art Peter*, is not *Catholic*, since it is entirely at variance with the Catholic tradition; we have the right to tell him that he is inconsistent with himself, since, on the one hand, he professes to be a faithful

* Translated from *L'Observateur Catholique*, August, 1863.

disciple of tradition, and on the other abandons this tradition in order to give to a passage of Scripture an interpretation purely subjective.

Take now the passage, Luke 22: 31, "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you:" how have the fathers of the Church interpreted it? All who have expressed an opinion understood it thus: Peter *alone* had need of the special prayer of the Savior, that his faith might be strengthened, because he was the only one of the Apostles who denied his Master, and hence he was obliged to repair the scandal of his fall by a more lively faith.

We ask if such an interpretation is favorable to the pretended primacy of St. Peter; if it is legitimate to bring forward a passage of this kind as containing a promise of the papacy? To do so is to pay no regard either to the context or to the Catholic tradition.

The Abbe Constant is sagacious in regard to his texts. Instead of accepting them in their *Catholic* sense, he assumes that his readers admit the *ultramontane* sense, and then he draws the following conclusions: "Jesus Christ, then, promised to Peter to make him *the foundation of his Church;* to put into his possession the keys of his kingdom, that is to say, *the supreme authority;* to ratify in heaven the judgments he should pronounce on earth; to pray for him that his faith might *never* fail, and that he might be able *always* to observe the command he received to strengthen *his brethren in the episcopate* and still more ordinary believers."

In this commentary, the Abbe Constant has forgotten to prove that these words of Jesus relate to anything else than simply *the person of Peter;* on the contrary he gratuitously *assumes* that by the word Peter the bishop of Rome is to be understood, and this is the reason of his adding to the text the words *always* and *never*, which would not apply to a person who must sooner or later die. He *assumes* that the privilege of the keys promised to Peter was not equally given to the other Apostles. He *assumes* that the power of the keys signifies *supreme* authority. He *assumes* that the brethren, whom Peter was told to strengthen in the faith, were *the bishops.* Unfortunately for *these assumptions* of the writer, he contradicts, in making them, the Holy Scripture itself and all the

fathers of the Church, who have never discovered in the passages cited any idea analogous to those of the Abbe Constant. He concludes with the remark: "It would be difficult to announce a primacy in terms more clear and precise." Our conclusion is exactly the reverse, and we should say, it would be difficult more fully to pervert these passages, to make them teach a doctrine more entirely contrary to the Catholic tradition, to trample under foot more directly the most simple notions of the *Catholic* doctrine.

To enlarge further upon the passages brought forward by the Abbe Constant, would only be to repeat what we have already said. Our readers know that, on our part, they have been objects of profound study, and that we have followed, in their interpretation, the venerable organs of the Catholic tradition. We have only, therefore, to observe that the author whom we have criticised, has not endeavored to obtain the support of a single church-father, and that his interpretations are *anti-Catholic*; or, in other words, contrary to the universal teaching of the Church during the first seven centuries which form the epoch of the fathers of the Church.

NOTE.—The most recent *Protestant* Commentators are disposed to admit the declaration, "On this rock will I build my Church," to refer to Peter, not however simply as a person, but *as bearing testimony to the truth he uttered*.—ED.

TRUE ORIGINALITY IN CHRISTIAN DISCOURSE.*

EVERY new volume of sermons now-a-days is advertised as being "original," by which is commonly meant that they contain new and brilliant thoughts, expressed in a piquant style, and with the individuality of the author strongly displayed. In Christian discourses this kind of originality is anything but desirable. It is only as a man is freed by the grace of God from every form of self-admiration and self-satisfaction, in view of his own gifts, that genuine originality in the sphere

* Translated from the *Dorpater Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. Hepf II*, 1863.

of Christian homiletics can ever exist. Whenever there is the slightest evidence of indulging in rhetorical ornament for the sake of popular applause, as so often appears in the sermons of young preachers of considerable ability, the speaker "has his reward," but the vital and saving power of the sermon is gone. Genuine originality, in the true Christian sense, can exist only on condition that the preacher die to self and become possessed with the spirit of Christ. This freedom from self by no means involves the sacrifice of the preacher's native individuality; on the contrary it imparts to that individuality a sacred consecration, and emancipates it from every obstacle which would embarrass him in being fully possessed with the great object to be exhibited. The condition of true Christian originality is negatively, self-forgetfulness and self-denial; positively, the being controlled *within* by the power of the truth. Nothing but sanctified littleness begets true greatness. Whoever feels it necessary to add to the Word of Life—the matter contained in the Bible—even but a single grain of excitants furnished by himself, in order to make his sermon more fresh and effective, has never learned in the school of the Spirit; his words come not from the right source his witness, in part at least, expires with the breath that utters it, and has no permanent and substantial effect. Whoever, on the other hand, declares God's word *only*, and is determined to preach nothing else, because he has learned from his own experience to despair of his own wisdom; whoever has Christ, the eternal and living Word of God, formed in his soul, is made alive, that is, *original;* because the life from which he draws is the *original life*, and because he is now associated with it, through his preaching, in the work of the new creation, and can say with Paul—the motto for all Christian originality—"I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

BISHOP BUTLER AND HIS RECENT CRITICS.*

The man who has written a good book has made the race of mankind his debtor throughout all time. This is true, even if the book belongs to that class which serves what seems to be but a temporary purpose, in giving a new start to scientific inquiry, or in suggesting a new thought, the carrying out of which will soon render the production in which it occurs obsolete. But how much more is it true, if the book has not only indicated and worked out an instructive line of thought, but itself remains, after more than a century, the most complete expression of that thought, and the work to which the highest laborers in that department refer with profound reverence, as that from whose wisdom they have drawn their own deepest inspiration, and to whose perfection they cannot add. All scientific inquirers in this country look up with reverence to Bacon, as the legitimate father of modern science. His "Novum Organum" is studied by each new generation with the most intense attention. Deeper meanings are supposed to be discovered in it as the labors of science disclose more of the secrets of the universe, and we hear not a little of the prophetic powers of laborious genius: and although Dr. Whewell has thought it needful to write his "Novum Organum Renovatum," to supplement the deficiencies, or to correct the errors of his greater predecessor, and Mr. Mill and a host of others have found many things not quite correct, or positively incorrect, in "The Greatest Birth of Time," yet Bacon's work is reverenced still, studied still, and perhaps at this day receives the enthusiastic homage of a far greater number of superior minds than it did half a century after its publication. This is as it should be: and we are persuaded that it would be deemed an evil omen by all the eminent scientific men of our day, if a tendency appeared to set in an opposite direction. The well-known work of Bishop Butler, entitled "The Analogy of Religion, Nat-

* A review of *Essay on the Skeptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy.* By S. S Hennell. London, 1859. From *The British Quarterly Review, July*, 1863.

ural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature," may, with much propriety, be designated the "Novum Organum" of theology; for, while in its main purpose it belongs to the department of Apologetics, it is so full of sagacious suggestions, there are scattered through it such "seeds of things," or rather of thoughts, that the careful student will find its aid invaluable in every part of his theological inquiries—opening up new vistas of truth, or laying its arrest upon unlicensed speculation, or suggesting corroborative arguments, or modifying dogmatic conclusions. He who has made the book his own by frequent and independent perusals, grows conscious of its influence over his whole thought, and often wonders as he looks upon the manner in which it has molded all his own productions; it becomes to him the *organum* which shapes all his mental operations, and by whose aid he proceeds along his "dim and perilous way in safety."

The aim of the two books, in their respective departments, is the same. Before Bacon wrote, many had discovered truth by observing, without any scientific ordination, the laws which he laid down; but unlicensed speculation was the rule, and such sober inquiry the exception. Bacon demanded that speculation should wait on inquiry; that nature should be interpreted by man, her minister; that he should learn the lessons she taught, instead of imposing his crude thoughts on her; that science should accord with facts, instead of being in antagonism with them; in other words, he taught the limits of thought in science, and showed that when these limits had been transgressed, error, and not truth, had emerged. This he did with an amplitude of learning, a splendor of imagination, a comprehensiveness and carefulness of inquiry, and a vigor of logic and of wit which have won, and shall continue to win, the admiration of ages. Butler pursued, with different faculties, the same end in his own department. He had not the learning of Bacon; he gave no evidence of the same brilliancy of imagination, though the producer of so many and such apt analogies was not wanting in that faculty. His subject allowed no scope for wit, although the presence of the power is often attested to the student in the grave and serious *asides*, prompted by the presumptuous speculations of his opponents, and which we can fancy not unaccompanied by a smile on his somewhat prim and delicate features. But while we would not claim for him the intellectual range of out-look and grandeur

of elevation which belonged to Bacon, we feel, in the perusal of his work, the charm of a moral conscientiousness of investigation, a careful weighing of evidence, a straining after the exactest form of expression, and a cautious putting forth of his thoughts, altogether unparalleled in our experience. This moral honesty, this intense conscientiousness, this unremitting care never to overstate anything, give a position of solitary grandeur to Butler on that "hill of God" into which none can ascend but such as are of clean hands and a pure heart; and amply fulfil the promise of that youthful profession which preceded the publication of the "Analogy" by twenty-three years: "I design the 'Search after Truth' as the business of my life."* That truth he believed he had found by careful inquiry. He found it not in airy speculations, of which there was abundance around him, but in attention to the harmony between the principles of Divine revelation and those which seemed to be expressed in the constitution and course of nature. Whenever a speculation on the subject of religion was presented to him, he tried it by what he observed in that constitution and course of nature; if it presented no relations to it, it was laid aside; if it was contradictory to it, it was at once rejected. His limits, like those of Bacon, were found in facts, and nothing was accepted by him which was not drawn directly from those facts, by induction or analogy. He did not profess to have found the whole truth, but what he did profess to have found he proved to be the product of the most persevering and conscientious inquiry.

But the fate of the books has not been precisely the same. Bacon's work dealt more with speculation, and proceeded more on the basis of what might be regarded as ordinated science in his time; and, as the result, much of his work has suffered loss. The "wood, hay, and stubble" of man's partial thought about God's creation, had mingled too much with "the gold and silver and precious stones" of that creation itself; and the natural consequence has ensued. Bacon's book has been sifted and reduced in bulk; but, somewhat like the Sibylline books, which grew in value as they lessened in number, the solid portion has but increased in preciousness; only, however, because it is solid. Butler's book has passed through the fire of criticism; the most em-

* From the letter to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Clark's Works, p. 747, vol. ii.

inent minds devoted to theological science have scanned it with critical eye; infidels have felt it a barrier which must be overthrown or overleaped, and yet the whole result of ascertained diminution from its weight and force is in one of the very few points in which he indulges in speculation—his argument for a Future Life, in the first chapter of the first part.

About every other alleged error there is, as we propose to show, something to be said on the other side. This impregnability we can not but regard as the result and guerdon of the conscientious care with which the book was composed.

In presuming to write about Bishop Butler and his recent critics, we are desirous, while discharging in a very legitimate manner the functions of our office as reviewers of current thought and speech, to express our own deep and increasing indebtedness to the production of that great man which is especially the object of assault. Butler needs no defense from our feebleness, and defense of him is farthest from our thoughts; but yet many minds may need, for their satisfaction, a further explanation of an assailed position, or an examination of an opposing argument. There are many in our day who seem hardly to discern the difference between assault and conquest; and if an objection has been urged, with some show of plausibility, against a religious argument, it seems to them sufficient reason for regarding that religious argument as unworthy of further notice. It would be vain to hope that minds of this order would be led to peruse Butler for themselves, but some reflection of the truth may shine upon them from a page professedly objecting to the objections which they have read, or of which they have heard. Another class must not be forgotten. There are many who long to know the solidity of the grounds on which their faith rests, and who are in danger of thinking that all is not right if but a stroke has rung upon the shield of such a paladin of the faith as Butler. For the help of these, and of young students, we propose to pass in review the criticisms of some recent objectors, careless of the old objection of the Herald's College about the bad heraldry of metal on metal, and reminding our critics that the fault has been committed by themselves, for Butler's work is a critique upon the infidels of his day.

The writers who have recently assailed the "Analogy" are Miss Hennell, in the work which we have placed at the head of

this paper; the Rev. Mark Pattison, in "Essays and Reviews;" the Rev. James Martineau, in his "Studies of Christianity," and in an article on "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," in the "National Review;"* and Mr. Bagehot, in his "Estimates of some Englishmen and of some Scotchmen."† They frequently unite in the same objection, in which case we shall take it in its strongest or most developed form. Some of the objections are fundamental, others only oppose particular arguments; while some, in doing the latter, glance a look of hostility toward the very principle of Butler's whole system. Most, if not all, proceed on a very partial or entirely erroneous view of Butler's position and design, or of the materials from which he drew his teaching.

The first great objection urged by Miss Hennell‡ and by Mr. Martineau§ is, that the whole argument of the "Analogy" is an *argumentum ad hominem;* and as Mr. Martineau has put it most strongly, we shall allow him to speak:

"It is altogether an *argumentum ad hominem* addressed on behalf of ecclesiastical Christianity to the believer in simple Theism. He is taken up on his own ground, and nothing more is asked from him at the outset than he is accustomed to allow—that the world and human life evidence the existence and exemplify the moral government of an infinite and holy God. 'Go with me this one mile,' says Butler, 'and I will compel you to go twain: resting with me at last in the assurance that the scheme of Redemption, as orthodox men understand it, has the same author as the scheme of Creation. For not a questionable feature can you name in my theology which has not its exact counterpart in yours.' It is needless for me to deny or explain the difficulties; it is enough that I retort them, and show that you, also, are in 'the same case.'"

After this pretty fair statement of the case, he proceeds to point out, in the same style, some of the parallels discussed by Butler, and then continues:

"This argument, it is evident, far from relieving any perplexity, lets

* Vol. viii., p. 213; and we attribute this article to Mr. Martineau from internal evidence and common report.

† The article was originally published in the *Prospective Review*, vol. x., as a review of Rogers's article on Butler, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. We quote from the *Review*.

‡ P. 20.

§ *National Register*, vol. viii., p. 212.

its lie, in order to balance it by another. It duplicates the sense of painful embarrassment, by detecting the same repulsions in the skeptic's residuary belief which have already determined him to partial unbelief. So far as the reasoning succeeds, it is not by lightening objections in the ecclesiastical scale, but by weighting them more heavily in the theistical; and the only new feeling it can give to an opponent is this: that however ill he may think of other people's God, he has no reason to think better of his own. If he is driven to accept a scheme of doctrine on this ground, he surrenders his higher sentiments to a lower necessity, and betrays the devoutness of his faith from shame at a logical reproach."

This argument is skillfully constructed. It represents pretty truly Butler's purpose, except that the writer characterizes as "ecclesiastical" Christianity that which we devoutly believe to be Scriptural. But when he comes to exhibit the tendency of the "Analogy," he takes a painfully one-sided view. If it is true that the difficulties do exist in connection with the belief of simple theism, then what becomes of that "higher sentiment" which has led the theist, on account of similar difficulties, to reject Christianity? If it was active in reference to Christianity, why should it not be active in reference to the theism which contains precisely similar difficulties? And if to yield to Christianity is to "surrender" this higher sentiment, it is difficult to see what is lost; for it was evidently held in abeyance, at least, under the former condition, or it would have rejected the theistic belief on account of those acknowledged difficulties, the like of which have constituted the professed reasons for rejecting Christianity. This higher sentiment seems to be a very feeble or a very inconsistent faculty, and to possess the power of seeing or not seeing objections at will.

Now it appears to us that this character of Butler's argument is so far from being a fault, that it is a great virtue. It may not be an argument of the highest order, but when conclusive it is very effective. It comes to men who are standing in a kind of mid-way uncertain position, and invites them to advance. They give certain reasons why they can not do so. It then proceeds to show that these reasons are equally effective against their remaining where they are; that the advanced position is not more objectionable than their present, while it possesses many advantages which they can not see while they remain where they are, and that if they will allow the reasons assigned ultimately to

prevail, they must recede to a position most ruinously disadvantageous. This is precisely what it does. The alternative, according to Butler, is Christianity or Atheism; for he who will not believe that Christianity is of God, because of certain difficulties which he discovers in it, must, on account of difficulties similar in character, give up the belief that God is the author of the constitution and course of nature, which he professes, notwithstanding the difficulties, to have proceeded from, and to be ordered by God. Consistency in rejecting requires him to become an Atheist; consistency with himself demands his belief in Christianity. For, if he can believe in God as the Author of Nature, notwithstanding the difficulties, he may easily believe, nay, ought to believe, in the Divine origin of Christianity. In Butler's day, as now, there were many who would shudder at the bare idea of Atheism; indeed, the mass of the unbelievers took extreme care to show this. Toland was even willing to have a kind of Rational Christianity, stripped of everything mysterious. Collins was a Theist. Tindal, to whose book Butler's work was chiefly opposed, was a very advanced Theist, whose central principle was the perfection of the law of Nature. "The law of Nature," he says, "either is, or is not, a perfect law: if the first, it is not capable of addition; if the last, does it not argue want of evidence in the legislator in first enacting such an imperfect law, and then in letting it continue thus imperfect from age to age, and at last thinking to make it absolutely perfect by simply adding some merely positive and arbitrary precepts?"* To this kind of theoretical argument, Butler simply answers by referring to the facts; and if the Theistical belief of a man became disturbed or destroyed by that reference, it was not the fault of him who pointed out the facts, but of the falsehood of the theory upon which the belief rested. It was his aim, however, to show that we are not competent judges of how much difficulty may be admitted into a religious belief, but that if so much as Theism presents may be admitted, consistency requires that Christianity should be received also, for—

If there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of providence which redemption informs us of, and that

* *Christianity as old as the Creation*, ch. ix, p. 135.

system of things and dispensation of providence which experience together with reason informs us of, i. e., the known course of nature, this is a presumption that they have both the same author and cause; at least, so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him, for an author of nature is here supposed !*

This kind of argument may be very inconvenient for Mr. Martineau, or any other person, but it is at least fair and conclusive. When Miss Hennell states that, "this nature of his argument *ad homines* of his own day, renders it, according to the usual course of things, inadequate to the needs of our own" (p. 20), we find it difficult to see the truth of the remark. The Theistic belief, we presume, is still the same; the difficulties have not altered in a single particular; revelation and the course of nature have undergone no change. All the elements of the argument remain just as they were; and this being so, it is impossible that the argument itself should have lost anything of its weight or applicability. If she means that through Butler's reasonings many have adopted the darker alternative, and have become Atheists, she must remember that with them Butler maintains no argument, as the conclusion of the quotation above made distinctly shows, and that he never intended his book as a reply to such. We might proceed further, and deny that there is much Atheism of a speculative character even now; and, above all, that whatever is professed has any relation of effect to Butler's reasonings.

The fact that it is an *argumentum ad hominem* answers some other objections which have been made in forgetfulness of it. Miss Hennell speaks of the "immense assumptions" on which Butler has proceeded, and states that "the very fact of so much being taken for granted by so deep a thinker, raises suspicion of its validity" (p. 21). She gives no reference to her quotation of the "immense assumptions," and we would wish to think she was merely mistaken when she quotes, as things taken for granted by Butler, the summary at the close of his introduction, of the very

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* *Analogy*, p. 8, Fitzgerald's second edition. Dr. Angus's excellent edition nearly corresponds in paging, though we uniformly quote Fitzgerald's.

things which his whole book was written to render credible, as being " analagous to what is experienced in ' the constitution and course of nature ;' " while she forgets what Butler has himself stated about the amount of his assumptions in the 8th chapter of part II :

"However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former ; that there is an author of nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature."—p. 290.

It is hardly fair or honest not to note such a statement as this, and refute it if false ; but it looks very dishonest, if it does not rather show culpable negligence, to represent the things to be proved as the positions taken for granted. Indeed, Miss Hennell's essay shows that her study of Butler had not commenced when her fancied proof of its skeptical tendency was finished.* When Mr. Bagehot cried out, " the whole argument is one of ' preconception, presumption and probability,' " he either allowed himself to be imposed upon by the alliteration, or showed how little he had looked into the foundation of the work which he undertook to criticise. The one assumption or preconception which Butler admits is the most elementary principle of all Theism ; and as he was reasoning with Theists and with them only, he was warranted in making that his starting point.

* She seems at times hardly able to understand what is plainly before her. For instance, she quotes from the preface to Butler's sermons, the passage in which he states his preference for his own method in ethics, to that which "begins by inquiring into the abstract relations of things," stating, however, that they "both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the practice of virtue ; and thus they exceedingly strengthen and enforce each other." Here is Miss Hennell's comment : "This shows us that, while the positive method had his decided preference, he was far from suspecting that the old scholastic mode of *formal proof* from the *a priori* assumed ' nature of things ' was in fact, utterly delusive for the attainment of truth, and that the two methods by no means necessarily ' lead us to the same thing.' " Here she seems, if the sentence has any meaning, to interpret Butler as saying just the contrary of what he does say. The same page, however, contains an equal absurdity in the assertion that Butler's view of the moral nature of man is the basis for the physiological system of George Combe.

But Mr. Bagehot will have it, that in proving Revelation, we assume the truth of one preconception respecting the Divine character, to which nature gives no witness,—the veracity of God.* He ranges through various fields of human inquiry, and finds evidence that God, "is, on the whole, a benevolent Being; but does it follow that he will tell the truth?" He goes on to show that benevolence will sometimes lie, for the purpose of giving consolation to a sufferer, and suggests that the belief in the doctrine of a future life, may be produced by some such deluding action on the part of God.

It will clearly follow that a Being whose only motive was benevolence, who admitted no higher consideration, who looked steadily and solely to our mere happiness, would endeavor to instill that belief although it were quite untrue, would not think that *that* had anything to do with the question, would not hesitate to make a false revelation to confirm men in a belief so pleasant, so advantageous, so consolatory!

We believe this will convey quite a new notion of benevolence to many of our readers; a benevolence so pure and simple that it seeks to accomplish its ends by lying.† But we are equally persuaded that such a notion will be repudiated by every well regulated mind; and we only quote it to show the style which some of Butler's antagonists resort to for the purpose of making out a case. Our reply to the principal argument is, that we never knew a Theist who did not believe that God was true, for we never heard of Mr. Bagehot's very original argument before. And, further, we find many writers who see evidence of God's veracity in Nature, not in "the structure of animals and plants, the courses of the planets and the muscles of man," to which Mr. Bagehot refers (although there is no appearance of deception in any of these), but in the moral constitution of man's nature; evidence which rests upon the universally observed fact, that the greatest liar is compelled, by the sheer force of the nature of things, to utter many more truths than lies; and that even he has a moral

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* *Prospective Review*, vol. x, pp. 566–7.

† Butler had foreseen this kind of folly: "Or perhaps Divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man, happy."—(p. 42.)

sentiment opposed to lying, reproving him for his own vice, and leading him to hate that vice in others when it injuriously affects himself. We can not see, and never could see, that there is, in proceeding upon such evidence as this, any assumption of what "God *must* be, and God *must* do." Mr. Bagehot has over-reached himself in his attempt, and has produced what ordinary Theists would count blasphemy instead of argument. The *argumentum ad hominem* is evidently not easily met by those who wish still to occupy their midway position, and their throes of restlessness only testify to its power. The dilemma to which they are shut up is painfully serious.

Mr. Pattison speaks of the reading of the "Analogy" as being "depressing to the soul," and attributes this to two things. He says, "Those periods when morals have been represented as the proper study of man, and his only business, have been periods of spiritual abasement and poverty. The denial of scientific theology, the keeping in the background the transcendental objects of faith, and the restriction of our faculties to the regulation of our conduct, seem, indeed, to be placing man in the foreground of the picture, to make human nature the center round which all things revolve. But they do so not by exalting the visible, but by materializing the invisible."* And, in the second place, quoting from the Rev. Alfred Vaughan's Essays (vol. i, p, 61), he applies these words to the theology of the Hanoverian divines,and especially of Butler: "To degrade religion to the position of a mere purveyor of motive to morality, is not more dishonorable to the ethics which must ask, than to the religion which will render such assistance." This quotation is not fairly applied, for its writer never thought of Butler when writing it: he was speaking only of what was the current of thought in Germany when Schleiermacher arose. Nor is it fairly applicable to Butler; for if there is any difference between morality and religion, the very quotations Mr. Pattison makes from Butler go to prove that "morals" were not represented by him as "man's only business;" for does he not say, "Our province is virtue and *religion*, life and manners, the science of improving the temper and making the heart better. This is the field assigned us to cultivate; how much it has lain neglected is indeed astonishing." "He

* *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 293-294.

who should find out one rule to assist us in this work, would deserve infinitely better of mankind than all the improvers of other knowledge put together."* It is quite true that he did not regard speculation as the chief good of man. "Knowledge," he says, "is not our proper happiness." Men of deep research and curious inquiry should just be put in mind not to mistake what they are doing. If their discoveries serve the cause of virtue or religion in the way of proof, motive to practice, or assistance in it, or if they tend to render life less unhappy, and promote its satisfactions, then they are most usefully employed; but bringing things to light, alone and of itself, is of no manner of use any otherwise than as an entertainment or diversion."† He did believe, that "the secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law."‡ This is the text, to which all his works form the most perfect of commentaries. Other orders of beings might be admitted to the secrets of God, but he was sure that was not our condition. But while we thus contend for Butler's wise abstinence from vague and profitless speculation, we are sure that we find him prosecuting his inquiries with the utmost diligence in both the books of Revelation by which God has made known to man his character, his relations, and his will—Nature and the Bible. If there is any speculative theology different from this, the world sustains no loss by the want of it; but while the sublime thought and devotion of the Sermons on the "Love of God" remain, or the discussions on the "Redemption of the World by a Mediator," the argument on Miracles, and much besides, it is a matter of surprise to find it asserted that Butler treats "morals" as man's "only business." The second part of the objection is equally baseless with the first. He never "degrades religion to the position of a mere purveyor of motive to morality." The word "mere" should have forbidden this quotation; for surely, even Mr. Pattison himself will allow that motives drawn from a higher sphere are admissible and are often very effectual in the lower. The thought of the eye of God on a man may deter from crime

* *Butler's Works*, Sermon XV., Angus's Edition, pp. 526-527.
† Ibid, Angus's Edition, p. 525.
‡ Deut. xxix, 29.

in circumstances when it alone can operate; but that does not degrade the thought. A Christian's heart may respond to the motive contained in Paul's exhortation, "And be ye kind one to another, tender hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you" (Eph. iv, 32); nay, may feel this the most perfect of motives, without any degradation to its character of melting and infinite mercy, and even while feeling most powerfully that its motive influence was one of the smallest portions of its value to him. There is a sense in which "man is placed in the foreground of the picture;" but it is only as he is to be studied for the knowledge he yields, and as his character and blessedness are proposed as a proximate end, but by no means as "the center round which all things revolve." It must have been long since the writer of this sentence read Butler; for no book leads us more constantly or continuously to the contemplation of Divine action in the surrounding universe and in ourselves than the "Analogy;" in no other is the Divine throne more steadily represented as the center of all influence and the end of all action.

The next objection which demands our attention is from Mr. Martineau. It relates to the different position held, as he alleges, by the difficulties in the two schemes of Nature and of Revelation. In the one, he tells us, they are exceptional; in the other, they constitute the whole.

"In the constitution of the world, those parts and arrangements which perplex our sense of the Divine justice and goodness are insignificant exceptions in a grand and righteous whole; and the gloom they would occasion, did they stand alone, is lost in a 'more exceeding glory.' They do not speak the essence and spirit of the system; they are the silent enigmas that lie out of relation to it, and are superable by faith only from their relative unimportance. It is otherwise with the doctrines by which the creeds offend the moral sense and the natural pieties; the hereditary curse of sin and ruin; the eternal punishment of helpless incapacity; the conveyance of an alien holiness by imputation; and the transfer of an infinite penalty from an alien race to a saving God. These are no exceptional incidents in the orthodox scheme, but its organic members, its very plan and life—the only thing it has to offer in exemplification of the character of God. These are not the 'difficulties' of its 'revelation,' but the whole of it; if these are not re-

vealed—its advocates will tell you—nothing is revealed; and a theology that omits them, wants 'the essentials of the Christian faith.'"*

This argument is a new and stronger form of the same objection to the application of the analogical argument to orthodox Christianity, urged by Mr. Martineau in the Liverpool controversy, in 1839, and reprinted in his "Studies of Christianity," pp. 92-94. It expresses a very deep and strong conviction, and deserves earnest attention.

There are some things in the statement to which we must take exception, as not correctly expressed. When orthodoxy is taxed with holding "the eternal punishment of helpless incapacity," we demur. We believe in eternal punishment; but it is in the punishment of the finally impenitent and unbelieving, for whom the Son of God has suffered as a sacrifice; with whom the Holy Spirit of God has striven; who have been surrounded with means and appliances of mercy, and who have obstinately rejected and resisted them all; and this is a very different thing from Mr. M.'s terse but false representation. Again, we have never heard, among intelligent, orthodox Christians, about "the conveyance of an alien holiness by imputation;" the phraseology has a sound most alien to our ear. We have read of "righteousness" being "imputed" to men; of "faith imputed for righteousness;" of being "justified through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus;" but these phrases convey a very different meaning from that which Mr. Martineau has chosen to express for us. Indeed, there is not one of his phrases which has not that touch of exaggeration in it which is sufficient to give an objectionable coloring to the hated dogma which he desires to reprobate. We deny, also, that the doctrines he has enumerated and stated with so little of philosophic accuracy and calm, are the *whole* of our Christianity. Man's depravity was a fact of nature before it became a doctrine of Scripture. The Atonement of Christ by a vicarious sacrifice, is the central doctrine, as we believe, of Christianity. But has Mr. Martineau never heard of the restorative energies of the Holy Spirit; of the bliss of conscious salvation in the peace of God; of the delights of assured communion with Him through Jesus Christ; of the joy in hope of the glory of

* *National Review*, vol. viii, p 213.

God, which is unspeakable in its depth and fullness, sustaining the Christian soul in adversity—his light in darkness, his strength in utter feebleness? Has he never read of a Heaven, where, in the praises of a "multitude which no man can number," the offensive doctrine of the Cross holds the most conspicuous place in the ascription of boundless honor and glory to the *Lamb* for ever and ever? Orthodox Christianity demands to be viewed as a whole; it claims to be contemplated in the light of its final blessedness, where it sees the darkness of Calvary changed into the central brightness of the world of ineffable bliss.

We object, further, that his statement is only partially true. It is by no means true that the difficulties in the Theistic scheme, which are analogous to those in the Christian doctrine of man's fall and the consequent inheritance of depravity, are mere insignificant exceptions. Rather, indeed, the sensitive mind is often deeply afflicted with their commonness and sadness. Do not the children of the drunkard, or the dissolute person, or the spendthrift, suffer for their parent's crime? How few persons do we meet in society possessed of a thoroughly healthy frame, and in how many cases of the disease that is wasting the strength and beauty around us is the evil hereditary. Three-fourths of the whole mass of suffering and sorrow which everywhere meet the eye, in the form of vice, poverty, and pain, are transmitted. It may be an easy thing for Mr. Martineau to shut his eyes to the prevalence of evil in the world: there are some who rarely hear of it, and to them all nature and life are arrayed in rosy light; but there are millions on whom that rosy light never falls, who are given up to sin and sorrow, in many cases utterly without hope.

But even if these were insignificant exceptions, the difficulty remains. It may not be so great in this supposition, but it is just the same in principle. The difficulties we have noticed are as *unaccountable* in the Theist's scheme as the difficulties of revelation or orthodoxy. Degree is not the question, but fact; and the man who feels himself bound to reject orthodox Christianity because it teaches the doctrine of inherited depravity, has but to go into one of our back streets, and see the children of the thief and the drunkard; or, if his nerves are too sensitive to endure so rude a process of conviction, he has but to stand before Cruik-

shank's pictures, and look upon the artist's representation of the ragged squalor, the bloated or pinched face, and the sullen or fierce air by which the junior proclaims the possession of his father's character, and tell us whether here is not an exemplification of the same principle, such as should bind him to renounce his present belief in the Divine righteousness and goodness, or—his objections to Christianity.

But even if objectionable matters should appear more prominently in Christianity than in nature, it is only what, from the analogy of creation, we would be led to expect. A beautiful passage of Coleridge affords a basis of illustration on this subject, of which we gladly avail ourselves:

"Every rank of creatures, as it ascends in the scale of creation, leaves death behind it or under it. The metal, at its hight of being, seems a mute prophecy of the coming vegetation, into mimic resemblance of which it crystalizes. The blossom and flower, the acme of vegetable life, divides into correspondent organs with reciprocal functions, and by instinctive motions and approximations seems impatient of that figure by which it is differenced in kind from the flower-shaped Psyche, that flutters with free wing above it. And wonderfully in the insect realm doth the irritability, the proper seat of instinct, while yet the nascent sensibility is subordinated thereto—most wonderfully, I say, doth the muscular life in the insect, and the musculo-arterial in the bird, imitate and typically rehearse the adaptive understanding; yea, and the moral affections and charities of man. Let us carry ourselves back, in spirit, to the mysterious week, the teeming work-days of the Creator, as they rose in vision before the eye of the inspired historian of the generations of the heavens and of the earth, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens. And who that hath watched their ways with an understanding heart could, as the vision evolving still advanced toward him contemplate the filial and loyal bee, the home-building, wedded, and divorceless swallow, and above all the manifoldly intelligent ant tribes, with their commonwealths and confederacies, their warriors and miners, the husband-folk, that fold in their tiny flocks on the honeyed leaf, and the virgin sisters, with the holy instincts of maternal love, detached and in selfless purity—and not say to himself, Behold the shadow of approaching humanity, the sun rising from behind in the kindling morn of creation?" *

* *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i, p. 85.

This exquisite piece of scientific poetry, presents to us the suggestive character of the lower dispensation of God's creative wisdom; the higher forms of the lower, appearing to prophesy to the eye of intelligence, had such a created eye looked upon them, of another order of being to follow them. It is impossible to look upon the exquisite plant-forms of native copper, which so strikingly resemble some of the most beautiful seaweeds; or, the native silver, which imitates with such exactness the beauty of the fern, without feeling that had man existed at the time of their production, he might have seen in them the prediction of a coming vegetation. But the illustration looks another way. The geologist knows that these are rare exceptions in the mineral kingdom, while the forms which they indicate have become the rule in our economy of creation; and thus the course of nature would suggest that in Christianity,—the higher dispensation,—the leading principles and facts might be such as were but scantily represented in the previous form of Divine manifestation. Where, then, is the force of the objection against the analogy arising from the present predominance of what were previously exceptional forms? Let us suppose the man, who had become thoroughly acquainted with nature during the long reign of inorganic forms and laws, and to whom the nearest approach to vegetable forms he had ever seen were the native silver or copper, to be suddenly introduced into the midst of a profusion of floral beauty; he might, at first, from recollections of previous anticipations, think that this was the fulfilment of the prediction. But while he passes delightedly through this new world, he discovers that there is not only the prevalence here of what was exceptional before, but something is occurring of which he had previously had no experience, beyond what appeared in the crumbling or rusting of his minerals when exposed to the atmosphere. The lily fades and withers on its stock, the rose sheds its beauteous and fragrant leaves upon the earth, and the whole smiling garden in a few months becomes a scene of saddest desolation. Would he be right in denying that this fair creation was not the product of the same wisdom and goodness which had formed his precious world, because of this prevalent destruction, which was so rarely and exceptionally revealed in his former experience? Or could we carry him upward still, to the period of animal life, of which he

had already looked upon the prophecy, and could we show him the rejoicing multitudes of creatures inhabiting every element, with their powers of locomotion, sensation, and self-directive intelligence, filled with gladness in the enjoyment of delighted existence, would he manifest a superior wisdom if, when confronted with pain, and mutual destructiveness, and death, he should deny this sum of happiness to be the creation of the same God whose hand had painted the lily, and whose breath had perfumed the violet, because that now sensibility to pain and shrinking from injury were the rule, while in the whole wide range of his previous experience the delicate mimosa alone avoided the rude contact of his touch? The case is that which Mr. Martineau puts. He finds some things difficult to interpret in the higher department of Divine revelation, and declines on account of them to receive it as Divine. We show him that there are similar things in that which he does believe to be Divine, and that if he can believe notwithstanding them, he may and can believe with us, notwithstanding the similar hindrances. When he informs us that in his position, they are but insignificant exceptions, but in ours they are more prevalent and conspicuous, we reply, because ours is the higher dispensation; and that he is no more competent to reject our higher revelation from the limited experience of his lower, than our sage pre-Adamite would be on similar grounds. He admits that the inorganic, the vegetable, and the animal creations, with their striking varieties, and few analogies, and increasing difficulties, are the work of one God; because, standing above them all, he has learned to see the great principles which bind them into a glorious progressive unity. He has but to come forth from his dim cave of natural religion, and stand with us on the sunlit summit of the Zion of revelation, to find that the God of nature and of orthodox Christianity is one. Remaining in his present low position, he is no more competent to pronounce upon that which is so far above him, than our supposed sage would be to decide upon the natural condition of man.

In connection with this matter, it is but right that we should consider what he has said on *vicarious redemption*, at the time of first publishing the argument just exposed.

"I can not quit the topic," he says, "without observing, however, that

there appears to be nothing in nature and life at all analogous to the vicarious principle attributed to God in the Trinitarian scheme of Redemption. There is nowhere to be found any proper transfer or exchange, either of the qualities or the consequences of vice and virtue. The good and evil acts of men do indeed affect others *as well* as themselves; the innocent suffer with the guilty, as in the case before adduced, of a child suffering in health by the excesses of a parent. But there is here no endurance *for* another, similar to Christ's alleged endurance in the place of men; the infliction on the child is not deducted from the parent; it does nothing to lighten his load, or make it less than it would have been, had he been without descendants; nor does any one suppose his guilt alleviated by the existence of this innocent fellow-sufferer."*

Analogy, strictly defined, signifies "similarity of relations." Now does Mr. Martineau mean to assert, that there is no similarity between the relation of a person who has been benefited by the labor, hazard, or suffering of another, and the case of the sinner saved by the suffering of Christ? Is not the man who is rescued from a burning house by the effort of another, whose effort has hazarded his life, and has been attended with sore injury, saved by that other's hazard and suffering? And is Mr. Martineau bold enough to affirm that this and similar forms of redemption are not of frequent occurrence? Besides that, the argument from Analogy, as stated by Butler, or as understood by his intelligent students, never professed to present a precisely similar case—it is enough that there is a general resemblance—and, moreover, that argument as applied by Butler (in the second part of the "Analogy," at least), is never advanced as *positive* proof, but as *negative*, in the form of answering objections. For while an analogy is suggested of a positive nature in such a case as we have mentioned above, and in such as Leonidas dying for the deliverance of Greece, and by his noble self-devotion saving it, yet the argument, as Butler wields it, is employed to ward off objections. Infidels and Unitarians object to the injustice of causing one to suffer for the good of others—the innocent for the guilty. We ask is not the principle the same, and the objection equally valid against allowing Howard to waste his life in wearing labors and sufferings that he may relieve the condition of the pests of society? As we look at the wan face

* *Studies of Christianity*, p. 94.

and the lightless eye of the mother, who has been wearing out life in constant watchings by the bed of a beloved child, do we not not see in its returning health the reward of her care—a care from the effects of which she may never recover? Why do we not object as much on principle to the wasting anguish produced in that loving heart, for the sake of restoring that little culprit, whose fever was produced by self-indulgent disobedience to her kind injunctions? It is true there may be no exact parallel in form between Christ's method of saving sinners and man's mediatorial action on behalf of his fellows; but there is an invincible obstinacy of objection in men, who cry out against the injustice of Christ's *voluntary* death for sinners, and yet extol the devotion of the mother, the bravery of Leonidas, and the philanthropy of Howard, and profess to find no difficulty in the constitution of things under which they all were sacrificed for the sake of others far inferior to themselves. But, at least, the professed Unitarian has no right to cry out against the injustice of the sufferings of Christ for sinners. For if there was suffering in the person of one whom they admit to have been "holy, harmless, and undefiled," it would unquestionably be an alleviation of the difficulty that some good to others resulted from the anguish, rather than that it was a mere purposeless endurance of an inconceivable agony by one "of whom the world was not worthy." If they and others reply that it was for the purpose of revealing to us the love of God, and thus drawing back our alienated hearts into the bonds of a filial affection, we can only wonder at the strangeness of the method by which the revelation is made. God would have us love him. To this end he manifests his love to us: and the manner is by, causelessly, without any apparent reason in their scheme, subjecting the only innocent and spotless being who ever trod our earth to sufferings which make the very heavens grow black and the sun to hide his face. With all calmness and with profoundest reverence we say, that if injustice can be predicated of his death as an atoning sacrifice, to demonstrate the Divine righteousness against the iniquity of man, that God may be just and the justifier of the believing sinner, we have no language in which to speak of the enormity of the injustice which permitted such an infliction without a reason. Arguing upon the principle of our opponents, and constituting our reason for the moment the judge of the Divine procedure, we should pro-

nounce it the darkest blot upon the Divine administration, and the deepest mystery which human thought or faith can encounter in all the universe. We do not so presume to sit in judgment: we do not profess to understand everything in the great transaction; but if we are to regard the question in the light of a balance of difficulties we are compelled to say that, compared with those attaching to the Unitarian theory, the difficulties of the orthodox doctrine of Christ's voluntary sacrifice as a manifestation of Divine righteousness are so light as hardly to be felt.

The next great objection is uttered by three of our critics, but most effectively stated by Mr. Martineau:

"Nor is this the only fallacy involved in Butler's reasoning. His fundamental maxim, that 'Revelation and Nature having the same author, may be expected to *exhibit the same features*,' may be admitted, until he adds, 'and therefore (to contain) the same difficulties.' There is, we suppose, *some* limit to the resemblance which may be reasonably looked for between the two systems. No one's anticipations would be satisfied by their being perfectly alike—each, in its disclosures, an exact *fac simile* of the other. And if so—if the presumption be irresistible in favor of some difference in the midst of the visible affinity—where should we fitly seek for the lines of divergence? Surely the very antithesis, 'Natural'—'Revealed,' is an index to the true seat of contrast. Precisely what nature hides is inspiration given to unvail; it is where the one is silent that the other has to speak; and only so far as the first leaves us in the dimness of perplexity does the second vouchsafe its light. The 'difficulties,' therefore, of unaided Theism are exactly what we should *not* expect to find over again in a religion sent to our rescue; and just in proportion as we do so, does the gift forfeit its character as a 'Revelation,' and remain undifferenced from our prior darkness. To insist that the Universe and the Gospel come from the same author, and to forget that they contemplate different ends, supplementary to each other, is to do violence to all laws of rational presumption."*

Mr. Bagehot thinks that "so far from its being probable that Revelation would have contained the same difficulties as Nature, we should have expected that it would explain those difficulties." He supposes it likely that "the Revelation which God would vouchsafe to us would be one affecting our daily life and

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* *National Review*, vol. viii, pp. 213-214.

welfare, would communicate truths either on the one hand conducing to our temporal happiness, in the present world, or removing the many doubts and difficulties which surround the general plan of Providence, the entire universe, and our particular destiny;" together with much more to the effect that, if God does speak, "His faintest disclosure, his least word would shed abundant light on all doubts, would take the weight from our minds, would remove the gnawing anguish from our hearts."* It is not surprising that with such raised expectations, such preconceptions of Revelation, Mr. Bagehot should be disappointed with that which exists; but where he detects the analogy in nature—which, if he is a Theist, he acknowledges to be a revelation from God—for such extravagant expectations, we find it hard to discover.

Miss Hennell represents her inquirer thus, after the perusal of Butler's argument: "He had hoped that Revelation was designed expressly to clear up the difficulties found in Nature, instead of repeating them in magnified proportions."†

It might be a sufficient reply to all these objections, to say that they all proceed upon a mistake, and, in Mr. Martineau's case, upon a misquotation. They all assume that Butler goes upon the assumption that the *same* difficulties are found in Revelation that meet us in Nature. If this were strictly so, there would be some force in the objections adduced; but then the argument of Butler would be no longer one of analogy, but one of identity, which is far from being the case. Mr. Martineau has placed in inverted commas his interpretation of Butler's meaning; and has thus in all probability misled himself, as he may have misled others, into thinking that Butler has so written; but while the interpretation is not new to those who read the religious literature of our time, the quotation will appear so to every student of the "Analogy." Briefly, let us say, we can not find it; nor can Mr. Martineau. In the free but accurate translation which Butler has given of the sentence, from the Philocalia of Origen, he has expressed the fundamental principle of his whole work. "He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the *same*

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* *Prospective Review*, vol. x, pp. 555-557.

† Page 7.

sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature."* Here the reader will perceive it is not the *same*, but the *same sort*. "And from all this it is before-hand credible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the *like* appearances of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity as in Nature; *i. e.*, that Christianity would be liable to the *like* objections as the frame of nature."† But likeness is not identity. The term similar often occurs, but Butler has not committed himself to the thesis which Mr. Martineau has supplied for him. Mr. Bagehot, with a love of strong and striking utterances, rather characteristic of his style, has far transcended all other blunderers in this walk, by saying: "If carried out to its extreme logical development, it would come to this, that if a catalogue were constructed of all the inexplicable arrangements and difficulties of nature, you might confidently anticipate that *these very same difficulties in the same degree and in the same points* would be found in revelation." This is monstrous; but monstrosity is only natural when a man undertakes to refute what he has not studied.

We must now proceed to examine the general objection, regretting that Mr. Martineau did not save his own time and space, and ours also, by a little more correctness. The residuary objection, then, reduced to its proper limits, is, that Revelation being given to remove the difficulties attaching to the constitution and course of nature, or God's providence in nature, should leave no objection behind, but, to use Mr. Bagehot's expression, "shed abundant light on all doubts." Mr. Martineau would hardly go so far; yet, notwithstanding his hesitation, many will so construe his words. Is this in harmony with the analogy of nature? Does not that very revelation of it at which we have glanced already, for another purpose, teach us, that in proportion as we advance from the inorganic world to the organic, and from the mere organism to those of higher type and more varied powers, from insensate to sensitive, from sensitive to intelligent, and from intelligent to moral, the difficulties increase in almost geometrical proportion? Each dispensation throws a clearer and fuller light on the Divine character. New features of that character come forth to view; but folded in the very heart of the

* *Analogy*, Introduction, p. 8.

† *Ibid*, p. 209.

revelation are the anomalies and exceptions ever increasing. Is it not so in the progress of a man's intelligence? There are multitudes who perceive no difficulties in creation. "The rude swain treads daily on them with his clouted shoon," and sees them not, nay, would be filled with astonishment if any one should hint at their existence. Let his soul, however, be awakened to inquire, and it will not be long before he finds enough that is startling in what seemed so easy before. Does not the student as he proceeds in his researches find his difficulties increase in proportion to his progress? He has discovered much; but much more, partially illumined, projects from the surrounding gloom, as if to mock his vain endeavor. He is like one who has descended into a vast cavern, with a single light, whose progress at first is easy and pleasant, as he fancies he can soon reach its limits; but when hour after hour has passed, and his torch reveals only an ever deepening gloom beyond, he is fain to retire wearied and dissatisfied because he can reach no end. The universe is not properly infinite, and yet man has not yet pushed his inquiries to its limits; and within the limits of his science how many unexplained problems exist." Wisely has it been said, as the last result of speculation, "all things spring out of a ground of mystery." Does not the religious thinker feel this as he approaches the awful subject of God and his government? Does he find no difficulty in his eternity, his omniscience, his omnipotence, his immutability? And yet how much greater his difficulties if, with the fool, he should say in his heart, "there is no God," or should think of any of his attributes other than as infinite. What difficulty, again, does he find in looking at evil, natural and moral, under the government of such a Being? And just in proportion as each attribute of the Divine character is known, do difficulties connected with it arise. The law which prevails throughout being that the brighter light throws the darker shadow, teaching man that if he will not accept truth in company with difficulty and mystery, he must be content to live without it, or unthinkingly to go on treading the round of lowest duties or animal enjoyments.

It is not our purpose here to enter upon a line of argument which has been so ably pursued by Sir William Hamilton, and carried out to its legitimate results (in theology) by Dr. Mansel, with such learning and convincing power. We merely put for-

ward the plainest facts, believing, as Butler more than once expressed it, that our difficulties in religious speculation, arise from no arbitrary interposition, as Miss Hennell supposes;* but from the fact "that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation." We are satisfied that the glow-worm's light shall sooner fill the vast expanse of our horizon with blinding radiance, when sun, and moon, and stars are withdrawn, that the pearly dew-drop shall sooner afford a sphere in which the monsters of the deep can sport, than the finite intellect of man shall penetrate the inscrutable counsels of Jehovah, or comprehend the vastness of his designs.

But while we contend in this manner for the legitimacy, nay, even the necessity, of difficulties in Christianity, we are far from admitting that it has shed no light on previous difficulties, or brought no relief to the heart of man. We believe that "life and immortality have been brought to light by the Gospel;" that the floating fancies of the poets, and the doubtful inquiries of the philosophers of the ancient world, have been corrected, confirmed, and illustrated by its revelation; that that awful and crushing mystery of death, and of life, as seen in its shadow, which pressed with such weight on the minds of Aristotle and the elder Pliny, which so distracted the fine mind of Cicero in his troubles, has been illuminated by the Gospel, so that the most sensitive and thoughtful minds of our own time walk calmly onward to meet the inevitable change, believing that it is but the narrow passage which leads to the fields of light beyond. And what an answer has the doctrine of the atonement of Christ,—unacceptable as it is to our critics,—given to the sad wail of the human heart, "How shall man be just with God?" which has come sounding to us down all the ages of time, voiced in the anguished cry of Balak, "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" Or, in the still deeper anguish of the self-immolating transgressor at the Churruk Pooja of Hindostan! How, with its clear and decided mani-

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* Page 25.

festations of the righteousness of God, of the magnifying and honoring of the Divine laws, has it satisfied the conscience of the trembling sinner! And with its wondrous revelation of the infinite compassion of God, pacified and won his rebel heart, and made his future life to shine in the beauty of holiness; so that no contrast can be greater than that which exists between the gloom, the dissatisfaction, the restless anxiety of mere natural religion, and the assured confidence, the peaceful repose of spirit, and the bounding, hopeful joy, with which the Christian runs in the way of God's commandments. He thinks not of the difficulties, so satisfied is he with the blessings he has received; or if they will obtrude themselves upon him, he reckons them of infinitely less importance than the mere speculator does. He treads with calmness under the guidance of the open eye of reason, illumined by Divine revelation, the field of finite light in which God has appointed him to walk; and when he nears the shadowy verge of darkness he is undisturbed; for the ear of his faith hears within it still the whisperings of a Father's love, and the beatings of a Father's heart; and he becomes persuaded that God has surrounded him with mysteries, that he may feel that he is surrounded by Himself, and that he walks under their shadow, that with reverent love he may recognize the overshadowing of Divine protection. Thus from the union of light with darkness, of revelation with mystery, man's soul is trained in confidence and humility, his aspirations are excited, his intelligence quickened, and the energies of his soul strengthened with a Divine joy. And what makes this educative character of mysterious difficulties all the more valuable is, that in the very process of removing previous difficulties, it introduces others; yet no new principle appears from which another author might be inferred. The difficulties are not the *same* but they are of the *same sort;* they are attached to other facts, which belong to a higher economy; they are deeper in their shade, as befits their progressive design; but the learner can never complain that he has been introduced into a sphere where different principles bear sway, for the higher is bound to the lower by chains of the closest analogy.

To show how little possibility there could be of objection to Butler's position, as we have exhibited it, if it were but carefully studied and understood, we quote one sentence from Mr. Bage-

hot, thoroughly confirming our position, but without feeling accountable for harmonizing it with other sentences in his article:

"If Butler's argument had only been adduced to this extent; if it had only been argued that, though a revelation might have been expected to explain some difficulties, it could not be expected to explain all; that a certain number would, from our ignorance and unworthiness, still remain; and those residuary difficulties would be of the same order, class, and kind, to which we were accustomed; that the style of Providence, if one may so say, would be the same in the newly communicated phenomena as we had observed it to be in those we were familiar with before,—it would not have been necessary to question the soundness of the principle."*

What a pity the writer had not studied Butler before he wrote! All his writing would then have been unnecessary.

The last objection of any importance, and the last which our space will allow us to notice, is the alleged inconclusiveness, or even sophistry, of Butler's argument in reply to the charge of immorality against the commands of scripture. Mr. Bagehot says: "It is impossible that there should be any analogy in nature for a precept from God opposed to the law of conscience. External nature gives no precept; our knowledge of our duty comes from within; the physical world is subordinate to our inward teaching; it is silent on points of morality.† Nature offers no analogy to the ascription by any professed revelation of an unworthy intention to God, or the inculcation through it of an immoral precept in man."‡ Miss Hennell says: "The notable instance of the defence of scripture immoralities is an evasion of this kind [*i. e.*, of ignoring of exceptions], which has drawn down abundance of indignant animadversion. The sophistry,—not in the logic, but in the open defiance of natural principles with which the results of the logic are accepted,—is so apparent as with many readers to stamp the character of the author at once."§ She pursues this line of remark throughout seven pages, in a running commentary on Butler's celebrated passage in which he denies that any such immoralities are com-

* *Prospective Review*, pp. 563–564.

† *Ibid*, p. 562.

‡ *Ut supra*, p. 503.

§ *Essay*, &c., p. 14.

manded in scripture; and she becomes almost frantic in her charges against him before the close. She is certain "his conscience must often have smote him," and so on. Had she but read the passage as coolly, and pondered it as long, and with as sound and large a mind as its author, she would never have written her essay. As many persons know quite as little of the bearing of this passage as our two critics, it may be better to quote it *in extenso*, inserting in brackets one or two of Miss Hennell's comments for remark:

"And now what is the just consequence from all these things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of Divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge of anything, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the scripture; *i. e.*, not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, great, and good Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated; but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice or goodness, to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions which would equally conclude that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice or goodness, which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. [How much it must have cost the author of the Sermons on Human Nature to suppose such an arbitrary change possible; but there was nothing else for it. He persuades himself he can show a peculiarity in the cases in question which will prevent injury to the revered law of morality in general.] But it is easy to see [is not this an expression that suggests how difficult he had found it to satisfy himself with it?] that all these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust and immoral which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really been so [here he anticipates how much his readers will be shocked, as no doubt he had been himself, and he goes on with more urgent vehemence]: which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action in any of these instances. But it is quite other-

wise in precepts which require only the doing of an external action; for instance, taking away the property or life of any. [What, then, are principles but the result of constantly similar individual instances? He must seek deeper for the explanation: before we condemn it, let us go with him to the very root of the tie between the creature and its creator]. For men have no right to either life or property but what arises solely from the grant of God; when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either; and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts which without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say this much of the few scripture precepts which require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts but what arises from their being offences; *i. e.*, from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked, designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthúsiastic. And objections on this head are not objections against revelation, but against the whole notion of religion as a trial, and against the general constitution of nature."*

Nothing can be more clear than that Butler denies that the actions referred to are vicious; and the grounds of that denial will be clear to every sound mind. God has a right to do what He will with his own. He asserts this right in the plague and the earthquake, in the ordinary course of nature. If He chooses to do it in some other manner, if He chooses to make man the executioner of His purpose, who can say He is wrong? And if He is not wrong in commanding, how can it be proved that the doer of His command is wrong in his obedience? Let it be only granted that God can communicate his will to men, and the whole argument stands free of all vice, and attributes no unworthy motives to God." To the argument of Mr. Bagehot, that the precepts are opposed to the law of conscience, and have no analogy in nature, we reply, that they are not opposed to any such law, and that there is therefore, no need to seek for such an analogy in nature. Butler does speak, in his Sermons on

* *Analogy*, pp. 201–202.

Human Nature, to which Miss Hennell refers, of the supremacy of conscience among the faculties of man; but the attentive student of his reasonings will discover that he never makes conscience an *infallible* rule of duty. The supremacy of which he speaks is *psychological*, over all the passions, and powers, and tendencies of man. When dispute or strife among these occurs, it has authority to pronounce decisive judgment; but he never does raise it into the universal law-giver of man; and in the beginning of the last quotation he has distinctly warned us not to indulge in such a style of thought respecting it. It is very easy for persons who fancy they are greatly shocked at something, to set up their own refined sensibilities as judge, and call them conscience, and oppose them to Divine commands; but this would never have received Butler's approbation. He would have pointed them to the course of nature, and have said: "If you call your sensibilities by the name of conscience, does not this offend them?" We greatly fear that this substitution of sensibility for conscience prevails with our two critics on this question.

Miss Hennell is exceedingly severe on Butler's honesty in her comments; but the apparent dishonesty arises from her not understanding him. Instead of "ignoring exceptions" by placing them in the background, he drags what are so regarded into the light, and denies that they are exceptions. When she attempts to expose Butler's fallacies, as she deems them, in her fourth comment, how miserably she changes the whole question and exposes her own incapacity! He was speaking of "*doing an external action.*" She enlarges and multiplies it, contrary to all historic truth with "*constantly similar individual instances.*" He speaks of the difference between commanding such a single external action and commanding that we should "cultivate the principles of treachery, ingratitude and cruelty," or "act in the spirit" of them. She asks: "What are principles but the result of constantly similar individual instances?" If this is honest, we have always been mistaken about the meaning of the word. But what opinion must we have of the competency of a critic who does not know the difference between *principles* and *results*. The very meaning of the word "principle" might have taught her better; and if she had read with a view to gaining a little philosophy, the subsequent sentence of Butler, on which she comments, it would have taught her that not prin-

ciples but *habits* are the result of a course of external acts. Such ignorance hardly deserves a serious reply. But the unfairness of the comment on this passage when Butler says, "yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency; calls for the most indignant condemnation. "Oh, monstrous!" she exclaims: "there is no difficulty in believing God to command injustice; *i. e.*, to be unjust only now and then, there is no harm for once and a way." This is monstrous. Miss Hennell first tries to make Butler speak of many acts when he only speaks of one; and when he is in the act of denying that injustice can be predicated of that one, she assumes that it is unjust, and makes him the defender of occasional acts of injustice. The only way to escape the conclusion that this is dishonest, is charitably to think that she did not know what she was doing, and consequently to regard her as totally incompetent to the task she undertook. And this, indeed, is what we are bound to do from the whole evidence presented by this "Essay on the Skeptical Tendency of Butler's 'Analogy.'" We took it up expecting to find that something worth considering might be found in it; but, after repeated perusals, have found that it has not advanced our knowledge of the subject in the smallest particular. If Miss Hennell should think we have treated her without the measure of gallantry which her sex might demand, we have only to say that when she enters the lists of controversy, and assails truth, she must expect to be treated according to the laws of the combat; and these, we hope, have not been violated in our treatment of her.

The general complaint made against Butler, to the effect that he does not advocate the claims of revelation on grounds of certainty, is rarely made by Christians, and is sufficiently answered by referring to the fact, urged by him, that religion is practical, and that in practical matters, "probability is to us the very guide of life." And he has well reasoned, that there is enough of evidence to lead us to right action, while the measure in which it falls short of certainty affords exercise for that spirit which it is the great design of the moral discipline of our probationary course to exercise and develop. It is, perhaps, because of this characteristic that some complain of "the chilling effect" of the book. It is too grave, too sober. Butler does not indulge in the flights of fancy which please the many, and are by them

mistaken for truth. He was too thoughtful and conscientious for that. He believed with Bacon, and although Mr. Pattison can hardly forgive him for it, he believed right, "The understanding must not, therefore, be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying. Now this has never yet been done. When it is done we may entertain better hopes of the sciences."*

We can not sympathize with Mr. Pattison's implied reflection that "the course of nature in Butler's phraseology is not what we should understand by that term, not what science can disclose to us of the laws of the *Cosmos*, but a narrow observation of what men do in ordinary life."† This very fact, that the "Analogy" contains none of the partial views of science of its own, or of any age, shows the wonderful sagacity of its author, and qualifies it by reason of this peculiar *timeless* character to be, as it is, a *κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί*. Had he adopted the science and the scientific phraseology of his day in writing, the fate of the book would have been far otherwise. Bishop Browne did so, and his great work on "Things Divine and Supernatural, conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human," published three years before Butler's, and the source of not a few of his best thoughts, is now rarely read, and many well-read scholars have never even seen it. The fashions of philosophy change as well as others, but no change in them will ever alter the high estimation in which genuine thinkers will hold the "Analogy" of Bishop Butler, as a work which unites the most comprehensive and conscientious investigation with the firmest and most reverent faith.

We have now accomplished what we proposed, and in taking leave of our readers, would earnestly urge upon them, but especially upon young men and young ministers, a careful and frequent study of this great book. Many take it up, and soon give it up, because they find it so dry and uninteresting. This is simply because they have made it the beginning of their studies; a place for which it is about as well fitted as Locke on the Understanding is for teaching the alphabet. But when they have been prepared by some good preparatory reading in books of thought, they will find it, as we do, vastly more interesting than

* *Novum Organum*, i, 104.

† *Essays and Reviews*, p. 294.

much of the thing called poetry, which young men buy and read. With such helps as Dr. Angus's valuable edition supplies, any young man of fair ability can master it by attentive study; and his great reward will be a well regulated mind, a calm and unblenching faith, a manly contempt for the transcendental moonshine which fascinates others to their destruction, and a readiness "to give an answer to every man that asketh a reason of the hope that is in him."

DUTY AND METHOD OF PULPIT INSTRUCTION.*

BY ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.

I WAS lately reading in a newspaper an account of a meeting called by some Agapemonists in London. The speakers were cried down—most deservedly—as talking blasphemous nonsense, when they said that "Brother Prince" was an incarnation of the Holy Ghost, etc. It occurred to me that as Jesus was called a blasphemer for calling Himself the Son of God, we should show some *difference* between the two cases; and what difference is there except what is derived from an appeal to the *Reason? i. e.*, that the one gave proof by His miracles of the truth of the claim, and the other, none at all. It can not be said that we are to decide between the two cases by the *matter* of what was preached; for it was precisely to this that the Jews, who rejected Jesus, did appeal: "This man can not be of God, because He keepeth not the Sabbath-day;" and "Thou being a man makest thyself God." For they did not expect the Messiah to be a *divine* person; as is evident from their being unable to answer, why "David called him *Lord*," and accordingly they condemned Him under the injunction given in Deut. xiii, 7. It can not be said that what He taught, or that what the Agapemonists said, was contrary to the immutable laws of natural *morality*. But if He had not really been a divine person, He would have been justly condemned for blasphemy; and He says Himself, "If I had not done among them the *works* which none other man did, they had not had sin." And if "Prince" had given like proofs, it would not have been allowable for us to reject him, merely on the ground that we have *no reason to expect* any such

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* From *Good Words*, March, 1861.

divine incarnation; for no more did the Jews think *they* had to expect such a Messiah as Jesus in fact was. No difference, then, can be made out, except the difference of *evidence and no evidence.* The case is altogether one of an appeal to the understanding in judging of evidence.

Of course, a sincere desire to obey the truth, a pure and candid judgment, is necessary for a right decision. The understanding *may* be biased by prejudice and passion; and no *mere* intellectual power will secure us against that; but still, after all, it *is* an appeal to the understanding. It is necessary to wipe clean the glasses of your telescope; but, after all, it is with your *eyes* you must see; only it is necessary to give your eyes a fair chance. It is a matter of great patience to hear people talk so thoughtlessly as some do, of "appeals to the heart, rather than to the head," on the ground that *mere* intellect is not sufficient (and who ever said so?) to guide us into truth. One may equally well say, "The *mere* use of the compass and rudder will not bring the ship into port, without sails or steam; therefore get up the steam, set the sails, and throw the rudder and compass overboard." No one can doubt that there is much hearty and fervent devotion felt for the Virgin Mary; and in fact, *she* is applied to by a much greater number than her Son. The difference is, between rightly and wrongly *directed* devotion. Impassioned hortatory discourses may get up the steam, but they do not supply the compass and rudder, without which we may as easily as not run upon the rocks.

"Oh, but let them read the Scriptures!" It is very little trouble for those who have the gift of florid eloquence, to give exciting exhortations, and then urge their hearers to read the Scriptures, without giving them any warning, any instruction, any explanation, but leaving them to open the Bible at haphazard, and take for their guidance the first passage they chance to light on. Any man of tolerable good sense, in reading any book—except the Bible—which he is anxious to understand thoroughly, does not *dip* into it at random, reading a scrap here and a scrap there; or taking single sentences, or half sentences, apart from the context; but considers, while reading (in the order it was written), what was the writer's design? Who, and how circumstanced, were those he was writing for? And what comes before, and what follows each passage? The way in which many

read Scripture is in all points *just the reverse.* And religious instructors often encourage the error, by compiling books of insulated texts, each "improved," as they call it, without reference to the context; or they piece together sundry passages into a system of their own; making what may be called an *anagram* of Scripture; *e. g.*, perhaps they find that "no prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation;" by which it is not unlikely they may understand that they are to take whatever sense is put on Scripture by the Church, which, they read, is "the pillar and ground of the truth;" and when they consider the question of "*What* Church is it to be?" the unlearned, who have been taught to profess their belief in "the holy *Catholic* Church," are not unlikely to conclude that that which is usually called the *Catholic* Church, and which claims to be *the* Catholic Church, must be the one to which they are to pay implicit submission.

By all means let men be urged to read the Bible; for the Evangelists and Apostles will preach the gospel better than we can; but let them have instruction and explanations, for the profitable study of Scripture. This will cost us more pains than mere eloquent exhortations; but it will do more good, and avoid much harm.

They should be taught that they are not to look on the Bible as *one* book, but a collection of several, written at different times, and for different purposes; and they should be placed as far as possible in the position occupied by the most simple and unlearned of those to whom those books were first addressed, who were familiar with places and with customs which the most learned among *us* can ascertain (and that imperfectly) only by diligent research.

We should endeavor to explain, especially, the differences between the Old and New Testaments, and the connexion between them. And anything in the habits of the people, or in the localities, it is worth while to explain, even though there should be no *immediate* connexion with a saving faith. Nothing should be regarded as insignificant that can tend to render the study of Scripture more interesting, and to put people, as it were, *at home* in it. For instance, a man may doubtless be a good Christian, without knowing that, in the East, the roofs of houses are flat, and formed a thoroughfare; so that he would not at all understand the meaning of "Let him that is on the

housetop not come down," etc., and that καιρὸς σύκων means the fig-*harvest;* so that the going to seek figs would be an unconquerable puzzle; and that it is the custom in the East to provide *garments* for guests; so that the man who was condemned for want of the wedding garment, which a poor man could not be expected to possess, would seem to be hardly used, etc.

Let no one say, "What is the use of this and that?" Whatever is written in the Bible is worth understanding, and therefore is worth explaining to those who would otherwise not understand it. And it may be added, that many things which are not *in themselves* either important or likely to be interesting to most hearers, may be such that to know and understand *them*, will make interesting, and fix in the memory other things that *are* of high importance. The case of the barren fig-tree is an instance; and so is the wedding garment.

Then again we should remember that the transactions and sayings recorded in the New Testament are but a very few, *selected* out of a great many that must have taken place. A *complete* account of all that our Lord did and said in one week of his ministry, would take up more space than all the four gospels; and if everything had been recorded, "the world would not have contained the books." Now, how *dare* any one say that what the sacred writers thought *worth selecting* to record, is not worth our attending to? Some few things, indeed, are recorded, that had a local and temporary interest, and none to us, such as "the father of Alexander and Rufus," etc., etc., but these are exceptional cases.

And what is said about explanations of what relates to places, customs, etc., will apply to the case of passages imperfectly, or obscurely, or erroneously rendered in our Version, and to words either wholly obsolete, or—which is many times commoner—obsolete in the sense in which they are used, though still in use in a different sense, and therefore much more likely to mislead than if wholly unintelligible.

It is a pity that, when our last authorized Version first came out, there was not at the same time appointed a standing *committee of revision*, to bring out a new edition every ten years, with such minute corrections as might seem needed. It would not have been desirable to *modernize* completely the whole diction,—far otherwise; but when a word has become so far

obsolete as to mislead ordinary readers, it is no longer a mere matter of taste, to leave it, or to change it. And such a bit-by-bit reform would not have shocked and unsettled men's minds, as a thorough reform of our Version now would do.

Even now something of a gradual improvement might be effected without any dangerous shock to men's feelings. (1.) A manifest misprint, as of "Strain at [out] a gnat," should be corrected. (2.) Some of the marginal and text readings might be exchanged, as in Philippians i, 7, "*You* have *me* in your hearts."* (3.) It would be good to put the words supplied by the translators in square brackets [ ] instead of *italics*, which, in all other books, denote the *emphatic* words. (4.) A few of the completely obsolete words might be changed. (5.) Some mistranslations might be corrected by a very slight change, as, "*the* angel," "*the* mountain," for "*a*," and *vice versa;* "our only Lord God and Saviour," for "the only Lord God and our Saviour;" "godliness is gain," for "gain is godliness," etc.

But as the case stands, each individual minister is bound to put before his people, to the best of his power, the true sense of *Scripture*, *i. e.*, of the real *original* Scripture, as the sacred writers left it. Let no one presume to say, "It is of small consequence whether the people understand this or that particular passage." It is *our* plain duty to explain to the people whatever may help them to the right understanding of the Scriptures; nor presuming to say, "It matters not much if so and so be not understood, or if they are mistaken as to such and such a trifling matter. "To be pure from the blood of all men, we must not shun to set before them all the counsel of God."

And we must not be deterred from this duty by the fear (so often put forward) of what is called "*unsettling* men's minds." It is true that every man's mind is likely to be somewhat unsettled, if he has been taught to build on a foundation of sand, and you seek to place his building on a rock. If he has been trained by those who assure him that his religion is true, but that an attempt to investigate the "reason of the hope that is in him" is likely to end in infidelity; if he has been taught to

*Although Conybeare and Howson adopt this rendering, the ablest critical expositors prefer the rendering of the authorised version, which is also that of the Syriac. The order of the words (comp. 2 Cor. viii, 5,) and the context confirm the latter view.—D.

regard our Bible version as the original, or as the only version extant, or as inspired and infallible; or if he has been taught to regard the Romish Legends as of equal authority with Scripture,—no doubt he will be "unsettled," and his faith, perhaps, endangered when he is undeceived on these points. But a truly honest and conscientious minister will not *dare* to leave any one in darkness whom he is able to enlighten, or to practice or to connive at anything of the character of a pious fraud, on the ground of a supposed expediency.

And if he does his duty honestly, because it *is* his *duty*, it will then be given him to perceive that the honest course was also the expedient one, and that there is much more danger ultimately in the opposite. For when once a man comes to perceive that he has been led, or left, to error, he will distrust, and probably disbelieve, all that comes from the same quarter. The first detected falsehood—the first suggested doubt—is a mortal wound to the faith which has been based on utter ignorance. For example, a man comes to learn, by some chance, that the passage about a "testament being of force after men are dead," is a mistranslation;* or that that about the "three witnesses" is allowed by the most learned men to be spurious, etc., and having been from the first taught that the Authorized Version is infallible, he will distrust altogether such teachers; and having heard that certain learned Germans represent our New Testament as a work compiled in later ages from floating and uncertain traditions, he may think this also very likely to be the case, and likely to be *your* opinion too all along: though, if the honest course had been taken from the first, it would have been easy to prove, even to the unlearned, the impossibility of such a theory. But this can be done only by one who has shown, at least, a willingness and an endeavor to remove all ignorance he can, and to connive at no error.

If you pursue, in all points, the open and straight forward course, you will find that instead of ultimately unsettling, you will have settled men's faith on a better basis than sand. For instance, the existence of various editions of Scripture with

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*Yet the latest commentators, Lünemann and Delitzsch, accept this as the true sense of Heb. ix, 17, giving to the last clause the meaning "(only) under the condition that the testator is dead:" Alford, "in the case of the dead."—D.

some different readings, and of different versions, by rival, and even hostile translators, while all the main facts and doctrines are to be found in *every one*, is a proof of authenticity within the reach of the unlearned.

It is curious that there should be so many who deride the pretence to learning of any one who ventures to offer an opinion as to the right sense of any word in the original, though they have no objection to his *commenting* on a passage as fully as he will. Of course there may be a pedantic and absurd display of knowledge—or ignorance instead of knowledge, and nonsense instead of sense—in either. But there are persons who can not be brought to perceive that every translator, and indeed punctuator, is, to a certain extent, a commentator.*

If our Church had intended that the translation of the Bible should be open to all, without any help from any one for the understanding of it, she would not have enjoined the clergy to "instruct the people out of the Scriptures," nor have required of them any qualification beyond that of being able to *read* the Services. If, on the other hand, she had intended the teaching of the clergy to be authoritative and sufficient, she would (like the Church of Rome) have left the Holy Scriptures in a dead language.

Any one who fairly tries, in the right way, to give instruction to the uncultivated, will be surprised to find how much more they can be brought to take in, by proceeding on the principle of the *inclined plane* than many would have thought possible. When the Lectures on a Future State were published, a reviewer derided the idea of their having been delivered to a country congregation, and understood by them. But such is the fact. He would probably have still more derided the idea of conveying to children of the lower order the Elements of Political Economy, of Christian Evidences, and of Logic. But it has been done. By the principle of the inclined plane, I mean that you should observe Aristotle's maxim of *ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν γνωριμῶν*. Begin by what is known, or very readily taken in by the learners (which can only be ascertained by conversing with them,) and thence proceed to something a very little in advance; and so on, leading them upwards gradually and almost imperceptibly.

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*See *Cautions for the Times.*

In giving instruction of any kind to any description of persons, it is necessary to have *conversed* a good deal with them. You must *hear* them as well as speak to them, so as to ascertain what are their difficulties, prejudices, and habits of thought, and what they have understood or mistaken in what was said to them, and what does and does not interest them, etc. Without this converse and examination, or without a great deal of it, it is impossible for any one to be a good instructor (whether by oral lecturing, or written discourses, or in printed books) to that class of persons with whom he has not had such *practice*. He will be like a physician who should have studied medicine theoretically, but never attended clinical lectures, never visited sick-beds, or felt a pulse, or examined a patient's tongue. The Laputan tailor who, instead of measuring Gulliver for a suit of clothes and *trying on* each garment from time to time, took his altitude with a quadrant, and calculated the dimensions, made the clothes a complete misfit.

And in conversing with those whom, and the like of whom, you wish to instruct, you should not limit yourself to the subjects of your instruction, but encourage them to open their minds on *any* that interest them (precluding, of course, scandal against their neighbors), so as to gain an insight into the character of their minds, and see what *kinds* of fallacy are most likely to mislead them, and what kinds of illustrations they can best take in, etc.

Moreover when they see you taking an interest in whatever interests them, they will attend to you the more. And you will have a great advantage if you possess some knowledge of agriculture or horticulture, or of the principles of any mechanical art, or anything else relating to matters in which the learners are necessarily conversant. If they find that you are not quite a stranger to the things they are occupied in, and especially if you should be able to give them now and then a useful hint thereon, they will listen the more readily to what you say on matters belonging to your own department.

EXAMINATION OF RENAN'S LIFE OF JESUS.*

BY DR. E. DE PRESSENSÉ.

For several weeks the adversaries of all positive religion have shown a touching solicitude for the laggard souls who still believe in the supernatural and seriously accept Christianity. Poor people, they say with a shake of the head, what a blow they are about to receive—a concealed blow, it is true, not struck fully in front, but so gently in the back, with exquisite politeness—a blow terrible, nevertheless, from which they will never recover; for, at last, the mist under which the origin of their faith has hidden and escaped detection is dissipated; the halo which encircled the head of Christ has disappeared. This God, to whom every knee was to bow, is nothing but a sweet swain of the sea of Galilee. The Gospel is a fit companion for the Eclogues of Virgil, and the crucified One, who aspired to reign from the elevation of a bloody cross, is reduced to the proportions of a Tityrus, more moral than that of Virgil, but also more of a charlatan. O splendid triumph of mighty criticism, so destructive and at the same time so respectful! All that remains is to bury with tears the defunct religions, and to perform their apotheosis after the manner of the Romans, who had an ingenious way of making those who troubled them disappear in a cloud of glory, as witness their first king, destroyed and at the same time deified. Decidedly the trick is executed; the Christians will never recover. Others, not so charitable, maliciously paint in advance our impotent anger, and our ridiculous anathemas in the face of a smiling and impassible enemy.

These anticipations will not be fulfilled. The new book, announced and trumpeted with so much ado, has neither frightened nor greatly excited intelligent believers. They have sustained more formidable assaults than this *charming* attack. Christianity, after having confronted the thoroughly armed philosophy of antiquity, the renaissance intoxicated with the

* Published first in the *Revue Chrétienne*, August, 1863, and then separately, under the title "*L'Ecole Critique et Jésus-Christ.*"

philter of Grecian art, and the eighteenth century with its terrible laugh and its generous love of humanity, is not likely to be disarmed just at present by an effeminate romance however genteelly attired. This is all that I can see in M. Renan's Life of Jesus.

The work of Strauss, in consequence of its imposing critical form, was the blow of a battering-ram against our ramparts. It opened a new era in the theological conflict. The Tübingen school has displayed vast knowledge and ingenuity in the endeavor to bring Christianity into the circle of purely natural events and to bend it to the laws of ordinary history; and yet whoever is familiar with the theological condition of Germany knows to what an extent these two powerful movements have been victoriously met. In the present case the peril is not so great. I find in this book neither sound philosophy nor solid criticism. I meet everywhere spirited and charming language, and everywhere also the double meaning, beneath which the real thought is disguised and the absolute void of faith covered over with a kind of sentimental unction. As for the high edification to be gained from this "Life of Jesus," I hardly think that this pleasantry will be continued, or that we shall be asked to show much gratitude to an author who pronounces Jesus adorable in the sense in which the world applies the term to an elegant woman. No Christian heart will be taken by such pretended homage which only wounds it in respect to what it holds most precious. They who are shocked and scandalized by it only become subjects of derision to the elegant critic who has perfectly measured the effect which he intends to produce.

With all this I do not deny that the book, in virtue solely of presenting the human side of Christ—disfigured it is true—will be of use. This is an advantage which we must guard against leaving to the adversaries of our faith. In Germany several remarkable essays have been made in this direction, as Neander's Life of Jesus and the work of Lange which is full of valuable matter. The chief service of M. Renan's book, however, will consist in drawing the attention of the men of the present generation to the person of Jesus Christ. They will soon leave the soft image it depicts, to contemplate the original in the Gospel narrative. The quotations of the words of the

Master, scattered throughout this fanciful biography, will produce their full effect. These pearls of great price will sparkle there in their holy brilliancy, and cause the elegant mounting to be forgotten. With these exceptions the furrow made by this book does not appear to us to be destined to be deep. Its permanent success would be a severe judgment for our generation, for it would show it to be more effeminate, more incapable of seizing the grand ideal than we have ever supposed. Still, if its success should be only ephemeral, it is considerable for the moment, and there are flatterers enough who are eager to praise it. This puts us at ease in freely discussing it. I propose to conduct the examination from the point of view of science as well as religion, and with reference to the dignity of man as well as to revelation, for this book is especially offensive from the side of humanity. It shows us anew how much the cause of man and that of the living and true God are identical. If all the disdainful irony for the human soul and the truth within it, which this book conceals, were known, if it were understood what mortal languor it breathes and communicates, and to what vain dilettantism it reduces religion and morals, there would be less relish for the morbid enchantment which is now in vogue.

I.

The basis of M. Renan's book is a distinct philosophical notion, in the name of which he rejects every supernatural element in primitive Christianity: it constitutes, in fact, his principal reason for making a selection, a picking and culling from the narratives of the Gospels, by which one entire portion is reduced to the rank of a mere legend. This philosophical notion is no where clearly explained in the "Life of Jesus," much less is it ever demonstrated. Without going beyond the work itself, it would be impossible to learn the philosophical principle which he really holds. He extols Jesus for having founded the ultimate religion, and for having given a summary of it in the Lord's prayer. This would lead the reader to suppose that the author recognizes at least *the Father who is in heaven*, for it would seem difficult to honor Jesus Christ as the founder of the absolute religion, and yet at the same time to reject its fundamental

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doctrine of the Deity. Nevertheless, it is well known that M. Renan confounds *the Father who is in heaven* with our Father, Abyss, whence we are sprung,—a phrase which became immortal from the first, on account of its original turn. Neither has his famous article on the *Metaphysics* of Vacherot been forgotten, in which occur the following words which he has never withdrawn: "The Absolute of justice and reason exhibits itself in humanity alone; regarded apart from humanity, this Absolute is only an abstraction; regarded as in humanity, it is a reality. The Infinite exists only as it is clothed in a finite form." The same article closes with a prayer to the Heavenly Father, a new proof that the Lord's prayer is consistent, in the view of the adroit writer, with the humanitarian Atheism, which is the true foundation of his system.

In his "Life of Jesus," however, he does not explain himself with equal precision. I know nothing more obscure than the passage in which he tells us that in order to understand the exact shade of the piety of Jesus, we must take away that which stands between the Gospel and us, and elevate ourselves above deism and pantheism, those sharply defined categories which lack shading and delicacy. "If God," says the author, "is a being out of ourselves, the person who believes himself to have particular relations with the Deity, is a visionary. Pantheism, on the other side, in suppressing the divine personality, is as far as it can be from the living God of the ancient religions. The men who have had the highest knowledge of God, Sakya-Muni, Plato, St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Augustine, in some hours of his eventful life, were they deists or pantheists? The very question is foolish. The physical and metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, would have left them in indifference. They felt the divine in themselves." I find no small difficulty, I confess, in understanding the shade of piety which appertains neither to deism nor to pantheism, and which is the same in Buddha and in Jesus. What is this divine something which is neither determinate apart from us, like deism, nor undeterminate, like pantheism? Nothing else, so far as I can see, than the *transcendent* (another convenient and vague word) humanity, which, in the view of Renan, is the superior form of the life of the universe. "The highest knowledge of God which ever existed in the bosom of humanity," he says on the same page, "was that of

Jesus." Now it is certain that Jesus recognized a personal and living God. But this knowledge his new biographer must regard as a complete illusion, since such a belief is diametrically in opposition to his system. How could Jesus have the highest knowledge of God, and yet fall into an error so grave? What the author intends to say, doubtless is, that He had the highest conception of the ideal, which is in his view the category of the divine. Very well; but Jesus did not so understand it. The Lord's prayer is the express denial of this entirely human transcendence. To represent that sublime prayer as the final utterance of the Christian religion, and at the same time as a part of such a system, an entirely different sense must be given to it from what it had in the mind of Christ, and ideas wholly modern must be delicately slipped in beneath the words. This style of swimming between two currents, this necessity of denying and affirming at the same time, instead of simply denying, is exhibited in a singular manner, in the passage devoted by M. Renan to the future destiny of man. Whoever recollects the preface to his translation of Job, knows what his opinion is respecting the immortality of the soul: he reduces it to the immortality of the good we have done, to our track, our furrow in the world through which we have passed. "The soul is immortal," he somewhere says, "because it believes in eternal things." Jesus, the founder of the absolute religion, would certainly never have admitted this sort of shading into his piety. He energetically affirms the personal immortality of man, and the final judgment. The author attempts to show that Jesus, grossly deceived as he was, was right. This piece of address he executes as follows: "The phrase *Kingdom of God* expresses with rare felicity the need, which the soul feels, of a supplement to its destiny, a compensation for the present life. They who refuse to conceive of man as composed of two substances, and who find the deistical dogma of the immortality of the soul to be in conflict with physiology, love to rest in the hope of a final reparation which, under *an unknown form*, will satisfy the wants of the heart of man. Who can tell whether the last step of the process, in the millions of ages, will not introduce the absolute knowledge of the universe, and in this knowledge the revivification of all that ever lived." The meaning of this, I do not pretend to understand. I only know that this unknown form under

which I am to live again, has no connection with a personal, or in other words a real, existence. If Jesus had any such thought, he has had the singular fortune to say precisely the contrary. I can not imagine how M. Renan would dispose of a declaration like this: "Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul."

Is it possible in the midst of all these equivocations to preserve the precision of philosophical thinking? The mind is at a loss what to take hold of: we can nowhere securely plant our feet, for we find nothing but quicksand ever ready to yield. This fugacious philosophy has no basis, no settled and avowed principle which admits of being seized; it is all in enigmas, and yet it unhesitatingly decides the question of the supernatural and proclaims the impossibility of miracles, as if it could ever have the right to do so, before overthrowing by serious argument the idea of God as a being free, distinct from the world, and consequently competent to interpose in its affairs. On this point the author is content to reproduce the well known passage in his pamphlet, "On the chair of Hebrew in the College of France." Instead of elevating the discussion to the dignity of principles, he appeals to the most vulgar empiricism. He declares anew that he will not believe in the supernatural, until one and the same miracle shall have been performed on several occasions before a commission of learned men. It is to him a matter for the laboratory. In other words, he entirely confounds miracles with prodigies,—he makes a miracle consist in an abnormal phenomenon and robs it of its *moral element.* Nothing is clearer I admit than that, if a miracle is nothing more than a strange event, designed simply to address the sense of sight, we might properly endeavor to get a section of the Institute to give it their sanction, just as a vender of orvietan, or the inventor of some lucrative specific, who desired to find a market for his wares might do. If on the contrary, a miracle is not merely a strange event, but a sovereign intervention of divine love which suspends the laws of nature only for some great moral end, this moral element is absolutely inconsistent with any such, or any similar exhibition. Miracles have undoubtedly their external and historical proofs which it would be well seriously to examine before requiring impossibilities in respect to them; yet at the outset they present to reason a grand question of religious

philosophy which touches the most profound problems of theism, since it really leads us back to the question of the divine freedom. To decide against them before settling this question, is to deny without evidence; and gratuitous negation is not a whit more philosophical than gratuitous affirmation. M. Renan has never attacked the fundamental principles of theism in front; he contents himself with appealing to the spirit of the age and to the general results of contemporaneous science. He stands upon the ground of opinion and not on that of reason. To assume an air of disdain is not to refute, any more than to strike is. A sneering conclusion is not a particle more rational than an anathema: argument, however slight, would be more in point. We have, then, the right to say that this new "Life of Jesus," absolutely lacks a philosophical basis. This master-piece of free thinking is as arbitrary as any reverie of the imagination. You are the representative of exalted science, and you look with pity upon the men of faith. We demand, then, that you really be what you style yourself; be rigidly scientific. Scatter the clouds of double meaning. Define and prove. With the *a priori* you have nothing to do. We do not wish to employ it ourselves; why should we consent to allow it to you?

II.

If we pass from philosophy to criticism we find no firmer footing. The author makes much use of his principle "that what has been well done once, need not be done again." For the larger part of his assertions he gives us his word of honor that they have been demonstrated by those who preceded him. We can understand this method of procedure when applied to scientific results universally accepted, and which admit of no further dispute; but the difficulty with the affirmations of the author is that they relate to the most delicate points of criticism, which still excite the most lively discussion, not only among conscientious believers but also among the learned of every school. I will give a striking example: The important position in the field of theology, taken by the Tübingen school is well known. This position ought not to be left in the rear, but carried by a regular assault; it is not possible to treat such a system as if it was nothing or had never been started. Suppose a writer who believes in the supernatural had taken no

notice of Baur in tracing the origin of Christianity, it is easy to imagine what a hue and cry would be raised. And yet this is just what M. Renan has done. His prepossessed readers do not suspect it because their ignorance is greater even than their prepossession. The other day one of the journals placed the works of Baur and Renan in the same line, without ever dreaming that they are in direct opposition. The writer, whose theological knowledge is of recent date, saw in both only the rejection of the supernatural. This was enough to convince him of the identity of their views, and in his desire to make the most of their agreement, he entirely failed to see the gravity of their divergencies; nevertheless they are as sharply defined as possible. M. Renan overthrows the fundamental thesis of the Tübingen school, which is the identification of the doctrine of Jesus with Judaism and the founding of Christianity as a matter of fact by Paul; for he ascribes to the teaching of Jesus the downfall of Judaism and the germ of the deep metaphysics of the Gospel of John. We shall return hereafter to these conclusions which contradict others of the same author; at present it is sufficient to indicate them, to show at what a distance from the school of Tübingen he has planted his standard. He proposes, however, to display his colors only on the plain—a procedure more convenient than to make a breach after a perilous struggle and to carry his banners over it. The absence of argument on a subject so much contested deprives the results of all scientific value. Besides, M. Renan can not vigorously press upon the Tübingen theologians, any more than he can upon any other critical school, since it is no part of his plan to discuss seriously the documents of the evangelical history. Yet here everything depends upon the place and the precise date attributed to them. Now, in the employment of these documents, no one has carried the arbitrary farther than he. We confine ourselves to a few examples.

Let us first speak of the choice and the limitations he makes of the *sources* of the Life of Jesus. The question of the Gospels is quickly disposed of, without any true grappling with the arduous problems it presents. M. Renan distinguishes four periods in the composition of the Gospel narrative. In the first we have a rudimentary history, composed substantially of discourses in the first Gospel and of narratives in the second; this

is the original nucleus of Matthew and Mark, as is indicated also by a well known passage of Papias cited by Eusebius. In the second period, the date of which we can not precisely fix, we have an incoherent mingling of the two currents from which proceeded our two first Gospels in their actual state; it is tradition with all its disorder and without the seal of any personal attestation. The third phase pertains to the compilation; from this sprang the Gospel according to Luke. The fourth is that of the narrative worked over and falsified by speculation; it is metaphysics metamorphosing the reality, leaving nothing but a substratum of fact. John was the Plato of the Jewish Socrates, and his friends who retouched his Gospel enriched it still further with speculative elements. Such, in a few words, is the theory of M. Renan, in which we recognize the manner of his master Ewald, but not Ewald's richness of positive learning, for this whole system on which the "Life of Jesus" rests, is simply a bubble in the air. It is true that in relation to the first period of the Gospel narrative, Renan quotes Eusebius, reproducing the testimony of Papias respecting Matthew and Mark, but he does not cite and consequently does not discuss the passage in which the same Father tells us that Matthew, before leaving Palestine for distant missions, gave at the request of his friends a summary of his oral narratives respecting the ministry of Jesus Christ.* There is no difficulty in reconciling this statement with that of Papias. Nothing stands in the way of admitting that Matthew himself added a narrative part to his collection of the discourses of Christ, and the supposition is not improbable that he borrowed largely from Mark, although everywhere impressing upon the narrative the special stamp of his own Gospel. M. Renan in picking out the passages he cites, has rendered his task wonderfully easy. He has relieved himself from the necessity of proving that the two first Gospels agree with the description he has given, or in other words that they are a mere collection of disconnected traditions. An assertion like this, however, now demands a solid demonstration, for eminent critics have shown by a great array of arguments that what distinguishes our synoptical Gospels from those which are apocryphal, is precisely the seal of indi-

* Eusebius, *Hist. Ecc.* iii, 24.

viduality, a fixed plan, and a general idea which refutes the supposition of a sort of legendary and hap-hazard formation. To speak only of Matthew, it is easy to show that the narrative is governed by a point of view having a distinct character, and exceedingly well adapted to the first readers of his Gospel. The whole life of Jesus is presented as the accomplishment of the prophecies and the consummation of the old covenant. It is equally easy to prove that the second Gospel bears the imprint of the teaching and the character of Peter whose interpreter Mark was, and that it was adapted to the circle of readers for whom it was originally designed. M. Renan does not deign to pay a moment's attention to these pretty serious objections, but contents himself with the sentimental affirmation: "The poor man who has but one book wishes it to contain every thing which touches his heart. These little books were lent to each other. Each transcribed in the margin of his own copy the words, the parables he found elsewhere and which affected him. The most beautiful thing in the world has thus sprung from an obscure and entirely popular elaboration." It is only necessary to compare our two first Gospels with the legends thus fabricated, or simply with the apochryphal books of the New Testament, to estimate this hypothesis at its true value. But, doubtless, the author has special and particular information in the matter; he was present at all this curious interchange of little books, which explains, he thinks, the origin of our first two Gospels.

We pass rapidly to the third period of the gospel history, namely, that of compilation. No historical value, according to M. Renan, can be attributed to the Gospel thus produced, because Luke modified the primitive tradition at pleasure. "He is a harmonist and corrector after the manner of Marcion and Tatian." Very well; but what will you do with the passage which so distinctly declares the writer of the third Gospel to have been the disciple and friend of St. Paul? This must be regarded as an important point, for Paul was in a position to be well informed, and brings us very near to the cradle of Christianity. The third Gospel, if it was written under the direct influence of Paul, comes to us with a value very different from what it would possess, if it was the work of some compiler.

Will it be believed that M. Renan does not even mention a tradition so well established?

We have already seen that on the whole he admits the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, but with such numerous retouches that it is no longer possible to make any reasonable use of it. Here we have not the poor people who make a sort of picnic of little books, but friends of John who vie with each other in embellishing his notes. These friends were certainly very able, for they have succeeded all together in producing, at a single effort, a style perfectly uniform. M. Renan does not hesitate to affirm that between the Gospel of John and the synoptical Gospels, there is absolute contradiction. "If Jesus spoke as Matthew would have him, he did not speak as John would have him." The author sees in the metaphysics of the fourth Gospel one of the numerous products of the philosophical movement of Asia Minor. The doctrine of the Word, according to him, is nothing but the doctrine of Plato disguised. This bold proposition like the others, he advances without attempting to prove it. He does not recall to our recollection even the fundamental points of the doctrine of the celebrated Jew of Alexandria. He does not tell us how much Philo's idea of the Word had the stamp of emanation and was imbued with the speculative pantheism, which had no more ardent adversary than St. John.* It is more convenient to say in passing, "St. John appears to have drawn from foreign sources." As to the alleged radical opposition between the fourth Gospel and the synoptical Gospels, in respect to the exalted dignity of Christ, M. Renan contradicts himself, for he states that Jesus in the excitement of the last period of his ministry gave occasion to this senseless exaggeration. So then, it was neither John nor his friends, who invented His divinity! Thus the pretended contradiction between John and the synoptical Gospels

* Whoever has studied Philo, is entirely familiar with the fact that between his system and that of St. John, there is an abyss, viz., that which separates the pantheistic dualism from the most emphatic theism. We might cite numerous passages which show that he attributes no personality to his *Logos*, and that it is purely and simply the personification of the world of ideas, as is clearly expressed in the following words: "The *Word* is nothing else than the intelligible world" (*De Opifice Mundi*). And yet Renan none the less trippingly pronounces Philo the elder brother of Jesus. See my *History of the three first Centuries of the Christian Church.*

disappears, it seems, at the very point where it was alleged to be most undeniable. It would certainly have disappeared still more completely, if M. Renan had borne in mind at this place, the formula of baptism in Matthew, the declaration so characteristic in the same Gospel that *no one knoweth the Son but the Father*, and all the passages in which Jesus presents himself as the direct object of faith. If he had paid more attention to the impartial analysis of Reuss, he would have been less confident in affirming an opposition which has no existence at all in regard to doctrine, and which is greatly exaggerated in respect to style. What difficulty is there in admitting that difference of position modified the form of expression? The controversies at Jerusalem demanded a different method from the instruction in Galilee. M. Renan admits a total change in the teaching of Jesus. There is certainly a much greater contrast between the bucolics of the lake of Tiberias in the author's arrangement, and the sombre excitement preceding the crucifixion, than between the sermon on the Mount and the anathemas against the Pharisees. Either one thing or the other,—either M. Renan has no right to attribute to the same person discourses so different, or he is not justified in maintaining the existence of a glaring contradiction, when the difference of language is only that required by the difference of position.

To crown all, he has made a very remarkable discovery, namely, that John in the whole course of his narrative was influenced by a low jealousy. His sole object was to elevate himself and disparage his colleagues in the apostolate, especially Peter. He it was, without doubt, who inserted in the Gospel of Mark the narrative of his rival's denial of Christ, for no where is it related with so little caution. This attributing to John the feelings of a soured member of the Academy, reveals certainly an exquisite perspicacity. But what next follows is not less able. In the view of the author, there is no metaphysical medley more stiff or awkward than the discourses of Jesus in the fourth Gospel. "This way of incessantly preaching himself and exhibiting himself, this perpetual argumentation, this stage-dress so lacking in simplicity, is intolerable to a man of taste, in contrast with the delicious sentences of the synoptical Gospels. The artifice, the rhetoric, the dressing up are too plain." In support of this the seventeenth chapter of John is cited. "Father, the hour

is come: glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee. I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. I pray for them which thou hast given me. All mine are thine and I am glorified in them. And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we are." These are the words which draw from the author the exclamation: "Rhetoric, vain and tedious display!" O impotence of talent to comprehend, to seize the divine even in its fullest radiation. O ridiculous incapacity of men of intellect and men of taste, who become nothing else, the moment the question is no longer one which requires the balancing of fine phrases or the appreciation of metaphors! The peasant who saw in the Venus of Milo, nothing but a broken stone, is he any more to be wondered at than the refined critic who sees nothing but a medley in the prayer of Christ? "The exquisite taste of a Goethe would find full scope on such a subject," says M. Renan. He is mistaken: exquisite taste would not escape stupid blunders, when it had to deal with this order of greatness. A child-like heart, a heart broken, not infatuated, is what appropriates this divine beauty which genius fails to discover, because love alone penetrates love, and like only comprehends like. It seems to me that St. John is well avenged for the insinuations made against him. There are judgments infinitely more grave upon him who pronounces them, than upon him against whom they are directed.

I do not understand how M. Renan can pretend to draw a Life of Jesus from documents so corrupted and interpolated as those which he presents to us. If it is true that we have in the first two Gospels nothing but little books, in which every poor man inserted whatever touched his heart; in the third only an uncritical compilation, and in the fourth merely an unsuccessful metaphysical essay with some happy hits and a few statements worthy of belief, we must renounce the hope of writing history, and say, once for all, that "the origins" of the modern world are plunged in a night too dark ever to be penetrated. Nevertheless, the author has not hesitated to undertake a circumstan-

tial narrative, hoping that, as on the Hegelian method, Entity may be evolved solely from Non-Entity.

If, in the selection of his documents, he has been extremely arbitrary, he has outdone himself in the use which he makes of them. He frankly tells us that in order to recognize the true words of Jesus, he contents himself with "that kind of splendor at once gentle and terrible, that divine force which underlines the words, detaches them from the context and renders them easily recognizable by the critic. The real words of Jesus reveal themselves; they translate themselves as it were spontaneously." Here we have critical mysticism to the full. The author forewarns us that he will receive in these primitive documents that which suits him, with no other guide than his inner sense. He tells us also that he will take the good, especially, wherever he finds it; that is to say, that he will combine the text as he pleases; will attach a passage from the little books to a passage from the compilation or from the metaphysical medley, thus forming a link, in his own style, between all these scattered fragments. I leave for the consideration of serious minds this significant passage: "The texts require the interpretation of taste; they must be gently solicited till they come at last to approximate each other, and to yield a result in which all the admitted facts are happily blended." Just so Agnelet *gently* approached the sheep of which he relieved his master. This gentle solicitation arrives at the same result, for the text treated with this gentleness has entirely disappeared and nothing remains but the fancy of the critic. We may say of the passages arranged by him, what Jesus said of the men surprised by the final judgment: "One is taken and the other left." Why, for instance, is the discourse recorded in the sixth chapter of John, which is tinged with a strong metaphysical hue, accepted as authentic, while, in the same Gospel, the last teachings of Christ, unquestionably less surprising, are rejected? Who can tell?

M. Renan strongly contests the originality of Christianity. He sees in it a syncretic product of Judaism, the religions of the East, and the Greek philosophy. We have already spoken of the erroneous assimilation which he maintains, between the doctrine of John and the school of Philo. He goes farther in this direction, for he will have it that even the teachings of

Jesus Christ were enriched by notions borrowed through secret channels from Parsism. In support of this proposition he appeals to the sacred books of the Persians. He is obliged, however, to admit that these books have been largely worked over since the rise of Christianity, and that they have undergone numerous interpolations. It is notorious that the *Bundehesh*, the book in which the idea of a Messiah is most clearly expressed, bears the visible impress of these emendations. By what right then is it vaguely affirmed, that primitive Christianity borrowed from the religions which have pillaged it? The same reasoning may be applied to the teaching of the rabbins in the Talmud, to which Jesus it is claimed was indebted for his most remarkable maxims. The author admits that the Talmud was not brought into a written form until three centuries after Christ. How then draw the line between what originally belonged to it and what it received or stole from the new religion? There is not, then, the least reason for representing Jesus Christ as a disciple even indirectly of Rabbi Hillel.

From these remarks, which might be extended and multiplied, it will be seen that the criticism of this book is no more solid than its philosophy. Attractive as it is, it has almost entirely sacrificed profound dicussion for literary charms. Nothing would be more legitimate than this method if applied simply to a work of art, giving itself out as such; but when the author pretends to write an exposition of transcendental science, a little less elegance and a little more demonstration become indispensable. With this arbitrariness of philosophical conception and this facility in connecting texts, a free rein is given to the imagination; history, thus treated, becomes an impossibility, at whatever epoch it is taken, and transforms itself into a fugitive mirage. M. Renan insists much on the rapidity with which legends are formed among the common people, who are always accustomed to give a plastic form to their aspirations and dreams. He proves to us, by his own example, that the critic who obeys a preconceived idea ends at last in the legendary, and that his creations, coldly appareled in the study, under the inspiration of the spirit of system, have no more reality than the inventions of the people, and much less beauty; for the myth always commences by being the warmly

colored reflection of the impression produced by a great event or a powerful personality. M. Renan desired, as he says, to give us a fifth Gospel to read, drawn from the four others, and all that he has done has been to compose the poorest of the apochryphal Gospels, for there is not a single one of these rhapsodies which does not preserve a few features, at least, of the form of the Redeemer. This leads us to consider more closely the image of Christ, which M. Renan hopes to substitute for that which for eighteen centuries his disciples have accepted to adore and hls enemies to rail at.

III.

We possess several apochryphal Gospels, so called, of the Infancy. They paint the early years of Jesus in the strangest colors. M. Renan proceeds to enrich this literature, for he too has written his gospel of the infancy, with historical data no less reliable than the obscure legend writers, whose singular inventions make us smile. These inventions render unnatural and overload the real substratum of the history—they are parasitic excrescences on the trunk of the tree, but the tree itself survives. But M. Renan does more: at the start he gets rid of historical reality, so that nothing may impede the flight of his imagination. He puts aside, with his habitual serenity of affirmation, the testimony of our Gospels respecting the birth of Jesus Christ at Bethlehem and his descent from David. The author has a principle of interpretation which never fails him: Whenever any feature in the life of Jesus corresponds to a prophecy of the Old Testament, this feature was unquestionably invented; the evidence is so plain that it is unnecessary to furnish any other proof. It is taken for granted, then, that Jesus was born at Nazareth, in the family of an artizan who had always occupied a low position in society. His life in the miserable hovel of his father and in the narrow streets of the little Galilean village, beside the springs where the young girls go in the evening to draw water, is described to us with an amount of care all the greater from the entire absence of any historical data. We have, in fact, a little picture, *á la Rembrandt*, very well executed, but which regarded as a work of art is a great error, for this precise description, wholly hypothetical though it is, destroys the poetical mystery of the origin of the Gospel.

M. Renan has described, with enthusiasm, the journeying in Galilee and the once marvelous shores of its lakes. He has written several pages, really delightful, on the natural scenery formerly so enchanting, the rare beauty of which he divined through the vail of sadness by which it has been obscured for so many ages. We certainly enjoy these exquisite sketches, which glisten like a circlet of diamonds. Nevertheless, these brilliant paintings are in our view abused, for they attribute to natural scenery an exaggerated influence in the development of the soul of Jesus. Just as the desert rendered his race monotheistic, so to the luxuriant and ravishing Galilee we owe the sweet Rabbi destined to eclipse Moses. The Law descends from Sinai like a formidable torrent; the Gospel blossoms like a lily in that valley, "which is the true country of the canticles and of the songs of the well-beloved; where the animals are small but extremely gentle; where the little brook-turtles have quick, soft eyes; where the stork, with grave and modest mien, allows himself to be approached by man." For the mystical dove, which symbolizes the Holy Spirit, M. Renan has substituted the quick and lively turtle dove and that famous blue bird, which has all at once made a sensation. All this pretended local coloring, however rich it may be, sheds a false light upon the figure of Christ; for though he loved natural scenery and divinely interpreted it in his parables, yet from what a height of spirituality did he survey it! In such a history the local coloring is not to come from the purple sky of the East, but from the pure shining of the soul and the sweet luster which emanates from a heavenly love. To crowd the palette with high colors in order to paint Christ, to multiply the accessories about him, to gild and polish the frame, is to destroy the true effect.

Nature, then, according to M. Renan, was the first instructor of Jesus; it communicated to his soul the tenderness, joy and freshness which characterize his earliest teachings. But the *substance* of his teaching, whence did he derive it? for if he was limited to expatiating on the charms of Galilee, this would hardly have been enough on which to found a religion. It must be understood, then, that there was at that time in the atmosphere a vague aspiration toward the future; at Rome and in Greece it was a poesy—a dream; in the farther East it was an agony

which impelled to the most terrible asceticism. In Judea, it was an oracle more and more distinct; the firm expectation of a liberator who should deliver the holy nation from its disgrace. Bring forth this great thought of the pure and artless soul of the young Nazarene, give to it for a frame-work those lovely banks of which he was enamored, and you have Christianity! Such is the way in which religions are produced. A great and indefinite idea carried by the winds, and a residence in the fields, solve the origin of one of those movements which eighteen centuries have not been able to exhaust!

On closely examining the summary of the teaching of Jesus at this first period, as given by M. Renan, we find that it is reduced to nothing, at least to nothing either new or original. Jesus only says what had been said before, and what was repeated all around him. His finest maxims are not his own; his hopes are those of his race; he is ignorant of the great progress made by the Western nations, who at the bidding of an Epicurus and a Lucretius have seen the old chimera of a Sovereign Divinity interposing directly in the affairs of the world put to flight. For himself, he still believes in it: he believes it after the manner of children and women; he imagines that God himself gives us our daily bread, and when he calls him Father, he conceives of him as pardoning, blessing, and succoring. If he commends poverty, the Essenes did so before him. He is thus quite a man of his race and age; the best, undoubtedly, but he invented nothing. How, then, did it come to pass that he founded a religion?—Ah! this it is which is so charming, so lovely; that which everybody knew he announced in tones so sweet and penetrating; with gayety so fine he mingled such bursts of tenderness; and then, too, he was beautiful, and he knew how to draw beautiful creatures around him to render his doctrine attractive. Who would not follow this wandering company as it goes from one festival to another; this troop of enthusiastic women and children overflowing with heart, as they pass through the enchanted places where paradise on earth reappears? "The country must have been delightful; it abounded in fresh streams and in fruits; the rich farms were shaded with vines and fig trees. The wine was delicious. Leave the austere John the Baptist preaching repentance in his desert of Judea, thundering without inter-

mission, and living on locusts in company with jackalls. Why should the companions of the bridegroom fast while the bridegroom is with them? Joy shall make part of the kingdom of God. The whole history of Christianity has thus become a delicious pastoral. A Messiah at marriage festivals; the courtesan and the good Zacheus invited to his banquets; the founders of the kingdom of heaven like a retinue of paranymphs. This is what Galilee has dared, and has caused to be received." I really do not see why M. Renan should be so severe in his judgment of Beranger for having sung praises to the *Dieu des bonnes gens*: at any rate Beranger would not have inserted them in the Gospel. Only, by a slip of memory M. Renan confounds two of the songs of the poet, and presents to us the "God of the good people" seated at the table of the king of Yvetot. We have already spoken of the sneer in respect to the courtesan called to his feasts, after which the author says: "*Leave John the Baptist preaching repentance in his desert.*" Thus he takes no notice of the sinful woman smiting her breast and weeping over her sins; no, she is not at the feet of Christ but at his side, present at his feasts and pouring out, perhaps, the delicious wine which does not intoxicate the young Galilean Master, for he is above suspicion: but who will answer for all the joyous company? The author says elsewhere that Jesus attracted the tax-gatherer, the prodigal son, and abandoned women, who surprised by so much that was charming, found in the sect a means of *easy rehabilitation*. For myself I can only say this delightful pastoral appears to me a pitiable caricature. The elegance of the style, the aptness of the metaphors do not change in the least its real character.

Everything in this description of the birth of Christianity is as false and fantastical as it is outrageous. It is not true that Jesus left John the Baptist to thunder alone against sin; for when he came forth from the desert, where his austerities went beyond the eating of locusts, his first word was, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand, Matt. iv, 17. It is not true that in Galilee he was greeted with universal enthusiasm and demonstrations of joy; for at Nazareth they sought to kill him, Matt. xi, 23, and over Capernaum and Bethsaida he pronounced a terrible malediction, Luke iv, 29. It is not true that he showed an easy indulgence to all who came, for he

received only those who wept at his feet, and if he lifted them up it was to say to each, "Go and sin no more." If the harlot came to him it was because remorse and hope were kindled in her breast as she beheld that sweet and holy aspect, too pure to look upon sin, but full of compassion for the sinner. It is not true that he reserved all his austere teachings for the second period of his ministry, for it was in Galilee that he exhorted his disciples to cut off the arm and pluck out the eye which become instruments of sin, Matt. v, 30. The Sermon on the Mount, which we are told inaugurated the feasts of these charming days, and promulgated this smiling doctrine, begins with these words: "Blessed are the poor in spirit. Blessed are they that mourn. Blessed are they that do hunger and thirst after righteousness." The eighth beatitude is for those who suffer for Christ; it exhibits thus his high and incomparable dignity, and opens, in some sort, the long and bloody tragedy of the martyrs. With what divine authority does he appear to be clad, when he abolishes some of the most characteristic precepts of the law of Moses,* with the words: "It was said by them of old time, * * but I say unto you," etc. Such is the end of the pastoral of Galilee. Nothing is required beyond the Sermon on the Mount, that is to say the portion of the Gospels accepted by M. Renan, and in which he arbitrarily assumes the whole of primitive Christianity to be contained, to overthrow his theory.

Let us pass to the second period of the ministry of Jesus. We have seen the troubadour; let us now view the thaumaturgist, the magician, in a word the charlatan, although a well-meaning one. By what transition was the young Rabbi, who led a life so gentle in his own neighborhood, brought to that sombre enthusiasm which is to involve him in a struggle so formidable that he will use every means, good or bad, to make sure his ascendancy? It appears that it was his connection with John the Baptist which launched him out into this new career which was to end in punishment. John was not his forerunner; he was, to a certain extent, an ally; but above all a rival. To balance his wide influence, Jesus did violence to his own nature in

* Or rather the Pharisaic and Rabbinic perversions or misapplication of the Law. The law itself, in its true spirit and aim according to our Lord, Matt. v, 17, 18, was never to be abolished, but passing into its completed form in Christianity was to abide forever.—D.

employing severer language and in administering baptism. This he would never have thought of himself, but since he had a certain tendency to yield to the opinions of the people (witness his resistance to all their darling dreams!) he followed the current. Jesus vied with the Baptist in civilities; he led his school, few as yet in number, to John, emphatically recognized his superiority, and had no other wish than to grow beneath his shadow, in the hope, by imitating him, of gaining the multitude. We would like to know from what sources M. Renan has been able to shed such new light on the relations of Jesus Christ with John the Baptist. The Gospels describe the latter as insisting, with singular energy upon his inferiority, declaring that he is not the Messiah, that he is not worthy to loose the latchets of his shoes, that He must increase while he himself should decrease. So far was Jesus from leading his disciples to John the Baptist, that exactly the contrary occurred. Peter and John passed from the school of the Baptist to that of the new Master. The evangelical tradition is here unanimous. By what right is it worked over and altered at this point, and that too without giving us notice? This alteration has no other end than to explain, by a nice psychological process, the new part played by Jesus Christ. He stood in need of the spur of secret rivalry to wake him from the beautiful morning dream, and to rouse him up to be a formidable adversary to the haughty Jewish theocracy! We admit that M. Renan has painted with equal spirit and sagacity the moral condition of Judea at this epoch; the intrigues of a priesthood without piety, but devoured by the love of power, controling at its will a fanatical people chafing under the Roman yoke; Epicureanism satisfying the wealthy classes rallied under the standard of Sadducism; the solemn puerilities of the schools of the Rabbins, expending vast knowledge and intellectual acuteness on ridiculous subtleties; and the parade of virtue and piety made by the Pharisees. He admirably describes the second temple—the center of religion and the seat of all kinds of intrigue,—the palace of the Herods stained with every crime, and that of the proconsuls, where sat a Roman skeptic thoroughly wearied with the religious passions of the foreign people among whom he had been sent to repair his fortune. The author is much more

at home in characterizing a falling religion than a religion which grows and expands.

Sad origin, forsooth, that of Christianity properly so called! It did not exist in its own distinctive character before this second period in which it makes its appearance in the Holy City! I know that M. Renan pretends the contrary. Nevertheless it is not till this moment that Jesus professes a distinct doctrine capable of offending and shocking public opinion. Till now he is satisfied (always according to his new historian) with professing a pure morality, affecting some trifling Semitic austerities and giving a limpid form to the ideas which had been proclaimed before his time and all about him. It follows, then, that Christianity would not have existed in all its purity except so long as it remained within the limits of this indecisive life, in the state of mere sentiment, of ethereal fluidity. The moment he makes up his mind, the moment he has a thought of his own, the moment he propounds a doctrine, he ceases to be faithful to his mission, he is no longer himself—which amounts to saying that he did not become himself until he was not himself. Here certainly is a palpable contradiction. M. Renan sometimes appears to set solely to the account of skillful accommodation all the positive elements of the new religion, which, as proving to be foreign elements and proceeding from without, did not originate in the soul and spirit of Jesus; but on a closer examination we soon find that he limits this accommodation to the employment of miracles and to certain popular appellations accepted by him, like that of the *Son of David.* The author admits, and this avowal in the present state of theological discussion is very important, that Jesus in this second period of his ministry taught a definite doctrine. For instance, he proclaimed the abrogation of Judaism and the advent of a religion for humanity, and subsequently attached this great reform to his own person. M. Renan complains of the fatiguing persistency with which he draws attention to himself and demands faith in himself. "The title, Son of Man, expressed his rank as judge; that of Son of God, his participation in the plans and the power of the Supreme Being. This power is unlimited. No one knoweth the Father but himself. He forgives sins; he is superior to David, to Abraham, to Solomon, and to the prophets. We do not deny that in these affirmations the germ of the doctrine which

subsequently made him a divine hypostasis and identified him with the Word." I know that the author pleads extenuating circumstances in favor of his hero; he observes that all our subtle distinctions, which establish a definite distinction of persons, had in his mind no existence. But it remains none the less true that Jesus actually taught this strange doctrine that he is the object of faith, and that a superior glory belongs to him. It is impossible in this case to speak of accommodation; for nothing was more offensive to the opinions of the day, and these ideas it was which occasioned his crucifixion. By what right, then, I ask, are we called to find here a deviation from primitive Christianity, instead of Christianity itself at its first appearance in the religious center of Judaism? We have already seen that in the first period, that of the idyl, Jesus presented himself as the object of faith and exercised sovereign power in the pardon of sins. Thus the distinction between the two periods is effaced and the unity of a religion affirmed, which was not formed at hap-hazard, by pieces and bits, but was incarnated in a holy personality.

The process of accommodation commences, according to M. Renan, with the miracles, which at the outset he pronounces impossible. I do not know why the author refers the miracles to the second period of the ministry of Jesus Christ; the Gospel attributes to him some striking ones during the first. He had then already begun to play his part and to use duplicity. It is wholly arbitrary to set aside and reserve this first year for artless simplicity and joyous abandon. At every step we meet new proofs of the incredible liberties with which M. Renan treats the documentary sources, and the absence of all rigorous method in his book. He affirms, in covert terms, that his hero allowed himself to be drawn into deceiving the human race. Jesus preferred, indeed, not to have recourse to these vile means; he resigned himself to them with repugnance; but the end was so great that it justified a little charlatanism. "He did not become a miracle-worker without reluctance. His miracles were an act of violence, perpetrated upon him by his age." Besides, the ideas of the East, which is full of finesse, are quite different from ours in respect to sincerity. "To us, races profoundly serious, conviction signifies sincerity with ourselves. But sincerity with ourselves has not much meaning among the Orien-

tals, who are little accustomed to the niceties of the critical mind. Good faith and imposture are words which, in our rigid conscience, contradict each other like two irreconcilable terms. In the East, between the two, there are a thousand subterfuges and a thousand evasions. History is impossible unless we boldly admit that there are several measures of sincerity. All great things are accomplished by the people: and the people are guided only by borrowing their ideas. It is easy for us, in our imbecility, to call this falsehood; and, proud of our timid honesty, to treat with contempt the heroes who accepted under other conditions the struggle of life. When we shall have done with our scruples, what they did with their falsehoods, we shall have the right to be severe upon them." This, be it remembered, is spoken of Jesus, of Him who said, "let your *yea* be *yea*, and your *nay*, *nay!*" To succeed in deception, when professedly coming to restore the moral law and to exhibit the unclouded ideal of holiness, is not to succeed; it is most shamefully to fail. It is then a contradiction in terms. I blush to be called to refute such a theory; whoever possesses the instinct of moral excellence and has studied the character of Jesus, must regard insinuations like these with pity and contempt. No; mankind will never be brought to believe that the divine crucified One founded Jesuitism instead of Christianity, under the pretext that he was a Son of the East. This morality above morality, this transcendent honesty which despises timid honesty, is corrupting to the highest degree and inflicts the deepest stain upon this "Origins" of the Gospel. I am not more hurt by the calumnies of Celsus, respecting the birth of Jesus, than by an imputation which makes my faith the offspring of a vile falsehood. This last charge of bastardy is equally insulting.

M. Renan supposes, quite gratuitously, that Jesus permitted himself to be carried away by these deceptions, for even the representation which he has given us of his teaching, under its second form, shows that the Galilean Master believed himself possessed of miraculous powers. He admits, indeed, that He performed, by the power of sympathy, some cures which might pass for prodigies. Thus, "his beauty, pure and attractive, calmed the diseased organization of Mary of Magdala; and, in many cases, is not the contact of a beautiful person worth all the resources of pharmacy?" Why does M. Renan

trouble himself to offer such absurd explanations, when he has at hand the convenient theory of Oriental sincerity? The author attempts, as much as possible, to attribute the pretended miracles of Jesus to the crowds around him. It may be supposed that his miracles escaped suddenly before their astonished eyes, like birds from a cage. He himself was the first to be surprised at them. Nevertheless, he carried complaisance rather far in accepting the title of the Son of David, which he well knew did not belong to him—he accepted it blushingly, with a virgin modesty—but yet he accepted it. Let us pass to the comedy of Bethany. The trick (here supposed) is too gross. M. Renan would have done better to leave Mary to "that languor" by which she had gained the affection of Jesus, than to cause her to play such a part in this shameful farce. Oriental sincerity has never given itself more ample scope than in that beautiful sepulchre, where Lazarus, comfortably established, awaited his resurrection. M. Renan, to spare us all anxiety, informs us that these tombs consisted of beautiful chambers, where one might feel himself quite at home. This page, with the remarks on the medical virtue of beauty, show that one can become ridiculous, even when rejecting the supernatural.

We pass rapidly to the end of the story. The nearer we approach the denouement, the more the fine moralist of the first period gives place to the athlete, the gloomy giant who wishes to crush all opposition. Jesus has still, indeed, some flashes of gayety, some racy replies, as when he says to his disciples, irritated against a Samaritan village and desiring fire from heaven to consume it: "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." A man must certainly be in straits for delicate irony and amiable points, to find anything of the kind in this utterance of indignant love. On another occasion, in the case of the woman taken in adultery, Jesus appears no less acute. He displays the subtle raillery of the man of the world, tempered by a divine goodness. At his meals he exhibited his usual good humor, and his conversation was full of gayety and charms. But these joyous reminiscences of Galilee became more and more unfrequent; a sickly exaltation more and more possessed him. Hence, when his disciples wished him to notice the beauty of the temple, the courts of which had been made

disagreeable to him by the arrogance of the priests, he showed a severely censorious spirit, refused to admire anything in Jerusalem, and, like a true demagogue, would see only the mite cast by a poor widow into the treasury. It is to these proportions that M. Renan reduces one of the most sublime and touching scenes of the Gospel, designed expressly to show how far Jesus stood above the materialistic prejudices of his race. When he said of the temporal beauty and glory of the theocracy, "See ye not all these things?" it was with the view of opening to the spiritual eye the higher invisible world of love.

The author discovers a new instance of the morbid exaltation of Jesus, in what he calls his new notion of the kingdom of God, which effaced his first conception, so pure, so ideal, of worship in spirit and in truth. He now entered into the apocalyptic visions of the Jewish people; he spoke of the resurrection, of the judgment, and of a visible glory with which he will be clothed. According to the author he was right; if he had thoroughly carried out his pure idealism, the only result would have been to leave in the memory of man a celestial but *evanescent* vision. It was necessary that the idea should take form, and come into contact with the earth, and this it could not do without losing its spirituality, without becoming similar, in some respects, to the profane multitude it sought to gain. "In accepting the Utopian ideas of his times, he converted them into lofty truths, thanks to fruitful misunderstandings. This rough shell contained a sacred kernel." Still, falsehood always as the passport of truth! Much might be said respecting this superstitious notion of the kingdom of God, which M. Renan attributes to Jesus Christ. The simple fact of his death is sufficient of itself to prove that his views were fundamentally different from those of his countrymen, for they expected only a terrestrial and national renovation. A Messiah who should have satisfied them in this respect would not have been crucified but adored. Between their gross dreams and the teaching of Jesus stands the cross. We find, it must be admitted, a certain foundation common to the current ideas of the Jews and to those which fill the last discourses of Jesus, because at the basis of each are the Hebrew prophecies with their striking symbols. But the interpretation is entirely different. On the one hand, we have a translation into the groveling prose of a

materialistic realism; on the other, an idealism the most sublime, not, however, a simple, bare idea, but one requiring accomplishment and confirmation in facts. What appears clearly in the prophetic discourses of Jesus is the distinct thought that the drama of history will have a denouement, which will uphold the great law of righteousness and that the material world exists not for itself but for higher ends. This is the full logical consequence of the theistic view of creation. There is something at work in this world besides physical and mechanical laws. Sprung from a great, divine thought, it is always subordinated to love and justice, to which in this domain, as in every other, the last word will belong. Admit that the first Christians believed in a speedy realization of their hopes; yet that ardent faith, which in grasping eternal good and establishing itself in the invisible, anticipates time and almost abolishes it, is an error of chronology not of morals. The idea which Jesus himself taught of the kingdom of God was not opposed to its spirituality. God was ever to him, the God who is spirit, and spirit is the greatest power in the universe; it moves matter: *Mens agitat molem.* This is the fundamental thesis of faith in the supernatural. For our part, we believe firmly in that day of wrath and of love, which shall grind the earth to powder. *Dies iræ, dies illa, solvet sæclum in favilla.* "Behold," says the prophet of the Apocalypse, "he cometh with clouds; and every eye shall see him, and they also which pierced him; and all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of him."

Jesus, in the new position which he had taken, could not fail to become involved in a struggle with the established powers. M. Renan devotes a vigorously written page to our Lord's contest with the Pharisees; why does he willfully spoil it with such expressions as "exquisite mockeries" and "malignant provocations," which jar so unpleasantly? "This Nessus tunic of ridicule," he says, "which the Jew, son of the Pharisee, has dragged in tatters after him, for eighteen hundred years, was woven by Jesus with divine skill. Masterpieces of lofty raillery, his lashings are inscribed in lines of fire upon the flesh of the hypocrite and the false devotee. Incomparable stripes, worthy of a Son of God! A God only could slay in this wise. Socrates and Molière only graze the skin. He carries

fire and fury into the very marrow of the bones." To attribute to Jesus raillery and malignant mockery betrays a wretched conception of his true character. The railer does not love humanity; he triumphs over it, he makes sport of its baseness. He who loves it, even to dying for it, can not be resigned to its debasement; he hates the evil in it with a hatred as glowing as the love which consumes him, because they are both kindled at the same altar. Hence the vehemence of his indignation; hence those thunderbolts which rend every veil and prostrate all the idols to which the human soul prostitutes itself. Holy love is a devouring flame against sin. It strikes in tears, and where it strikes, it breaks but to save. The anathemas against the Pharisees and the beatitudes are the outgoings of the same heart. "He was patient, patient," says Pascal, "but terrible to demons."

M. Renan correctly observes that Jesus was much more tolerant of the civil than of the religious power. But his explanation is deserving of no respect. This great master of irony, he says in his own peculiar style, designed to found the doctrine of transcendent disdain, the "true doctrine of that liberty of soul which alone gives peace. Freedom and right are not of this world; why trouble life with vain susceptibilities? The true Christian is an exile; what to him is the temporary master of this land which is not his country?" These words contain a dangerous equivocation, which it is important to expose; for if they really expressed the true idea of Christianity, they would turn from it every generous soul, since it would shelter beforehand every form of cowardice with an easy excuse. The plan of Jesus was to found a spiritual religion in a world which had never known anything of the kind. The State had always claimed to own the entire man, either in the name of God, as in the Jewish Theocracy, or in its own name as in Greece and Rome. Under such a government we may talk of national independence, but liberty in the true sense, the liberty of the individual does not exist; he belongs, without reserve, to the public. A religion, which like Christianity, is founded upon conscience, in order to stand, must necessarily detach, isolate, and render independent its indispensable basis; it must, therefore, firmly trace the line of demarcation between the sphere of public life and that of religion and morals. This it can do

only by boldly declaring that its kingdom is not of this world, that it holds itself, as religion, outside of the State, that it respects the State in its sphere, on the condition that it leave the soul to God. This is the reason why the founder of Christianity and his apostles carefully abstained from all connection with political life. Jesus incarnated the new religion. In his case no distinction could be drawn between the citizen and the religious man; he himself was the living religion. For him to engage, from an earthly point of view, in public affairs, would have been to mix religion itself with politics, to confound the two domains, and once more to place conscience under the yoke of the State. Thus what is ascribed to him as transcendent disdain, is simply the isolation of religion in its relations to the civil power, which till then had usurped all authority, and this isolation was precisely the principle of liberty in all its applications.

At first it limited despotism; it arrested it at the threshold of the inner sanctuary, turned it back powerless, and opposed to it the only successful resistance it had yet encountered. When the civil power undertook to make encroachments upon the soul, the Christian was not satisfied with a facile disdain; he advanced beyond to danger and peril, and carried his irony even to the abandonment of his body to the despot, rather than yield to him his invincible thought. Tell me of irony which endures punishment, and of a transcendent disdain which goes to the point of death! Despotism is thus repelled, and in the strife with conscience it marches to certain defeat. So true is this, that the Roman Empire succumbed to the irony of martyrdom.

But the Gospel has done more than to secure liberty of conscience, by defining, and through heroic sufferings defending, its kingdom. It has established liberty everywhere, for this has been its history. When Pagan society was overturned, a new world arose from its ruins. The Christian was no longer a stranger and proscribed; he was one of the members of this rejuvenated society; he had his duties as a citizen to perform, and was bound to apply to civil life the principles of justice, equality, and brotherhood, which he had drawn from the Gospel. Thus wherever Christianity has become deeply rooted, and has kept aloof from whatever would impair and subject it, it has brought with it the reign of justice. Far from cultivating in

the soul a mild indifference, it inflames it with the love of right and liberty, and renders it capable of defending them resolutely and steadily. Religion, as religion, can not go out of its own sphere, under penalty of compromising the liberty which was born on the day when the independence of souls was proclaimed; but by remaining there, it acts all the more surely upon the public mind, through its great ideas respecting the destiny of humanity, the worth of each of its children, and their rights as immortal creatures redeemed by Christ. Hence it is that the fire of patriotism is incessantly rekindled even at the altar, provided that the altar is not made to yield a slavish support to the throne, and thus to become the most dangerous foe to the work of Christ. So far from having ground for rejoicing in the ascendancy of pure Christianity, as if it rendered men indifferent to right, justice, and liberty, despots have reason to tremble before it; for, by a voice indirect but sure, it has overturned and will overturn all tyranny. On the contrary, they can sleep in tranquility so long as a frivolous Epicureanism, like that which flourished at Rome at the beginning of the present century, reigns around them, and need not trouble themselves on account of a silent and prudent irony, which permits so vulgar a world to despise and at the same time to work; but when religious faith revives among a people, when resolutely, in the name of God, it wills the liberty of conscience—the mother of all true liberty—then the days of tyranny are numbered, because if there is between itself and materialism a secret affinity, as Benjamin Constant affirms, it must find a foe in everything which elevates the soul and recalls it to its native dignity. Thus it is that Jesus died upon the cross, not only for the salvation but also for the liberty of the human race, inasmuch as he made victorious by his blood the kingdom which is not of this world. He has opened to the soul not only an asylum inaccessible to all the abuses of power, but, further still, a generous school of justice where the citizen learns to love the right in order to serve and defend it in the domain of social life. This is not so profitable, I grant, as a lofty contempt, but it is a hundred times grander and more truly mighty.

The account of the passion is given with rare ability, and yet it is meager and cold compared with the sober and tragical narrative of the Evangelists. Pilate is perfectly understood. His

indifference, his hesitation, his scruples, his cowardly yielding to the passions of the mob, as soon as he fears a dangerous accusation against himself; all this anatomy of a Prefect of the Prætorium, a functionary of the Roman Empire, is given with superior philosophical acumen. The scene of the Sanhedrim, the intrigues and violence of the priests, are painted with no less skill, and the words in which M. Renan brands the denouement are truly eloquent: "When the civil power becomes a persecutor or an intermeddler at the solicitation of the priest, it gives evidence of weakness. But let that government which is in this respect without sin cast the first stone at Pilate. The secular arm, behind which clerical cruelty shelters itself, is not the culprit. No one has a right to affirm that he has a horror of blood when he causes it to be shed by his servants." Thus the secondary personages of the drama are admirably represented. The theater of action is equally well painted, but the action itself, and especially the divine hero, lose their true physiognomy. This is because, here especially, the most exquisite art, the art of a master in poetry and criticism is insufficient. Take away the holy victim who dies for the sins of the world, and all is altered and belittled. In the view of M. Renan, the death of Christ, which he sincerely admires, is, nevertheless, the result of his excessive exaltation in the latter part of his career. He is too much of an artist not to appreciate its grandeur. It is a most beautiful close to the poem of his life—as the doom of exile on St. Helena is the ideal crowning of the Napoleonic epopee; but after all the Galilean Master, like the great General, reached through his faults this sad and grand conclusion. The ideal Christianity is that of the Galilean period; but Jesus would never have gained the cross by drawing after him a joyous and wandering band, or by sitting down to rural meals. He would have lived, but his thought would have died and oblivion would have completely buried it beneath the flowers scattered over him by the beautiful creatures about him. His death has given immortality to his religion, though he owes it to the revolutionary fever which seized him and brought him into conflict with the established powers. It seems to me that thus presented, the death of Jesus loses all its sublimity. It occurs betimes, it puts an end to his visionary career at the moment when he might have been excited to the

pitch of fanaticism. His last discourses embarrass our historian. Generalizing the remarks, which in their place imply only entire submission to the will of God and a disposition to make every sacrifice to promote his cause and to subordinate all to him, the author imputes to Jesus the wish to subject human life to the most unreasonable rules, and the demand that all his disciples should renounce family ties and the ownership of property. That he aimed at nothing of the kind, however, is certain, since he gave precepts in relation to the marriage relation and the employment of wealth. Only he always maintained that every human consideration, every interest and affection must yield to the divine will, and that we become Christians only in renouncing ourselves. There is nothing here which resembles an impossible chimera or an exceptional morality. It is the fundamental principle, indeed, of the Christian life.

We have already spoken of the manner in which M. Renan regards the touching farewells of the upper chamber. They appear to him spoilt by an unbridled mysticism. The institution of the supper is reduced to the most scanty dimensions. The author pretends that the account was arranged after the death of Jesus. He simply "practiced his mysterious rite of the breaking of bread;" he spoke afterward of his moral union with his disciples in the mystical and realistic language which was peculiar to him. The excited imagination and softened hearts of his friends transfigured the last repast into a resemblance to the paschal supper. From this they likened their Master to the Lamb of God, sacrificed for their sins. Thus arose a singular myth which has since occupied a predominant place in his worship. Thus, let us add, are fabricated at pleasure the myths of the schools, by the happy art of artificial combination and the skillful perversion of the most precious texts; for the only foundation of all this argumentation is positively nothing more than the mere good pleasure of M. Renan. We have already exposed the parody which he has given us of the agony of Gethsemane. How felicitously is introduced the remembrance which Jesus is imagined to have now had of the clear fountains, and the beautiful young maidens whose love he might so easily have won! M. Renan, from an artistic point of view, has here committed a blunder inconceivable on the part

of so delicate a mind. To throw a pretty rose-tint over that forehead, bathed with a bloody sweat, at the hour of the final struggle, to attempt embellishment in a scene like this, is to carry a little too far the love of contrast.

We stand at last at the foot of the cross.—We may not trust, according to M. Renan, to the narrative of John, for jealous of his associates in the Apostolate, he has given us, in order to elevate himself, an imaginary scene, in which he himself plays the principal part, and is the person to whom one of the last words of Jesus is addressed. To justify himself in imputing this base feeling to the beloved disciple, M. Renan appeals to the absence of this narrative in the other Gospels, as if its occurrence in the Gospel written by the only Apostle who was present on Calvary, was not entirely natural. The crucifixion, as M. Renan conceives of it, notwithstanding the petty incidents which he introduces, is still grand and imposing, thanks to the sublime words of the divine Sufferer. He admits that Jesus saw in his own death the salvation of the world, and that this raises that death to the dignity of a free sacrifice. M. Renan accepts the testimony of the Evangelist in his account of the passion. Why is it that this testimony loses all its value and is nothing but a confused collection of fables the moment it relates to the resurrection? It is because, according to M. Renan, we take offense at the supernatural and because everything which implies it is false in advance. Hence it is no longer necessary to compare these different narratives, the fundamental agreement of which certainly is all the more striking from their difference in details and their lack of arrangement. Whoever speaks of the supernatural speaks of fables and inventions. The proofs of the resurrection of Christ, drawn from the unanimous belief of the Apostolic Church and from the miracles produced by this belief, are not even mentioned. The first Christians took for a real resurrection that moral presence which is so vividly felt in the first period of mourning by the loving heart. "The life of Jesus to the historian terminates with his last sigh; but such was the impression he left on the hearts of his disciples and of a few devoted friends, that for several weeks he was to them a person alive and ministering consolation. The strong imagination of Mary of Magdala played in this respect a prominent part.

Divine power of love! Sacred moments in which the passion of an hallucinated female gives to the world a resuscitated God!" What he means to say is that the faith of the Church universal is nothing but hallucination. Such is the final utterance of this pious and edifying book, which, according to its admirers, Christians ought to receive with gratitude. A supplementary chapter is devoted to making out that Judas probably closed his eyes in peace under his own vine and fig-tree, or at least that he did not perish by the knife of one of his former friends. As for the other enemies of Jesus, they never had the opportunity to discover the magnitude of their crime. A slight matter for Pilate to have sacrificed one innocent person more! We must dismiss then all thoughts of an exceptional punishment, as if he had committed some extraordinary crime. There is, however, one entire people from whose foreheads the drops of blood which fell upon them on Calvary have never been washed away. The history of the Jews is alone sufficient to show that in the drama performed eighteen centuries since in a corner of Judea, everything can not be reduced to such insignificant proportions as M. Renan would make out.

IV.

From this rapid analysis of the book of M. Renan, every impartial reader will see that the Christ he presents to us does not correspond in any degree with the Biblical documents, even when these are picked and culled and newly combined after the transcendent method of the author. He is constantly in flagrant disagreement with the passages, the authenticity of which he admits and which he has "gently drawn to himself." We have already seen that the Sermon on the Mount, which the author regards as containing the whole of Galilean Christianity, that is to say Christianity in its purest form, is sufficient to refute his hypothesis, for it contains the essential elements of that rigid doctrine, attached in a strange manner to the person of the Master, which according to M. Renan, ought to appear only under the excitement of the struggle at Jerusalem. Take from the Gospels as little as you please, and that little will suffice to place this new history of Jesus in the catalogue of works of fiction. A narrative may be fictitious and yet preserve the general coloring of the time in which the

scenes are placed, and the physiognomy of the persons whom it brings upon the stage. Of no importance as a history, it will still be valuable as a work of art. It calls up an epoch which no longer exists and leads us to comprehend it by a kind of intuition. This merit we entirely deny to M. Renan's "Life of Jesus." Notwithstanding his great talent of style, he has failed not only as an historian but also as an artist.

For, to give life again to the great era in the past, it is not enough to draw beautiful sketches of a few landscapes, and to give to proper names their Oriental form, as Caipha instead of Caiphas, Judas of Kerioth instead of Judas Iscariot, and Mary of Magdala instead of Mary Magdalene. The holy image of Christ must be displayed on its own foundation, and his moral grandeur composed of grief and love be preserved. The divine glory which encircles in the eyes of mankind his blood-stained brow, must not be removed. Down deep in the heart, even where faith in the strict sense does not exist, there is, if we are not mistaken, an image of Jesus which can never be effaced. The love of the crucified One is stamped upon the human soul in letters of light. Come what may, this ever remains his greatest memorial. Whatever does not correspond to this conception is a defective work and will finally be abandoned. We ridicule the romances which, like Cyrus the Great, transferring to antiquity all the affected ways of the hotel Rambouillet and introducing into Babylon a court of love where madrigals were polished and false wit elaborated, our parents thought so charming. Is a pleasant and smiling Jesus, bringing only the fine railleries of the man of the world for the relief of the greatest moral disorders, much more strange? There have been men who stood aloof from the Christian faith, who yet comprehended and admired its austere beauty. No one certainly will impute to Sainte-Beuve a mystical tendency. It is from without and from a distance that he has expressed his judgment of Port Royal; nevertheless there is no false tone in the picture he has traced; he preserves the noble sadness which becomes the subject. He does not make the heroic monastery a pretty Sacred Heart, nor change the pious hermits into languishing shepherds, mingling mysticism and love in easy devotion. But had he done so, the violation of truth would not have been greater than this pastoral story of Galilee exhibits. Better make of Saint-Cyran an amiable

director of nuns, and of Pascal a silly lover, than to present to us a feminine, gay, and smiling Jesus. It is here that the superiority of Sainte-Beuve to M. Renan appears. His criticism is much more impartial, and far more independent of preconceived ideas. He paints the thing as it is, and without embellishment, and does not give us Mignard where Philip of Champagne with his sober pencil should be.

The Christ of M. Renan strongly reminds us of those sweetish and melancholy fair faces so numerous on the canvas of contemporaneous sanctity, and which are like the young beginners in our religious painting. We meet every day this feeble type; it is very common in this soft generation. Idealize it somewhat, make a little more prominent the cast of benevolence which belongs in part to moral lassitude, give to skepticism, which retreats from the public throng, something I know not what of the transcendental to complete the finish, and you have the new Christ. I affirm that so far as art is concerned, the poorest painting of the sixteenth century is infinitely superior, and produces a far deeper impression. I will go still farther; the most antique sketch, a figure scarcely in outline, painted by imperfect processes, in the catacombs of St. Agnes, moves the heart differently and elevates the imagination far higher than the delicate pencil which possesses all the refinements of our civilization. There, at least, the innermost feeling is not crushed; we see no ironical curl upon the lips of Jesus, but a countenance, deep and pure, and beaming with love and holiness which penetrate the heart. The new ideal, which appealed to humanity eighteen centuries ago, is not profaned. It is really the good shepherd who seeks the lost sheep, the sympathizing brother who saves us by his own sufferings, and this brother, nevertheless, is God; this is the Christ whom we adore, and he whom they wished to crucify. Nothing can ever supply the place of this portrait, the tradition of which is preserved in the paintings of Raphael and Leonard da Vinci. Whatever deviates from it in any sensible degree can not last.

Thus, in his willingness to sacrifice everything to art, M. Renan has certainly rendered it less service than those even who never thought of it. In this book, as well as in his other writings, the constant tendency to confound religion with æsthetics, the good with the beautiful, is very apparent;

identifying evil with vulgarity, he necessarily regards the good as nothing more than elegant ease and refined enjoyment. This is no where more palpable than in his Life of Jesus. Taking no account of the moral malady which consumes humanity, assigning no place to sin and repentance, he passes smilingly along the gloomy abysses of evil and suffering which line our path—and the Christ he describes does the same. He never went down into those depths, and consequently with a little melancholy he mingles a great deal of gayety. There is no trace in him of the generous, infinite grief of compassion, which embraces all the suffering, which burns to save and to forgive, and urges this holy and sorrowing love even to self-immolation. Yet in this consists the supreme beauty of Christ; moral beauty, no doubt, but a beauty which must be made to live again in every image of Him; if not, the image has no claim to be reckoned as a high work of art, and we sink into miniature and embellishment. We are greatly deceived if we imagine that art can dispense with moral inspiration, particularly as regards a countenance in which holiness and love are the predominant features. Hence it is that notwithstanding his marvelous skill in the chiseling of stone and marble, the artist has only succeeded in producing the statue of a beautiful young man beloved by women, when that of a holy one and of a God was demanded. Of what account are the richness of the materials and the finish of the model? It is none the less a failure.

Taking the book of M. Renan by itself, and without comparing it with the documents of the Gospel history, or with the indelible image of Christ engraven in our hearts and minds, it appears to me to contain so many contradictions as to be amply sufficient for its own refutation. Several of these in the details of the narrative I have pointed out; but, beyond all this, the Christ he describes is essentially contradictory. It is impossible to conceive of any such person. He is not a living creature but a mere product of speculation. He does not stand; he floats like a fantastic being that has no consistency and takes all sorts of forms. There is no reasonable relation between the two periods of his life, between the rural scenes of Galilee and the tragic scenes at Jerusalem. No one can see why the delightful teacher becomes so suddenly a gloomy giant, an

intractable fanatic, a revolutionist, and why this excitement of women and children terminates before the Pretorium and at Calvary. To explain it as a cunning plan to diffuse the pure and sweet doctrine of the Galilean period, by means of the marvelous and the scandalous, is altogether unsatisfactory, because that pure and sweet doctrine is entirely changed in the second period of Christ's ministry. M. Renan will never make us understand this sudden change, this burning fever which seizes the agreeable rabbi and urges him to exaggerate his mission with unheard of persistency, in giving himself out as the great Ambassador of God, in whom everything centers, who saves the world by his death, and pretends to reign over all hearts. After having reduced primitive Christianity to a kind of gay science, such a sudden transition to self-exaltation is a change without ground or reason. This self-exaltation, according to M. Renan's own showing, was carried to the point of claiming a nature like that of God. If the point at issue be admitted, it is a clear case of insanity or of scandalous imposture. To pronounce, after all this, the madman who pretends to live in the souls of his disciples and claims to be the Son of God, the greatest of men, is to be guilty of gross inconsistency. Jesus does not deserve this honor if he played a part so unworthy.

After all, it is not so much the work of Jesus which extorts the admiration of M. Renan, as its results in the world. He can not deny that the great era of history dates from Him, or that from Him modern civilization, with all its benefits and all its lights, takes its origin. There is one resurrection which undoubtedly proceeded from Him, namely, that of the ancient world, which certainly descended into the grave with its beliefs, its gods, its glories, and its liberties; and that at least was not a death feigned to produce a theatrical effect like the fraud attributed to Lazarus. The world knew not even the name of the obscure Galilean who has restored it to life. It died from the exhaustion of its moving principle; it sank beneath its own weight; and if it had been left to itself on the precipice, we know not into what depths of corruption it would have plunged and been lost. Who laid the foundations of a new social order? Who brought moral health into this mass of corruption, life into this death? Who opened to expiring human-

ity the career of an immense progress? It was the Galilean. M. Renan does not deny it. "All history," he says, "is incomprehensible without him. He is the incomparable man to whom universal conscience has decreed the title of the Son of God; and that with justice, for he gave to religion an impulse with which probably no other can be compared. Whatever is most excellent in every one of us we owe to him. He is more than a reformer of an obsolete religion; he is the center of the eternal religion of humanity." This testimony is important, and I can well understand how an eloquent and generous writer should take it up and exclaim: "I have before me two witnesses, one of the first century, the other of the nineteenth; both trustworthy as to what they have seen, but of questionable authority in respect to what they have not seen. The one is St. John, to whom I will refer for the *life* of Jesus. The other is yourself, to whom I will refer for the *work* of Jesus after the lapse of eighteen centuries. These two witnesses together make his divinity resplendent before my eyes."*

The testimony of M. Renan is, nevertheless, given against himself and clearly shows the insufficiency and ridiculousness of his interpretation of the life of Christ. He expressly says that facts must be explained by adequate causes. The *fact* to be explained is the renewal of the world; the *cause* is the appearance in Judea of an exceedingly gentle young teacher, with nothing to distinguish him from other men except a charming manner and a high degree of moral purity, which does not exempt him, however, from the common lot of suffering. Neither his life nor his teachings are distinguished by any marked or peculiar character. He said nothing really new, since we find his most beautiful maxims scattered through the floating traditions of his race and even in the writings of the Stoics. Transcendent disdain, love of mankind, and sublime spirituality are found on more than one page of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus. These philosophers spoiled those sublime truths by shocking inconsistencies.—But did not Jesus

* See the excellent article of M. Cochin, in the *Correspondant* of the 25th of July. We are happy to render the most sympathizing homage to these touching pages, penetrated with the purest Christian spirit, which elevate us to the height where all secondary differences melt away in adoration of the divine Head of the Church universal at the foot of the Cross.

do the same when (according to M. Renan) he became a sort of exalted tribune of the poor, and when he obtruded his own personality with such intolerable persistency? If to be inconsistent, then, is enough to ruin a great cause, Jesus should have succeeded no better than the Talmudists and the school of the Porch. Why, then, is it that he achieved so great a triumph, while the sages who developed the same ideas in Judea and at Rome were unable to retard for a single day the downfall of the ancient world? The reason is, it seems, that he uttered them in tones full of unction, and that he displayed a prodigious force of will! This is the cause of results so extraordinary! On such an explanation, the disproportion between cause and effect manifestly exceeds all bounds. M. Renan is condemned by his own principle. The denial of the supernatural involves the necessity of having recourse, for the interpretation of history, to a thousand petty suggestions which explain nothing and only plunge us into still deeper absurdities, for the principle of causality is evidently rational and well established. It seems to us that there are few sophisms more revolting than a philosophy of history according to which the world was elevated by a few borrowed sayings and saved by a smile. For the healing of humanity sick unto death, something more than contact with an exquisite person was required. Compared with such prettinesses, the foolishness of the Cross, the folly of the Sovereign intervention of divine love in history, appears alone wise and reasonable, and we comprehend better than ever the bold and defiant question of St. Paul: "Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the profound teacher of this age? Has not God shown the wisdom of this world to be foolishness? The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men." 1 Cor. i, 20, 25.

Compare, now, with all these attempts to explain the life of Jesus and the history of the world, the grand solution accepted and professed by the Church in all ages, which stands apart, with imposing singleness, from all minor differences. It takes cognizance of man, both in his native nobility and in his actual degradation, which is equalled only by the grandeur of his redemption. Called to a holy life by a free and holy God, whose image he bears, he is to decide his own destiny in the solemn trial of his liberty. He falls, and drags with him in his

ruin the world of which he is monarch; but even in his fallen state he carries with him the indestructible remembrance of his high origin. The torch of the life divine is still glimmering within. It casts a dim light upon the darkness, and prevents not only despair but also consolation, which would be the lowest degree of degradation: for banishment borne without sorrow ceases to be banishment, it is final expatriation. The exile loses his native country whenever he ceases to weep for it and becomes at home on a foreign soil. The race of man is too noble to submit quietly to an abject existence, because it is the race of God. Hence, notwithstanding all the enticements of the flesh, notwithstanding his errors and his follies, he yearns to find his lost God, only however to set up miserable idols which he breaks successively in pieces. In truth it is not so much he that is seeking God as God who is seeking him; for this God is neither the universe (a conception which confounds Him with nature), nor an abstract God able neither to think nor to love, but a Father.

On the throne of the universe reigns free and holy love. God himself is this love. He wills to save as he willed to create, in his sovereign liberty and without constraint; and history, the course of which he directs, is but the stirring drama of redemption. If aspiration and hope have never disappeared from the earth, if they are found, vague but strong, in the bosom of heathenism, while in prophetic songs, inspired on Zion's harp, they salute the coming king, it is because God has never abandoned even for a single day the fallen race which he destined for pardon and redemption. At length He for whom the world is waiting comes; He whom the whole of Judaism prefigured, of whom the East had a glimpse in its feverish and incoherent dreams, and toward whom the exhausted West unconsciously turned. He comes to represent mankind in the highest trial of his liberty. He does not come for an idyl, but for a sublime and bloody tragedy; for he is to redeem a lost world and to descend to the lowest depths of human condemnation, even to the dust of the grave, to triumph over death in its own gloomy realm, and to reopen by his resurrection the gates of eternal life to pardoned humanity, who shall recognize in him their Saviour and their God. Thus the world, fallen by the abuse of its liberty, is redeemed by a free sacrifice of love,

which reunites the broken links between heaven and earth. The mystery is great I acknowledge; but at least there is no disproportion between cause and effect. I can form the idea of a world transformed by such a grand and striking manifestation of divine love: but that a vague influence, a breath of gentleness and peace, a breeze from the East, should have been sufficient to overturn so many idols and overcome so many obstacles, and should have made the most parched and worn-out soil again to blossom, will always transcend my comprehension, and in the end will be certain to embarrass M. Renan and the whole naturalistic school.

I add, that apart from the Christian explanation the personality of Christ becomes entirely inexplicable. If he is not the God-man, his teaching, with the exception of a few ingenious parables and a few maxims which were already known, but which he imbued with a purer spirit, is nothing but a tissue of wearisome repetitions. If he is not the way, the truth, and the life, the vine whence the branches draw their nourishment—if he is nothing more than an ordinary teacher,—then there is no book more absurd or more empty than the Gospels. There is no language more contemptible, let us consider it well, than that which is ever presenting a person as the center of all religious life, if that person is simply a creature. Take away his divinity and you have in the sublimest words of Christ nothing but empty forms without significance or relevance. Their expression only obliged me to look at an offensive personal exhibition. But just this personal exhibition it is which constitutes the whole Gospel, and the Gospel has transformed the world. Here again, in order to avoid the mystery, we must fall into absurdity, and suppose Jesus to have become at once a maniac and the greatest and most powerful of the sons of men! The contradiction is flagrant and the facts remain unexplained.

The solution of M. Renan is not only irrational, it also involves the most outrageous contempt of humanity. From the beginning he gives us clearly to understand that man for a long time was confounded with the animal:* probably the only distinction

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* Man, *when he first distinguished himself from the animal* (p. 51, Am. Trans.). M. Reville, in an article on Mythology, published in the *Temps* of the 7th of August, tells us that our first parent was not at the side of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, but *on* some sort of a tree, like a monkey.

he makes between himself and the animal in the greater perfection of his organs. He is not by birth a son of God, but like the other creatures simply the offspring of the primitive slime. Consequently we can not speak of a fall, for from what height could he have fallen? From an origin so low he could only rise. The naturalistic philosophy would not for anything in the world accept the doctrine of the fall, which it regards as imperiling our own dignity, all unconscious, it would seem, how much it degrades the human soul by refusing to admit its native nobility and its divine parentage. This contempt of humanity I find expressed in a still more degrading manner in the prominence which M. Renan attributes to deception in the success of great ideas. He distinctly avows his conviction that noble causes are gained only by bad means, and that truth never prevails unless it is supported by falsehood and marvel; that is to say, that truth must be decked out as a courtesan in order to be received by mankind. It is never espoused except as Tamar was espoused by Judah, by means of a vile surprise and the deceitful apparel of a strange woman. Let those who imagine that dishonor is transformed into a mark of distinction, when it is placed upon man by man himself, be cheered by it. From the moment we regard man only as an advanced monkey, I can see how we must imagine also that he can not be caught except by stratagem. For one I am unable to descend to this depth of humility. I believe that Truth is queen of humanity by divine right, because humanity is made for it. Falsehood may have its time, but the future does not belong to it. It succeeds only by surprise. The fool who believes in to-morrow is the truly wise man. The man who in order to triumph to-day, knowingly falsifies the truth, does not believe in to-morrow, and so he is one of those wise men who are fools. All petty calculations fail when a great thought is concerned: the best policy in the things of the soul is to have none. Christianity has triumphed because its friends had the imprudence to tell right out all they knew of truth, and were one and all confessors and martyrs. Whence comes the power and the winning influence of martyrdom? From the entire sincerity it exhibits; and the best proof that humanity is not so abject as some suppose is, that men have ever believed by preference in those witnesses who suffered themselves to be slain. When a man lives by his

doctrine as a deceiver, his doctrine will die; when he is ready to die for it, the doctrine will live and triumph. The human race is decidedly on the side of loyalty. Let us cease then to slander mankind under pretence of making them free, and let us acknowledge that the religion which humbles is also that which exalts. Heap reproaches upon Christianity as much as men please, they will always be forced to acknowledge that while it unsparingly exposes our shame and misery, it treats the human soul with holy respect. What greater mark of respect, what higher honor could we desire, than a God humbled in order to save it?

Let us recall the sublime rapture of Pascal, the expression of which in writing, for the sake of more vivid impression, he always carried about his person. It begins by what we may call an outgushing of his faith, in the few words which follow, and which are interrupted by sighs as if inexpressible:

> "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
> Not of philosophers and of the learned;
> Certainty, certainty, feeling, joy, peace;
> God of Jesus Christ."

Then follows this significant exclamation:

> "Greatness of the human soul!"

Thus at the very time that this great genius throws himself at the feet of the Crucified and cries out: "Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ! I have separated myself from him. I have fled from him, renounced, crucified him! Let me never be severed from him:" at this hour "of total and sweet renunciation," in the dust where he is prostrated, he vividly feels the greatness of the human soul. He is not mistaken; for never does the soul appear greater than when in the presence of the Redeemer sacrificed for it. It is on our knees and beneath the cross that we exclaim: Greatness of the human soul! On the contrary he who passes before the cross, mocking and wagging his head, believes man to be too low for such a sacrifice. He declares with Celsus, that such a miracle for a worm so abject is impossible, and exclaims: Oh, vileness of human nature! It is true his bearing is lofty, and he is proud to proclaim his own and our dishonor; but what a poor exchange!

Some degree of courage is required to quote the passage of

Pascal to which we have just referred. There are those who regard it as exhibiting a bewildered and sickly genius, and who style him a visionary. Be it so: I do not hesitate to avow that in this sense all true Christians are visionaries. They are not Christians except as in some happy hour they have seen and understood Christ and beheld him with the eye of the soul. He is their friend and their consoler, their brother and their God. Yes; in this enlightened age, notwithstanding all the inventions and all the theories of science, there are men who live with Christ, and who feel their hearts burn within them at his words, like the disciples who broke bread with him at Emmaus, on the evening after his resurrection. Judge then what their feelings must be when he, whom they adore as the Son of God, not with a distant and unfrequent worship, but with the most holy intimacy, is presented in the light which has now been exposed. What care they for the talent and genius employed in such a cause? To demand their gratitude and to trifle with their sadness in advance is to show the most profound ignorance of the sensibilities of the Christian heart. That a feuilletonist, an improvised theologian, who admires only because of his ignorance, should do this, is conceivable; but let the faith of Christians be experienced but a single day, and it would be felt that a respectful sympathy alone is becoming, when a chord so sacred in their hearts is struck.

I close this critical examination of the "Life of Jesus" as I began, with the calm certainty that the Christian faith is in no danger from its success. So much arbitrary assumption must soon disgust the scientific mind accustomed to more rigorous methods. What is the sum and substance of this book? A religion which is no religion, since it consists solely in a most intangible sentiment and substitutes an ambiguous expression for the name of God; a morality without sanctions, since no certain retribution is left for justice; and as a compensation for these defects, transcendental disdain which gives men permission to bear much present ill, because right is not of this world. The book of M. Renan is like a vase admirably cut, but filled with a subtle poison which enervates the soul, stupefies the will, and intoxicates the conscience by substituting the poetic and fictitious in the place of moral feeling. It contains nothing sound or manly. Of victorious struggles for the good

and for liberty, this school has no conception. Christianity would only be too well avenged upon a nation that would renounce it for the sake of such an idle phantom. Be assured so long as there dwells in the human soul a longing for pardon and justice, men will be drawn to the Christ whom the Church adores. In vain will even enchanters tell them, "lo he is here, or lo he is there." They will turn away from all such fanciful Christs, who are only the ideal forms in which their authors would find some little reflection of themselves, in order to return to the Christ of St. John and St. Paul, of Pascal and Luther.

THE ARTICLES OF THE NEW BELIEF.*

The events of the last two years have been thus far favorable to Christianity; men have spoken out their hitherto concealed doubts and misgivings, and we have learned to the full the dangers which threaten the orthodox belief. Different men have made different degrees of progress in the new path; but, taking as a point of departure, "The full persuasion of the Divine authority of every part of Holy Scripture, and a full belief in the facts it narrates as history," we may say confidently, that we can now, with tolerable accuracy, measure the progress made in this descent by Dr. Temple, the Edinburgh reviewer, the Congregational Lecturer for 1859, Messrs. Pattison, Kingsley, Llewellyn Davies, Garden, Ludlow, Maurice, Jowett, Wilson, Williams, Davidson, and the Bishop of Natal. If we may judge of the nature of the ground by the movement of the travelers, the inclination downward would appear to be both rapid and great; it seems difficult to stand still in any part of it. There is impulse enough given at the very outset to carry any man to the bottom. If any are held back, it is evidently (at a great sacrifice of consistency) by the strong force of early training, from regard to the opinions and feelings of beloved friends, from the obvious loss of position and character and influence which would ensue; in some cases, from the fear of God, and an earnest desire not to give offense to the weakest

*From the London *Christian Advocate and Review*, January, 1863.

in the faith. These causes, however, *reach only to individuals;* intellectually and logically, no one who has rejected the full Divine authority of Holy Scripture, can find one safe step between the ground he has forsaken and open infidelity and atheism. Dr. Priestley justly ridicules the timidity of those who halt between Unitarianism and Orthodoxy; Gibbon in like manner sneers at Dr. Priestley for his coquetry with faith and infidelity: and it would be easy enough in the same way to convict the deist and skeptic of inconsistency in maintaining any principle short of atheism, or pantheism, or universal unbelief.

In comparing together the sentiments of the writers mentioned above, we may notice that there are principles which seem to underlie them all, but which rise to the surface, some in one writer and some in another. These principles may be thus arranged under the name of "*The Articles of the New Belief.*"

1. We believe in one eternal God existing in the Trinity of Persons, but we do not on that account assent to any dogma or doctrine expressing or defending this belief, either in the language of Scripture, or of the Councils of the Church.

2. We believe in the Holy Scriptures as the inspired Word of God, containing in them a revelation of all things necessary for the religious instruction and salvation of men; but we do not receive the books of Scripture, that is, the documents themselves, as necessarily true and divine, either as to their history, their prophecies, their modes of reasoning or their forms of thought and expression. What we do believe in them is what *we* discern and feel to be the Word of God.

3. We believe in the Lord Jesus Christ as very God and very man, but we are not on that account obliged to accept all that is narrated of his conception, his birth, his miracles, his resurrection and ascension into heaven. Some of these things have been stumbling-blocks to the greatest minds in all ages, and may be quite as helpful to us if understood in an allegorical as in a literal and historical sense.

4. We believe that Christ by his death made atonement for the sin of man; that he was a true sacrifice for sin; that he reconciled the whole world to God; that he obtained redemption for us. He sacrificed himself *on our behalf* according to the will of God; but we do not on that account acknowledge that he died in the room and stead of transgressors; that his death has

any reference to the punishment due to man's sin, to the sentence of the law, to the claims of the Divine government, or to our deliverance from guilt. He was our representative, our example and pattern, not our substitute, bearing the punishment due to us and so reconciling the Father to us.

5. We believe in the Holy Ghost, that through his grace men are born again and born of God; that some men are converted in later life, so as to be more earnest and religious than they were before; but we object altogether to classify men into believers and unbelievers, into saints and sinners, especially as connected with any religious opinions or sentiments of any kind. All men in a Christian country are sinners, and all are children of God whether they be Papists or Unitarians, Dissenters or Churchmen, Socialists or Atheists; so that they earnestly strive to do good and be good, we are warranted to call them brethren; nay, even the worst characters, we have no right to condemn or to withdraw from them our charity. Such distinctions only foster pride, and are altogether contrary to the Christian religion.

6. We believe in a future state of rewards and punishments, but we believe these punishments to be strictly remedial; they are in no sense *penal*, otherwise than as all sufferings are penal. They are mercifully ordered to check us in dangerous and ruinous courses, and their continuance after this life will be of the same character, viz., with a design ultimately to cure and remove the evil.

7. We believe that Jesus Christ will come to judge the quick and the dead, and that men will be raised from the dead at the last day, in their bodies, to receive the reward of their works; but as we think all representations of God as the moral governor of the universe to be essentially absurd and foolish, we receive this doctrine with necessary reservations.

8. Finally, we believe in the Christian religion as truly divine, but not exclusively so; other religions have had in them elements of truth, even of saving truth. It is conceivable that another form of religion more pure and perfect than Christianity may yet be made known. We despise, therefore, what are called "The Evidences of Christianity." So far as Christianity is divine it needs no evidence; so far as it is human no evidence can prove it to be otherwise than it is.

PREACHING AND PREACHERS OF WALES, PAST AND PRESENT.*

[The following article is translated from the Welsh, and was written as an introduction to a recent volume of Welsh sermons. The author is the Rev. Owen Thomas, of London, who has ministered for several years to the Welsh Calvinistic churches of the Metropolis, by appointment of the Association of that denomination. He is also Editor of "*Y Trathodydd*" (The Essayist), a quarterly, and the leading periodical in the language. As one who himself stands in the very front rank of Welsh pulpit orators, and as a gentleman of scholarly culture and fine critical ability, he is qualified beyond most others to discuss the subject here considered, and by those competent to judge of the facts, this discussion is regarded as eminently just and satisfactory.]

There is, perhaps, more preaching in Wales, considering its size and population, than in any other country on the face of the globe. Nothing is more astonishing to strangers visiting there than the multitude of its places of worship; and nothing is more remarkable in connection with them than the crowds that are seen to frequent them, not only on Sabbath days but during the week; and this is, doubtless, a special peculiarity of our nation. Something like it is seen occasionally in the principal cities of England and Scotland, but it is a thing quite common in the most rural districts of Wales. There is no season too busy to be sacrificed by the Welsh to the sermon. Multitudes are often seen leaving their fields in the middle of a fair-day, in harvest-time, to betake themselves to the chapel; and not seldom has the fair been known to be emptied, comparatively, for an hour and a half or two hours, by the desire of the people to listen to the itinerant stranger who might happen to be in town. Long miles are often walked to hear a sermon, and scarcely any fatigue is felt from the enjoyment which it furnishes. There are in the country no meetings of any sort

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*From *Lampau y Deml* (Lamps of the Temple). By Rev. Owen Thomas, A. M. Carnarvon, 1858. Translated by Rev. Llewelyn J. Evans, Professor of Church History in Lane Theological Seminary.

half so popular as the great preaching assemblies, nor such kindness, liberality, and hospitality shown toward any object as toward the preparations and expenses which these involve. Preaching in Wales, during the last half-century, has been not only the chief means of religious instruction to the people, but also one of the chief sources of social entertainment. The sermons of the Sabbath, including the style, the voice, the eloquence of the preacher, are a prominent subject of conversation during the week; and, with thousands, nothing is the subject of more eager anticipation, or looked forward to with more pleasure than the sermons of the following Sabbath. We do not claim that this is all religion. We know it is not. There is danger that thousands in our country have nothing higher in view in all this than entertainment. They use the pulpit and the chapel to minister to them, in great part, the same pleasure that a large number of our English neighbors receive at the theater. They delight in the smooth eloquence, the beautiful similes, the ingenious arguments, the musical voice of the preacher, with little thought, perchance, of the relation of the contents of the sermon to their personal condition. This it must be confessed, not only deprives such hearers of all the benefits of the Gospel, but places a great temptation in the way of the preacher himself. He is in danger of being drawn aside from the great end of his ministry to that which must prove destructive of it. He must watch continually lest he be ensnared into striving to please men, and thus ceasing to be the servant of Christ. But however low may be the aims of many in the attention which they give to the Gospel, there can be no doubt that the moral condition of Wales has been thoroughly changed by the ministry of the Word. The spiritual darkness that covered our land has been dispelled, the corrupt customs and ungodly games that stained it have been in many neighborhoods almost forgotten, and those virtues which are universally acknowledged as indispensable to social comfort and prosperity, are respected and practised more extensively than in any part of our kingdom. There remain, indeed, dark spots on our national character, which every one, jealous of his country's honor, will endeavor to remove; but, on the whole, taking into consideration all the elements of character, the Welsh people need not fear comparison with any other people

in the whole world. And only prejudice itself will deny the immediate dependence of that wonderful and precious revolution, which has taken place in the moral character of the nation within the last century, on the nature of the instruction communicated from the pulpit and the influence of that instruction on the popular mind; and if we apply one of the first principles of natural philosophy to the present aspect of our country, that every cause is to be measured by its effect or effects, no one can doubt the grandeur of the preaching whose efficacy has been so great. The preachers have been buried, the sermons are lost, but some idea may be formed of the nature of the preaching from the hold which it took and retains on the mind and heart of the nation, and from the entirely new aspect which it presents religiously. If, as is very probable, it was deficient in some of the elements which the critic deems essential, the work which it has wrought in our land is enough to prove its power to secure the great end of the Gospel. Very few examples have been preserved of the old preaching; it was for the most part, in its peculiar excellence, something which could not be put on paper—the burning of a consuming fire, the rushing of a mighty wind, the shooting of forked lightning, the roaring of terrible thunders, the rocking of a fearful earthquake, the powers of the world to come brought sensibly before the congregations, something that must be seen, heard, felt, to be understood; but that which Wales is to-day, compared with what it was a hundred years ago, is a commentary on it and a sufficient testimony to its character as a blessing to the world, and to its possession of elements which it would be a great pity ever to lose.

The circumstances of our country have changed wonderfully from what they were a hundred years ago; yea, fifty years, or even less. There are schools in every neighborhood; opportunities for acquiring knowledge and attainments therein are much more extensive; monthly and quarterly periodicals and newspapers of all sorts, not only in Welsh but in English, are making their way into every locality; we are assured by some of the principal booksellers of the Metropolis that in scarcely any part of the kingdom do they sell so many books as in Wales; railways and traveling facilities have brought our nation into closer intimacy with the great English world, and as they

increase will bring us still closer; large numbers of our youth, male and female, are sent to the best schools of England to perfect their education; schools of the highest grade are established in all parts of the Principality, able to compete with the best of their kind in England; almost every young artisan and tradesman now endeavors to spend a few years in London or in one of the large English towns, to accomplish himself in his business; from all causes it is easy to see that an immense change has taken place in the circumstances of our country within a very few years. It is clear that the ministry, to maintain its influence over the mind of the nation, must be awake to these changes; that it must keep the lead in intellectual cultivation and in the prosecution of general no less than Scriptural knowledge; that it must be especially vigilant to guard against the new dangers to the nation's moral condition arising out of the new circumstances in which it is placed. Labor, application, diligence are required of the preacher to make his ministry equal in all respects to the demands of the age; and it is a duty specially incumbent on the churches to give him all assistance thereto, by furnishing the opportunities of a liberal education to prepare him for his work, and by releasing him from all worldly care in the performance of it. The Churches of Wales are beginning generally to recognize the necessity of the former, and we are glad to see a growing sense of obligation in regard to the latter. No stronger proof is needed that our preachers are, generally speaking, sensible of the demands of their age, than this volume—a volume which after all is only a sample of the ordinary discourses of their authors, and of the discourses delivered every Sabbath in a very large number of the pulpits of our country. We do not hesitate to claim for most of these sermons an immense superiority, as compositions, over the best sermons of our old fathers, with perhaps one or two exceptions—a superiority at the same time directly associated with the present circumstances of our nation. In the fair endeavor to discover the meaning of the text, and to ground the sermon on the thought of God's spirit contained in it; in the power to grasp its great principles and to present them in a series of propositions to the hearers; in the skill to construct the composition out of the materials furnished by inspiration itself in the text and context; in the attempt to exhibit the

harmony of its truths, not only with the entire body of the Divine revelation, but with the great principles of man's intellectual and moral being; in the comprehensive view of the mutual relations of Divine truths, and especially of their glorious convergence in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, not to mention correctness of language, propriety of rhetoric, happiness of illustration, and purity of taste, it seems to us there can be no comparison between the best sermons almost that were formerly delivered and several in this collection. And as we have already remarked, the same characteristics distinguish the Welsh ministry generally in these days. At the same time we are not without feeling that there is considerable danger, lest in the laudable endeavor to adapt the ministry to the new circumstances of the times, it should lose in those features which have hitherto distinguished it among us—those features which have in an especial manner given it power and efficacy, and made it such a blessing to our country. The danger of this is so much the greater in that there seems to be almost an incompatibility between those characteristics and the new elements requisite to that preaching, which is likely to be not only acceptable but useful in these days. One of the tasks to be accomplished by Welsh preachers in this age, is to meet in their ministry the exigencies of the times without losing out of it the peculiar characteristics which have hitherto distinguished it, and which have crowned it with such power. Our remarks by no means refer to any departure from the Gospel, as the contents of that which is delivered, but to the ministerial delivery of the Gospel to the world; and, in this respect, we think that there were some things in the old Welsh preaching which we should be careful not to lose, whatever changes may be necessary. Let us point out two or three of these.

One characteristic of the old-time preaching, so far as we remember it, and according to all that we have heard of it from others older than ourselves, and from several no longer on earth, was the thorough-going conviction which possessed the preacher of the truth and authority of the Gospel, and of its divine claim to reception from all who heard it. This was very noteworthy in our old preachers. They believed, and therefore they spoke. They had risen through their own experience to such certainty in regard to the things of the Gospel, that they were

to them things which could not be questioned, and which they could not but speak. Many of them, it is true, had never encountered the objections common among infidels to the Divine Revelation; that skeptical spirit which many in our days would honor as the sign of a great, broad, and liberal mind, was then quite foreign to our country and confined to a class with which they never came in contact. They were, therefore, by no means expert in the apologetics of the faith. But they had something which to themselves as Christians was unspeakably higher, and which to themselves as ministers in the condition of their country, was unspeakably better,—a deep, intense, and abiding experience of the authority of truth over their own minds, a heart-feeling that the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation, the testimony of the inward man. They consequently spoke always with authority. They felt that what they uttered were the words of God, and thus to their hearers the words of eternal life. Their message must be believed by the people for this sole reason—it was from God. The conviction of the truth of the Gospel was so deeply-rooted in their minds that they could tolerate no opposition to it, and scarcely would they admit the legitimacy of arguing in behalf of it. Enough for them that anything was in the Bible. Whatever in that light appeared to them to be the truth they presented to their hearers, naked and unadorned, leaving it to grapple with their consciences, wholly confident that it could not be unsuccessful. All who remember anything of the late Rev. John Elias, remember this characteristic. It belonged to him from his first appearance as a preacher. "I will tell you the first thing which I ever heard of John Elias," said an intelligent old man to us once: "Davydd Cadwalader came by here one day, on his return from a monthly meeting. After a little talk I asked him what kind of a meeting they had had. 'Well!' said he, 'there was a weaver boy there from Carnarvonshire, and he has begun to preach and they put him to preach in the monthly meeting. The great Lord keep him from error; the people will have to believe whatever he says.'" That, in a great measure, was characteristic of all the old preachers. We have often heard it remarked of Robert Roberts, of Clynog, that for nothing was he more noted than for this. In the power which he had to fix in the minds of his

hearers this conviction about himself was the secret of Howell Harris' strength. Having asked a somewhat thoughtless old man what he remembered of Mr. Harris, the answer which we got was: "That man spoke of hell as though he had been there." We have no doubt that there are similar stories in regard to many others of the old fathers. Now, having this element in such strength, they could not be otherwise than successful. It was this which clothed the apostles with such power: "we were eye-witnesses of his majesty." This made the Apostle Paul so confident and made his ministry so effective: "I received it not of man." This it was that made Luther so fearless of devils, and himself a terror to Pope and Emperor. Out of this sprung the invincible courage of John Knox, and gave him such authority over the minds of his countrymen. And so of the old Welsh preachers. Notwithstanding their personal consciousness of man's deficiencies, notwithstanding their poverty and low station in society, notwithstanding their well-known lack of many qualifications generally deemed necessary to ministers of the Gospel, this constituted them servants of Christ in their own minds, and messengers of God in the consciences of their cotemporaries.

Now, we would by no means intimate that the preaching which we have now is in danger of becoming faithless, although, perhaps, we can scarcely claim that our convictions are as deep and strong as those of our fathers; but it is to another thing quite different that we desire now to direct the attention of our brethren. There is considerable danger, we imagine, lest even the more comprehensive view that is now taken of Scriptural truth, the necessity which is felt of laying down soberly, minutely, and cautiously the foundations of that particular portion of it which may be considered the more analytical and argumentative form given to the discourse, those elements which are specially demanded by the wider intellectual culture of the hearer of to-day, compared with the hearers of the past; there is considerable danger, we imagine, lest these things should assume such a character as might tend to leave a doubt in the minds of those who are addressed as to the unqualified faith of the preacher himself in the truth of that which he presents before them. We do not suppose that a manner the most accurate, the most modest and trembling, bordering on

the diffident, necessarily produces on the minds of the hearers the impression of feebleness in faith on the part of the preacher, and we are sure that it is much more desirable than that presuming, insolent, dictatorial manner which is sometimes seen, the only effect of which is to rouse every feeling to a fortified opposition against it; while, at the same time, the former manner is under the necessity of assuming a tone less infallible, if not more fallible, than the resolute, authoritative air which distinguished the old preachers, and which best becomes one wholly convinced that he has a message from God. There are difficulties, it must be confessed, on both sides; and the best way to avoid them is to bring the heart under the simple power of the truth, and to a deep consciousness of its importance on the one hand and of its divine authority on the other.

Another special characteristic of the old Welsh preachers, arising in part out of that which has been already noted in them, was an intense feeling of the unspeakable importance of the truth delivered by them, and of its essential connection with the eternal life of their hearers. This, perhaps, was the chief peculiarity of the ministry of our fathers. This was *that Welsh fire* which has become proverbial among our English neighbors. The Welsh have been in the habit of believing that it is altogether lawful for them to lay out their whole nature in the service of their God. They do not regard religion as something for the intellect alone, as though it did not concern the feeling. They see from the Bible that its seat is the heart, and thence it subjects the whole man to itself. Consulting their own nature under the influence of religion, Welsh preachers are full of warmth and energy in urging their countrymen to surrender themselves to it. The great majority of English ministers are not altogether so. It is true that the best of them, outside of Wales, are full as fiery as the most ardent Welshman. So especially was Dr. Chalmers always; so is Dr. Guthrie, and Dr. Candlish, and Dr. M'Leod; so is Mr. Birney always in his best efforts; so is Mr. Melville always, the greatest preacher perhaps among the English. So are all the greatest men. And it is strange that the rest do not learn from their success to strive in some degree to imitate them. But for the most part they are very different. It is true that the English on the platform in political meetings, and the legal advocates in the courts

of justice, and the honorable members of parliament, of any ability and influence, bring out all their powers and give rein to all their feelings; they shout, they strike their hands together, they stamp with their feet, they often seem under the inspiration of their subject as though for the time being they had lost all self-control. But it would be highly unbecoming to go into such ecstasies in the pulpit. There one must be as cold as ice. To warm up with those themes which fire heaven, would be beneath the dignity which befitteth such a place. Not so the old Welsh. Whatever else they wanted, they did not lack ardor. They threw themselves wholly into their work. They travailed much in prayer and meditation, laboring to get the contents of the sermon not only into the understanding and the memory, but also into their feelings. They were not content unless they were thoroughly drenched with the spirit of it. As a consequence the sermon was a word from the heart to the heart. It is said of Robert Roberts that he would hardly sleep a wink the night before preaching at the Bala Association or on any similar occasion; all night long he would be up in his chamber, rolling at times on the floor, wrestling with God that his own heart might be impressed by the truths which he purposed preaching on the morrow to others. We have heard the late Rev. Griffith Solomon relate an incident of his preaching which should be preserved from oblivion. Robert Roberts, while itinerating through Anglesea with another brother, came to Brynsiencyn, where the late Rev. John Parry, of Chester, then lived and kept school. Elias Parry, brother of Mr. Parry, attended the school, a young boy who had been familiar from childhood with preaching and preachers. There was another young boy at the school who knew much less of preaching and preachers, and to whom Robert Roberts was an entire stranger. The two boys went together to hear the sermons. A large congregation had assembled, and great expectations were entertained of the preachers, and particularly of one of them. There was considerable feeling while the first preacher was speaking. When he was through Robert Roberts arose. There was terrible earnestness in his countenance. He read his text; at first he seemed timid—he spoke less accurately than usual. By degrees his utterance becomes freer, his voice clearer, his look more and more earnest. He goes on, lays hold on the

soul of the assembly, some faint, the rest cry out, he himself with a voice like God's trumpet, thrills the place through and through. Upon this the other boy turns to Elias Parry, and asks him, his face pale as a corpse, "Is he a man or an angel?" "Why! an angel; did n't you know?" "No, indeed, I did n't know. Great heaven! but how much better an angel preaches than a man!" That, undoubtedly, from all we can learn, was the most remarkable element in the ministry of that wonderful man, an intense feeling of the truth, and the complete abandonment of himself to that feeling as he stood above the congregation. And the same thing distinguished in a greater or less degree all our old preachers, at least all who have ever reached eminence as such. We do not propose at this time to defend every thing which accompanied these feelings, nor every exhibition which they made of them. Nor shall we claim for them that they were not perhaps too much inclined to neglect the enlightening of the intellect and the awakening of the conscience, in their desire to excite the feelings and play upon the sensibilities; but, after all, there was some adaptation in their manner to meet something in our nature which could be met in no other way, an adaptation which in our opinion constituted one of the best elements of their ministry.

Preaching with us, in these days, is in some danger of losing this trait which until now has been a special peculiarity of the Welsh ministry. The necessity laid on the preacher by the circumstances of the times, to meet the intellect of his hearers, the attention which must be paid to order in the composition; to sobriety, quietness, and fairness in the exposition; to pertinence, strictness, and strength in the argument; all the care, in a word, which is needful to secure literary accuracy and beauty, endanger, without constant watchfulness, the existence and influence of another element, much more important to the efficiency of the sermon to accomplish its great end. Many have feared something like this from our colleges. The greater number, unfortunately, of those known to them who had been honored with such advantages, have turned out to be preachers proverbially dry, and of everything this is most painful to the Welsh. But by this time Wales throughout has been convinced that there is no necessary connection between the one and the other, and that the highest learning and the purest

literary taste are perfectly compatible with the deepest religious feelings. And when, now and then, one is seen making a parade of punctilious propriety in the pulpit, too fastidious to exhibit feeling, our nation with scarcely an exception, by virtue of a natural temperament, ascribe it fully as much to weakness of head as deficiency of heart; and surely, not without some degree of reason, for nothing is more certain than that the few Welsh preachers who incline to be lacking in feeling are at the same time lacking in mind. We are fully aware that noise is one thing and feeling another, and that there may often be much of the one and none or but little of the other. That which is needed is the latter, however it may reveal itself, whether in the seriousness of the countenance, the tone of the voice, the fervor of the delivery, or in that absorption of the speaker in his subject, which in so marked a manner distinguished the old Welsh preachers. We are exceedingly jealous lest this feature of the ministry of our fathers should be lost; and we are very glad to be assured by others better acquainted with the country generally, and with various denominations among us, than we can profess to be, that there is little or no danger of it.

With a reference to one other particular which specially characterized the ministry of our fathers, we bring these remarks to a close: their endeavors to accomplish something *at the time* in connection with the great aim of the Gospel. In the consciousness that they had a message from God, on which depended the eternal life of their hearers, they were in general not satisfied to conclude any meeting without some indications that their message had found a reception. They considered the sermon a failure almost unless they had obtained the complete mastery of the congregation, melting it into tears, rousing it to cries, raising it into rejoicings. Some of them in all probability carried this to excess, often occasioning strong animal excitement, with but little real depth of religious feeling to sustain it. But scarcely ever was one of them satisfied without visible signs at the time of the effects which had been produced through them. The great point was the conversion of sinners and the edification of saints. And in their thoughts they connected success in that with the immediate results exhibited in the conquest of the congregation. They accordingly

employed every means to secure that, condescending at times to what might seem to be a trick of oratory, anything, everything, in voice, language, comparisons, attitudes, which might seem to them at the time likely to produce, or which on previous occasions had been found efficacious in producing feeling in the minds of their hearers, and enable them to terminate the meeting with victory. They could not think of hoping that a blessing might sometime in the future attend the truths presented to them; they must see at the time signs of success, otherwise all was in vain. Now it is easy to see that such a feeling, however erroneous it might be, could not fail of exerting an advantageous influence, not only on the delivery of the sermon at the time, but also on the entire mental preparation which preceded it, the materials of which it was composed, the arrangement of these materials, and the whole aspect of the discourse. It was designed to come in contact with the minds of men, to effect a special result in those minds, and to effect it at once. Every truth would not answer for that. Something must be found adapted to such a purpose, and when found all justice must be done to it, in voice, temper, and spirit, which might be necessary to secure this result; and, assuredly, in general it suffered no wrong. And the success which followed it was great. The aspect of Wales to-day proves it.

There is in our day less, somehow, of expectation for immediate results, and less importance attached to visible evidences of feeling under the sermon. The preacher seems more confident in the might of the truth if it but come in contact with the mind, and thus rather inclined to be content with the advantage which he gains for that inattentive hearing, although it may seem at the time to result in nothing more, and consequently he is somewhat in danger of letting his sermon run through without aim. With the old preachers the sermon was a tool to work with; to them it was good for nothing except according to its fitness for that. The danger now is lest it should become a toy to amuse with. By them it was prized according to the effects which followed it; it is now in danger of being valued according to the intellectual power which it exhibits. We are far from thinking and we would by no means intimate that the preachers of to-day have any lower aim than our old fathers had; but we are not so sure that they

expect to reach it so directly, that they look on it as something to be expected as constantly, and that they are equally disappointed without visible signs hopeful to themselves that in some measure they attain it. Certain it is that there is nothing more momentous to the preacher himself than the sincerity of his aim in the work intrusted to him, and equally certain is it that nothing is more needful to secure that aim, so far as that depends on him, than such a sense of its importance as will cause him to concentrate all his energies on it, and to be quite ready, if need be, to sacrifice all to it. In consideration of all the difficulties pertaining to this work, and of the fearful responsibility connected with it, every true minister of Christ is ready to exclaim, "who is sufficient for these things?" And we are sure that we could not, on behalf of all ministers of the gospel in Wales, address to the churches of the saints, among all religious denominations, any appeal more in harmony with their feelings than that which the Apostle Paul made to the saints of his day in behalf of himself and his fellow-laborers, "BRETHREN, PRAY FOR US!"

To a certain extent the Church and the Christian must accept the new conditions of society; for in some respects they are harmless, in some they are real improvements, and to some of them the Church has been much beholden. To modern missions what a mighty help is our speedy transit! If the Roman highways opened the world to the Apostles, the over-land route and the ocean steamers make it still more accessible to the living evangelist; and the speedy journey effected, the still swifter tidings keep him constantly in sight—keep the Church and its messengers still close to one another. Although in some directions the tone of thought and feeling is ominous, although the wish for a new Bible or new Gospel is of itself a sufficient sign that the old one is not understood, there is no harm in desiring new illustrations of old truth, or new presentations of the familiar and faithful saying. The bread may be equally wholesome, though there may be a hundred different shapes of the loaf, and though for placing it on the table, some may prefer the pictured porcelain, and some the baskets of silver, and some the wooden trencher of olden time.—*Evangelical Christendom.*

SELECTIONS FROM NEANDER'S COMMENTARY ON 1 CORINTHIANS.*

I:4. *I thank my God always on your behalf for the grace of God which is given you by Jesus Christ.* The ancient expositors comment upon the forbearing manner in which the Apostle addresses the Corinthians. He intends to speak of much for which he blames them, but for this very reason he commences with what he can praise in them. Thus he wins their confidence. The question, however, might arise, how it was possible for Paul to commend a church in which so many grave faults existed, or how he could speak otherwise to them than in tones of rebuke. A *captatio benevolentiæ* is not to be thought of; to such a man as the Apostle, the end could not sanctify the means. But were there not blessed results of the gospel already visible in the Corinthian church? Did not even the evil in the church presuppose the existence of much that was good in its bosom? When faults like those in Corinth appeared, Christianity must have already made a deep impression. The very fact that the peculiar Grecian vices disturbed the purity of the Christian church in that city, proves that the community had been deeply stirred by the gospel. Paul, therefore, could properly speak in exalted terms of the effects of divine grace among the Corinthians. Indeed he would have done violence to his own feelings, if he had repressed the expression of his gratitude to God for all the privileges and gifts of which this church, so dear to his heart, had been made partakers. That the Apostle should, first of all, think of the good divinely produced, is an indication of his Christian view of history. In the spirit of love, he first recognizes the good, to which the subsequent admixture of evil was only a troublesome accident. He first renders thanks to God for the good of which He was the author, and then sees in the bad the reaction of human nature against the work of God. So should we, also, never make prominent the shady side, except along with the divine light side.

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*Translated from *Dr. A. Neander's Auslegung der beiden Briefe an die Corinther.* Berlin, 1859.

I: 10.—*In the same mind and in the same judgment.* How are these two words related to each other? In the writings of Paul, *mind* often designates, like *spirit*, the intellectual faculty in man, the spirit in distinction from the soul; but in this sense the word can not here be taken. It also designates still further the mind's practical direction, the disposition. So, for example, in 1 Cor. ii: 18, "the fleshly mind," and with this signification, it here forms an antithesis with *judgment* (counsel, opinion), which expresses the theoretical. That the practical precedes the theoretical is entirely in accordance with the psychology of Paul and the New Testament generally. The latter flows from the former. There are indeed two opposite modes of regarding the relation between the two. The one view places the theoretical first, and derives the sin which exists from the want of knowledge; the other regards the direction of the mind as dependent upon the heart, and this is the view given in the New Testament. The way in which a man judges of religious things depends upon his disposition, the state of his heart toward God. Accordingly the Apostle refers the differences and divisions in the church to something wrong in disposition, or in other words, to selfishness.

I: 18.—*To them that perish, foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God.* The gospel exhibits itself to man in one of two aspects: either as folly or as a divine power. This is a necessary result, founded in the very nature of evangelical truth. In order to be able to understand aright the announcement of a crucified Saviour of the world, the consciousness of sin, the felt need of salvation, is indispensable. While those who feel this need find out their salvation, the gospel of the cross of Christ to the unreceptive can appear only as something foolish. This also gives the reason why the doctrine of Christ crucified should be preached without the help of human wisdom—that is, the wisdom of dialectic demonstration as taught in the schools of rhetoric, and familiar to the cultivated Corinthians. Where the sense of need and true receptivity exist, the gospel works by its own power and without the help of man. Where this is wanting, no disputes and demonstrating render aid—no human wisdom is able to make it acceptable. This is not saying that it can not furnish various preliminary helps, by which men may be guided to the one thing needful.

The final decision will always depend upon the inward state—the disposition of the heart.

I: 21.—*The world by wisdom knew not God.* The whole history of ancient philosophy shows that it never attained to a satisfactory knowledge of God. There was always left the dark conjecture of a hidden Divinity, and when reason strove to rise above polytheism, it fell into pantheism, only at last to sink into skepticism, and to end in the conviction of the uncertainty and insufficiency of all higher knowledge. The writings of the elder Pliny, for instance, are pervaded by a high admiration of the spiritual in the natural world, and a profound apprehension of the power and glory of the creation; but he is far from recognizing a living and personal God, and hence, the only effect of this feeling of the divinity of nature is to sink him into despair, as he beholds in man, a creature surpassing all others in activity, but at the same time, on account of the infinity of his wants, the most unhappy of all. Believing in the gods, as he did, only through fear, he would certainly have regarded the doctrine of the cross as foolishness.

But if the creation is adapted to lead men to the knowledge of God—if God has made the experiment with mankind, as Paul affirms in his address to the Athenians, "if haply, they might feel after him and find him, although indeed he be not far from every one of us" (Acts, xvii: 27), why has God not actually secured this end? The Apostle answers this question in the first and second chapters of Romans. Had man remained in his original relation to God, he would have known Him from the revelation He has made in creation, with a knowledge, not abstract, but resting upon vital communion with Him. Human reason would then have been a clear mirror in which the image of God was reflected. But since man is inwardly estranged from God, this hindrance to the knowledge of God must be removed, and nothing but redemption can take it away. Humanity could not elevate itself to God, and therefore God was pleased to condescend to it. Hence, what the soul by no process of self-elevation could reach, may now be attained by the humble consecration of itself: what knowledge should have grasped, and yet could not do, is now attained by faith. Hence, in the second clause of the verse,

the words "save" and "believe" are emphatic; the theoretical knowledge of God must be preceded by actual salvation from sin, and this is not obtained by power of intellect or speculation, but by the child-like acceptance of the saving power from God—by faith rooted in the depths of the soul. Accordingly, Greek speculation and the Jewish law sustained (in one respect) a similar relation to the Christian faith: each, in its way, was to convince mankind of their weakness and incapacity, of themselves, to come to God, and thus to lead them to the condescension of God in Christ, by means of which alone the capacity to become acquainted with the being of God, and to do his will, can be imparted to man. Thus does the Apostle open before us the deepest views into the course of human development under the government of God, and the entire history of the ancient world, in the East and in the West, is a commentary on his words.

II: 3. *And I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling.* Some understand by "weakness" external suffering, sickness, persecution and the like; but no reason certainly can be given for thus restricting the meaning of the word; and since it stands in close connection with words which express conditions of the inner life, we understand it to mean the feeling of human weakness in general, although excited to a higher degree, perhaps, by the particular external circumstances of the Apostle. *In fear and in trembling* describes the climax of this feeling, in connection with the sense of responsibility to God, and of the dignity and difficulty of the apostolic office. This state of mind is the opposite of self-consciousness and self-reliance, which, to the ancient heathenism, appeared to be the highest virtue. This loss of hope in ourselves, this expecting nothing from ourselves, belongs to the essence of Christian humility; yet, so far removed is it from slavish fear and cowardly conduct, that the humble consecration of the soul to God supplies the only right courage, which nothing can subdue. The feeling expressed by the Apostle was continually fostered by the great bodily weakness with which the divine power of his ministry was connected (comp. Gal. vi: 17; 2 Cor. xii: 9), and must have been greatly increased on his arrival at Corinth. He had come from Athens, where he had preached in vain to the wise men after the flesh; in Corinth he

had gone into the synagogue and preached again in vain; under these impressions, he turned to the Gentiles. The connection of this thought with what precedes is clear: in such a state of mind, when the weakness and nothingness of every thing human pressed upon his heart, nothing could be farther from his purpose than to call in the help of human agencies in the ministration of the gospel, or to preach to the Corinthians "with excellency of speech or of wisdom."

II: 4.—*In demonstration of the Spirit and of power.* The word rendered "demonstration" occurs but once in the New Testament, and was probably selected with reference to the reasonings of the Greek philosophers: it means *proof*—the proof of something affirmed. The expression "Spirit and power" is a kind of hendiadys, equivalent to *powerful Spirit*, and the meaning of the whole clause is, the proof of the gospel, consisting in the power of the in-dwelling Spirit. The proof of the Spirit stands contrasted with proof by means of the letter; the proof of power, with proof by logical demonstration. It is the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*—the proof of the truth of the gospel by the experience of its power in the inner life, to which alone Paul here attaches value. All other forms of proof fail to convince the man who meets the overtures of the gospel with no inward receptivity. Neither the aids of rhetoric and logic, nor miracles addressed to the senses, are of any avail, and so Paul does not employ those of Christ or of himself for the purpose of persuasion. On the other hand, where the right internal preparation exists, the gospel, as a divine power, is sufficiently proved by the experience of the heart.

II: 6.—*We speak wisdom among them that are perfect.* The Apostle certainly could not intend to say that he preached to persons of a certain intellectual elevation something *higher* than the doctrine of Christ crucified as the Saviour of the world, for the doctrine of the cross was ever to him the highest, and he would know nothing else. But in the very admission that the gospel, to those who embrace it, must appear to be wisdom, is conveyed the inference that as such it may and must not only be exhibited, but also developed. To novices in Christianity this can not be done. They must first become familiar with the fundamental doctrines, and it is not until these

have been received into their inner life that it can be shown to them how all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ: for the gospel ever begins with the practical, and thence passes into its intellectual and theoretical form. When the Christian point of view has once been practically taken, there is room for the preaching which leads the believer to see how in Him all wisdom and knowledge have their center, and how every thing is made tributary to the new view of God and the universe derived from the gospel. To such preaching the Apostle refers when he enumerates among the gifts in the Corinthian church the "word of wisdom:" so, too, in the sixth chapter of Hebrews, where the distinction is made between the simple preaching of the gospel and the Christian wisdom founded upon it. What kind of knowledge he would include under this term, although not here expressly stated, is evident from the epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians. He means the recognition of Christianity as the center of human history—the understanding of its connection with the whole guidance of the universe and of the problem of history and the world to which it gives the solution. The passage, therefore, calls for the development of a science from Christianity, which alone can be true and satisfactory. From the nature of this wisdom preached by the Apostle, it is plain how erroneous it is to understand by "the perfect," persons of superior intellectual cultivation, as if equivalent to "the refined:" the perfection of which he speaks is simply perfection in Christianity, a maturity of Christian knowledge; for this alone, and not general cultivation, is the qualification for understanding the wisdom spoken of.

III: 14, 15. *If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire.* "To be saved as by fire" is a proverbial expression, which occurs in the Greek classics and also in the Old and New Testaments (comp. Zech. iii: 2; Jude, 23). It signifies "to escape with a whole skin—to be rescued with difficulty from danger."

The figure in the passage is evidently that of a building, not of a city, as Billroth supposes. Even if no such building actually existed, Paul might easily form the conception of it for a given purpose. The edifice rests upon a fire-proof foundation

but it is composed of various materials more or less inflammable. The builder dwells in the house: fire breaks out and consumes it: but he himself is able to escape through the flames.

What, now, is the meaning and point of the comparison? Three answers have been given. Some suppose the figure to refer to the enlargement of the church by missions in contrast with its original establishment; others, to the conduct of Christians in contrast with their faith; and others still, to the progressive development of Christian knowledge and doctrine in contrast with the simple foundation of faith. The first view is held by Theodoret. He supposes the reference to be to the genuineness or spuriousness of the piety of new members brought into the church by the preaching of the gospel. But to this it may be replied that if by the fault of the preacher, by his erroneous exhibition of Christianity, those who are not true Christians are added to the church, Paul would never have said that he built upon the true foundation. If, on the other hand, he is not to blame, if he has preached the pure gospel, and therefore can not be made responsible for the perverse manner in which some receive it, how is it possible to speak of him as liable to punishment? The second explanation which refers the passage to the greater or less degree of harmony between the foundation of the Christian faith and the actual lives of believers was also held by some of the fathers. It rests, however, upon a total misconception of Paul's idea of faith. A firm adherence to the only true foundation is plainly presupposed in the passage. But Paul would never have said of a life of sin, that it rests upon the true foundation: upon that foundation, which is Christ, he takes for granted that nothing but a genuine Christian life can be built. We see in this explanation, against which Augustine wrote his book, *De fide et operibus*, the reappearance of that substitution of theoretical orthodoxy for true, vital faith, according to which, he who possessed the former, even though leading an unholy life, was regarded as in a state of salvation.

The connection is decidedly in favor of the third explanation. Up to this point the subject of discourse has been the fundamental and germinant doctrine of Christianity. There is an original, unchangeable foundation, viz., the simple gospel of Christ. The process of building, the further development of this doc-

trine, may and will be different, more or less pure, more or less affected by human imperfection. A preacher may recognize this foundation, and plant his feet upon it, and yet his discourses may be of very different value, as compared with each other, since he may build up what is genuine and permanent or what is foreign and certain to pass away. This is the standard by which the Apostle directs the teachers who succeed him to be judged.

III: 23. *And ye are Christ's: and Christ is God's.* The sublime declarations with which this chapter closes remind us of similar expressions of the ancients, and especially the paradoxes of the Stoics. Diogenes of Sinope, for instance, says that the wise man is the friend of the gods, and hence is possessor of all things. The resemblance of such words to those of the Apostle is evidence of the remains of nobility still existing in human nature: but apart from redemption, no such dignity belongs to man, and, therefore, these expressions have a meaning entirely different from the Christian sense of the words. For antiquity rested upon the excessive exaltation of self; Christianity rests upon humility. The Stoic felt himself equal to Jupiter, died in spite of the will of the Deity, and committed suicide whenever he conceived of himself as no longer able to live in a manner becoming his dignity. The Christian abides in humble submission, feels the preciousness of his inheritance amid reproach and suffering, and, certain of eternal life, takes the cup of death, not from the hand of an iron fate, but from the hand of eternal love.

VII: 21. *Art thou called* [being] *a servant? Care not for it; but if* [εἰ καί] *thou mayest be free, use it rather.* In the ancient world slavery was regarded as a necessary relation. This arose from the habit of restricting the conception of the highest good to the domain of the State. Men had rights, not as human beings, but as citizens. There was no recognition of the essential dignity of man as bearing the image of God. The difference between civilized and savage men was held to originate in a fundamental difference of nature, and the former, it was thought, were ordained to rule over the latter by virtue of a higher development of the intellectual faculties. Such reasoning was sufficient to satisfy even such a man as Aristotle of the rightfulness of slavery. Christianity repudiated slavery by

summoning all as joint-partakers of a higher life, to stand on one and the same platform, and by claiming for every one, without distinction, the right of free self-development. But while it thus denied the fundamental principle of slavery, it changed nothing in the external condition of the slave.

It did not aim, by means of revolution, to subvert the existing state of things, but through the infusion of a new spirit to establish a principle which should guide and control the historical result. Converted slaves in becoming conscious of the universal dignity of man, in recognizing the freeman as a brother, and in learning the contradiction between their condition and the God-given dignity of the race, might easily have been led to violent efforts to break their bonds. Hence the frequent exhortations of the Apostle, designed on the one hand to awaken in the slaves the consciousness of their essential equality with the free, and on the other, to warn them against arbitrary attempts to throw off the yoke.

Use it rather. The question is whether the word *slavery* or *freedom* is here to be supplied. In favor of the former is the ancient exegetical tradition; since the Reformation the other has become more common, but recently De Wette, Harless, and Osiander have adopted the old view. In examining the question we must consider not only the words and the connection, but also the ideas elsewhere expressed by the Apostle. First, then, which word is it most natural to supply? "*Freedom*" certainly stands nearest; "slavery," drawn from "servant," is more remote. A writer could say "use proffered freedom," but to "use slavery," which is a deprivation, could hardly be said; the expression would have been "rather remain." Against supplying "freedom," it is urged that *καί* in the protasis requires the sentence to be rendered "if even thou mayest be free, remain still a slave." But the *καί* admits of the other rendering, taken either in an adversative sense, "but if however thou mayest be free," or better, as expressing an extension of the thought, "if also in addition to this thou mayest be free." The slave, the Apostle means to say, has a dignity sufficiently great in being a Christian, but if he may also become a freeman, he should not slight the opportunity. Why the *καί* should be claimed as not standing in the right place to support this explanation it is not easy to see; it certainly occupies its proper posi-

tion before *δύνασαι*. The explanation against which we contend has also been affirmed to be necessary, because the *application* of the propositions immediately preceding was here to be expected, not a proposition entirely opposite. But we can not admit that the application of the general principle announced in the passage, such as this explanation calls for, would be correct; to make it is to show a misconception of the true meaning of the principle. It is one thing to say that a man should not arbitrarily break away from the position in which God has placed him, and quite another to affirm that he should not leave it if God opens the way. It could never have occurred to the Apostle to say to the poor, because you have embraced Christianity as poor men, you must never accept riches however honestly obtained. Much less would he counsel the slave to refuse freedom when properly procured. The Greek was to remain a Greek, the Jew, a Jew. They both occupied, in the general development of humanity, a distinct position, to which in itself nothing blameworthy could be attached. Slavery, on the other hand, is essentially the product of sin, and is to be destroyed by the influence exerted by Christianity on the relations of mankind. The Christian slave, in adhering to his faith might often be brought into severe collision with his master, and although this could not harm him if he persevered in obeying God rather than man, why should not the relation be dissolved, if God furnished the opportunity? Not to dissolve it in such circumstances would be to tempt God. Paul teaches that every one should labor for the kingdom of God according to his ability; but how much was the slave cramped and fettered in this respect, and on the other hand how much would freedom be worth to him in extending the sphere of his service for Christ! The alleged counsel of the Apostle, therefore, to prefer slavery, would not be a legitimate application of his general principle, but a purely arbitrary direction without ground or motive. Nor can it be regarded as a hyperbolical expression, designed to show the superior importance of the freedom within and the comparative insignificance of everything else. Tertullian might write in this way, but not Paul.

It has been urged that the connection of the passage with v. 22 makes the other explanation unavoidable. We must certainly admit that the words in v. 22 assign no ground for the

whole thought immediately preceding, as we understand it. The verse must be referred to "care not for it," and not to the following parenthetical sentence. But how often, in the writings of Paul does the motive assigned refer back to the *principal* thought and not to that which he throws in by the way. Even on the other explanation, however, v. 22 gives no reason for the preceding sentence. Paul says in that verse, that the bond and free are equal before Christ; does this constitute any reason why a bondman should not accept the proffer of freedom? Admit that there is something higher than mere outward freedom: yet it does not follow from this that it possesses *no* value: on the contrary the higher freedom imparts to the lower additional worth. Finally, exegetical tradition is urged in favor of the other interpretation. But this can for us possess no decisive authority. It is true that so far at least as it comes from the Greek commentators it is not to be despised; their testimony is of weight as opposed to many forced interpretations of modern times. But there are also hoary errors, especially in exegesis, in which the natural sense of a passage is often obscured by doctrinal or ethical prejudices. In this passage the explanation has been affected by the ascetic tendency of the ancient church.

The explanation we have given agrees with the conduct of the Apostle himself. His citizenship in the kingdom of God did not prevent him from attaching value to his Roman citizenship. All civil freedom is delusive, indeed, without Christian freedom, but with it is to be prized, and this passage is of importance for the value it attaches in this modified sense to freedom in the State.

THE MINISTER'S BIBLE-CLASS.*

It is always important, and especially so in these days of distraction, that the young minister should be reminded of the extent of his obligation to study and unfold the Scriptures. The Bible bears to him a relation which no other book does; and he stands to the Bible in a relation in which no other man stands to it. His life and energies, of thought and action, are pledged to that one object. The Bible is the center of all literature to him, in a sense beyond that in which it is the center to all. It is his own peculiar and sacred province: to study it, to defend it, to make himself master of all its secrets, and to unfold them all, is the great business of his life. It is true that he has no special prerogative of possession, no special immunity from error, no clerical monopoly of its blessings. The Book is the common heritage; and every part of it is thrown open to every man. There is no order of men to whom, as an order of men, has been given a right of absolute control over the Scriptures, or a guarantee of their infallible interpretation. The great declaration of the Day of Pentecost revoked any such grant, if it had ever been made in the past; and expressly precluded any such distinction in the great Church of the future. Whoso hath an ear, may hear, and whoso heareth, may understand. But it is a perversion of this great truth to deny the special charge which is given to the Christian ministry concerning the sacred volume. They are its human guardians and expositors: they are set for its defense, and set apart for its study. All its treasures are put into their hands as householders, to be dispensed by their fidelity; they are expressly encouraged to regard themselves as Christian scribes, to be versed beyond all others in the letter of the law; and they are promised that "with what measure they mete out the endless stores of instruction committed to their hands, it shall be measured to them again!" The more they magnify their office in this respect, and make it

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* Abridged somewhat from the *London Review, Oct.,* 1862.

honorable by their own diligence, the better for themselves, and for the Church, and for the world. It should be their ambition to make themselves what they are supposed to be, supreme in this sphere. Whatever other pursuits they engage in, as the recreation of life, their study should be in the Book of their profession and calling. There they should be masters. If not in other matters, in this, at least, they should be the highest human authorities. But this supremacy can not be maintained, save by those who systematically and steadily make the study of the Scriptures the business of their lives. And in proportion as they acquire this power, they will feel it incumbent to use it actively; they will more and more understand that they are not only passive referees, to whom difficult points may be brought for solution, but that they are appointed to open and dispense the treasures they are intrusted with, to the utmost extent of their opportunity.

It is obvious that the pulpit can not exhaust this ministerial responsibility. Undoubtedly, it is in the pulpit that the minister discharges the main part of his duty; there, his fidelity must ultimately be tested and approved, and, if he there shows himself faithful to his great text-book, he will not be chargeable with unfaithfulness elsewhere. But the Christian minister is in the pulpit only a few hours in the week; and, although those few hours represent the result of the studies of many hours, and are, indeed, the pith and soul of his life, yet, two or three hours in the week can not satisfy the claims of the Bible on him who is its professed expositor. For, it must be borne in mind that the pulpit has its manifold restrictions, especially in the present day. The Bible in the pulpit is, after all, only *the Bible within the Bible:* the most excellent part of that which is all excellent, but still only a part. Preaching gospel truths to the unconverted, and applying the evangelical promises to the penitent, and teaching the saved Church for its edification, absorb and bring into pulpit use a wide range of Scripture, but still leave a large and precious remainder. We are free to admit that the pulpit has been, in past times, and might be now, and perhaps one day will be, the center of more frequent and more comprehensive teaching than now pro-

ceeds from it. The time may come again, when a much more copious, systematic, and exhaustive unfolding of the treasures of the Word of God will be tolerated or demanded in the chair of ministerial instruction. But we must take things as they are. Many causes have concurred to limit the function of the pulpit to the sermon or homily proper. The congregation is generally impatient of any marked deviation. But into this question it is needless here to enter; and it would be a hard matter to define the circle of subjects confessedly appropriate to the preacher's office. But we shall find it easier in due time to point out those which are not appropriate; and, meanwhile, will assume that the Christian minister who would discharge all his obligations to the Bible on the one hand, and the people on the other, must teach the Scriptures elsewhere than in the pulpit, and in other ways supplementary to his preaching.

The Minister's Bible-class suggests itself at once as the very adjunct that the pulpit requires. But, upon proceeding to sketch its capabilities, we must guard against being supposed to intimate that it is the only, or indeed the indispensable, adjunct. We have no desire to exaggerate its importance. It is only one of many expedients by which a faithful pastor may seek to satisfy his desire of usefulness, and to pay his great debt to the Word of Life. To discharge that obligation fully, or in any sense whatever, requires that he make his whole life bear the burden. The Christian pastorate is, to all who strive to realize its true ideal, a perpetual, life-long, all-pervading ministry of the Word. Besides making his own character its reflection, the minister must strive to bring it into contact with all persons and all circumstances surrounding him. On all occasions, he must be ready to exhibit its endless applications to common life; to show its bearing on every question; to pronounce its verdict on every disputed point, its solution of every difficulty. He must be ready to defend it when attacked, to rescue it when in danger, to introduce it when forgotten, and to give his true interpretation when it is perverted. In short, his fidelity to the book intrusted to him, demands that he qualify himself to be an interpreter and a referee everywhere and in all companies, in whatsoever pertains to it and its literature.

And there are many who make their pastoral life the only and the sufficient supplement of their public preaching. But, granting this, the classes of which we shall now speak, must commend themselves to the young and active minister, as an exceedingly valuable medium of teaching, intermediate between the pulpit and the common life.

In this branch of service, supposing him to engage in it, the young minister must choose his own specific course, and conform the character of his instruction to the character of those whom he has to instruct. No general rules can be laid down; nor have we any published models for imitation. Every man must consult his own taste or peculiar gift; must take into account what time he has to dedicate to such service, and what kind of companies he can gather around him. It may not, however, be without its use to give a brief summary of three distinct kinds of Bible-class which have found pretty general acceptance in the present day: the first occupied with what may be termed the externals of the Bible; the second devoted more particularly to the doctrines contained in it; and the third concerned only with the text and its direct exposition.

The Bible-class *about* the Bible comes first. It embraces all the literature of the Scriptures; all Biblical questions and subjects, in short, which are not doctrine or exposition. The conductor of such a class has the common Introductions to the Scriptures for his guide; and can make such a judicious selection of his topics as shall lead his students through paths of most grateful variety, to a sound general acquaintance with the structure and contents of the Holy Volume. Such classes are not uncommon: some of them more systematic, and some of them less; but all seeking to ground young people in the fundamentals of what ought to be known about the grand fabric of the Word of God, and to excite in them a reverent admiration of the heavenly art displayed in its structure. We have taken some pains to procure information on this point; and, as the result, have found a number of classes in healthy operation which deal with such subjects as the writers, contents, and scope of the several books of Scriptures—the history and formation of the two canons—the leading types and symbols with their correspond-

ing antitypes and realities—the several prophecies and their fulfillments—the texts which infidelity has in all ages perverted, with the special perversions of modern times—the poetry of Scripture and its parallelism—the Psalms, their divisions and writers—the Messianic Psalms—the several lines of scriptural history, and the leading personages in its biography — the natural history of the Bible — its mountains, rivers, and seas—the tabernacle and the temple, their form and ritual—and a number of other similar subjects. The classes which pursue such tracks of inquiry are not very numerous; but they are to be found, and they are rapidly increasing. They do not, perhaps, in most instances, rise to the point of efficiency and vigor which the above remarks might indicate; but, generally speaking, they answer the description we have given.

Now, it is hard to overrate the importance of such systematic ministerial instruction as this. It is true that young people might read about such matters for themselves; especially in these days, when the accumulations of ages of industrious research are epitomized in hand-books compiled with accuracy and skill, and placed within the reach of everybody. But it is easier to recommend these books than to insure their being read, and they are essentially dull without the stimulus of a living prompter. Nothing can supply the place of an oral instructor in such matters as these. It is true, also, that that instructor can not do very much with the time at his disposal, and in the short term of his intercourse with such classes. But, with every deduction, they do real and substantial service. They are most useful to the young minister himself. They keep his attention awake to the learning, which, sacred to all, is doubly sacred to him. They oblige him to furbish his own armory, to maintain and increase the stock which he brought with him from his college. They tend to preserve him from the danger of limiting his knowledge of Scripture to the professional round of his pulpit texts, and to mature his own acquaintance with all the miscellaneous literature that enshrines and illustrates those texts. Meanwhile, to the young people themselves, he may make them an unmingled benefit. Their minister's lectures have to his flock all their own peculiar charm, with

the additional sanctity that the pastoral relation gives them. They afford him the opportunity of investing scriptural matters with fresh and living interest. They give him the means of imparting what is of more value than the mere information conveyed—a sound and healthy bias. He can teach the lessons of his text-book with a better influence than the book itself can exert. He can make these weekly exercises—half lectures, half conversations—the channel of infinite good suggestion. In them he may do much toward protecting the young from the stealthy approaches of the rationalizing and irreverent spirit, and toward enlisting their early interests and sympathies on the side of truth. While dealing with the externals he may lead the way to what is within; while examining the hem and the fringes of the vesture of the truth, he may open their eyes to see the beauty of the vesture itself, and thus he may hope to divert their minds from attractions without; and, by his own quiet influence, prove a successful rival of the more demonstrative claimants for the ears of young men. To do this, is worth the best labor and study of the minister fresh in his work; and if his weekly Bible-class really has in it such capabilities of usefulness to himself and to the young people around him, it is plainly his duty to make the most of their assistance.

But these observations have more than suggested the second and perhaps higher kind of class: that, namely, which makes the Bible a text-book for directing the theological judgments and opinions of its members. This kind of class is, in the nature of things, more select. But many specimens of it may be found, especially in our large towns; their number, also, is multiplying, and will multiply, just in proportion as it comes to be felt by young men generally, that the doctrines of Holy Scripture ought to be apprehended, in their truth and in their harmony, by every intelligent Christian. Most young men are either engaged, or hope to be engaged, in instructing those younger than themselves; very many are aspiring one day to teach those older than themselves. And if we add the fact that there is, in the present day, a peculiar and specific bias to theological controversy, it will not be a matter of wonder that Bible-

classes, professedly for theological ends, are spreading in Christian churches. The plan of conducting them differs in different places. Sometimes a theological subject is taken, and the minister gives a kind of lecture upon it, he and his hearers searching the Scriptures together. Sometimes an individual is appointed to write a short essay upon a particular doctrine, which is made the basis of ministerial comment, or of general conversation. Sometimes the catechism accompanies the Bible, as a text-book; sometimes a well-known body of divinity; and, in some instances, the rather perilous expedient is resorted to of giving every one present an opportunity of making any inquiry that his curiosity, or love of argument, or ostentation, or desire of knowledge may suggest.

Certainly, there is much in such a class that should commend itself to the young minister who loves his vocation, and has a right estimate of his own responsibility and power. It should be his humble ambition to be, in his way, a sort of theological tutor to his flock, especially the young; to shield them from the errors and heresies that are everywhere crying to be heard, and to give them sound instruction in the science of revealed truth. But this special service obviously needs specially-prepared men; and demands that they should make their class-teaching matter of diligent and discreet forethought. And even in their hands, it requires much caution, especially with respect to oral discussion in the class. The prerogative of the minister is to teach; and the privilege of his class to be taught. The free discussion of controverted points does more harm than good; and, instead of this, questions proposed on paper, left with the teacher for his leisurely consideration, and answered the next week, may answer every purpose. Classes of this kind are to be found which do as much honor to their conductors as to the young men who compose them. But they are few; and they owe their efficiency to the peculiar gifts of the men who have raised them. It would be a great blessing to the Church if their example were more extensively imitated; for the times imperatively demand them. The gravest theological questions are flippantly treated in popular books, which are composed specially for young men;

and lecture-rooms and debating societies abound, in which they are discussed by free-thinkers, who lose no opportunity of attracting intelligent youth. Well, therefore, for the congregation blest with a minister capable of gathering around himself all its young men, with all their energies and all their earnestness, and laborious enough to make weekly preparation for all their great demands upon him—and well for the minister whose vocation this is. However powerful his influence in the pulpit, he is doing a work hardly inferior in importance out of it. The Church wants a large reinforcement of such men, and their number would soon be largely multiplied, if the young men who annually enter the ministry, with a preparatory training, and books at their command, would count it their bounden duty to prepare themselves for such work as this. It does not require a vast array of learning to begin with; it is enough to have the sound training which all young ministers are supposed to have, and, without which, it is almost sinning against the age to send them forth. This will give them the key to all requisite knowledge; and the art of using it—an art which is perfected by use. If they concentrate their energies, economise their time, make every so-called sacrifice, and seek the highest inspiration of diligence, they will soon be able to meet the highest demands of their flock, in the pulpit and out of it, and the two preparations will gradually converge into one; while preparing for the pulpit, with all its supreme anxieties and responsibilities, and seeking to press more and more of the living Scripture into the service of their preaching ministry, they will be most effectually equipping themselves for all that extra pulpit usefulness, the claims of which we now enforce.

We must pause here to hint at one use which such a class subserves, and one which is too obvious to escape notice: the opportunity it gives the minister of exercising a wholesome supervision over the candidates for lay-preaching or the ministry. Such a class as this, conducted by a competent head, would, of necessity, attract all the young men who think of making theology their future study; and he could scarcely do a better service than to make his class a training-school for such persons—singling them out from the rest,

and striving to help them in their preparation. The period which intervenes between the self-dedication to this office and the entrance upon it, is of vital importance for all the future. In the case of lay-preachers, what service might be rendered, and is often rendered, in the friendly direction of their studies; how much evil prevented, by pointing out defects, and guarding against errors, and helping the eager young student to overcome the disadvantages which often hinder his progress! In the case of those who are candidates for the ministry, how much may be done in the minister's Bible-class, to prepare them for their future term of training! How great is the benefit of even a twelve month's preliminary discipline of this friendly, pastoral kind! A young man found in the class, who is likely to go forward into the ministry, ought to have as much special attention paid to him by his superiors as other duties will allow. Generally, he stands much in need of direction, and he ought to have some one on whom to rely. He needs to be told what theological fundamentals must be studied, and what books he ought to read. He is making sermons, and, perhaps, acquiring habits of thought, composition, and delivery, which will trouble him sorely one day. How important that his manuscript should be examined, his essays in preaching heard, and the errors of both pointed out! Or he may be plunging too deeply into the higher divinity, and need to be reminded of the importance of not neglecting the simple elements of education. Whatever may be the value of a course of training in theological seminaries—and it is not possible to exaggerate its importance—the benefits of that course are largely increased when a preparatory discipline of this informal kind has gone before—when the training itself has been, so to speak, trained for. Very much good is done in this way every year; and much more might be done. But this subject leads us away from the Bible-class, and we must abstain from dwelling upon it as it deserves. We leave it with the suggestion, that a permanent class, established solely for preachers who are in their earliest probation, might be kept up in every large place by a competent minister, with the best possible results.

And now we have reached that type of the Bible-class

which is most faithful to its primary design; keeping close to the simple exposition of Scripture, but adopting a kind of exposition inadmissible in the pulpit, being distinguished by its greater freedom and simplicity, by its class of subjects being unlimited, and by its flexible adaptation to the character and need of its select members. This is the primitive Bible-class; which, whether conducted by ministers or laymen, whether with older or younger members, whether in the house of God, or the parlor, or the barracks, or on shipboard, has, for a long time been, and still is, the channel of endless blessing to multitudes, and, in some cases, the only and the saving means of grace. We refer, however, here especially to the minister's class as professedly supplementary to his pulpit instruction, in which he can read the Scriptures with a select number, opening up their hidden treasures, or explaining their better-known contents in a manner more genial and more familiar than the higher place would permit.

It is not intended to assert that the direct exposition of the Scripture, word for word, paragraph by paragraph, and even book by book, is altogether unsuitable to the pulpit. The ancient preachers made this their constant aim, and the homilies of some of the Fathers are, in fact, their commentaries. There have never been wanting worthy imitators of this style, who have worked into the tissue of their sermons the closest exegesis of consecutive books: some of the most precious volumes of English exposition—one or two of the *most* precious—are the lasting result; and although this kind of preaching may not be the legitimate function of the pulpit of the present day, and, in our readers' experience, may be without example, it is questionable whether it might not, under some circumstances, and in some approximations, be introduced to advantage. A week-evening or even midday course of such exposition might, in large towns, be made very instructive and very profitable. It may be objected, that the exposition of the lesson before the sermon might serve this purpose; but long and elaborate expositions of the preliminary lesson are—unless the sermon indemnify by being excessively short, and, therefore, meager—wearisome, at the very least. And, moreover, it is meet that the

Word of God should somewhere in the Divine service speak for itself, in its own integrity, the reader alone being between the Holy Oracle and the congregation. Be all this as it may, exposition must have its throne in the pulpit; and far be it from us to give the faintest intimation to the contrary. All good preaching must be more or less expository; the points of the sermon must be derived from a careful study of the bearings of the text; its sinews and strength must be obtained from a full and thoughtful collation of the mind of the Spirit on the same subject elsewhere; its illustrations, however affluent from other sources, must owe their best to the Word of God; while its spirit and force and unction must come from intimate communion with the living truth. This, in fact, and no more than this, is the preaching of those who are termed distinctively, expository preachers, and this, no less than this, is the preaching of all the best of those more popular preachers who are sometimes most unwisely contrasted with them. These, likewise, derive the strength of their ministry from the study of God's Word; and often from a much deeper study than they are supposed to expend upon it. The art of the conveyance of the result may conceal the process; and a certain light—it may be earthly, but still glorious—suffused over the whole, may soften down or make imperceptible, those lines and points of exposition which, in reality, determine the outline of the discourse. But all sound, healthy, evangelical, soul-saving, useful preaching must be expository—in the very nature of things, and according to the law which makes the Word itself, and not the skill of man, the Spirit's agent in the renewal of man's soul.

But, after all, there is a kind of exposition which is not suited to the pulpit, and which finds its fitter place in the class-room; or, rather, there are two kinds of exposition which require a less public chair—the one because of its simplicity, the other, because of its depth.

The former gives its general character to the Bible-class. This is its common, normal form, proved by experience to be always practicable and always popular; demanding nothing in the teacher beyond the average ministerial knowledge, and nothing in the members beyond teachableness and love

of the Bible. It undertakes nothing more than the simple reading of certain selected portions, with sound running comment, apt and lively illustration of all kinds, conversational question and answer, and the ever-varying application that the Word itself suggests. It may be a parable thoroughly discussed, the narrative and meaning of a miracle unfolded, the delineation of a Scripture character studied; or it may be the gradual and consecutive opening out of a book or an epistle; or it may be the weekly study of the coming Sunday lesson with those who will have to teach it to children in the school. This is the most common, and perhaps the best type of the class. Here, ministers of all orders may be quite at home; there can be no argument against the thing itself, there can be no difficulty about finding the right members, and there can be no plea of unfitness in the teacher. It does not require in the latter that thorough mastery of the Word of God in all its range and fullness which is the prerogative of age and experience; it does not require possession of the tongues and critical apparatus; it does not require a peculiar gift, or any peculiarity at all. It demands only the true heart of a pastor; and that preparation which every minister, supposed to be daily studying the Bible, while men generally only read and meditate on it, has always at command. Such classes, in such hands, can do nothing but good; and we would earnestly recommend every young minister who has not tried them to begin. They ought to be universal. Not, however, as substitutes for any other meetings of Christian fellowship; nor as substitutes for preaching; in their very nature they are distinct, and have a place of their own. They always, when justice is done them, commend themselves. No one has ever found them fail, who may not impute the failure rather to himself than to any other cause. It is true, the teacher may be sometimes resisted by obstacles over which he has but slight control; some whom he would benefit may soon evince a distaste for Scripture; many may be so unhappily situated as to be prevented from attending, or attending regularly; others may be entangled in distracting avocations, not wrong in themselves, but all-absorbing; and there are never wanting instances of those whom no pastoral solicitude will win

from the more seductive recreations of the world without. But, after making all deductions, there will always be found a large remainder of people, especially young people, who will gladly follow their minister into his class-room, and to whom his genial and conversational expositions of Scriptural truth will always have a peculiar charm. Let no one who would make full proof of his ministry, in the pulpit and out of it, undervalue this little arrow in his quiver.

But the subject is far from being exhausted. There is another kind of private exposition, which demands a more select circle, and aims at a more thorough penetration into the mysteries of Scripture than the former. The Bible-class may be made a channel for the conveyance, not only of the minister's simplest teaching, but also of his ripest instruction on the most profound or the most controverted subjects. There can be no reasonable objection to this. If he have the ability and the resources, and if he can find a capable auditory, surely there is no reason why he should not seek utterance for words which his good sense would leave unspoken in the pulpit, but which, nevertheless, his heart prompts him to utter somewhere. Into this sphere, however, we almost shrink from entering; it is one which obviously must be left to individual sense of duty or vocation; and what little we have to say will be rather a testimony of what has been reported as having been done, than as a recommendation of our own. Among our miscellaneous notes of observation we have records of several such classes of select weekly exposition; but shall confine our remarks to one which has been adopted with some success, and which may stand as a specimen of the whole. In this instance, an hour is devoted to the elucidation of the hidden or obscure places of Scripture; and the treatment of a series of these more recondite passages in the course of a few winter's travels through almost all the main difficulties of Holy Writ. The experiment has been tried with some fair success; and, perhaps, there are some of our readers who might be induced to make it for themselves. For their sake, we will hazard a few more instances on the subject, and classify this kind of passages under their three heads: (1) those which are obscure in themselves, and by virtue of Divine purpose;

(2) those which have become obscure through causes springing from man's infirmity; and, (3) those which are obscure, simply because they are in neglected places, and are generally unobserved.

It has pleased God that there are many parts of his revelation themselves, as it were, unrevealed; many sayings which utter only to hide their mystery. It might be supposed that this would be so; it is the glory of God's Word, as well as of God himself, to conceal a thing. Some of these passages are dark because of their excess of glory, bearing the burden of thought, for which, as yet, man has no faculty, and under which words fail of their function, and break down. Some of them are charged with revelations that are clouded with uncertainty until the set time come, but will be clear enough at the appointed hour. All these are given to man's contemplation; they pass understanding, but yield themselves to faith, or the higher reason. We do not say that they are to be excluded from the pulpit. Some few of these passages are texts of which the preacher is never weary, and on which strains have always been preached that have been the choicest edification of the Church. Others of them enter the pulpit, if not as texts, yet as the illustration of texts on which they shed their light; dark sayings in themselves, they brighten others; the dazzling glory which repels the eye from itself, irradiates all that it is shed upon with unearthly light; and happy the preaching over which these dark sayings diffuse their glorifying influence. But there are others which, while appropriate to the pulpit in only a very limited sense, are capable of being very profitably discoursed upon in a more private circle. However, we only glance at this province of Scripture in relation to the class. The introduction of such higher, deeper sayings certainly is not to be recommended as a common practice. Nor is there much danger. These passages have no charm for the ordinary mass. They reserve their attraction for the exceedingly select few who make the Scriptures their supreme and all-satisfying study, and whose ears have been opened by a second *Ephphatha* for a more interior hearing. Wherever expounded—whether in the pulpit or in the class-room—they are for an elect circle, everywhere only too small. Or, rather, they are oracles

which can not be perfectly heard but by the solitary worshiper. Vain is all talking about them, unless the new sense which they require has been given. But we must pass from this branch of the Hidden sayings; only remarking that, while they can not be recommended as the ordinary matter of the Bible-class, their occasional introduction, where all other things concur to render them suitable, can not fail to exert an elevating influence upon the members. For, though they often baffle the understanding, they never fail to impress and strengthen it.

There is another class of passages which are obscure, through causes traceable to human infirmity. And these, again, are manifold. Some are indistinct to us, simply because the language that conveys them is a dead language, although enshrining living words; many texts are obscure through the uncertainty about a single expression of the original, which learning has not been able to remove; others, because, even in the original documents, the word spoken in one tongue had to be reproduced in another; while not a few are obscure in our own version, because of the defect in its rendering. Again, there are parts of Scripture around which controversy has thrown a mist of uncertainty; or which suffer under an erroneous conventional interpretation, handed down and propagated traditionally and unexamined; or which are indistinct through the subtlety of the writer's argument and diction, requiring only a searching study of the context to make them clear. We might multiply these causes of the obscurity of a large number of passages, amounting to a considerable portion of Scripture. Now, it is hardly necessary to prove that these hard sayings ought to be explained and cleared up to the utmost extent of a minister's ability, and on all occasions that make it practicable or desirable to do so. They contain the difficulties which perplex and torture many a mind; on some of them, and the number not large, it may be boldly said, hang all the heresies and errors of the Christian Church.

The pulpit can only, to a partial extent, meet this requirement. The ideal pulpit, we grant, would meet it perfectly. There all doubts would be solved, all vexed questions settled, all unsound interpretation corrected, all controverted doctrine

defended, and a light kept for ever burning that would leave no part of God's house dark. But we have not to do with the ideal pulpit. That real, imperfect, and restricted one with which we have to do, demands—notwithstanding its wide range and grand achievements—the reinforcement of some other subordinate and loyal methods which shall finish its work, and fill up the measure of its teaching. And our class furnishes one such method. Without the formality of theological teaching, but with all the exactitude of careful preparation, the minister can then handle passages that might embarrass him in the pulpit. He can select his texts; give the history of opinions upon them, if he likes; show how they had been pressed violently into the service, now of this, and now of that, heresy, with all the perversions to which they have been wrested; and wind up all by giving the judgment from which, in that little assembly at least, there is no appeal. Or he may—and we speak now of what is the practice in many classes of which we have reports—allow the members to suggest, occasionally, their own texts—passages, namely, which have given them trouble, or kept their minds unsettled; he may take those texts to his study, classify them, study them, reach his own convictions upon them, determine what may be said positively, what doubtfully, and what only negatively, concerning their meaning, and give the whole result at the next meeting. Of the benefit of such a class, in judicious hands, it is impossible to speak too highly. To thoughtful, inquiring young men, with a healthy spirit of speculation in them, but exposed always to a very unhealthy temptation of that spirit; carrying about with them often a mass of unsolved doubts, fermenting in their minds, fretting their peace, and periling their faith—such a refuge as this class may sometimes be made a blessing little short of their salvation. And to the young minister, too, it is no light advantage to be obliged to make himself master of the interpretation of these uncertain Scriptures. True, it would bind him like a slave to his Bible and his books; but in a glorious slavery, and with fetters of gold. It would effectually save him from the danger of wasting his precious time—in his case, time doubly pledged—upon pursuits which, good in themselves, and to others paramount, are interdicted to

him by higher obligations. It would obviate the liability of his coming to limit his acquaintance with Scripture to that familiar sphere of it where his pulpit-texts lie; and help him to acquire that minute and thorough biblical knowledge which is the glory of his vocation, but which depends upon his familiarity with its more obscure regions. Moreover, there is no better method of studying the manifold phases of theological opinion; or, what is almost the same thing, the history of the Christian Church. And, all this being true, we regard it as our duty to commend the design to the ambition of every earnest and conscientious young minister who may read these lines.

There is yet one more class of obscure passages, those, namely, which are hidden only because they are not much sought for. They lie—not, indeed, in the waste places of the Bible, for of such there are none, but—in its neglected and unfrequented parts. How many tracts of Holy Writ there are which, to the mass of readers, are little better than *Gaza, which is desert;* where, however, those who seek will find some of the richest music, and the most beautiful flowers, and the goodliest fruits, in all the great garden of the Lord! There they lie, in unvisited corners, waiting to give up their unvalued secret to all who pass them not by, but turn aside to seek them. It is true that there is to all a Bible within the Bible; but to too many there is nothing more in it than that. They forget that the earthly vesture of the Word is woven from the top throughout by a Divine Hand; and that every thread in the fabric, to its lowest hem, is sacred. They are apt to think only of the holiest of all, and to forget that the temple reaches outward to its Beautiful Gate, and that every stone in it, and its very dust, is holy. Or, in better words, they are in danger of not remembering that *all* Scripture is given for instruction. Hence the necessity that the minister should be to all a continual remembrancer, and lead his people in the pursuit of hid treasures. He should be himself familiar with all parts of the Bible, and prompt his flock to the same universal acquaintance. His pulpit should be rich in illustration, gathered from all regions of Scripture. But, if he think proper, the illustrations of his pulpit may be made sometimes the text of his Bible-class.

A selection of passages, such as we have referred to, might occupy many a profitable hour. He would have an opportunity of teaching his young people to mark the grace and the depth of a multitude of sayings in the Psalms, and the Prophets, especially the Minor Prophets, and even in the New Testament, of the existence of which they were scarcely aware. Thus he would help them to find out the home of many a quaint and touching word, which, when met with in books, or heard in the pulpit, falls upon the ear with a beautiful but unfamiliar sound, more like that of an ancient saw than the word of Scripture. Thus he would be able to point out to them many a secret harmony and unthought-of coincidence; and trace with them many a golden thread, undiscerned before, running through the whole fabric of Scripture. And thus, while giving the strength of his mind to the exposition and application of the Word of Life as such, it would be the recreation, so to speak, and minor ministry of his vocation, to be the interpreter of what may be called, with a good meaning, the beauties and the graces of the Bible. Like the high-priest's girdle, the vesture of Scripture is for glory and beauty; its *glory* shines in the pulpit above, and it is not asking too much that its *beauty* should be admired in the class-room below.

Putting all these obscure passages together, we think we are not going too far when we say that they might form the material of a very profitable course of class-room teaching. Continued winter after winter for only two or three years, the result would be a very large amount of wholesome and most interesting instruction. Would that we could see a few volumes of the results; viz.: a collection of these classified obscurer passages of the Bible, with brief summaries of opinions, just enough critical annotation, and such sound and judicious exposition as should make it acceptable both to the intellect and the heart of the reader. If some of those ministers who conduct their classes on this plan would combine to execute such a scheme, each taking his part, they would render their generation a very great service, and furnish a good supplement to all the commentaries.

THEISM AND SCIENCE.*

BY PROF. ERNEST NAVILLE, OF GENEVA.

To UNDERTAKE to substitute the eternity of matter in place of the idea of God is to make shipwreck of science. All knowledge, it is claimed, rests upon observation; and since the idea of God is not derived from observation, it lies outside of the conditions of knowledge, and, therefore, we can know nothing respecting God. I admit that God can not be the object of observation. I even grant, if you wish, that from the starting point of science, God is a hypothesis, as La Place expresses it. But it is entirely illogical to say that, therefore, the idea of God must be removed from the field of science. For how is science constructed? Mind contemplates matter; human thought, in the observation of facts, seizes upon the idea they express, and discerns the law which governs them. This is the work of genius. When the facts have been laboriously collected, by repeated observations, the moment arrives when the conditions of a great discovery exist. There is then a sudden light in science, a flash of lightning across the mind. It is in such a moment that Archimedes, in the ecstasy of the revelation which opens to him a new world, exultingly shouts out his discovery, and that Pythagoras offers sacrifices of gratitude to the gods. If the labor was a prayer, the discovery is its answer. Sometimes a hypothesis is of such a kind as to admit of being verified at once. Compared with all the facts, it is confirmed by them, and explains them. A hypothesis thus confirmed is a truth. Science accepts it, and it takes its place henceforth among the treasures of our knowledge. But when genius discerns a law hitherto unknown, it still remains a hypothesis until it is verified. Kepler discovered a law of the planetary revolutions; but the joy of this revelation was succeeded by bitter disappointment, when the calculations by means of which this hypothesis was to be confirmed, gave an opposite result. Nevertheless, he did not abandon the new idea which had taken possession of his mind, and ultimately the truth

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was demonstrated. It was not the hypothesis, but the original calculation, which was at fault. Copernicus discovered the law of the motion of the planets around the sun. The objection was made, that if his idea was true, the planet Venus would have phases like the moon. He could only reply that God would give us grace one day to solve this difficulty, and it was not long before the phases of Venus were established by means of the telescope. Hypotheses are discredited by the spirit of system, which seeks to defend a hypothesis in spite of facts. Diogenes replied to one who denied the existence of motion, by walking before him. This is a very solid answer. Every system which contradicts facts is a false system. And, on the other hand, every hypothesis which really accounts for the facts is a truth.

If these principles are admitted, our demonstration is complete. Yes, in the view of science, the idea of God is a hypothesis; but science is entirely made up of *verified hypotheses*, and without the hypothesis of God, the world and man are inexplicable. God is the only true solution of the universal problem. All systems strive after unity. To materialism, which explains every thing by matter, we oppose the existence of mind; to fatalism, which explains every thing by necessity, we oppose the existence of conscience; to pantheism, which deifies us, we oppose the feeling of our misery. These systems fail to explain the facts, and we are obliged to come to God, the Sovereign and Creator, as the hypothesis which explains the whole. We do not invent this idea; we only accept it. There is but one God, who is the God of all the families of spirits. He is the God of nature: "the heavens declare his glory;" but he is especially the God of man, because man can know and love him. Man feels himself to be the priest of the universe, and his voice raises to God the hymn of creation. To know truth, beauty, and goodness is to know God. He it is who made the world and peopled it with spirits. The good is his will, and wherever we behold it, we recognize God. "Be ye lifted up, ye everlasting gates, and the king of glory shall come in."